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IN REMEMBRANCE OF DEAN ROBERT YEGGE
THE HONORABLE PATRICIO M. SERNAt
I am truly honored to write a tribute to the late Dean Robert Yegge,
who passed away peacefully on December 16, 2006. My tribute to the
Dean will focus on his accomplishments in securing diversity and inclu-
sion at the Sturm College of Law and in pioneering a multi-disciplinary
approach to legal education, thereby enhancing the legal profession
throughout this great nation. I contributed a short essay in honor of the
75th anniversary of the Denver University Law Review in 1998 wherein I
stated:
Thank you, Dean Yegge, for giving us the opportunity to be major
contributors to society and to pursue our dreams. Thank you also for
being a visionary that brought the law school to national prominence
by recognizing the importance of educating lawyers in disciplines
other than law in order to enhance their ability to analyze fully both
legal doctrine and issues of public policy. Under your leadership, the
law school became not only a teaching institution, but also a research
organization and a center of community action and service programs.
You pioneered the multi-faceted approach to legal education that to-
day is prevalent in our nation's law schools.
I stated the following at the Memorial Service for Dean Yegge on
January 13, 2007:
There is a Native American saying: "We will always be remembered
forever by the tracks we leave." Dean Yegge left deep and distinc-
tive tracks of enormous integrity, enlightened wisdom, the courage of
a lion, a nurturing and caring heart, unselfish generosity and consid-
eration of others, illuminating vision, and moving inspiration. The
Dean not only recognized and appreciated the value of diversity and
inclusion - he did something about it - because as he once said, "It
was the right thing to do; it needed to be done."
In the early 1960s, there was a profound dearth of Hispanic lawyers
in the southwest. The Dean obtained a Ford Foundation grant in
f Patricio M. Sema is a Justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court, having been sworn in on
December 5, 1996. He served as Chief Justice during 2001 and 2002. He was appointed as a Dis-
trict Court Judge to the First Judicial District in Santa Fe and served for over eleven years, from
1985 until 1996, during which he was also President of the New Mexico District Judges Associa-
tion. As the first person in his family to attend college, he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in
Business Administration from the College of St. Joseph on the Rio Grande, a Juris Doctor degree
from the University of Denver School of Law, a Master of Laws degree from Harvard Law School,
and an honorary Doctor of Laws Degree from the University of Denver School of Law. He taught as
an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law School and Columbus School of Law at Catho-
lic University of America in Washington, D.C.
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1967 for an intensive summer law program for Hispanics. I was a
member of the first class of twenty individuals. Eleven of us were
awarded full tuition and a fellowship to this great law school. All
eleven of us were successful in the study of law, and we all passed
the bar exams in our respective states.
The first summer preparatory program was such a resounding success
that shortly thereafter the Council on Legal Education Opportunity
(CLEO) was founded as a non-profit project of the ABA Fund for
Justice and Education to expand opportunities for minority and low-
income students to attend law school. Over the past thirty-five years,
more than 7500 students have participated in CLEO's pre-law and
law school academic support programs, successfully matriculated
through law school, passed the bar exam, and joined the legal profes-
sion. Can you imagine? Our very own visionary Dean Yegge started
the ball rolling at this law school in this extremely successful, pro-
ductive, and noble endeavor that has greatly enhanced diversity and
inclusion in our nation's law schools and in the legal profession.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., said, "Life's most persistent and urgent
question is: what are you doing for others?" Dean Yegge immedi-
ately comes to mind. He made a monumental difference, and this
difference serves as a major cornerstone of his wonderful life legacy.
I have personally benefitted from his legacy, as well as from our
friendship which spanned forty years. I'm so proud that the Dean
came to Santa Fe in 1996 and spoke at my swearing in to the New
Mexico Supreme Court. He also attended my swearing in as Chief
Justice in 2001.
It has been said that "some people come into our lives and quietly go.
Some people move our soul to dance. They awaken us to new under-
standing with the passing whisper of their wisdom. Some people
make the sky more beautiful to gaze upon. They stay in our lives for
awhile, leave footprints in our hearts, and we are never, ever the
same." This was Dean Yegge. The essence and content of his char-
acter are personified by the distinctive tracks he left us to forever re-
member him.
Those of us who were touched by Dean Robert Yegge will never
forget him. His innovative and caring spirit will continue to inspire fu-
ture students at this great law school.
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JOHN E. MOYEt
Bob Yegge's cookouts on Yegge Peak were legendary, with spe-
cially "flavored" steaks and beans and entertainment provided by the
participants, including mandolins and piano concerts, and Bob's special
hospitality. All of his friends remember Bob on their favorite Yegge
Peak excursion. Other friends remember his masquerade as Santa Claus
every Christmas, visiting his friends' homes with a genuine "ho ho ho"
that only Bob could produce from his commanding, senatorial voice.
The joy he brought to the children of the homes he visited was remem-
bered tearfully by those paying their respects at his services. His act as
Santa Claus was reportedly even recognized in the record of the United
States Supreme Court.1 Other friends remember Bob's generosity and
spirit, noting his philanthropy to animal causes and his participation in
multiple civic and community activities. And there was Bob's style-
charismatic, bombastic, cheerful, and genuine. He filled the room when
he came in, and his infectious laugh was his trademark. His vanity li-
cense plate said "Harump"-his tongue-in-cheek way of jovially dis-
missing the world.2
Bob will be remembered for all of those characteristics, but an essay
about him in the Denver University Law Review should remember him
most for his commitment to legal education and the administration of
courts and the legal profession.
I served as Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Af-
fairs when Bob Yegge was the Dean during the 1970s. His vision for the
College of Law was to assemble an all-star faculty who were promi-
nently recognized for their respective specialties. He recruited out-
standing scholars, such as Bill Beaney, Eli Jarmel, and Ved Nanda. He
identified and hired outstanding teachers, such as Jan Laitos, Frank Jami-
son, and Jim Winokur. He gained the respect and admiration of the fac-
ulty he inherited, including the legendary Professor Thompson Marsh,
t John E. Moye is a partner in the Denver law firm Moye White LLP. He served as Profes-
sor of Law at the University of Denver College of Law from 1974-1979 and Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs from 1974-1976. He was President of the Colorado Bar Association from 2002-
2003 and is a member of the Board of Advisors to the Institute for the Advancement of the American
Legal System at the University of Denver.
1. Reportedly, when Bob Yegge appeared before the United States Supreme Court and
introduced himself, Associate Justice Byron White interrupted him to ask if he had ever been known
by an alias. "In my house," the Justice said, "he is known as Santa Claus."
2. The word "harumph" is defined as "[ain expression of disdain, disbelief, protest, refusal
or dismissal." Wiktionary, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/harumph. The abbreviated version of the
word on the license plate was a product of a limitation on Colorado license plates to only six charac-
ters.
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who had been teaching at the Law School since 1927. I admired the care
with which Bob worked with his faculty members to encourage and in-
spire them to achieve academic excellence. He also had the wisdom to
appoint a businessman as Associate Dean for Financial Affairs. Jack
Hanley administered the financial affairs under Bob's guidance, and the
law school was a very profitable division of the University. During the
years I served with Bob, faculty meetings were uniformly congenial and
supportive, and he was masterful at seeking and obtaining compromise
and consensus. His faculty was his family, and he nurtured and sup-
ported them like a parent. I never knew him to make a commitment that
he could not fulfill, and he insisted that the University Administration
provide resources for his faculty and administrators to thrive.
In the administration of a law school, Bob Yegge was both an inno-
vator and a visionary. He pioneered diversity in the law school popula-
tion, and began preparatory programs for Hispanic students to encourage
and prepare them for the rigors of their legal education. He knew that
diversity in the student body was necessary to bring real-world experi-
ences into the classroom. Programs copying the Yegge model were
adopted in other law schools nationally. Today, the Sturm College of
Law celebrates leading statistics for diverse classes, and many students
seek their legal education here precisely because of the diverse student
body. The Law School also boasts that an early participant in Yegge's
innovative diversity program, Patricio Sema, became the Chief Justice of
the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Under Yegge's deanship, the Law School began experimenting with
interdisciplinary education and the curriculum included a series of
courses that involved faculty from other colleges at the University. Over
the years, the variety of interdisciplinary offerings at the Law School
expanded and many students realized that their legal education could be
significantly supplemented with the study of other disciplines. Some
forty years later, the Sturm College of Law has adopted a strategic plan
for its law curriculum that highlights an extensive component of interdis-
ciplinary courses and the desirability of an interdisciplinary approach to
the practice of law.
One of Bob Yegge's greatest contributions to the legal profession
was his leadership in establishing the master's degree program in Judicial
and Legal Administration ("MSJA/MSLA"). Over thirty-five years ago,
Bob recognized the need to develop law-related professions and occupa-
tions, particularly with respect to court and law firm administration.
Together with Professor Harry Lawson, Bob created a curriculum to train
professional court managers and administrators. Their work was recog-
nized in a national program sponsored by the American Bar Association
that led to the creation of the Institute of Court Management, which
Yegge graciously (and cleverly) agreed to host at the University of Den-
[Vol. 84:3
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ver. His own words illustrate his visionary attitude toward the utility of
this unique course of study:
The philosophy of judicial administration at DU has been, and still is,
that a number of disciplines, besides law, have valuable roles in de-
termining what justice is, the factors affecting it, how you get it, how
you know when you get it, and how you keep it. In short, the general
political, social, and economic environment in which a judicial sys-
tem or court functions constitutes the proper subject matter of judicial
administration in the broadest sense.
3
Bob's commitment to orderly and competent judicial administration pro-
duced a star in the crown of the University of Denver as the
MSJA/MSLA degree program has been a model for other programs in
the burgeoning industry of judicial and law firm administration through-
out the country. In many ways, this innovative, comprehensive program
is Bob's legacy to the legal profession and the courts, allowing lawyers
and judges to do their jobs while interdisciplinary-trained court and law
firm administrators manage the business of justice.
When it came to selecting and supporting a faculty, pioneering pro-
grams to ensure a diverse student body, developing interdisciplinary le-
gal education, and creating an innovative curriculum for law firm and
court administrators, it is not difficult to describe Bob's contribution.
Paraphrasing his own words, he knew what it was, he knew how to get it,
he knew it when he had it, and he knew how to keep it.
As we miss Bob as a great friend, we will also miss him greatly as a
colleague.
3. Robert B. Yegge, Thirty-five Years and Still Counting, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 186, 187 (2005).
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ROBERT B. YEGGE-A REMEMBRANCE
VED P. NANDAt
Dean Emeritus Robert B. Yegge will be long remembered for his
outstanding accomplishments. During his incredibly productive life, he
managed to create a lasting legacy, not only at his alma mater, the Uni-
versity of Denver Sturm College of Law, but for legal education and the
legal profession, as well. And that is not all, for the range and scope of
his activities covered a much broader terrain. From serving as an honor-
ary trustee at the Colorado Academy and on the National Science Foun-
dation and the Luce Foundation committees, he led a host of civic and
community organizations. All the while, he was generous to a fault and
touched many lives. He left a large circle of friends who will sorely miss
him.
I.
In the fall of 1965, Bob Yegge, just thirty-one years old became act-
ing dean when he succeeded Harold Hurst. That was the year when I
joined the College of Law faculty as a rookie from New Haven. I was
new to Denver and had informed some of the University of Denver
("DU") faculty who interviewed me that I intended to keep my options
open after a year, as I had offers from other schools on the East Coast
that were willing to wait for me for a year if I wished to relocate.
After graduating magna cum laude from Princeton University and
earning an M.A. (Sociology) and J.D. from DU, Bob had started teaching
at DU as an instructor in Law and Sociology (1959-62) and as an adjunct
associate professor and director of the Administration of Justice Program
(1962-65). After serving a year as acting dean, Bob became Dean, the
youngest law dean in the United States. He served in that capacity until
1977, when he was named Dean Emeritus.
Bob Yegge brought dynamism and excitement to the College of
Law during his term as acting dean. He asked the faculty to closely ex-
amine the traditional legal curriculum and embarked on the process of
introducing interdisciplinary studies to enrich the curriculum by system-
atically adding the fields of sociology, economics, general semantics, and
international relations.' He identified goals and tasks for the school: that
t Vice Provost and Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh
Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law.
1. See Robert B. Yegge, Our Diamond in Rough, 44 DENV. L.J. 307, 309 (1967) [hereinafter
Yegge, Our Diamond in Rough].
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it "should be a place for teaching the accumulated tradition of the law
and further teaching about what the practitioner of the future might ex-
pect to encounter"; that it should be a research center that encourages and
supports "research necessary to maintain our legal institutions and our
profession in the stormy years ahead"; and that it should be "a leader in
community involvement and community action."2
He shared his vision with faculty and students, who were equally
inspired as he undertook the mission of achieving these goals deliber-
ately, boldly, and with passion. He selected eminent scholars and crea-
tive minds from all over the country to attract to DU and proposed inno-
vative programs in the Administration of Justice, Trial Advocacy, and
Natural Resources, among others. These were promising new develop-
ments and he began his efforts in earnest toward moving a very good
regional law school to the ranks of first-rate national law schools. His
enthusiasm was infectious, and the practical steps he had already taken
sufficed for me to decide to stay in Denver for a while; and I am still
here, never regretting the decision to stay.
The next several years were indeed stimulating. In a couple of
years Bob doubled the number of full-time faculty from thirteen to
twenty-six. Among the notable new faculty members were William M.
Beaney, who held the endowed William Nelson Cromwell law professor-
ship at Princeton University, chaired Princeton's political science de-
partment, and was one of the nation's best-known authorities in Constitu-
tional Law; H. Laurence Ross, who chaired the department of Sociology
and Anthropology at New York University; and Wilbert Moore, Presi-
dent of the American Sociological Association. Christopher H. Munch,
who was a professor and chairman of the Department of Law at the
United States Air Force Academy, joined as Bob's associate dean.
During the summers of 1967 and 1968, Bob revisited the academic
programs of the College of Law, bringing members of the bench, bar,
and the community concerned with legal education, along with the in-
volved faculty and students, to begin long-range planning for several
programs, including the Administration of Justice, Business Planning and
Taxation, International Legal Studies, Natural Resources, Professional
Responsibility, Urban Affairs, clinical programs, and dual degrees. Dur-
ing the 1967-68 school year, several alumni activities were centered on
the theme of the 75th anniversary of the College of Law, "The Responsi-
ble Professional in a Changing Society." In the fall of 1967, the activi-
ties focused on "The Professional as a Keeper of Law," while the focus
for the winter of 1968 focus was on "The Professional as a Creator of
Law," and spring 1968 on "The Professional as Administrator of Law."
2. Report of the College of Law 1967-68 to the Chancellor of the University of Denver 1
(1968) (on file with Denver University Law Review).
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Several conferences were held, including one jointly sponsored with the
American Council of Education on "Legal Aspects of Student-
Institutional Relationships" and another co-sponsored with the American
National Red Cross and the American Society of International Law on
"Humanitarian Law."
In 1968, Dean Yegge reported that the College of Law had joined
Harvard, Yale, Northwestern, Columbia, the University of Chicago, the
University of Wisconsin, and the University of California at Berkeley in
"having the largest amount of grant and contract research in American
legal education.",3 The College of Law was designated as one of the
Russell Sage Foundation centers for the study of Law and Society, along
with Harvard and Yale Law Schools as the newest such centers. That
year the United States Office of Education gave to the College of Law its
first ever grant to any American law school for a study on improvement
of the legal curriculum.'
The College of Law developed dual degrees with other academic
units of the University to gain depth of interdisciplinary knowledge
through concentrated course work and independent research in specific
subject areas identified for concentrated legal studies. These areas were
administration of justice, natural resources, international law, and busi-
ness planning, leading to J.D. and M.A. degrees in such subjects as Soci-
ology, Psychology, Economics, Political Science, International Studies,
and Geography, and J.D. and M.B.A. and J.D. and M.P.A. (Public Ad-
ministration and Judicial Administration) degrees.6 With a grant from
the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law and the Russell Sage
Foundation, the Association of American Law Schools and the Law and
Society Association designated the University of Denver College of Law
to conduct its first summer institute entitled "Social Science Methods in
Legal Education" ("SSMLE") in 1967. These SSMLE institutes gave the
College of Law singular national prominence. The goal was to train ex-
perienced law professors from across the country under the direction of
eminent legal and social science educators in innovative law teaching
methods and concepts.7
Bob Yegge stated that during his first year as dean the emphasis
was on building faculty strength 8 and that the task of the College of Law
was to train lawyers who "by their contact with the main currents of legal
and social thought, will have gained the power of analysis, the power of
judgment, and the devotion to rational inquiry which are the precious
possessions of those who are not prisoners of their time and place ...




7. Yegge, Our Diamond in Rough, supra note 1, at 314-15.
8. Id. at 315.
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[and] true professionals who will continue to learn throughout their
lives." 9 During the 1970s he assiduously attended to the task of assem-
bling gifted teachers and known scholars who shared and skillfully im-
plemented his goal of training lawyers as "true professionals."
His successful efforts from 1965-70 to strengthen and enhance the
clinical programs at the College of Law and to establish an enduring
partnership between law and behavioral sciences led Bob to explore in
1970 a similar partnership between law and pure sciences. He noted that
College of Law students who had worked with those in other disciplines
and had benefited from the College's "systematic fusion of social science
methods and knowledge into the legal curriculum," had come to the re-
alization that "law is inadequate to handle all social problems."' He
made this statement in his introduction to a symposium issue of the Den-
ver Law Journal based on papers from a conference of experts in sci-
ence, technology, and the law whom Dean Yegge had gathered at the
College to explore the possibilities and to "engage[] critically and con-
structively in the business of considering the implications of science
[and] technology on legal process."11
Bob Yegge had initiated an innovative diversity program that my
colleagues John Moye and Pat Serna have so eloquently described in
their tributes. And he had instituted the path-breaking MSJA/MSLA
program, also highlighted in John Moye's tribute. The College of Law
became the academic home of the newly-created Institute of Court Man-
agement, the product of an American Bar Association-Johnson Founda-
tion task force formed in response to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger's
call that ten or twelve of "the best informed people in this country
[should] plan a program to train the large number of [professional court]
managers [and administrators]. 12 Robert Yegge, then a member of the
board of directors of the American Judicature Society, was one of those
selected in that group.
Among the numerous other programs and projects that blossomed
under Bob Yegge's leadership, I will mention here only three-the Inter-
national Legal Studies Program, the Natural Resources Program, and the
Master in Taxation Program. The planning sessions of the ILSP at
Yegge Peak-where laughter and joyful camaraderie mingled with seri-
ous discussion-are legendary. The participants still recall those special
times with great delight.
Bob Yegge completed his term as a highly successful and effective
Dean. His twelve years at the helm of the College of Law had led to the
9. Id. at 307.
10. Robert B. Yegge, The Implications of Science-Technology for the Legal Process -- Intro-
duction, 47 DENV. L.J. 549, 552 (1970).
11. Id. at 551.
12. Robert B. Yegge, Thirty-Five Years and Still Counting, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 186, 187 (2005).
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realization of his dream-he indeed had transformed a very good re-
gional law school into a great national law school. In addition to these
many contributions to the College, Bob acquired special gifts from law-
yer-philanthropist Frank H. Ricketson, Jr., and broadcasting legend
Lowell Thomas, which enabled the school to move to the Park Hill cam-
pus in 1984.
II.
Bob did not sit on his laurels after he became Dean Emeritus. He
continued to teach and write with undiminished zeal and energy as a pro-
fessor of law. And when the University again called on him to lead the
College he cheerfully answered the call and assumed decanal duties dur-
ing 1997-98. Among his interests was the new field of preventive law,
which he strongly advocated. He served as Vice-President and Execu-
tive Director of the National Center for Preventive Law at the DU Col-
lege of Law, which then-Dean Edward A. Dauer and his collaborator,
Professor Louis M. Brown, had established as a non-profit organization
for the advancement of research, teaching, and practice in the field of
preventive law.
He continued to be prominently engaged in a plethora of profes-
sional activities. He chaired several boards and served as a member and
in an advisory capacity on numerous boards and editorial boards, includ-
ing those of the American Bar Association, National Center for State
Courts, American Judicature Society, National Council for Arts and
Education, Law and Society Association, the Henry Luce Foundation,
and the American Foundation for Temple Bar. He received dozens of
national and international honors and awards recognizing his achieve-
ments and contributions.
IlL.
In spite of his demanding professional commitments Bob Yegge
still had time to become deeply involved in service to the community.
He chaired the boards of several distinguished civic organizations and
served on many others. These included the Colorado Council on the Arts
and Humanities, Mile-High Chapter of the American Red Cross, the
Colorado Prevention Center of the University of Colorado Health Sci-
ences Center, Denver Urban Observatory, Colorado Legal Education
Program, Metropolitan Denver Legal Aid Society, Colorado Legal Ser-
vices, Colorado Academy, and an organization that held a special place
in his heart, the Denver Dumb Friends League.
IV.
On a personal note, Bob was a dear and close friend. He was my
daughter, Anjali's, godfather. His mother, Fairy, considered me as her
son. I vividly recall a dinner at a Japanese restaurant where Bob, Fairy,
2007]
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and I were together when Fairy called me, as she used to do, "son." The
Japanese waitress looked at us in surprise and asked Fairy, "Are these
your sons?"--Bob, pale and blonde, and I a deep brown. The waitress,
without missing a beat, said, "Ha! I see-the same noses!"
My wife, Katharine, and I particularly relished the opportunity to
travel in India with Bob as part of an educational trip I was leading, see-
ing Bob totally at home, as always, yet in a very new and foreign setting.
In January this year Bob was supposed to address the Association of
American Law Schools' annual meeting in Washington, DC. His friends
expressed their shock and grief to me, as have so many in this city who
still can't believe that his booming laughter and his fond "Hi, Kiddoes,"
will never be heard again.
Bob's Christmas parties, his Santa Claus outfit, his constant efforts
to make others happy, are some of the many special traits that I will al-
ways remember. I cannot forget Bob's days in the hospital during his
illness. Every day I would hope that things would improve-and every
day he and I would say that he was going to beat the harsh reality that so
slowly became apparent. And even his surgeon, Dr. Craig Brown, prac-
tically broke down when he told us Bob wasn't going to make it. These
are some of the indelible imprints on my mind that I continue to recall.
Bob was a man of resolute character, courageous and resilient be-
yond belief. He never lost his sense of humor. As I said above, he was
generous to a fault, selfless, and loyal. Time and again you could hear
the tender care for others expressed in a matter-of-fact way that was pure
Bob. He will always remain a role model for me and for countless oth-
ers.
[Vol. 84:3
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On June 19, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit decided In re Qwest Communications International, Inc.' Ac-
cepting a Writ of Mandamus,2 the court declared that the writ, "presents
an issue of first impression in this Circuit, namely, whether Qwest
waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, as to
third-party civil litigants, by releasing privileged materials to federal
agencies in the course of the agencies' investigation of Qwest.",3 During
the course of investigations by the United States Department of Justice
("DOJ") and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), Qwest
had turned over approximately 200,000 privileged documents "pursuant
to a written confidentiality agreement between Qwest and each agency.
' 4
Those documents, in turn, had been introduced into evidence in criminal
trials, produced in three separate criminal proceedings, and used as ex-
hibits in SEC investigative testimony.
In upholding the district court, which had in turn upheld the rec-
ommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the Tenth Circuit joined the ma-
jority of other circuits6 in refusing to allow a selective disclosure of privi-
leged or work-product documents without the resulting waiver of the
privilege or protection.7
In a 2005 Seton Hall Law Review article, the author, Andrew
McNally, argued for the revitalization of the selective waiver to encour-
t Nancy Gegenheimer is a partner with Holme Roberts & Owen LLP. She received her
B.A. from the University of Colorado, 1975; and J.D. from the University of Denver, 1978.
1. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S.Ct. 584 (Nov. 13, 2006).
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 165 1(a) (West 2007).
3. Qwest, 450F.3dat 1181.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1194.
6. In re ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 307 (6th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 688 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Steinhardt
Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. The Republic of the
Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1431 (3d Cir. 1991); The Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
7. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1200.
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age voluntary disclosure of corporate wrongdoing.8 As of May 15, 2006,
the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules submitted proposed new
evidence Rule 502.9 Proposed Rule 502(c) addresses selective waiver. 10
This article first lays out the history of the attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection. Secondly, it sets out the landscape of the
government agency policies informing Qwest's actions, and thirdly, it
discusses the case law on selective disclosure starting with the Eighth
Circuit's opinion in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith." This arti-
cle then discusses the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Qwest and the proposed
new evidence Rule 502 and concludes with a discussion of what lies
ahead for selective waiver of the privilege.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges known to
common law. 12 Initially, the privilege worked only one way, prohibiting
attorneys from revealing their client's secrets. 13 But the privilege quickly
expanded to communications that went either way between lawyers and
clients.14 The scope of the privilege is "governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the Courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience."' 5  Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 501 ("FRE 501") provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be gov-
emed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
ence. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or
8. Andrew J. McNally, Revitalizing Selective Waiver: Encouraging Voluntary Disclosure Of
Corporate Wrongdoing By Restricting Third-Party Access To Disclosed Materials, 35 SETON HALL
L. REV. 823, 844 (2005).
9. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES (2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf.
10. FED. R. EVID. 502 (Proposed Draft 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
ExcerptEV Report Pub.pdf#page=4.
11. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
12. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also Hunt v. Black-
burn, 128 U.S. 464,470 (1888).
13. See Berd v. Lovelace, (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch.).
14. Boltonv. Corporation of Liverpool, (1833) 39 Eng. Rep. 614, 615 (Ch.); THE
HONORABLE DICK THORNBURGH, WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: A BALANCED
APPROACH, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION 6 n.8 (2006).
15. FED. R. EVID. 501; United States v. Zolia, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
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political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
state law. 
16
The Federal Rules of Evidence are statutory in nature because they
"were passed by both houses [of Congress] and signed into law by the
President."' 17  This differs from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which were promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act.' 8  A rule on
privilege cannot be made effective through the ordinary rulemaking
process. Congress must enact such a rule through its authority under the
Commerce Clause.'
9
The attorney-client privilege provides that:
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
adviser in his capacity as such (3) the communications relating to that
purpose (4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his in-
stance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or his
legal adviser (8) except if the protection be waived.
20
The purpose of the privilege is "to encourage full and frank com-
munication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice."'2  The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon law-
yers being fully informed by their clients. 22 The protection of the privi-
lege extends only to communications and not to facts,23 and the purpose
of the communication must be for legal advice. 4
There are complications in the application of the privilege when the
client is a corporation because the corporation is an artificial creature and
16. FED. R. EvID. 501.
17. Act of Jan. 2 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (establishing an appendix for
rules of evidence); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privilege and
Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1788 (1994).
18. See Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 264 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (West 2007)).
19. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074(b) (West 2007).
20. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 683, 684 (1st Cir. 1997); accord 8
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (providing the "privilege applies only if(I) the asserted
holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication
was made (a) is a member of the bar or a court or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client; (b) without the presence of strangers; (c) for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion on law; or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceed-
ings and not (a) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (iv) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client").
21. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 395.
24. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977); Underwater
Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D.D.C. 1970); In re Natta, 264 F. Supp.
734, 741 (D. Del. 1967); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Co., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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not an individual.25 Nonetheless, there is no question that the privilege
applies when the client is a corporation. 26 One difficulty with the privi-
lege when it relates to a corporation is determining whether or not the
communication is actually between an attorney and a client for purposes
of legal advice.27 In light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory
legislation confronting modem corporations, corporations, unlike most
individuals, constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law.28
The privilege is also difficult in the corporate context because the restric-
tion on privilege is that it must be legal advice, not business advice.29
The privilege belongs to the corporation, not to individuals.3°
This difficulty in applying the attorney-client privilege in the corpo-
rate setting is reflected in the nearly twenty-year period wherein the
courts struggled with the control group test and who, in fact, was entitled
to claim a privileged communication.1 In 1981, the Supreme Court took
the issue up and recognized, citing ethical considerations, that a lawyer
must be fully informed of the facts and must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.2
The Court explained, "In a corporation it may be necessary to glean in-
formation relevant to a legal problem from middle management or non-
management personnel. 33
But all testimony exclusionary rules, including the attorney-client
privilege, contravene the fundamental principle that the public has a right
to every person's evidence.34 As a result, privileges are strictly construed
and only accepted to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to
testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascer-
25. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389-90.
26. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Assoc., 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963); Upjohn,
449 U.S. at 389-90 (citing United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336
(1915)).
27. See Meredith, 572 F.2d at 608.
28. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (citing Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Cor-
porate Arena, 24 BUs. LAW. 901, 913 (1969)).
29. See Calvin Klein Trademark Trust, 198 F.R.D. 53, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
30. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-92.
31. See Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Upjohn,
449 U.S. at 389-90.
32. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389, 391-93.
33. Id. at 391 (citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).
34. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950); In re Keeper of the Records of XYZ Corp. v. United States, 348 F.3d 16, 22
(1st Cir. 2003).
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taining the truth.35 The privilege is not limitless and courts take care to
apply it only to the extent necessary to achieve its underlying goals.
36
A party who invokes the privilege has the burden of establishing
that it applies to the communication at issue.37 That party also has the
burden to prove that it has not been waived.38 Just like the attorney-
client privilege, questions of waiver of privilege are governed by federal
common law.39
The attorney-client privilege can be waived expressly and impli-
edly, and both are equally binding.4 ° Professor Weinstein explains:
[T]he courts have identified a common denominator in waiver by im-
plication. In each case, the party asserting the privilege placed pro-
tected information in issue for personal benefit through some af-
firmative act, and the Court found that to allow the privilege to pro-
tect against disclosure of that information would have been unfair to
the opposing party.
4 1
A client impliedly waives the privilege when the client (1) testifies con-
cerning a portion of an attorney-client communication; (2) places attor-
ney-client relationship itself at issue; or (3) asserts reliance on advice of
counsel as an element of a claim or defense. 42 On the other hand, ex-
press waivers include: (1) express and voluntary surrender of the privi-
lege; (2) partial disclosure of a privileged document; (3) selective disclo-
sure to some outsiders but not all; or (4) inadvertent over-hearings or
disclosures.4 3
When a party defends its actions by disclosing an attorney-client
communication, it waives the attorney-client privilege as to all such
communications regarding the same subject matter. 44 But an extrajudi-
cial disclosure, not used to gain adversarial advantage in judicial pro-
ceedings is not an implied waiver of all communications on the same
35. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (arguing that the benefit behind the
exclusionary rule is the public good of deterring police misconduct which outweighs the traditional
principles of using all available evidence in seeking the truth).
36. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 571 (1st Cir. 2001).
37. See United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1972).
38. See Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v.
Bollin, 264 F.3d 391,412 (4th Cir. 2001).
39. See United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1,3 (1st Cir. 1998).
40. The Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
41. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503-
41 [1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin Ed. 1977); cf Keeper of the Records of XYZ Corp., 348 F.3d at 22.
42. Keeper of the Records of XYZ Corp., 348 F.3d at 24.
43. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684 (citing MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, § 93 at 341-48 (J.W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)).
44. See Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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subject.45  There are other well-established waivers, not involved in
Qwest.
46
II. WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
The work product doctrine is a protection, not a privilege.47 It has
its genesis in the Supreme Court's opinion in Hickman v. Taylor,48 de-
cided in 1947. Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which protects all
types of communications, both oral and written, the work-product doc-
trine protects documents and tangible things that are both privileged and
non-privileged if prepared in anticipation of litigation. 49  The work-
product doctrine is now codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The rule provides:
Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this Rule, a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this Rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or
for that other party's representative (including the other party's attor-
ney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials
when the required showing has been made, the Court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party con-
cerning the litigation.
50
The rule specifically protects against disclosure of mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other rep-
resentative of a party concerning the litigation. Thus, the work-product
45. Keeper of the Records of XYZ Corp., 348 F.3d at 24.
46. Other waivers include a crime-fraud exception. See Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155,
162 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)) ("All reasons for the attor-
ney-client privilege are completely eviscerated when a client consults an attorney not for advice on
past misconduct, but for legal assistance in carrying out a contemplated or ongoing crime or fraud.");
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Murphy,
560 F.2d 326, 337 (8th Cir. 1997). Another exception is joint defense or communications with co-
defendants. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. The Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424
(3d Cir. 1991). Another exception not at issue is when a disclosure to a third party is necessary for
the client to obtain informed legal advice. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1424. By
Qwest's admission at oral argument, inadvertent disclosure was not an issue. In re Qwest
Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 584
(Nov. 13, 2006); accord Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1417 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (permitting some disclosure of confidential information without resulting in an inadver-
tent waiver).
47. Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J.
917 (1983).
48. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
49. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 432 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Echo
Star Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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doctrine encourages attomeys to write down their thoughts and opinions
with the knowledge that their opponents will not be able to rob them of
the fruits of their labor.51 "The purpose of the doctrine is to establish a
zone of privacy for strategic litigation planning and to prevent one party
from piggybacking on the adversary's preparation."
52
The work has to be prepared in anticipation of litigation, but actual
litigation does not have to be filed, in fact, it does not even have to be
true litigation.53 For example, a summons from a department of the gov-
ernment qualifies as anticipation of litigation. 54  The courts recognize
that prudent parties anticipate litigation and begin preparation prior to the
time a suit is formally commenced. The test that is applied is "whether,
in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the par-
ticular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared for or
obtained because of the prospect of litigation."55 But there is no work-
product protection for documents prepared in the regular course of busi-
ness, or to satisfy public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other
non-litigation purposes, even if those documents are prepared while liti-
gation is a prospect or ongoing.
6
Like the attorney-client privilege, there are strong policies behind
the work-product doctrine.5 7 The attorney-client privilege protects the
attorney-client relationship and the legal system, and the work-product
doctrine is said to protect the adversary system. 58 In some respects, the
work-product doctrine is not only different, but it is also broader than the
attorney-client privilege. 59 The protection given work product by the
Rule is broader in the sense that it may be, but need not be, work of an
attorney, and work product is not confined to information or materials
gathered or assembled by an attorney.
Hickman v. Taylor distinguished between opinion and non-opinion
work product and this distinction is followed in the Rule. 60 "[A] showing
of necessity is sufficient to overcome" the work-product protection when
documents "do not contain opinion work product, i.e., writings which
51. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11; Echo Star Commc'ns, 448 F.3d at 1301.
52. United States v. AdIman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995).
53. See In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1993) (providing that the "presence
of an adversarial relationship does not depend on the existence of litigation").
54. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981) (Internal Revenue Service
summons is anticipation of litigation).
55. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 8 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2017, 2021-28 (West 2006); United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590,
593 (6th Cir. 2006).
56. WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 55, § 2024; Roxworthy, 457 F.3d at 593.
57. E.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-37 (1975).
58. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir.
1991).
59. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 304 (6th
Cir. 2002).
60. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-512.
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reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories.' Likewise, the rules as to waiver of work product differ
slightly from attorney-client privilege.62 Not every disclosure of work
product necessitates a waiver. Instead, the disclosure must be to an ad-
versary. Courts distinguish disclosure of work product to adversaries
and non-adversaries.63
Thus, waiver of work product will occur if there is a disclosure to
an adversary, 64 and similar privilege waivers, 65 such as the crime-fraud
waiver, also apply to work product.66 Because the waiver of attorney-
client privilege and work-product protection differs, there are cases
where the same conduct resulted in a waiver of the privilege but not
work product.67
III. FACTUAL SETTING OF QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CASE
In early 2002, the SEC began investigating Qwest's business prac-
tices.68 In the summer of 2002, Qwest learned that the DOJ had also
commenced a criminal investigation of Qwest. 69 In those investigations,
Qwest produced 220,000 pages of documents that were protected by the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.70  Qwest also with-
held 390,000 pages of privileged documents.71
Prior to the initiation of the federal investigations, the plaintiffs had
filed civil actions against Qwest that involved many of the same issues as
the investigation.72 In the civil cases, Qwest produced millions of pages
of documents, but withheld all of the privileged documents, including
61. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1431.
62. See United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681,687 (1st Cir. 1997).
63. Westinghouse Elec. Corp, 951 F.2d at 1428; see also Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 687;
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices, 293 F.3d at 305-06.
64. In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 860 F.2d 844, 846 (8th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp. of Am., 91 F.R.D. 84, 90
(E.D.N.Y. 1981)); Grumman Aerospace Corp., 91 F.R.D. at 90; Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. Nat'l
Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 67 (D.D.C. 1984).
65. See supra note 46.
66. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 164 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Int'l Sys. & Controls
Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982).
67. See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United
States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cit. 1980); Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236; In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1375 (D. C. Cir. 1984); Picard Chemical Inc. Profit Sharing
Plan, 951 F. Supp. 679, 689 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Shields v. Sturm, Roger& Co., 864 F.2d 379, 383
(5th Cir. 1989); In re Martin-Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624-26 (4th Cir. 1988).
68. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1181(1Oth Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 584 (Nov. 13, 2006).
69. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1181.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1182.
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those that it had produced to the SEC and the DOJ.73 Qwest disclosed
the withheld documents on a privilege log, as it must.
74
Qwest had a written agreement with the SEC to maintain the confi-
dentiality of the documents and to not disclose them to any third party,
except to the extent staff determines that disclosure is otherwise required
by law or would be in furtherance of the SEC discharge of its duties and
responsibilities. 75 But Qwest agreed that the DOJ could share the docu-
ments with other state, local and federal agencies and that the DOJ could
make direct or derivative use of the documents in any proceeding and in
its investigation.76 The DOJ agreed to maintain the confidentiality and
not disclose the documents to third parties except to the extent that the
DOJ determined that disclosure was otherwise required by law or would
be in furtherance of the DOJ's discharge of its duties and responsibili-
ties.77 The confidentiality agreements with both the DOJ and the SEC
were in writing.78 But the documents, given the scope of the DOJ's per-
mission, were introduced into evidence in criminal trials, were produced
in discovery in three separate criminal proceedings, and used as exhibits
to SEC investigative testimony. 79 The DOJ was not required to file these
documents under seal, keep a record of how they were used or to deal
with the documents in any special way.
80
Private parties in civil litigation found the documents identified on
privileged logs and moved to compel. 81 The Magistrate Judge held that
Qwest had waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product protec-
tion by producing the documents. 82 The District Court upheld the Magis-
trate Judge's order compelling production and required further produc-
tion of certain reports prepared by Qwest's counsel, redacted of attorney
opinion work product. 83 The order to disclose the redacted version of
counsel's report was not challenged in the Tenth Circuit.84 The district
court stayed its order pending outcome of the writ of mandamus.
85
73. Id.
74. See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West, 748 F.2d 540, 541-42 (10th Cir. 1984) (pro-
viding that a party seeking to assert the privilege must make a clear showing that it applies); FED. R.
CV. P. 26(b)(5); FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
75. SeeQwest, 450F.3dat 1181.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1181-82.
78. Id. at 1181.
79. Id. at 1194.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 1182.
82. Id. There was no issue of inadvertent disclosure or involuntary waiver in the Qwest case.
Id. Also, there was no issue of waiver of opinion work product. Id.
83. Id. at 1182.
84. See id
85. Id.
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IV. LANDSCAPE REGARDING FEDERAL AGENCIES' POLICIES FACED BY
QWEST
At the time that the DOJ and the SEC began investigations of
Qwest, there were years of precedent where corporations waived the
privilege to either: (1) not be labeled uncooperative; or (2) secure leni-
ency during an investigation. Both the DOJ and the SEC have written
policies regarding waiver of attorney-client privilege.
A. Department of Justice
The DOJ has a corporate leniency policy for antitrust violations.86
With respect to leniency before any investigation has begun, the DOJ
policy includes, as one of its six conditions: "The corporation reports the
wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full, continuing
and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation."
87
With respect to all of its investigations, the DOJ is also guided by its
principles of Federal Prosecution of Corporations, which appeared in a
memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder and provided
guidance to prosecutors about whether to prosecute a corporation.88 The
memorandum was not made public at the time that Deputy Attorney
General Holder issued it. The memorandum attaches guidelines titled
Department's Federal Prosecution of Corporations (the "Guidelines").89
The memorandum emphasizes that the factors laid out in the Guidelines
are not outcome determinative and are for guidance only. Prosecutors
are not required to reference the factors or document the weight they
accorded specific factors in reaching their decision. 90 In setting out fac-
tors to be considered in charging corporations, the Holder Memorandum
states that, in general, prosecutors should apply the same factors in de-
termining whether to charge a corporation as they do with respect to in-
dividuals.91 The Guidelines go on to state, however, that due to the na-
ture of the corporate "person" some additional factors are present.92 For
example, one of those factors is: "The Corporation's timely and volun-
tary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the cor-
86. See Dep't of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy (August 10, 1993), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm.
87. Id. This is also a policy for individuals. See id.
88. See Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Eric Holder Jr. on Bringing Criminal Charges
Against Corps. to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter
Holder Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.
html.
89. Id. [hereinafter Guidelines] ("Guidelines" refers to the Federal Prosecution of Corporation
guidelines attached to the Holder Memorandum).
90. See Holder Memorandum, supra note 88.
91. See Guidelines, supra note 89, § I.A.
92. Id.
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porate attorney-client and work product privileges (see section VI, in-fa)y93
Section VI of the Guidelines then addresses whether a corporation's
voluntary disclosure was sufficient. 94 The section discusses the impor-
tance of the completeness of disclosure and that it will be a factor
weighed in assessing the adequacy of the corporation's cooperation.
95
The disclosure may include waiver of attorney-client and work-product
protections with respect to its internal investigation and its communica-
tions with its officers, directors, and employees of counsel.96 The Guide-
lines provide that prosecutors may therefore request a waiver in appro-
priate circumstances. 97 The government recognized that waiver by the
corporation may be the only way the government could get the state-
ments of possible witnesses, subjects, or targets.98 The Guidelines state:
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a
corporation's cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure in-
cluding, if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work prod-
uct protections, both with respect to its internal investigations and
with respect to communications between specific officers, directors,
and employees and counsel. Such waivers permit the government to
obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without
having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements.
99
The Guidelines imply that the government may consider a corpora-
tion not cooperative if it enters into joint defense agreements with its
officers, directors or employees or continues to pay and advance their
attorneys' fees, unless required to do so by law, or otherwise supports
culpable employees.l00
In a November 2003 interview published in the United States Attor-
neys Bulletin, United States Attorney James B. Comey stated that be-
cause of an individual's rights to invoke the Fifth Amendment, the inter-
nal investigation and notes of counsel during an internal investigation
may be the only way for the government to get to certain facts. 10 1 United
States Attorney Comey reiterated in this 2003 interview that:
93. Id. § IL.A.4.
94. See id. § VI.
95. See id.





101. See Interview by United States Attorneys Bulletin with James B. Comey, United States
Attorney, 51 United States Attorney Bulletin No. 6, 4-5 (November 2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usab5106.pdf (regarding Department of
Justice's policy on requesting corporations under criminal investigation to waive the attorney-client
privilege and work product protection).
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It is hard for me to understand why a corporation would ever enter
into a joint defense agreement because doing so may prevent it from
making disclosures it must make if it is in a regulated industry or
may wish to make to a prosecutor. In any event, how a joint defense
agreement will affect the corporation's ability to cooperate will vary
in every case. If the joint defense agreement puts the corporation in a
position where it is unable to make full disclosure about the criminal
activity, then no credit for cooperation will be factored into the gov-
ernment's charge and decision, and it will get no credit for that coop-
eration under the guidelines.
10 2
Subsequent to the Holder Memorandum, in 2003 Deputy Attorney
General Larry D. Thompson issued the "Thompson Memorandum."
10 3
Attached to the memorandum were revisions to Holder's Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations. The main focus of the
revisions, according to the Thompson Memorandum, is to increase em-
phasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's coopera-
tion.104 He notes that:
Too often business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with
a Department investigation, in fact takes steps to impede the quick
and effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing under
investigation. The revisions made clear that such conduct should
weigh in favor of a corporate prosecution. The revisions also ad-
dress[ed] the efficacy of the corporate governance mechanisms in
place within a corporation, to ensure that these measures are truly ef-
fective rather than a mere paper program[].
10 5
The revision that addresses this focus appears in Section VI of the
Thompson Memorandum, on collaboration and voluntary disclosure.
10 6
The revisions added that agreements for immunity or amnesty or pretrial
diversion may be entered into only with the approval of each affected
district or the appropriate department official.10 7  Another factor was
added into Section VI as follows:
Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corpo-
ration, while purporting to cooperate, has engaged in conduct that
impedes the investigation (whether or not rising to the level of crimi-
nal obstruction). Examples of such conduct include: overly broad
assertions of corporate representation of employees or former em-
ployees; inappropriate directions to employees or their counsel, such
102. Id. at4.
103. See Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Larry D. Thompson on Principles of Fed.
Prosecution of Bus. Org. to Heads of Dep't Components United States Attorneys (June 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_
organizations.pdf.
104. Id. at 1.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 6-8.
107. Id. at6.
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as directions not to cooperate openly and fully with the investigation
including, for example, the direction to decline to be interviewed;
making presentations or submissions that contain misleading asser-
tions or omissions; incomplete or delayed production of records; and
failure to properly disclose illegal conduct known to the corpora-
tion. 108
The Thompson Memorandum would have been issued during the
investigations of Qwest. 109 The Justice Department sent out another
memorandum on October 21, 2005 from Acting Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Robert D. McCallum Jr. which provided that, to ensure that federal
prosecutors exercise appropriate prosecutorial discretion under the prin-
ciples of the Thompson Memorandum, each district was directed to es-
tablish a written waiver review process. 11 The McCallum Memorandum
acknowledged the fact that waiver review processes may vary from dis-
trict to district (or component to component) so that each United States
Attorney or Component retained the prosecutorial discretion necessary,
consistent with their circumstances, to seek timely, complete, and accu-
rate information from business organizations."'
The Thompson Memorandum, like the Holder Memorandum, states
that a corporation's offer of cooperation does not automatically entitle
the corporation to immunity from prosecution. 12 It is merely one factor
considered in conjunction with other factors. In fact, a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and cooperation will not even assure that a cor-
poration will be given any leniency. Prosecutors must and do retain wide
discretion in determining the charges to bring against a corporation and
waiver of the privilege is just one of the factors.' 13
The Thompson Memorandum came under strong criticism from the
Southern District of New York in United States v. Stein. 114 In Stein, the
district court found that provisions of the Thompson Memorandum relat-
ing to factors to weigh in determining whether the corporation appeared
to be protecting its employees and agents, including through advancing
108. Id. at 8.
109. Compare id. at 1 (noting the Thompson Memorandum was issued on January 20, 2003),
with Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1181 (noting the SEC and DOJ investigations of Qwest began in the sum-
mer of 2002). In United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the court held
that portions of the Thompson Memorandum were unconstitutional violations of due process under
the Fifth Amendment and the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
110. Memorandum from Acting Deputy Att'y Gen. Robert D. McCullum, Jr., on Waiver of
Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection to Heads of Dep't Components United
States Attorneys (November 2005) [hereinafter McCallum Memorandum], available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/AttomrneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf.
111. Id.
112. Compare Thompson Memorandum, supra note 103, at 1, with Holder Memorandum,
supra note 88, § VI.
113. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 103, at 6.
114. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 363-65, 367-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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attorneys' fees, were unconstitutional. 15 The court held that they vio-
lated the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
16
On December 12, 2006, Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty
issued new guidelines.' 17 In a memorandum to all Heads of Department
Components, Deputy Attorney General McNulty states that the new
memorandum supersedes and replaces guidance contained in the memo-
randum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson entitled
"Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations," dated
January 20, 2003.118 However, as was the case when the Thompson
Memorandum supplanted the Holder Memorandum, much of the Princi-
ples of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations remain the same.
What changed, however, was Section VII. 119 Section VII of the McNulty
Memorandum sets out specifics on how the value of cooperation will be
treated in charging a corporation. 2°
The McNulty Memorandum expressly states that waiver of attor-
ney-client and work-product protections is not a prerequisite to a finding
that a company has cooperated in the government's investigation. 12 The
McNulty Memorandum goes on to state, "However, a company's disclo-
sure of privileged information may permit the government to expedite its
investigation .... A corporation's response to a government's request
for waiver of privilege may be considered in determining whether a cor-
poration has cooperated in the government's investigation.'' 122  The
McNulty Memorandum identifies two categories of information that can
be requested, seriatim, from a corporation. 123 Category I must be re-
quested first and entails purely factual information, which may or may
not be privileged, relating to the underlying misconduct. 124 If the Cate-
gory I purely factual information provides an incomplete basis to conduct
a thorough investigation, prosecutors may then request Category II in-
formation. 125 Category II information includes attorney-client communi-
cations or nonfactual attorney-work product. 126  Such information in-
115. Id.
116. Id. at 365.
117. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Paul J. McNulty on Principles of Fed. Prosecution
of Bus. Org. to Head of Department Components United States Attorneys (December 12, 2006)
[hereinafter McNulty Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/
mcnultymemo.pdf.
118. Id. at2.
119. Id. at 7-12.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 8, I1.
123. Id. at 9-11.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id.
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cludes "legal advice given to the corporation before, during, and after the
underlying misconduct occurred.'
127
B. Securities and Exchange Commission
The SEC has its own rules, guidelines and criteria that will be con-
sidered if the SEC is to give credit for self-policing, self-reporting, reme-
diation and cooperation. These are set forth in a release known as the
"Seaboard Report" which came out in 2001.128 Criteria No. 11 of the
Seaboard Report is footnoted with the statement that in some cases the
desire to provide information to the SEC staff may cause companies to
consider choosing not to assert the attorney-client privilege, the work
product protection and other privileges, protections, and exemptions with
respect to the SEC. Of the thirteen criteria, only Criteria No. 11 goes to
the company's cooperation. It provides:
Did the company promptly make available to our staff the results of
its review and provide sufficient documentation reflecting its re-
sponse to the situation? Did the company identify possible violative
conduct and evidence with sufficient precision to facilitate prompt
enforcement actions against those who violated the law? Did the
company produce a thorough and probing written report detailing the
findings of its review? Did the company voluntarily disclose infor-
mation our staff did not directly request and otherwise might not
have uncovered? Did the company ask its employees to cooperate
with our staff and make all reasonable efforts to secure such coopera-
tion?
129
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 130 directed the SEC to enact
rules of professional responsibility for attorneys.' 31 These rules, as en-
acted, provide that with regard to the attorney-client privilege and work
127. Id.
128. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 2 1(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement
Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.
129. Id.
130. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
sections of 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (West 2007)).
131. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides:
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall is-
sue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including a rule (1) requiring an
attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary
duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel
or the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and (2) if the
counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary,
appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the
attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the is-
suer or to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
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product doctrine, a lawyer is required to report "evidence of a material
violation,' 32 which is defined as "credible evidence, based upon which it
would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and com-
petent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material
violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur."' 13 3  The Rule
then goes on to provide that the attorney is supposed to report such mate-
rial violations up the ladder to the chief legal counsel or chief executive
officer. 134  The Rule instructs that confidential information can be dis-
closed by an attorney, to prevent commission of an illegal act that would
be likely to perpetrate a fraud on the SEC or could cause substantial in-
jury to the financial or property interests of the issuer. 35 While much
broader rules had in the past been proposed, they were withdrawn. 36
The rules as enacted do not dramatically change the state of the law on
attorney-client privilege. Many states already allow an attorney to reveal
confidential information to prevent a crime or fraud.
137
C. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the "Act") was signed into law by the
President on July 30, 2002.138 The Act makes sweeping changes to the
law applicable to public companies and their officers and directors. Its
provisions are wide ranging and far beyond the scope of this article.
With respect to attorney-client privilege, the SEC enacted professional
responsibility rules for attorneys appearing while practicing before the
SEC, as required by Section 307 of the Act. 139 These rules are discussed
above.
The Act also includes broad whistle-blowing provisions. Sec-
tion 806 of the Act amends Title 18 of the United States Code to protect
employees of publicly traded companies against retaliation in fraud
132. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2006).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2006).
134. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2006).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i)-(iii) (2006).
136. The SEC proposed a rule on selective waiver which read:
Where an issuer, through its attorney, shares with the Commission information related to
a material violation, pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, such sharing of information
shall not constitute a waiver of any otherwise applicable privilege or protection as to
other persons.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,706
(Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). In 1984, the SEC proposed to amend the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934 to establish a selective waiver but the proposal was never taken up by
Congress. SEC Oversight and Technical Amendments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecom-
munications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of The H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong. 51 (1984).
137. James W. Semple, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
53 FDCC QuARTERLY 419, 432 (2003).
138. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
sections of 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (West 2007)).
139. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2006).
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cases.140 The Act also sets out a criminal provision for retaliation or any
harmful action, including interference with lawful employment or liveli-
hood, against any person for providing to a law enforcement officer any
truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission
of any Federal offense.
14 1
D. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
A provision added to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 2004 ad-
dressed waiver of the privilege. Section 8 C 2.5(g)(1) allowed for a five-
point reduction in a corporation's culpability score if the defendant fully
cooperated in the investigation. 142 The final sentence of § 8 C 2.5(g)(1)
as of 2004 previously read: "Waiver of attorney-client privilege and
work product protection is not a prerequisite to reduction in culpability
score.., unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and
thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the organiza-
tion." 43 Under pressure from many sources, including the American Bar
Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and others, the amendment was re-
moved in April 2006.144
V. LEGAL PRECEDENT FACED BY QWEST
A. Tenth Circuit
At the time Qwest faced investigation by the DOJ and the SEC,
there was no Tenth Circuit precedent in support of selective waiver.
Tenth Circuit precedent followed the traditional rule of waiver upon dis-
closure. For example, United States v. Bernard145 was a criminal pro-
ceeding wherein the defendant had disclosed attorney advice to a third
party.146 The court held any voluntary disclosure by the client is incon-
sistent with the attorney-client relationship and waives the privilege.
147
In 1990, in United States v. Ryans,148 the Tenth Circuit reiterated that any
voluntary disclosure by the client to a third party waives the privilege. 1
49
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. 2005).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (Supp. 2005).
142. Vote by U.S. Sentencing Commission May Staunch Erosion of Attorney-Client Privilege,
90 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. 418,419 (2006).
143. Id.
144. Change to Evidence Rule Would Allow Partial Waiver to Government Agencies, 22 LAW.
MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 319 (2006).
145. 877 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir 1989).
146. Bernard, 877 F.2d at 1465.
147. Id. (citing United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158 (1 1th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
987 (1987)).
148. 903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1990).
149. Ryans, 903 F.2d at 741 n.13.
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Likewise, as to work product protection, Tenth Circuit precedent
held that production of work-product material to a non-adversary waives
the work product protection
50
B. Other Circuits
Limited waiver of attorney-client privilege was first recognized by
the Eighth Circuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.5' Diversi-
fied Industries was under investigation by the SEC.' 52 The Board of Di-
rectors hired a law firm to conduct an investigation into the Company's
business practices when it was revealed that the Company may have
maintained a slush fund that was used to bribe purchasing agents.'53 The
law firm undertook an investigation and reported the results to the Com-
pany's Board in a memorandum that summarized employee interviews,
analyzed accounting data, evaluated the conduct of certain employees,
drew conclusions as to the propriety of their conduct and made recom-
mendations as to steps the company could take. 154 In its initial opinion,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the law firm had not been hired to ren-
der legal advice and therefore found that the materials, which civil liti-
gants sought in subsequent civil litigation, were not privileged.'55
The court also found the materials were not work product because
they were not prepared in anticipation of litigation. 56  As such, the
Eighth Circuit determined that it did not have to deal with a claim of
waiver of the privilege as a result of the materials having been turned
over to the government during a governmental agency investigation.
1 57
The Eighth Circuit in its initial opinion noted that the waiver issue was a
serious one but need not be decided since the court had found the materi-
als were not privileged. 58 The court went on to note:
[W]e would be reluctant to hold that voluntary surrender of privi-
leged material to a governmental agency in obedience to an agency
subpoena constitutes a waiver of the privilege for all purposes, in-
cluding its use in subsequent private litigation in which the material
is sought to be used against the party which yielded it to the
159agency.
150. See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 668 (10th Cir.
2006); Foster v. Hill, 188 F.3d 1259, 1272 (10th Cir. 1999).
151. 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
152. Diversifiedlndus., 572 F.2d at 611.
153. Id. at 607.
154. Id. at 607-08.
155. Id. at 606.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 604.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 604 n.1.
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The Eighth Circuit reconsidered its opinion in en banc. 160 As to at-
torney-client privilege, the court found upon reconsideration, that the
memoranda prepared by counsel, corporate minutes and a letter that re-
vealed the content of the memoranda prepared by counsel were indeed
privileged and that the privilege had not been waived when Diversified
turned its memorandum over to a governmental agency.' 6' The court
stated:
As Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate and nonpublic
SEC investigation, we conclude that only a limited waiver of the
privileged occurred. Bucks County Bank and Trust Co. v. Storek, 297
F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1969), United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d
256 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961). To
hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing pro-
cedure of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to in-
vestigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders, potential
stockholders and customers.
1 62
The cases relied upon by the Eighth Circuit in its en banc opinion
are not directly on point as to waiver.1 63 Bucks County Bank & Trust
Co. v. Storek,'64 involved testimony given in a suppression hearing not
being admissible at a subsequent criminal trial. 65 United States v. Good-
man166 dealt with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in a subsequent criminal investigation .
67
As to the work-product protection sought for several non-privileged
documents, the court found that they were not prepared in anticipation of
litigation and, therefore, were not protected.
168
Four years later the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia considered a limited waiver issue in The Permian Corp. v. United
States.1 69 In Permian, Occidental Petroleum Corporation and its subsidi-
ary, the Permian Corporation, were involved in litigation with respect to
Occidental's proposed exchange offer for shares of Mead Corporation.
70
Millions of documents were produced and Occidental and Mead had an
160. Id. at 606.
161. Id. at 611.
162. Id.
163. Diversified was dealing with selective waiver which is to waive the privilege as to some
parties and not others. Courts distinguish this from partial disclosure which is to waive as to some
documents but not all. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423
n.7 (3d Cir. 1991).
164. 297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1969).
165. Buck County Bank & Trust Co., 297 F. Supp. at 1123.
166. 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1961), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961).
167. Goodman, 289 F.2d at 257.
168. See id. at 262.
169. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
170. Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1215.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
agreement that there would not be an inadvertent waiver if a privileged
document was inadvertently produced.
171
Meanwhile, Occidental was involved with the SEC trying to get ap-
proval of its registration statement. 172 As part of that process, Occidental
agreed that the SEC could have documents that had been produced to
Mead.173 Once again, there were agreements that the documents may
contain privileged information and they would not be delivered to any
persons other than the SEC or SEC staff, but the agreements appeared to
grant the SEC the right to turn the documents over to other governmental
agencies after notice to Occidental.174 Even though the letters were not
explicit about the SEC being forbidden to release the information to
other governmental agencies, counsel for Occidental had indicated that
there was such an oral understanding. 175 Seven of the documents pro-
duced were attorney-client privilege and twenty-nine were protected as
work product. 
76
Thereafter, the Department of Energy sought to get the same docu-
ments that the SEC had received, including the seven documents that
were protected by attorney-client privilege and twenty-nine that were
protected as attorney work product. 77 While there seemed to be some
disagreement over what exactly was Occidental's arrangement with the
SEC regarding their use of the documents, the court's analysis was that
there was no dispute that the documents had indeed been turned over for
the SEC's use.' 78 The Circuit found that the mantel of confidentiality
had been breached and an effective waiver of the privilege had been ac-
complished. 1
79
As to attorney-client privilege, the D.C. Circuit declined to adopt
the Diversified selective waiver, finding that the limited waiver would
not serve the interests underlying common law privilege for confidential
communications between an attorney and a client, stating "[t]he client
cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving
the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to
obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose
confidentiality he has already compromised for his own benefit." 
180
171. Id. at 1215-16.
172. Id. at 1216.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 1217.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1217-18.
179. Id. at 1220. As with the Qwest case, there was no question of inadvertent disclosure since
Occidental had authorized disclosure by Mead to the SEC. See id. at 1219.
180. Id. at 1221.
[Vol. 84:3
2007] TENTH CIRCUIT REJECTS SELECTIVE WAIVER 795
Because the corporation had turned the documents over to the SEC
but was resisting disclosure to the Department of Energy, the court took
the opportunity to state that it was unaware of any congressional direc-
tive or judicially-recognized priority system that places a higher value on
cooperation with the SEC than cooperation with other regulatory agen-
cies stating:
Voluntary cooperation with government investigations may be a
laudable activity, but it is hard to understand how such conduct im-
proves the attorney-client relationship. If the client feels the need to
keep his communications with his attorney confidential, he is free to
do so under the traditional rule by consistently asserting the privilege,
even when the discovery request comes from a "friendly" agency.
181
As to work product, with little analysis the court upheld the district
couit's finding of no waiver with respect to the work-product documents.
The court, citing United States v. AT&T, noted a more liberal standard
applicable to waiver of the work-product doctrine as opposed to the strict
standard of waiver for attorney-client privilege:
The attorney-client privilege exists to protect confidential commu-
nications, to assure the client that any statements he makes in seeking
legal advice will be kept strictly confidential between him and his at-
torney; in effect, to protect the attorney-client relationship. Any vol-
untary disclosure by the holder of such a privilege is inconsistent
with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.
By contrast, the work product privilege does not exist to protect a
confidential relationship, but rather to promote the adversary system
by safeguarding the fruits of an attorney's trial preparations from the
discovery attempts of the opponent .... A disclosure made in the
pursuit of such trial preparation, and not inconsistent with maintain-
ing secrecy against opponents, should be allowed without waiver of
the privilege. We conclude, then, that while the mere showing of a
voluntary disclosure to a third person will generally suffice to show
waiver of the attorney-client privilege, it should not suffice in itself
for waiver of the work product privilege.
82
In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum the Circuit Court for the District of Co-
lumbia again rejected selective waiver, regardless of whether there were
confidentiality agreements in place with the government agency.'
83
181. Id
182. Id. at 1219 (citing United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (em-
phasis and footnotes omitted). See generally WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 2327;
EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 93 (2d ed.
1972).
183. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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The following year the Second Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit. 84 In
In re John Doe Corp., the company was under investigation for, amongst
other things, bribing governmental officials.185 The privileged document,
an investigatory memorandum titled Business Ethics Review ("BER"),
had not been shown to a governmental agency but instead to under-
writer's counsel to assure the underwriter's counsel there were no merits
to claims of illegal bribes, ostensibly because there was no mention of an
illegal bribe of a governmental official in the BER.186 It was this silence
that the Second Circuit considered a waiver once the BER was shown to
underwriter's counsel. 87 The company argued for a selective waiver due
to "the legal duty of due diligence and the millions of dollars riding on
the public offering of registered securities. ' 88 The Second Circuit was
unmoved:
We view this argument with no sympathy whatsoever. A claim that a
need for confidentiality must be respected in order to facilitate the
seeking and rendering of informed legal advice is not consistent with
selective disclosure when the claimant decides that the confidential
materials can be put to other beneficial purposes.1
89
The next circuit to address selective waiver was the Fourth Cir-
cuit.' 90 The Fourth Circuit had previously refused to embrace the con-
cept of selective waiver created in Diversified. 191 As to attorney-client
privilege, the court in Martin Marietta said, "[I]f a client communicates
information to his attorney with the understanding that the information
will be revealed to others, that information as well as the details underly-
ing the data.., will not enjoy the privilege."'192 In Martin Marietta, the
court was really addressing the issue of subject matter waiver rather than
selective waiver. Martin Marietta sought to limit the waiver to docu-
ments actually disclosed to the government rather than implying waiver
to all materials on the same subject as those provided to the govern-
ment.' 93 But the court found there was waiver as to the entire subject.194
As for work product, the court noted a broader protection for work
product, but held that a waiver as to some work product will waive the
184. In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982).
185. Id. at 484.
186. Id. at 485.
187. Id. at 489.
188. Id.
189. Id. (noting that use of the fact of an investigation to allay the concerns of third parties
about possible criminal acts, to create the appearance of compliance with laws requiring disclosure,
or to cover up a crime disclosed through protected communication in the course of the investigation
will cause the corporation to lose the privilege).
190. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).
191. See United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979).
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entire subject matter. 95 The court also held that there was subject matter
waiver of non-opinion work product but not of opinion work product,'
96
deciding an issue it had previously left open in Duplar Corp. v. Deering
Milliken.' 
97
The next circuit to deal with the selective waiver issue was the
Third Circuit in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. The Republic of the Phil-
ippines.198 Westinghouse had disclosed documents relating to an internal
investigation regarding possible bribes of foreign officials. 199 The docu-
ments had been turned over to the SEC during an SEC investigation.00
When the Republic of the Philippines later sued Westinghouse, alleging
it had obtained a government contract in the Philippines through bribes,
the civil litigants sought all the documents that had been turned over to
the SEC.2°t The Third Circuit found that Westinghouse had waived both
the attorney-client privilege and the work-product protection.20 2 West-
inghouse had turned over several reports generated during investigations
by the SEC and the DOJ.2 °3 The court found that this turnover effectu-
ated a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to subsequent
civil litigation.2°
The court found that selective waiver does not have anything to do
with the purposes underlying the attorney-client privilege, which is to
protect the confidentiality of attorney-client communications in order to
encourage clients to obtain informed legal assistance.20 5 The court re-
viewed the only known exceptions to waiver despite a disclosure: (1) for
co-defendants or (2) disclosure to an agent necessary to obtain informed
advice and found that each of these continued to promote the purposes
behind the privilege.20 6 The Third Circuit found that a selective waiver,
designed to encourage corporations to undertake internal investigations,
does not serve any purpose of encouraging full disclosure to one's attor-
ney in order to obtain informed legal assistance.20 7
In fact, the Third Circuit opined that a whole new privilege was be-
ing sought and was not persuaded that a new privilege was necessary to
encourage corporations to cooperate with the government.2 8 The court
noted that no such privilege had been created as of the time corporations,
195. Id. at 624-25.
196. Id. at 625-26.
197. 540 F.2d 1215, 1222-23 (4th Cir. 1976); see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
198. 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).
199. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1417.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1418.
203. Id. at 1417.
204. Id. at 1418.
205. Id. at 1424.
206. Id.; see also supra note 46.
207. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1425.
208. Id.
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like Westinghouse, were cooperating with the government in its various
209agency investigations.
Likewise, the Third Circuit found that Westinghouse waived the
work-product protection for work-product documents by turning them
over to the SEC and the DOJ. 210 The court held:
When a party discloses protected materials to a government agency
investigating allegations against it, it uses those materials to forestall
prosecution (if the charges are unfounded) or to obtain lenient treat-
ment (in the case of well-founded allegations). These objectives,
however rational, are foreign to the objectives underlying the work-
product doctrine.
211
The next circuit to address selective waiver was the Second Circuit
in In re Steinhardt Partners.212  Steinhardt Partners addressed only
waiver of work-product documents. In Steinhardt Partners, the com-
pany was alleged to have manipulated the market for two-year treasury
notes.21 3 In civil litigation relating to this same conduct, the company
withheld a memorandum prepared by its attorneys and previously given
to the SEC.2 14 The memorandum had been solicited by the SEC during
the investigation of the company and while there was a pending threat of
an enforcement action.2 5 There was no agreement that the SEC would
maintain confidentiality of the memorandum.
The Second Circuit rejected Steinhardt's attempt to use the work-
product protection to sustain this unilateral use of a work-product memo-
randum containing counsel's legal theories which had been voluntarily
submitted to an investigatory body.216 The court stated, "[W]e agree that
selective assertion of privilege should not be merely another brush on an
attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic
advantage. ''21 7 The court said the same rationale used for attorney-client
privilege and work-product cases on selective privilege applied, citing
Permian and Westinghouse.
218
But in rejecting Steinhardt's plea for selective waiver in this case,
the Second Circuit declined to adopt a per se rule and held that
"[c]rafting rules relating to privilege in matters of governmental investi-
gations must be done on a case-by-case basis. ,2 19 The court implied that
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1429.
211. Id.
212. 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
213. Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 232.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 234.
217. Id. at 235.
218. Id.; Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1221; Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1428.
219. Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236.
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if a written agreement had been in place, that would have been a consid-
eration.
220
Four years later, the First Circuit rejected any selective waiver in
United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.2 1  Pursuant to
contract between MIT and the Department of Defense, MIT had submit-
ted certain billing statements to the defense contract audit agency.222 In a
subsequent IRS investigation as to MIT's tax-exempt status, the IRS
sought the same documents.223 MIT initially redacted the documents for
attorney-client privilege and work-product material. 2 4  The IRS then
sought to get the redacted information from the defense contract audit
agency.2 5 The IRS went to the district court to enforce its subpoena, and
the district court held that the disclosure of the legal bills to the audit
agency forfeited the attorney-client privilege.22 6 Rejecting various argu-
ments, including an argument that MIT had to make these kinds of dis-
closures in order to become a government defense contractor, the First
Circuit held, "[A]nyone who chooses to disclose a privileged document
to a third party, or does so pursuant to a prior agreement or understand-
ing, has an incentive to do so, whether for gain or to avoid disadvan-
tage.
227
As to a work-product privilege, however, the First Circuit followed
prior case law and held that the work-product protection is not as easily
waived as the attorney-client privilege.2 28 The court found that disclo-
sure to the audit agency was disclosure to a potential adversary because
there was a potential for controversy and even a potential for litigation.2 29
While undoubtedly MIT hoped to avoid that controversy, it was still dis-
closure to an adversary.2 3 °
The Federal Circuit has not recognized limited waiver and refused
to do so under the facts in Genentech, Inc. v. United States International
Trade Commission.
23 1
In 2002, The Sixth Circuit rejected selective wqiver in In re Colum-
bia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litigation.232  Privileged
220. Id.
221. 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997).
222. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 683 (1st Cir. 1997).
223. Mass. Inst. ofTech., 129 F.3d at 682-83.
224. Id. at 683.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 686.
228. Id. at 687 & n.6 (citing WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 55, § 2024); Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1428-29; Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 234-35; In re Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d at 1371-75; Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d at 625; In re Chrysler Motors
Corp. Overnight Eval. Program Litig., 860 F.2d 844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 1988)).
229. Mass. Inst. ofTech., 129 F.3d at 687.
230. Id. at 686.
231. 122 F.3d 1409, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
232. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
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documents had been provided to the DOJ and other government agen-
cies.233 These documents were sought thereafter in civil litigation.234
After a thorough review of the state of the law, the court summarized the
following: (1) cases where selective waiver was permissible; 235 (2) cases
where selective waiver was permissible in situations where government
agrees to a confidentiality order;236 and (3) cases where selective waiver
was rejected under any situation.237 After consideration, the Sixth Circuit
rejected the concept of selective waiver, in all of its various forms.
238
C. District Court Opinions
Several district courts have held that disclosure to governmental
agencies does not waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege.
Most notably for Qwest, the District of Colorado had adopted one of the
exceptions for a waiver.
In 1993, in M&L Business Machines, Inc., the district court in Colo-
rado found a limited waiver in circumstances wherein the party makes a
contemporaneous reservation or stipulation that it does not intend to
waive the privilege and makes some effort to preserve the privacy of the
privilege.239 The district court in M&L Business Machines discussed the
state of the law of selective waiver of attorney-client privilege and ac-
knowledged that the Tenth Circuit had not addressed the issue.240 The
district court held that because the Bank of Boulder, in cooperating with
the government in its investigation of M&L Business Machines, had
provided privileged material but had reserved the right to assert the privi-
lege in other proceedings, it had not waived the privilege.24'
The approach adopted by the District of Colorado came from
Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America v. Shamrock
Broadcasting Co.242 In that case, Shamrock had turned over documents
to the SEC in response to subpoenas and had not entered into any confi-
dentiality agreements with the SEC.243 The court held that if the docu-
ments had been turned over under a protective order, stipulation or other
233. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 293 F.3d at 292.
234. Id. at 293.
235. Id. at 295 (citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc)).
236. Jobin v. Bank of Boulder (M&L Bus. Mach., Inc.), 161 B.R. 689, 695-96 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1993) (citing Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
237. Pernian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1221, In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d at 489; Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1426, Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236.
238. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 293 F.3d at 302.
239. M&L Bus. Mach., 161 B.R. at 695-96.
240. Id. at 696.
241. Id. at 696-97.
242. 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
243. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. at 639.
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express reservation of the producing parties' claim of privilege as to the
material disclosed, there would be no waiver in subsequent litigation.
244
Notably in the districts that have not decided the selective waiver is-
sue, the Seventh Circuit, Fifth Circuit and Ninth Circuit, there are district
court opinions supporting selective waiver. In In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena, dated July 13, 1979, the district court held that a privileged report
turned over as part of cooperation with the SEC and to the Internal
Revenue Service, did not waive the attorney-client privilege.245 In
Texas, a district court prevented class action discovery of documents that
had been turned over to the SEC in In re LTV Securities Litigation.246
The Northern District of California has also adopted the Teachers'
Insurance approach in Fox v. California Sierra Financial Services.247
D. Congressional Actions
1. Proposed Rule 502
On May 15, 2006, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
submitted to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502.248 The Rule addresses a number
of problems with the current federal common law governing the waiver
of attorney-client privilege and work product. The proposed Rule 502
addresses the scope of the waiver, inadvertent disclosure, selective
waiver, controlling effect of court orders, controlling effect of party
agreements, and a definition of attorney-client privilege and work prod-
uct as used in the Rule. With respect to selective waiver, however, the
standing Committee unanimously agreed that a provision on selective
waiver should be included in any proposed rule released for public com-
ment but should be placed in brackets to indicate that the Committee has
not yet determined whether a provision on selective waiver should be
sent to Congress.249 The standing Committee recognized that any rule
prepared by the Advisory Committee should proceed through the rule-
making process, but it would have to eventually be enacted directly by
Congress as it would be a rule affecting privileges.250 The proposed Rule
502, which the standing Committee has not yet determined to send to
Congress with respect to selective waiver would provide:
244. Id. at 646.
245. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. 368, 373 (D. Wis. 1979).
246. In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 605 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
247. Fox v. Cal. Sierra Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520, 526 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
248. Memorandum from Honorable Jerry E. Smith, Chairman of the Advisory Comm. on
Evidence Rules, to Honorable David F. Levi, Chairman of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice
and Procedure I (May 15, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum from Honorable Jerry E. Smith], avail-
able at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/reports/ExcerptEVReportPub.pdf
249. Id. at 3.
250. Id. at 9; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074(b) (West 2006).
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[(c) Selective Waiver. - In a federal or state proceeding, a disclo-
sure of a communication or information covered by the attor-
ney-client privilege or work product protection - when made to a
federal public office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, inves-
tigative, or enforcement authority - does not operate as a waiver of
the privilege or protection in favor of non-governmental persons or
entities. The effect of disclosure to a state or local government
agency, with respect to non-governmental persons or entities, is gov-
erned by applicable state law. Nothing in this rule limits or expands
the authority of a government agency to disclose communications or
information to other government agencies or as otherwise authorized
or required by law.]
251
2. Proposed Legislation
On the last day of the 109th Congress, Second Session, Senator
Arlen Specter introduced a bill titled the "Attomey-Client Privilege Pro-
tection Act of 2006."152 If enacted, the Act would prohibit consideration
of waiver of privilege; prohibit conditioning treatment on waiver; protect
corporations paying attorneys fees of individuals, joint defense agree-
ments and sharing information with employees. 3
VI. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION
The Qwest case involved issues of waiver of attorney-client privi-
lege and non-opinion work-product documents.254 Like the Second Cir-
cuit in Steinhardt Partners and several other courts that have addressed
selective waiver, the Tenth Circuit did not adopt a per se rule against
selective waiver.255
The Tenth Circuit, placing heavy emphasis on the state of the record
before it, declined to expand the testimonial exclusionary rules of attor-
ney-client privilege or work-product doctrine.256 After discussing the
facts and analyzing the law as discussed above, the court's conclusion
251. Memorandum from Honorable Jerry E. Smith, supra note 248, at 5-6. The proposed
Rule 502 was sent out for public comment in August 2006. Notice from David F. Levi, Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, To The Bench,
Bar and Public 1 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Memo Bench Bar
andPublic 2006.pdf. The process for consideration and promulgation of the Rule if enacted will
likely take several years. See JAMES C. DUFF, THE FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, The Rulemaking Process: A Summary for The Bench and
The Bar (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm.
252. S. 30, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006), available at http://www.acc.com/public/attyclientpriv/
thompsonmemoleg.pdf.
253. Id.
254. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 584 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2006) 1.
255. See Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 230; Delwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d
1122 (7th Cir. 1997) (addressing law enforcement investigatory privilege but applying the same
analysis); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d
at 1371-72.
256. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1195.
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under the heading "No Selective Waiver in This Case" states, "For the
reasons discussed above, the record in this case does not justify adoption
of selective waiver., 257 The court made a reference to a deficient record
on at least ten occasions:
e We conclude the record in this case is not sufficient to justify
adoption of a selective waiver doctrine as an exception to the general
rules of waiver upon disclosure of protected material.258
o The record does not establish a need for a rule of selective waiver
to assure cooperation with law enforcement, to further the purposes
of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, or to avoid
unfairness to the disclosing party.
2 59
* On this record "[W]e are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a
long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination."
260
e The record before us, however, does not support the contention
that companies will cease cooperating with law enforcement absent
protection under the selective waiver doctrine. Most telling is
Qwest's disclosure of 220,000 pages of protected materials knowing
the Securities Case was pending, in the face of almost unanimous cir-
cuit-court rejection of selective waiver in similar circumstances, and
despite the absence of Tenth Circuit precedent.
261
e The record is equally deficient concerning whether the DOJ and
the SEC may have independently gained access to the Waiver Docu-
ments by invoking other means or theories, such as the crime or fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege.
262
* The record does not support reliance on the Qwest agreements
with the SEC and the DOJ to justify selective waiver. The agree-
ments do little to restrict the agencies' use of the materials they re-
ceived from Qwest.263
* The record does not indicate whether Qwest negotiated or could
have negotiated for more protection for the Waiver Documents, or
whether, as it asserted at oral argument, seeking further restrictions
would have so diluted its cooperation to render it valueless.
264
* The concession highlights a further record deficiency: the nature
and severity of the burden placed upon the district court to sort
through all 220,000 pages of Waiver Documents to determine what
257. Id. at 1201.
258. Id. at 1192.
259. Id.
260. Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972)).
261. Id. at 1193.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1194.
264. Id.
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use the government made of each document, and whether any further
disclosure had vitiated an otherwise applicable privilege or protec-
tion.
265
* The record in this case does not indicate that the proposed excep-
tion would promote the purposes of the attorney-client privilege or
work product doctrine.
266
* As discussed above, the record is silent on whether selective
waiver truly is necessary to achieve cooperation.
267
Some of the circuit courts that have declined to follow Diversified
have noted that, in doing so, they are not adopting a per se rule.268 The
Tenth Circuit also falls into this category. In doing so, the courts are
preserving the ability to craft rules relating to privilege on a case-by-case
basis as recognized in Federal Rules of Evidence 501 ("FRE 501") and
the Supreme Court in Upjohn.269 FRE 501 was substituted by Congress
for a proposed set of privilege rules drafted by The Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence and approved by The Judicial
Conference of The United States and by the Supreme Court.270 Avoiding
any per se rule is consistent with FRE 501 and the Advisory Committee
Notes, which state that the rule "reflect[s] the view that the recognition
of a privilege based on a confidential relationship and other privileges
should be determined on a case by case basis. 271' FRE 501 manifests a
desire to provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege
on a case-by-case basis.272
The Tenth Circuit, while acknowledging its power under FRE 501,
made it clear that, under the facts of the case, it saw no compelling rea-
son to adopt a selective waiver rule on privilege.273 Granted, Qwest had
entered into written confidentiality agreements with the government
agencies.2 74 The First, Second, Seventh and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits have, in declining to adopt a per se rule, indicated a written confi-
dentiality agreement may have been considered in allowing some selec-
tive waiver under certain circumstances. But, each of those courts de-
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1195.
267. Id. at 1196.
268. See, e.g., Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236.
269. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40,46 (1980).
270. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46.
271. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1184 (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1192.
274. Id. at 1181.
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clined any selective waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product
under their particular case.275
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit found the circumstances in Qwest mer-
ited no allowance of selective waiver. It appeared to be the breadth of
the disclosure; the excessive use of the documents in other state criminal
proceedings and agency actions; the knowledge of existing civil suits at
the time of disclosure; the lack of any of solid precedence, all of which
persuaded the Tenth Circuit, on this record, to decline to adopt selective
276waiver. The Tenth Circuit also noted that, if selective waiver was es-
sential to government operations, the agencies should have supported
Qwest's request; however, they did not.277
VII. SELECTIVE WAIVER GOING FORWARD
Although the Sixth Circuit characterized the state of the law of lim-
,,278ited waiver as a state of "hopeless confusion, the reality is that no
corporation in the past two decades could have turned over privileged
documents or work product documents to the DOJ, SEC or any other
"adversary" agency without knowing that said decision may indeed re-
sult in a full waiver of the privilege, including to civil litigants.
The Sixth Circuit carefully segregated the law of selective waiver
into cases in which selective waiver is allowed-(the Eighth Circuit
stands alone); selective waiver is never allowed; and selective waiver
might be allowed. 279 But in reality, with the exception of the Eighth Cir-
cuit, each of the circuit courts refused to allow selective waiver under the
facts presented in each case. The various circuit courts' passing refer-
ences to the possibility of some factual situation in the future wherein
privileged documents are turned over but no full waiver is found, is more
an adherence to FRE 501 than a state of hopeless confusion of the law of
selective waiver. FRE 501 leaves interpretation of privilege up to the
courts, applying common law.
Notwithstanding lack of any supportive precedence, as the above-
discussed case law demonstrates, many corporations chose to make the
decision to turn over privileged materials to government agencies. Un-
der the current state of the law, that decision must involve careful con-
sideration, weighing the merits of handing over privileged documents to
the government, either because they demonstrated that the company was
not guilty of wrongdoing or because the corporation determines that get-
275. In re The Leslie Fay Companies Inc. Sec. Lit., 161 F.R.D. 274, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Dellwood Farms, 128 F.3d at 1127; United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 37 (ist Cir. 1995);
Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236; In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 824.
276. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1193-94.
277. Id. at 1193.
278. In re Columbia HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 2945 (6th
Cit. 2002).
279. Id. at 295-302.
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ting leniency from the government is important enough that the corpora-
tion would risk waiving the privilege and deal with the consequences of
waiver in subsequent civil litigation. That decision-making process is a
process worth preserving. As discussed above, a new proposed Rule 502
has been drafted and circulated by the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure.28 ° So, the question is why do we need a new rule; what
will the rule really add?
The rule will make the corporation's consideration and decision eas-
ier. A corporation would be able to waive the privilege and not risk hav-
ing those documents disclosed in subsequent civil litigation. But what
does this really do for the attorney-client privilege? The attorney-client
privilege is the "bastion of ordered liberty.",281 Its purpose is not to facili-
tate government investigations, but rather to encourage full and frank
discussions between an attorney and his or her client to get to the truth so
that the lawyer can best represent the client. It has been suggested that
half of a privilege is not worth having at all. 282 And, indeed, it is appro-
priate that there be some concern over whether the proposed Rule 502
will have an adverse impact on the attorney-client privilege when a cor-
poration tries to gather facts in an internal investigation.
Indeed, when Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty made re-
marks at the Lawyers for Civil Justice Membership Conference on De-
cember 12, 2006, he acknowledged that there must be integrity in what a
company does when investigating misconduct and that to do the job
right: "[C]orporate attorneys have told me that they need full and frank
communication between attorney and employee if they are expected to
steer conduct away from law breaking or uncover criminal wrongdo-
ing"
283
When an individual discusses the internal affairs of a corporation
with inside counsel, the hope is that they will always be frank and can-
did. But United States Attorney James B. Comey candidly revealed that
turnover of privileged internal investigations of a corporation may be the
only way that the government can get statements of individuals due to
the Fifth Amendment.284 From employees' point of view, they may be
more willing to discuss matters candidly when they are armed with the
knowledge that a corporation will have to carefully consider all of the
consequences of waiving the privilege, including the possibility the privi-
lege is waived in full.
280. See supra note 248.
281. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 1, 2 (4th ed. 2001).
282. Collin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective
Waiver: Is Half-Privilege Worth Having at All, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, 156 (2006).
283. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 117.
284. Interview with US. Att. James B. Comey, U.S. ATr'Ys BULL., November 2003, at 4.
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Despite radical changes in Section VII of the McNulty Memoran-
dum, it is not likely to have much impact on corporations' waiver of
privilege. This is so because although the fact that the McNulty Memo-
randum expressly states that prosecutors must not use a corporation's
declination against the corporation in making charging decisions, it none-
theless provides that "prosecutors may always favorably consider a cor-
poration's acquiescence to the government's waiver request in determin-
ing whether a corporation has cooperated in the government's investiga-
*,,285 croaintion. Most corporations waive the privilege in hopes of getting favor-
able treatment. For similar reasons, the proposed Rule 502, while it may
indeed facilitate corporations' cooperation in government investigations,
is not likely to have a favorable impact on the attorney-client privilege
itself.
With proposed Rule 502, corporations could certainly undertake the
kind of analysis discussed above. Or, corporations could choose to turn
over privilege documents to plead for leniency, knowing there will be
fewer consequences in later civil litigation. This could have an impact
on the individuals whose statements helped the corporation get favorable
consideration, at their personal expense. In the long-run, this may have
an adverse impact on the privilege because individuals will stop commu-
nicating.
If a corporation has to weigh the risks of waiving the privilege to
the government in full, meaning accepting all the consequences including
that the information may be available in civil litigation, this simply
makes the decision to waive the privilege more calculated. Knowing that
the corporation can waive the privilege without having to consider the
consequences of that waiver in other arenas, such as civil litigation,
could make employees uneasy about discussing matters with their
in-house counsel. Employees do not want to become the chip the corpo-
ration uses with the government. Proposed Rule 502 undermines the
gravity of a corporation's decision to waive the privilege. That decision
should never be made lightly given the importance of the privilege in
common law.
While the Rules Committee has not determined whether to submit
proposed Rule 502(c) to Congress, such a Congressional change to the
privilege is what Andrew McNally argues for in his article Revitalizing
Selective Waiver.286 Mr. McNally appropriately points out that selective
waiver encourages corporate cooperation with government investiga-
287 i
tions, which is indeed a laudable goal. But he candidly admits there is
no case for arguing that selective waiver will further the goals and pur-
285. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 117, § 2.
286. See generally McNally, supra note 8.
287. See id. at 826.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
poses of the attorney-client privilege itself.288 Nothing has prevented
corporations from waiving the privilege, after weighing all of the conse-
quences, in each of the cases discussed above. No doubt, even without a
rule, selective waiver and government disclosures are likely to continue.
But, no doubt some corporations have refused to waive the privilege
despite pressure from the government after considering the consequences
and possible disclosure of that information in subsequent civil litigation.
In Stein, the district court found that the Thompson Memorandum, as
invoked by the United States Attorney's Office, caused KPMG to con-
sider departing from its longstanding policy of paying legal fees and ex-
penses of its personnel.289 KPMG was extremely anxious to curry favor
with the USAO by demonstrating how cooperative it could be.29 °
At the time, the Thompson Memorandum expressly identified will-
ingness to waive the privilege as a factor to be considered in whether a
corporation is being cooperative. The McNulty Memorandum does not
change this, but does say a corporation cannot be penalized for not waiv-
ing the privilege. With a new selective disclosure rule approved by Con-
gress, corporations will be hard pressed to justify their refusal to waive
the privilege to the government. And, for this reason alone, it seems that
the proposed rule undermines the privilege. The government may con-
sider it a right once a corporation does not have to consider the conse-
quences of further disclosure to third parties, for example in civil litiga-
tion.
The privilege is too important a bastion of the common law and too
critical to an attorney's ability to represent his or her client to risk un-
dermining it with a rule that is unnecessary given the last two decades
wherein hundreds of corporations have waived the privilege and partici-
pated in voluntary cooperation with government agencies.
288. See id. at 857.
289. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
290. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
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IN RE QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL: DOES
SELECTIVE WAIVER EXIST FOR MATERIALS DISCLOSED
DURING A GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION?
"An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but re-
sults in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than
no privilege at all."'
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of corporate wrongdoing, regulators, legislatures, and
the public have demanded greater transparency of corporate transactions
through government investigations. In conjunction with these investiga-
tions, corporations are encouraged to cooperate with government agen-
cies, including, but not limited to the Department of Justice ("DOJ") 2 and
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), 3 by releasing privi-
leged and protected documents. Cooperation may include the decision to
waive the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection for infor-
mation produced to the DOJ and SEC.4 It may also include a decision to
sign a confidentiality agreement protecting the selectively disclosed
documents from further disclosure to adversarial third parties.5
1. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (describing the attorney-client
privilege).
2. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, former Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporateguidelines.htm (setting forth factors that federal prosecu-
tors should weigh in determining whether to bring criminal charges against a corporation). On
December 12, 2006, the DOJ released the McNulty Memorandum to replace the Thompson Memo-
randum, in response to the growing concern that the Thompson Memorandum was having an ad-
verse effect on the attorney-client privilege. The McNulty Memorandum is a significant step for-
ward in protecting attorney-client privilege, but does not go far enough to restore the balance be-
tween federal prosecutors and corporations under investigation. See Memorandum from Paul J.
McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice to of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys,
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnultymemo.pdf.
3. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21 (A) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Deci-
sions, Exchange Act Release No. 34,44969, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
AE-1470, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Seaboard Report] (setting forth criteria
the SEC will employ in determining whether it should give credit for cooperation during investiga-
tion).
4. Michael H. Dore, A Matter of Fairness: The Need For a New Look at Selective Waiver in
SEC Investigations, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 761, 761 (2006). Under the McNulty Memorandum, prose-
cutors may request a waiver in furtherance of their law enforcement obligations. McNulty Memo-
randum, supra note 2, at 8. Furthermore, before requesting a waiver, "prosecutors must obtain
written authorization from the United States Attorney" who must then "consult with the Assistant
Attorney General[,] before granting or denying [a waiver request]." Id. at 9. Declination of a waiver
may be considered against the corporation if and when it is charged. Id. at 10.
5. See Dore, supra note 4, at 762.
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The majority of federal circuit courts of appeals, including the First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Federal, and D.C. Circuit find that
disclosure of materials during a government investigation waives the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.6 The Eight Circuit
and a few district courts embrace the concept of selective or limited
waiver in some situations, including where a confidentiality agreement
has been signed by a corporation and the government agency. However,
confusion remains over the applicability of selective waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product doctrine during government inves-
tigations.
In In re Qwest Communications International, Inc.,8 the Tenth Cir-
cuit chose not to adopt selective waiver and instead referred to the "na-
ture of the common law to move slowly and by accretion." 9 The court
thought that Qwest Communications International ("Qwest") sought an
entirely new privilege, a "government-investigation privilege," that
would constitute a "leap ... in the common law development of privi-
leges and protections."' 0 In failing to clarify the issue of selective
waiver, the Tenth Circuit further muddied the waters for corporations
faced with a waiver request.
Part I of this article provides a history of the attorney-client privi-
lege, work-product doctrine, and theory of selective waiver. Part II dis-
cusses the split among the federal circuit courts over the issue of selec-
tive waiver. Part III introduces the Tenth Circuit's decision in In re
Qwest Communications International, Inc. Part IV analyzes the culture
of waiver, confidentiality agreements, proposed Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502 concerning selective waiver, policy reasons for adopting se-
lective waiver under limited circumstances, and the purported chilling
effect a rule of selective waiver would have on attorney-client communi-
cations. Finally, the conclusion addresses steps for rectifying the split
among the federal circuit courts.
I. BACKGROUND
The following sections briefly discuss the origins and applications
of the attorney-client privilege, work-product doctrine, and selective
waiver to corporations involved in government investigations.
6. Id. at 761 (defining selective waiver as a waiver of materials protected by the attorney-
client privilege and/or work product doctrine).
7. See Kathryn Keneally and Kenneth M. Breen, New Life for Selective Waiver, 30
CHAMPION 42, 43 (2006).
8. In re Qwest Commic'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
584 (2006).
9. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1192.
10. Id.
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A. Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations
The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine are distinct
bodies of law that serve different purposes." The attorney-client privi-
lege is a common law rule of evidence 12 which governs the type of evi-
dence admitted in court.13  The attorney-client privilege is the oldest
privilege relating to confidential communications, dating from the Six-
teenth century.14 The purpose is "to encourage full and frank communi-
cation between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice."'
' 5
The attorney-client privilege covers communication between lawyer and
client where the client is the holder of the privilege.' 6 The attorney client
privilege is "construed narrowly" because it "obstructs the truth finding
process."'
17
The attorney-client privilege has a distinct application to corpora-
tions and other business entities. Unlike the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, 18 the attorney-client privilege may be asserted
by a corporation or other organization to protect documents produced
during business operations.' 9 The United States Supreme Court recog-
nized the effect of the attorney-client privilege on corporations in Upjohn
v. United States.20  While confusion remains over what communications
made by corporations and their agents are covered by the privilege,2' it is
essential to clarify the issue of selective waiver to "ensure voluntary cor-
porate compliance with the law," without waiving any protective rights.22
11. See Karen L. Valihura & Robert J. Valihura, Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product
Doctrine: Corporate Applications, in BNA CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES PORTFOLIO No. 22-3 §
XIV (2000).
12. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
13. LISA G. LERMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 165 (2005).
14. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
15. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
16. See LERMAN, supra note 13, at 165.
17. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1988);
see Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
18. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944) (denying corporations protection of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, on the ground that the constitutional
prohibition against self-incrimination protects only natural persons).
19. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 99 (4th ed. 2001); see also United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318,
336 (1915) (recognizing the availability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations).
20. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (holding that the lower courts' application of a narrowly con-
strued attorney-client privilege "makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice
when their client is faced with a specific legal problem [and] also threatens to limit the valuable
efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law").
21. Some courts rely on Wignore's treatise to support the position that legally related attor-
ney-client communications are protected. See Valihura, supra note 11, § VI; WIGMORE, supra note
14, § 2317. Other courts find that the attorney-client privilege only protects legal advice in response
to information communicated by the client. Valihura, supra note 11, VI.; see also Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1962).
22. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 102.
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B. Work-Product Doctrine for Corporations
The work-product doctrine embraces many of the same concepts of
the attorney-client privilege, yet is distinct from and more expansive than
the attorney-client privilege.23 The doctrine was originally discussed in
the Supreme Court decision of Hickman v. Taylor,24 reaffirmed in United
States v. Nobles,25 and codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3). 26  Hickman established protection for materials collected by
counsel in preparation for possible litigation, absent a showing from the
adversarial party of sufficient need for the materials.27 Furthermore, it
protects the attorney's thoughts, mental impressions, and theories, from
disclosure. 28  Unlike the attorney-client privilege, work-product protec-
tion historically belongs to the attorney 29 and is not waived unless disclo-
sure occurs to an adversary.3 °
The work-product doctrine also applies to corporations. 31 The ma-
jority of cases conclude that internal investigations of possible illegal
activity by the corporation performed in close proximity to litigation
qualify for coverage under the work-product doctrine.
32
C. Selective Waiver
Protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege and work-
product doctrine is not absolute.33 Protection is waived to privileged
material if the client, client's attorney, or agent of the client agrees to
waive the privilege.34 Many courts find action evidencing a disregard for
the confidential nature of a legal communication is enough to waive pro-
tection under the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege.35
23. Valihura, supra note 11; see United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975).
24. 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
25. 422 U.S. at 236-39.
26. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also include a provi-
sion codifying work-product protection for pre-trial discovery in criminal proceedings. See FED. R.
CaiM. P. 16(b)(2).
27. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 480-81 (summarizing Hickman, 329 U.S. 495).
28. See FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
29. Valihura, supra note 11.
30. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1428; cf Reliance Ins. Co. v. McNally Inc., No:
89-2401-V, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22605, at *9 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 1992) (declining to find a waiver
when two parties with a common legal interest share information).
31. JOHN W. GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE §7.06 (3d. ed. 2000).
32. See In re Int'l Sys., 693 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979).
33. Valihura, supra note 11, § VII; Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 78(1) (2000).
35. Valihura, supra note 11, § VII. See generally In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (holding that "if a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality
of attorney-client communications like jewels"); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp.
771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (holding that "[o]ne cannot produce documents and later assert a privi-
lege which ceases to exist because of the production"); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61
F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that "once the secrecy or confidentiality is destroyed by a
voluntary disclosure to a third party, the rationale for granting the privilege in the first instance no
longer applies").
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Courts reason that if the client is indifferent to maintaining confidential-
ity to privileged materials, the law should not protect the privilege at the
expense of other parties with an interest in the materials.36
In the corporate context, the law governing selective waiver of at-
torney-client privilege and work-product doctrine is unsettled.37 Of par-
ticular concern is the applicability of selective waiver in the context of
government investigations. Some courts find that turning over privileged
materials to the government does not necessarily waive the attorney-
client privilege or work-product protection.38 Yet others, following the
strict language of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doc-
trine, reject the idea of selective waiver.39 Courts rejecting selective
waiver have reasoned that selective invocation of the privilege is an
abuse of discretion. 40 Because "the privilege prevents forced disclosure"
of materials to adversarial third parties, courts do not allow clients to
pick and choose when to assert the protection.41
II. SELECTIVE WAIVER AMONG THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
With the exception of the Eighth Circuit, the majority of federal cir-
cuit courts of appeals reject the selective waiver doctrine. The following
sections discuss the decisions of the circuits addressing selective waiver.
Section A reviews the Eighth Circuit's minority view for allowing selec-
tive waiver. Section B reviews the decisions of the majority of federal
circuit courts rejecting selective waiver. Despite the common conclusion
36. See GERGACZ, supra note 31, §§ 5.04-5.05.
37. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 295 (6th
Cir. 2002) (stating that the case law addressing selective waiver is "in a state of hopeless confusion."
(citing In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co. Inc., 161 B.R. 689, 696 (D. Colo. 1993))).
38. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (finding selec-
tive waivers applicable in certain circumstances); see also Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128
F.3d 1122, 1128 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding of forfeiture where the government failed to obtain a confi-
dentiality agreement); In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that if the
government agrees to maintain confidentiality, disclosure of documents does not constitute a
waiver); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 644-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that disclosure to the SEC constitutes a complete waiver unless privilege is
specifically reserved at the time of disclosure).
39. See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302; Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1425 (hold-
ing that selective waiver to the government was "laudable," but did not serve the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1997)
(holding that maintaining the attorney-client privilege "makes the law more predictable and.., eases
its administration"); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988) (declining to
embrace the concept of limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the court found that when "a
client communicates information to his attorney with the understanding that the information will be
revealed to others, that information . . . will not enjoy the privilege." (quoting United States v.
(Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984))); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214,
1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding the attorney-client privilege available to a litigant who maintains
"genuine confidentiality").
40. GERGACZ, supra note 31, § 5.05.
41. Id. (citing Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975) (holding that the "party
asserting the privilege placed information protected by it in issue through some affirmative act for
his own benefit, and to allow the privilege to protect against disclosure of such information would
have been manifestly unfair to the opposing party").
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of the federal circuit courts that selective waiver does not afford protec-
tion to voluntarily disclosed materials, the lack of uniformity in reason-
ing among the circuits is of great concern.
A. Minority View: Disclosure in Certain Circumstances Does Not Con-
stitute Waiver
Only a few courts have sanctioned or adopted a per se rule against
selective waiver;42 this leaves the door open for use of selective waiver
under certain circumstances.43
The majority of arguments in favor of selective waiver gain their
credence from the Eighth Circuit's decision in Diversified Industries v.
Meredith.44 In Diversified, "[t]he Weatherhead Company sought an in-
ternal [investigation] report prepared by outside counsel for Diversified's
independent audit committee." 45 The resulting report was later disclosed
to the SEC pursuant to subpoena.46 Finding for Diversified, the court
asserted that the documents disclosed to the SEC were within the scope
of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine and, thus,
protected from further disclosure.47 Judge Henley held that production of
the documents to the SEC constituted a limited waiver of the attorney-
client privilege: "To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the
developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside
counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders,
potential stockholders and customers.
'" 8
Although the Eighth Circuit continues to follow this rule, it stands
alone among federal circuit courts. However, Judge Boggs, sitting in the
Sixth Circuit, provided in his dissent in In re Columbia/HCA,49 well-
reasoned support for the theory of selective waiver.50 Recognizing the
important public policy interest of cooperating with the government,
Judge Boggs stated that "[although] the harms of selective disclosure are
not altogether clear, the benefits of the increased information to the gov-
42. See infra notes 56-88 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 606; In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236;
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussing voluntary disclosure of
privileged material to the SEC for purposes of nonpublic informal investigation, a proceeding to
which plaintiffs were not a party, did not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege); Saito v.
McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18553 2002 WL 31657622, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting the
many circumstances and policy reasons for allowing selective waiver); Maruzen Co., Ltd. v. HSBC
USA, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 1079, 2002 WL 1628782, at *1 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (holding that voluntary
disclosure to government agencies pursuant to an explicit non-waiver agreement does not waive the
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine).
44. 572 F.2d 596.
45. See Dore, supra note 4, at 762; Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 599-600.
46. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 599-600.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 611.
49. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
50. Id. at 307-14 (Boggs, J. dissenting).
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emiment should prevail., 51 He characterized the court's choice as "not
one whether or not to release privileged information to private parties
that has already been disclosed to the government, but rather one to cre-
ate incentives that permit voluntary disclosures to the government at
all. 52 Judge Boggs opined that other methods, such as search warrants
and civil discovery, would not reach privileged materials and may con-
sume additional government time and money. 3 Finally, the dissent re-
jected the majority claim that enforcement of the rule would be burden-
some and possibly expensive, stating that the exception "seems clear and
predictable," and "as rule-like as this court makes it."
54
B. The Majority View: Disclosure Constitutes Waiver
The majority of federal circuit courts reject selective waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.55 However, not all
circuits have done so for the same reason. The following review of fed-
eral circuit court decisions are broken into three categories: 1) circuits
rejecting selective waiver with a confidentiality agreement; 2) circuits
rejecting selective waiver without a confidentiality agreement; and 3)
circuits rejecting selective waiver based on the facts in the case, not on
the theory alone.
1. Selective Waiver With a Confidentiality Agreement
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of Philippines,56 the
Philippines government alleged that Westinghouse bribed its former
President to procure a contract to build the nation's first nuclear power
plant.57  During investigations of the alleged bribe, Westinghouse dis-
closed an internal investigation report to the SEC58 based on the agency's
confidentiality regulations, and subsequently to the DOJ, pursuant to a
confidentiality agreement. 59  The Philippines sought discovery of this
report and the underlying documents.6° Westinghouse refused, citing the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, arguing that a confi-
51. Id. at 311 (Boggs, J. dissenting).
52. Id. at 312 (Boggs, J. dissenting).
53. Id. at 311-12 (Boggs, J. dissenting).
54. Id. at 313 (Boggs, J. dissenting).
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56. 951 F.2d 1414.
57. Id. at 1417.
58. Id. Westinghouse relied on SEC regulations stating that "[i]nformation or documents
obtained by the [SEC] in the course of any investigation or examination, unless made a matter of
public record, shall be deemed non-public." Id. at 1418 n.4 (citing 17 CFR § 203.2 (1978)). SEC
regulations "further provided that information or documents obtained in the course of an investiga-
tion would be deemed and kept confidential by SEC employees and officers unless disclosure was
specifically authorized." Id. (citing 17 CFR § 240.0- 4 (1978)).
59. Id. at 1417. The agreement between Westinghouse and the DOJ stated in part that: (1) the
DOJ could review the attomey-client privileged and work product protected materials; (2) the mate-
rials would not be disclosed outside of the DOJ; and (3) that such review would not undermine
work-product protection and attomey-client privileges afforded to Westinghouse. Id. at 1419.
60. Id. at 1420.
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dentiality agreement specifically stated that disclosure to the DOJ did not
constitute a waiver.
61
The Third Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit's approach to waiver
62
and held that selective waiver "has little to do with" the underlying pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege to encourage clients to seek legal
advice.6 3 The court noted that several factors warn against creating a
new privilege allowing parties to disclose materials to the government
without waiving the attorney-client privilege.64  Finally, the fact that
Westinghouse and the DOJ entered into a confidentiality agreement
made no difference. 65  In the court's view, voluntary disclosure to an-
other party waives the attorney-client privilege, regardless of whether the
party agrees not to disclose the communications through a confidentiality
agreement or compulsion through subpoena.66
In In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,67 the Sixth Circuit up-
held a district court decision that Columbia/HCA waived protection to
written reports summarizing results and findings from internal audits
supplied to the DOJ in conjunction with an investigation.68  Colum-
bia/HCA initially asserted that the documents relating to those audits
were protected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product doc-
trine.69 Columbia/HCA argued that it had not waived any privilege pro-
tection over the documents by voluntarily disclosing them to the DOJ
because they had entered into a confidentiality agreement with the
DOJ.70  The Sixth Circuit found that any voluntary disclosure of privi-
leged documents to a third party operates as a complete waiver of other-
wise applicable immunities from production.71
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1425. The Eighth Circuit rejected the selective waiver justification in Diversified
because "selective waiver does not serve the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to one's attorney
in order to obtain informed legal assistance; it merely encourages voluntary disclosure to govern-
ment agencies, thereby extending the privilege beyond its intended purpose." Id. Moreover, the
court noted, "selective waiver does nothing to promote the attorney-client relationship; indeed, the
unique role of the attorney, which led to the creation of the privilege, has little relevance to the
selective waiver permitted in Diversfied." Id.
63. Id. at 1424. The Third Circuit relied heavily on the decision in Permian Corp. v. United
States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981), that however laudable cooperation may be, selective waiver
is beyond the intended purposes of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 1424-25.
64. Id. at 1425-26 ("First, because privileges obstruct the truth-finding process, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly warned the federal courts to be cautious in recognizing new privileges. In
addition, the Supreme Court has been 'especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where
it appears that Congress has considered the competing concerns but has not provided the privilege
itself... Congress rejected an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, proposed by
the SEC, that would have established a selective waiver rule regarding documents disclosed to the
agency).
65. Id. at 1426-27.
66. Id.
67. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
68. Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 289.
69. Id. at 292.
70. Id. at 293.
71. Id. at 300-02.
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2. Selective Waiver Without a Confidentiality Agreement
In Permian Corp. v. United States,72 the D.C. Circuit held that dis-
closure of documents to the SEC by a subsidiary of Permian, Occidental,
waived the attorney-client privilege to the documents.73 Although the
district court found that documents sought by the Department of Energy
in an unrelated investigation were protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege, the D.C. Circuit found Occidental waived the privilege by disclos-
ing the documents to the SEC.74 The court expressly rejected the Eighth
Circuit's selective waiver theory, finding the argument "wholly unper-
suasive," and concluded that unfair results would occur by allowing liti-
gants to convert "the privilege into a tool for selective disclosure., 75 The
court noted that letters sent between Occidental and the SEC may have
created an implicit confidentiality agreement between the two parties, but
Occidental did little to protect the waiver documents once they changed
hands.76
In In re Martin Marietta Corp. ,77 the Fourth Circuit strictly inter-
preted the selective waiver doctrine in the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine context. 78 Faced with charges that Martin Mari-
etta defrauded the Department of Defense and committed mail fraud,
Martin Marietta, upon invitation of the U.S. Attorney, submitted a posi-
tion paper to the U.S. Attorney detailing why the company should not be
prosecuted.79 The position paper was later sought by an indicted em-
ployee for use in his defense against charges arising out of the same ac-
tivities.8°
The Fourth Circuit discussed the many "competing policy con-
cerns" that have led courts to carve out exceptions to the rule of waiver.8 '
However, the court rejected Martin Marietta's argument for selective
waiver because the indicted employee sought materials that had already
been revealed to the government.8 2 The court noted the adversarial in-
terests of the two parties involved in the litigation, that Martin Marietta
made an express assurance of completeness of its disclosure to the U.S.
Attorney, and that the disclosures were made in an attempt to settle on-
72. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
73. Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1219.
74. Id.
75. Id at 1220-21. Judge Abner Mikva characterized the privilege as resting on the need for
secrecy between a lawyer and his client, and that turning documents over to the SEC was inconsis-
tent with this need for confidentiality. Id.
76. Id. at 1219-20.
77. 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).
78. Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d at 626.
79. Id at 623.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 623 (Noting concerns such as "facilitating the settlement of litigation, permitting full
cooperation among joint defendants, expediting discovery and encouraging voluntary disclosure to
regulatory agencies").
82. Id at 623-24.
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going controversies.8 3  Therefore, the position paper submitted to the
U.S. Attorney was not entitled to protection.
84
In United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,85 the First
Circuit upheld in part and vacated in part a district court decision that the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's ("MIT") disclosure of its legal
bills to a government agency waived the attorney-client privilege to those
materials, thus, requiring MIT to turn over the legal bills to the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS"). 86  In reaching its decision, the First Circuit
favored adherence to clear rules, rather than abandoning them in favor of
an unstructured doctrine. 87 Moreover, the court rejected the idea that a
tacit agreement between MIT and the IRS protected the privileged mate-
rials that were later disclosed, because anyone who discloses documents
has an incentive to do so.
8 8
3. Rejection of Selective Waiver Based on Case Facts
In In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.,89 the Second Circuit held that
Steinhardt Partners, subject to an SEC investigation, waived work-
product protection to a memorandum by submitting it to the SEC. 90 Be-
cause Steinhardt voluntarily disclosed the memo to the SEC, an adver-
sary, work-product protection was waived to other parties. 91 Judge Ten-
ney was unmoved by the argument that corporations would no longer
cooperate with the government and would be reluctant to investigate
internal wrongdoing.92  In the eyes of the court, there are "substantial
incentives" for corporations to cooperate with the SEC.93
Moreover, when a company voluntarily cooperates with a govern-
ment entity, it deliberately gives up some of the benefits of the adversar-
ial system in order to obtain the significant potential benefits of such
83. Id. at 625.
84. Id.
85. 129 F.3d 681 (lst Cir. 1997).
86. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 681-84 (Finding that the privilege is "governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience.").
87. Ashok M. Pinto, Cooperation and Self-Interest are Strange Bedfellows: Limited Waiver of
the Attorney-Client Privilege through Production of Privileged Documents in a Government Investi-
gation, 106 W. VA L. REV. 359, 373 (2004).
88. See Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686 ("Anyone who chooses to disclose a privileged
document to a third party, or does so pursuant to a prior agreement or understanding, has an incen-
tive to do so, whether for gain or to avoid disadvantage. It would be perfectly possible to carve out
some of those disclosures and say that, although the disclosure itself is not necessary to foster attor-
ney-client communications, neither does it forfeit the privilege. With rare exceptions, courts have
been unwilling to start down this path--which has no logical terminus--and we join in this reluc-
tance.").
89. 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
90. In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236.
91. Id. at 234-35.
92. Id. at 235-36.
93. Id.
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cooperation.94 The fact that the defendant, faced with a federal probe
and a civil lawsuit, was forced to "make difficult choices is insufficient
justification for carving a substantial exception to the waiver doctrine. 95
The Second Circuit, however, declined to adopt a per se rule that all
voluntary disclosures to the government act as a waiver of work-product
protection.96 Instead, issues of selective waiver should be applied in a
common-sense manner on a "case-by-case basis.,
97
In Genentech v. United States International Trade Commission,
98
the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of selective waiver. 99 Genentech
filed a complaint against the United States International Trade Commis-
sion ("ITC") based on alleged violations of some of its patents. 00 In a
concurrent lawsuit against other competitors for patent infringement,
Genentech inadvertently disclosed several thousand documents. 01 After
an Indiana district court ruled that Genentech waived its privilege to the
documents, Genentech's opponents in the ITC proceedings requested
disclosure of the documents.1
0 2
The court disagreed with Genentech's view that waiver of a privi-
lege should be limited to proceedings in district court. 0 3 Genentech's
documents were not protected, the court reasoned, by the attorney-client
privilege because Genentech failed to use "'best efforts' to maintain the
confidentiality of the documents." 10 4  Instead of allowing waiver, the
court adopted a rule of general waiver that allows the documents from
district courts to be introduced in later court proceedings. 1
05
Finally, the Seventh Circuit discussed the idea of selective waiver in
dicta, in Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.10 6 The court explained
that materials in the government's investigative files were protected from
disclosure by the law enforcement investigatory privilege. 10 7 Judge Pos-
ner delivered the opinion of the court and noted that "[i]n the case of
selective disclosure, the courts feel, reasonably enough, that the posses-
sor of the privileged information should have been more careful, as by
94. Id.
95. Id. at 236.
96. Id. The court was concerned that a per se rule would fail to "anticipate situations in which
the disclosing party and the government may share a common interest in developing legal theories
and analyzing information," or those situations where the parties "entered into an explicit agree-
ment" that the materials would remain confidential. Id.
97. Id.
98. 122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
99. Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1415-18.
100. Id. at 1411-12.
101. Id. at 1413.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1416-17.
104. Id. at 1418.
105. Id.
106. 128 F.3d 1122, 1122 (7th Cir. 1997).
107. Dellwood Farms, 128 F.3d at 1124-26.
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obtaining an agreement by the person to whom they made the disclosure
not to spread it further."' 0 8 While the Seventh Circuit disavowed selec-
tive waiver in the cases before it, one may read this statement of the
court to argue for selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege where
there is a confidentiality agreement.
III. IN RE QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL, INC. 0 9
This section outlines the facts and circumstances that led to the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Qwest.
A. Facts
In consolidated securities class actions against defendant Qwest,
lead plaintiff shareholders sought an order that Qwest turn over 220,000
pages of otherwise privileged material that it had produced to the SEC
and DOJ during investigations. 01 Prior to producing the documents,
Qwest entered into confidentiality agreements with the agencies whereby
Qwest stated that it did not intend to waive the attorney-client privilege
or work-product protection.11' Concurrently, a number of private plain-
tiffs sued Qwest alleging securities violations. 12 During the course of
the securities case, "Qwest produced millions of pages of documents to
the Plaintiffs, but did not produce the Waiver Documents."'' 13 The plain-
tiffs later sought the disclosure documents through discovery." 4 Qwest
asserted that it had only selectively waived the privilege and that waiver
only applied to the government agencies, not the plaintiffs." 5 The mag-
istrate judge ruled that Qwest waived protection by producing the docu-
ments to the SEC and DOJ and ordered Qwest to produce the waiver
documents to the plaintiffs. 116  Qwest refused. The district court af-
firmed the magistrate's decision and further required Qwest to produce
certain reports prepared by its counsel. 1
7
Qwest filed a motion to reconsider the order to produce the docu-
ments and to certify an interlocutory appeal, which was granted in part
by the district court."18 However, the district court declined to certify the
108. Id. at 1127.
109. 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006).
110. In re Qwest CommcnsInt, 450 F.3d at 1181.
111. Id. The confidentiality agreements stated, in relevant part, that the protected documents
would not be disclosed, except to the extent that those agencies determined that disclosure would be
"'required by law or... in furtherance of the Commission's discharge of its duties and responsibili-
ties." Id.
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interlocutory appeal on the waiver issue. 1 9 Subsequently, Qwest filed awrit of mandamus in the Tenth Circuit on the waiver issue.120
B. Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected Qwest's argument that agreements with
the SEC and DOJ prevented disclosure to third parties. 12' The court re-
viewed other federal circuit court decisions addressing selective waiver
and found only the Eighth Circuit had adopted the rule in "circumstances
applicable to Qwest."' 122 Based on the record in the case, the court held:
(1) a selective waiver rule is not necessary to ensure Qwest's cooperation
with the government; 123 (2) the confidentiality agreement between Qwest
and the SEC and DOJ granted the government agencies "broad discretion
to use the Waiver Documents ... and any restrictions on their use were
loose in practice;"' 124 (3) a selective waiver rule will not promote the at-
torney-client privilege or work product doctrine; 125 (4) refusal to adopt a
selective waiver rule did not result in unfairness to Qwest; 126 (5) the case
law did not support selective waiver; 127 (6) Qwest advocated a new gov-
ernment investigation privilege; 128 and (7) the record is silent "regarding
[the] existence, significance, and longevity" of the purported "culture of
waiver."129
The court began its analysis with the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine, finding protection provided by both were lost if
confidential information is disclosed to a third party.' 30  The court re-
viewed cases for and against selective waiver, noting the majority of
federal circuits rejecting selective waiver.13 1 Furthermore, the court
found a waiver of protection, regardless of the existence of a confidenti-
ality agreement covering the waiver, noting that a disclosing party uses
voluntary disclosure as a means to "forestall prosecution ... or to obtain
lenient treatment.'
132
In rejecting selective waiver, the Tenth Circuit stated that the com-
mon law moves "slowly and by accretion," thus precluding it from
adopting selective waiver because such a rule "would be a leap.., in the
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1181.
122. Id. at 1186.
123. Id. at 1193 (Qwest made the decision to disclose, notwithstanding the almost unanimous
circuit-court rejection of selective waiver and the lack of Tenth Circuit precedent).
124. Id. at 1194.
125. Id. at 1195.
126. Id. at 1196 (explaining that allowing a party to "choose who among its opponents would
be privy to the Waiver Documents is far from a universally accepted perspective of fairness").
127. ld. at 1196-97.
128. Id. at 1197-99.
129. Id. at 1199-1200.
130. Id. at 1185-86.
131. Id at 1187.
132. Id. at 1190.
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common law development of privileges and protections." '133 The court
characterized selective waiver as "the substantial equivalent of a new
privilege."' 134  As the Supreme Court has "declined to recognize new
privileges," such a marked shift in the law should derive from the legisla-
ture, not the courts.' 35 If a change is to be made, it is the province of the
legislature to determine whether voluntary privileges are "so important
that they deserve special treatment."'
136
The Tenth Circuit stated that the record before it did little to "sup-
port the contention that companies will cease cooperating with law en-
forcement absent protection under the selective waiver doctrine., 137 In-
stead, Qwest voluntarily disclosed materials, notwithstanding the unani-
mous federal circuit court rejection and lack of Tenth Circuit precedent
on the issue.' 38 Although the Tenth Circuit did not find confidentiality
agreements "irrelevant," as other courts have, the court concluded
Qwest's confidentiality agreements "do not support adoption of selective
waiver," because they allow for widespread disclosure at the discretion
of the SEC and DOJ. 139 Furthermore, broadening the reach of the privi-
lege or protection might have the opposite effect of inhibiting communi-
cation between attorney and client because employees may be reluctant
to fully disclose information to their employer.14
0
Addressing the tactical nature of the waiver decision, the court
noted that allowing Qwest to choose among its opponents that "would be
privy to the Waiver Documents is far from a universally accepted per-
spective of fairness."' 14 1  Instead, adopting the doctrine of selective
waiver would be "another brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and
manipulated to gain tactical or strategic advantage."'' 42 Qwest, perceiv-
ing an obvious advantage from disclosure, "hedged its bets" that the
documents would be covered by selective waiver, thus accepting the
133. Id. at 1192.
134. Id. at 1197.
135. Id. at 1197-99 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972)). To support its
position, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that both Congress and the SEC have declined to adopt selec-
tive waiver with regard to the Securities and Exchange Act. Id. at 1198. Furthermore, the court
argued that courts in general are not the appropriate forum for such change. Id. at 1199.
136. Id. at 1200-01 (citing In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1375 (D.C. Cir.
1984)); see also McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
("Given the Legislature's expressed desire to control evidentiary privileges and protections, adoption
of the selective waiver theory should come from that body.").
137. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1193.
138. Id.; cf In re M & L Business Mach. Co., 161 B.R. 689, 696 (D. Colo. 1993) (the only
Colorado district court case supporting the idea of selective waiver was rejected by the Tenth Circuit
because, unlike Qwest, the bank in M & L took "substantial steps" to ensure confidentiality, did not
disclose documents to benefit itself, and the fact that the documents did not pertain to a government
investigation).
139. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1194.
140. Id. at 1195.
141. Id. at 1196.
142. Id. at 1188 (quoting Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 235).
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possible resulting consequences.143 In the eyes of the Tenth Circuit, this
gamble was evidence that adoption of a selective waiver rule was not
necessary to preclude Qwest from being unfairly treated.'44
Finally, the court addressed the purported culture of waiver ad-
vanced by Qwest and supported by amici.145 The court found the "anec-
dotal material" serving as the foundation for the purported "culture of
waiver," was silent regarding its "existence, significance, or longev-
ity.' 1 46 Furthermore, the record was "silent about Qwest's particular
dealings with the agencies and whether it experienced the tactics de-
plored in amici.' 47 However, the court's interest in the specific tactics
employed by the agencies suggests that a well-documented record of
coercion may be important for parties seeking to claim that disclosure
does not result in selective waiver.1
48
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit in Qwest Communications International passed
on the opportunity to clarify much of the confusion and legitimate con-
cern underlying selective waiver. The court left open many of the impor-
tant questions and issues plaguing attorneys facing a waiver request by
stating that the facts in the case counsel against allowing a waiver. To
clarify the issue of selective waiver and once again give credence to the
privileges and protections that lie at the very foundation of the jurispru-
dential system, five distinct areas must be addressed and clarified: 1) the
routine practice of government officials seeking a waiver during gov-
ernment investigations; 2) the language of proposed Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502(c); 3) the validity of confidentiality agreements in conjunction
with a selective waiver; 4) the policy concerns favoring a practical selec-
tive waiver rule; and 5) the purported chilling effect selective waiver will
have on employee communications with corporate counsel. Clarifying
these issues will provide strength to the privileges and protections of the
United States legal system and further eliminate barriers to corporate
cooperation with government investigations.
A. Government Practices and Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
502(c)
This section discusses the current practice of government agencies
of actively seeking waivers. While DOJ and SEC policies promote hon-
esty and fair dealings with the government and investing public, these
policies also undermine attorney-client relations. The DOJ revised its
143. Id. at 1196.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1199.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1199-2000.
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corporate investigation guidelines late in 2006, but the new guidelines
are a modest improvement over previous practices. 149 The Judicial Con-
ference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules ("Advisory Commit-
tee") has stepped into the controversy by proposing a new waiver rule.
However, the new waiver rule does little to curb current problems and
creates new challenges for attorneys.
1. Culture of Waiver: Coercive Government Waiver Tactics
A major concern facing corporations today is the "culture of
waiver" established by government agencies during investigations.150
Essentially, the argument is that DOJ15 1 and SEC 52 practices effectively
deputize corporate America as an arm of law enforcement during the
course of an investigation by pressuring corporate attorneys to voluntar-
ily disclose materials to receive cooperation credit. 153 The Tenth Circuit
all but dismissed the "culture of waiver" by referring to the "anecdotal
material" serving as its foundation.154 While the Tenth Circuit dismissed
the evidence Qwest put forth to support the existence of the culture of
waiver, the evidence has caught the attention of several "prominent legal
149. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Thompson
Memorandum, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
150. See The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context, Survey Results
Presented to U.S. Congress and U.S. Sentencing Commission by Am. Chemistry Council et al., at 3
(2006) [hereinafter Corporate Survey Results], available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/
attyclient2.pdf.
151. The DOJ's policy was originally outlined in the in the 1999 "Holder Memorandum."
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Bringing Criminal Charges
Against Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html. The Holder Memorandum was
later refined in the 2003 "Thompson Memorandum," which encouraged federal prosecutors to re-
quest companies to waive its privileges as a condition for receiving cooperation credit during an
investigation. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 2. The Thompson Memorandum was refined in
the 2006 McNulty Memorandum, making it more difficult for the government to force companies to
disclose privileged materials and communications. However, the McNulty Memorandum makes
clear that prosecutors can always consider favorably decisions to waive the attorney-client privilege.
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 2.
152. The SEC articulated its policy in the 2001 Seaboard Report, whereby it would grant
leniency for cooperation with SEC investigations. Seaboard Report, supra note 3, at *2-3. The
Seaboard Report noted generally that "when businesses seek out, self-report and rectify illegal
conduct, and otherwise cooperate with Commission staff, large expenditures of government and
shareholder resources can be avoided and investors can benefit promptly." Id. at * 1. Accordingly,
the SEC set forth some criteria it will consider in determining whether, and how much, to credit,
among other things, cooperation, during an investigation. Id. at *2. In a January 2006 press release,
the SEC reaffirmed the importance of cooperation in determining whether financial penalties will be
imposed on corporations. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement of the
Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
153. See Corporate Survey Results, supra note 150, at 3. In January 2006, the Association of
Corporate Counsel compiled the results of a survey sent to 4,700 members. Id. at 2 n.7. Of those
responding to the survey, fifty-two percent of inside-counsel and fifty-nine percent of outside-
counsel responded affirmatively to the question of whether there had been a "marked increase in
waiver requests as a condition of cooperation." Id. at 3.
154. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1199.
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organizations," "three branches of the federal government,",155 and a re-
cent district court.1 56 Waiver requests have become so common that the
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York "has publicly called
for a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege by all corporate
targets wishing to obtain" cooperation credit. 157 As further evidence of
the problem, a 2006 survey of over 1,200 in-house counsel and outside
corporate counsel indicated a marked increase in waiver requests as a
condition to receiving cooperation credit. 158 Recent DOJ policies have
sought to curtail the routine demand for waiver through a written review
process. 159  Unfortunately, the new DOJ guidelines impose token re-
straints on the ability of the government to demand a waiver and do little
to curb the culture of waiver.
1 60
The Tenth Circuit failed to recognize that corporations have to
make choices that greatly restrict their ability to effectively protect and
defend themselves during a government investigation. By making
waiver of the privilege to confidential material a prerequisite to receiving
cooperation credit, the government has created a self-serving blueprint
that allows them to determine whether a corporation should be indicted.
With this leverage, the government can demand disclosure of "privileged
information at the outset" of the investigation, and the corporation is left
with "no rational choice" but to cooperate. 161 While current DOJ and
SEC policies represent a well-intentioned attempt to prevent continued
corporate wrongdoing and encourage voluntary disclosure, the reality is
that these policies permit the government to condition cooperation credit
on the thoroughness of the disclosure by the corporation. 62 In essence,
government agencies exploit their power to gain a tactical advantage
over corporations.
There are legitimate arguments that the benefits of DOJ and SEC
policies outweigh the erosion of the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine. Namely, that corporate wrongdoing can be
rooted out quickly, corporate value can be protected, and the investing
155. Judson W. Starr & Michael S. Munson, Is the Pendulum Swinging Back on Waiver Is-
sues?, A.B.A ENVTL. AND ENERGY Bus. LAW REPORTER, at 8 (June 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL400000pub/newsletter/200606/starr-munson.pdf.
156. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
157. Letter from Robert D. Evans, American Bar Association, to the Honorable Howard Coble,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, at 3 (Mar. 3, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/0603031etter-acprivh.pdf.
158. See Corporate Survey Results, supra note 150, at 2.
159. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 2, at 8-11.
160. See Jonathan Peterson & Kathy M. Kristof, U.S. Eases Its Tactics on Suspect Finns, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at C1.
161. David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of
Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 154 (2000).
162. See Corporate Survey Results, supra note 150, at 3. This practice will continue under the
McNulty Memorandum because prosecutors "may always" consider a declination of waiver in
making its charging decision and will continue to look favorably upon corporate acquiescence to
government waiver requests. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 2, at 10.
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public can be protected. 163 However, DOJ and SEC policies convey a
message that longstanding privileges are not reliable in the corporate
context, and are dismissive of a corporation's right to a balanced playing
field in the adversarial process. Moreover, the nature of the agencies
policies suggests that the government is "manipulating" the privilege, not
the corporations. 164 The SEC and DOJ are the ones coercing corpora-
tions to waive its protections "or else,"' 165 thus, "having their cake and
eating it too.' 16 6 To level the playing field and once again give corpora-
tions a valid choice on whether to disclose, DOJ and SEC policies must
be abolished or amended.
2. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
In 2006, the Advisory Committee began accepting comments to
proposed Rule 502, entitled "Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Prod-
uct; Limitations on Waiver," governing issues such as selective
waiver.1 67  The rule seeks to rectify the conflict among federal circuit
courts that disclosure of protected information during a government in-
vestigation does not constitute a general waiver of attorney-client privi-
lege or work-product protection.' 68  Additionally, the rule purportedly
furthers the "important policy of cooperation with government agencies,
and maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of government investiga-
tions."1
69
However, Rule 502(c) will not reduce the "burden, expense, and
complexity associated with privilege evaluations of documents pro-
duced" during government investigations. 70  First, the Rule does not
clearly protect materials covered by the attorney-client privilege and
163. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1.
164. See Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1221 (referring to the idea that selective waiver doctrine
allows a party to manipulate use of the privilege through selective assertion).
165. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352-53 (noting that the government overstepped its bounds of
constitutionality when it pressured KPMG, facing indictment, into cutting off the legal fees of its
former personnel). The court found that KPMG's choice to do so was improperly influenced by the
Thompson Memorandum. Id. at 380.
166. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *9.
167. Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Proposed Rule 502 on Waiver of
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product, at 6 (June 30, 2006) [hereinafter Report of the Advi-
sory Committee on Evidence Rules], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-
2006.pdf. Proposed Rule 502(c) states, in relevant part, that
a disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege
or work product protection-when made to a federal public office or agency in the exer-
cise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority-does not operate as a
waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of non-governmental persons or entities.
Id. at 7.
168. See id. at 13.
169. See id. at 14.
170. Letter from Matthew R. Gemello & Steven B. Stokdyk, Co-Chairs, Corporations Commit-
tee, of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California, to Professor Daniel J. Capra & Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, at 2 (Apr. 14, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/EV%20Comments%202006/06-EV-001 .pdf.
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work-product doctrine. The ambiguous language of the Rule leaves open
for interpretation what an "investigation" by an agency is, who is a "per-
son" involved in the investigation, and what is protected disclosure mate-
rial or information. Second, the proposed selective waiver rule will con-
flict with state evidence rules that do not recognize selective waiver.
This will further exacerbate the problem because no uniform or clear rule
will exist governing attorney-client relationships in all jurisdictions.
171
Thus, selective waiver may initially provide protection in one jurisdiction
but will be lost because of different treatment in another jurisdiction.
Third, the proposed rule might have the impact of creating a presumption
on the part of the government that it is appropriate to demand waiver in
all circumstances.172 In essence, it may become a more coercive weapon
than current government policies because it destroys any resistance ar-
gument; thus, providing the government with unfettered access to privi-
leged materials because a federal evidence rule now protects the informa-
tion. 173  Finally, the proposed rule is unclear on how a government's
agreement to confidentiality may limit, or conflict, with Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16 174 and Brady v. Maryland.175 The broad language
of proposed Rule 502(c) fails to provide guidance or comfort in favor of
the interpretation that Rule 502 supersedes "Rule 16 or Brady and its
progeny."' 76 That is not the kind of protection or certainty the attorney-
client privilege is meant to foster.
B. Confidentiality Agreements: A Valid Means of Disclosure
Corporations frequently seek protection during a government inves-
tigation by entering into a confidentiality agreement with the govern-
ment. Many corporations do so with the belief that confidential materials
will be protected from disclosure to third-parties outside of the govern-
ment investigation. Court decisions addressing the issue of selective
waiver pursuant to a confidentiality agreement are less than homoge-
nous.' 77 Some courts have indicated that the existence of a confidential-
171. See McKesson HBOC Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 821 n.l 1 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (demonstrating that action taken in one jurisdiction that may constitute a waiver may nonethe-
less result in waiver in another jurisdiction).
172. See David M. Brodsky et al., Preserving The Attorney-Client Privilege, at 3 (Apr. 19,
2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Brodsky.pdf.
173. Id. at8.
174. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(B) (holding in relevant part that "upon a defendant's request,
the government must disclose to the defendant, and make available for inspection, copying, or pho-
tographing, all of the following ... any relevant written or recorded statement by the defendant if:
the statement is within the government's possession, custody, or control; and the attorney for the
government knows--or through due diligence could know--that the statement exists.").
175. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (stating that criminal defendants are entitled to information in the
government's possession material to their defense).
176. Lauren Rosenblatt, Will Selective Waiver Become A Reality Under Proposed Rule 502?,
BUSINESS CRIMES BULLETIN, Aug. 17, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jspid=
1155732412262.
177. Compare Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1429, with In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l,
450 F.3d at 1194.
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ity agreement is irrelevant to a waiver of privileges. 178  The prevailing
argument among these courts rests on traditional waiver theories that
disclosure to a third-party waives to all, 179 and because the attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine are not "creatures of con-
tract., 180 The Advisory Committee on Rule 502 objects to confidential-
ity agreements entered into prior to disclosure, arguing that disputes will
likely arise over the particulars of the confidentiality agreement.1 81 Yet
other courts, including the Tenth Circuit in Qwest, 182 indicate that the
existence of a confidentiality agreement does not foreclose selective
waiver if the agreement actually restricts use of the documents. 1
83
Instead of adopting a per se rule that a confidentiality agreement is
or is not valid, courts should evaluate waiver pursuant to a confidentiality
agreement on a case-by-case basis. 84 Some factors to take into account
include the following: (1) whether waiver is necessary for the govern-
ment to uncover the information in the first place; (2) the reasonable pre-
cautions taken to protect the waiver documents; (3) the scope of the
waiver; (4) who is benefited by the waiver; and (5) the overreaching is-
sues of fairness.185 Evaluating selective waiver on a case-by-case basis is
beneficial because it does not automatically give protection to a corpora-
tion where the confidentiality agreement does little to protect the docu-
ments, as was the case in Qwest, 186 and gives protection to others where
the confidentiality agreement strictly construes the waiver provisions.
Moreover, allowing confidentiality agreements that contain adequate
protection encourages self-policing and prompt disclosure by corpora-
tions without fear that waiver to the government will result in subsequent
disclosure to actual or potential adversaries. 87  Although corporations
178. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1430; In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at
303.
179. See Dellwood Farms, Inc., 128 F.3d at 1127.
180. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303.
181. Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, supra note 166, at 14.
182. In re Qwest Commc "ns. Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1194 (not strictly precluding the use of confi-
dentiality agreements, but rather, stating that Qwest confidentiality agreement did little to restrict the
SEC's and DOJ's use of the materials they received from Qwest).
183. See Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236; In re Natural Gas Commodities Litig., No.
03CIV.6186 (VM)(JCF), 2005 WL 3288007, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2005); Nancy Horton Burke,
The Price of Cooperating with the Government: Possible Waiver of the Attorney-Client and Work
Product Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 62-67 (1997) (setting forth factors courts have examined
when evaluating a confidentiality agreement purportedly protecting privileged documents).
184. This position is congruent with the wording of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 that allows
courts to create rules on a case-by-case basis that conform with Rule 501. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
Commentary to the rule states that "Rule 501 manifests a congressional desire not to freeze the law
of privilege but rather to provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-
by-case basis... " FED. R. EVID. 501, Commentary by Stephen A. Saltzburg, Daniel J. Capra, and
Michael M. Martin.
185. See GERGACZ, supra note 31, §§ 5.11, 5.13-5.16.
186. See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1194.
187. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Intervenor-Appellant, Mckesson Corp., at *4, 403 F.3d 1048 (2006) (No. 03-10511); United States
v. Bergonzi, 403 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004).
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may gain from disclosing material through a confidentiality agreement,
they do so at the expense of divulging "highly sensitive and incriminat-
ing information" and are not absolved from liability of the acts dis-
closed.
188
There is a balance already in play whether a corporation should air
its grievances in order to cooperate or force the government to go it alone
at the cost of more stringent treatment and increased expense. 89 A prac-
tical rule that allows waiver pursuant to a confidentiality agreement that
explicitly states which documents are being disclosed and to what extent,
further strengthens the genuineness of the corporations' desire to main-
tain protection to the documents 190 and prevents use of waiver as a tacti-
cal advantage. While this may not absolutely forestall a government
agency from disclosing the material,' 9' it may provide the corporation
with a shield of protection, not a sword, should litigation arise over the
terms of the confidentiality agreement.'
92
On a practical level, society demands an assessment of the action or
inaction of the corporation in terms broader than merely the corpora-
tion's waiver. The significance of intent should not be overlooked
through a knee-jerk reaction that rejects outright the theory of selective
waiver. 93 Applying objective standards of interpretation to a confidenti-
ality agreement, including the factors outlined above, it becomes difficult
to reject selective waiver. Such a rule accounts for the intent of the cor-
poration and continues to treat carelessness and negligence as subversive
to the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege.
C. Public Policy Favors a Practical Selective Waiver Rule
The preference for or against selective waiver is nothing more than
a policy consideration and has very little to do with furthering the princi-
ples of the attorney-client privilege. 94 What has to be weighed is the
prohibition on waivers that will likely aid public regulatory agencies
against the public good that will result from thorough government inves-
tigations. In reality, continued prohibition against selective waiver mod-
estly benefits the attorney-client privilege, while decreasing the efficacy
of costly governmental investigations.
188. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8.
189. Id.
190. See In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 235.
191. See, e.g., In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 229 F.R.D. 636, 646 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding
confidentiality agreement under which SEC could disclose documents as required by law or in
furtherance of its discharge of its duties and responsibilities to be "conditional" and thus "inconsis-
tent with those cases ... allowing selective waiver.").
192. See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 306-07 (referring to the attorney-client privilege, the
court states that "there is no reason to transform the work product doctrine into another 'brush on the
attorney's palette,' used as a sword rather than a shield.").
193. See id. at 307.
194. Id. at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (finding that the "exclusion of privileged information
conceals no probative evidence that would otherwise exist without the privilege").
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Upjohn stated that an asserted privilege must "serve[] public
ends."'195 A practical selective waiver rule will serve public ends by in-
creasing judicial economy and fairness among parties. The public inter-
est is clearly served when the government can expeditiously root out and
prosecute wrongdoing and provide prompt relief to injured parties.
196
Conversely, the public interest is not well-served when the government is
forced to obtain information through lengthy investigations that consume
precious government resources. 197 In contrast to the significant public
interest in recognizing a selective waiver privilege, a per se rule against
selective waiver in the government investigation context will exclude
reliable and probative evidence of wrongdoing. 1
98
The Tenth Circuit cites Branzburg v. Hayes'99 and the absence of a
selective waiver privilege from the nine specific privileges drafted by the
Judicial Conference Advisory committee, as evidence that a new selec-
tive waiver rule should not be allowed.2 °° In Branzburg, the Supreme
Court declined to create a new reporters' privilege against compulsion
from testifying before a grand jury given the lack of evidence that such a
privilege would restrict the flow of news to the public. 20 1 The Supreme
Court noted the public interest of pursuing and punishing criminal behav-
ior outweighs the interest in possible future news stories.20 2 If the public
interest in pursuing and punishing criminal behavior in the corporate
context is of such tantamount importance, why would a selective waiver
rule directed at that very goal, be unwise? Moreover, in rejecting the
proposed nine privileges and enacting Rule 501, Congress manifested an
affirmative intention not to "freeze the law of privilege., 20 3  Because
Congress rejected the Advisory Committee's nine-privilege proposal, the
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 501 is, unlike the Notes to most of the
other Rules, not to be solely relied on in construing the Rule. Rule 501
was introduced to "provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules
of privilege on a case-by-case basis," and to allow change. 204 The law
occasionally adheres to concepts long after experience suggests that a
195. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
196. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (privileges may be justified by a
"'public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining the truth."' (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting))).
197. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (recognizing that "[e]ncouraging corporations to
disclose their internal investigations confidentially allows the SEC to resolve its investigations
expeditiously and efficiently.").
198. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the
occasional injustice that will result from a categorical rule excluding all reliable and probative evi-
dence).
199. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
200. See In re Qwest Commcns. Intl, 450 F.3d at 1197.
201. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693-94.
202. Id. at 695.
203. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47.
204. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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change is necessary. 20 5 Reason and experience no longer justify so re-
strictive a privilege in the corporate investigation context.
Modification to the attorney-client privilege furthers the important
public interest in transparent corporate investigations without unduly
burdening the adversarial system.2°6 By protecting the documents, third-
party plaintiffs will be hard pressed to form a valid argument that they
will be adversely affected by not having access to the documents because
they would not be privy to the information in the first place.207 Further-
more, if the third-party can show sufficient need for the materials, they
will be able to obtain them through a court order.20 8 Thus, the justifica-
tion for rejecting selective waiver seems "inadequate to override the
strong public interest such a rule would serve.', 20 9  Because litigants
should have a reasonable expectation of privacy in disclosure of materi-
als during a government investigation, a rule of selective waiver should
be adopted.
D. Employee Communications with Corporate Counsel
Parties opposing selective waiver continually point to the purported
"chilling" affect such a rule may have on employee communication with
corporate counsel.210  However, given the nature of the em-
ployee/employer relationship, how likely is it that an employee will be
discouraged from disclosing pertinent information out of fear of disclo-
sure in subsequent litigation?21' Not a single circuit court case, bar asso-
ciation study, or scholarly article has provided a concrete answer; and
they cannot possibly because it depends entirely on the scope of the
waiver, which the courts have been unable to delineate. 212 The mere fact
205. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933) (declining to "enforce the ancient rule of
the common law under conditions as they now exist."); see also Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445,
471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting) ("When precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can
be made to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it.").
206. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at * 10-11.
207. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 ("Application of the attorney-client privilege to communication
such as those involved here ... puts an adversary in no worse position than if the communication
had never taken place."); Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 309 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (finding that the
"exclusion of privileged information conceals no probative evidence that would otherwise exist
without the privilege."); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 142 n. 14 (noting that it is not "inher-
ently unfair for a party to selectively disclose privileged information in one proceeding but not
another" because "when a client discloses privileged information to a government agency, the pri-
vate litigant in subsequent proceedings is no worse off than it would have been had the disclosure to
the agency not occurred."); Saito, 2002 WL 316572622, at *6 ("fairness has little relevance in the
context of selective waivers ... because disclosure to one adversary does not prejudice a subsequent
adversary any more than it would have if the initial disclosure had never been made.").
208. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (holding that "[w]here relevant
and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is
essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had.").
209. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *10.
210. See Brodsky, supra note 172, at 5 (referring to the uncertainty employees will feel if there
are no reliable privilege protections).
211. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. See Hon. Arlen Specter & Hon. Patrick Leahy, Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: The Negative Impact for Clients, Corporate Compliance, and the American Legal System,
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that a legal communication was made in an express or implied confiden-
tial relationship, such as between an employee and corporate counsel,
does not create or guarantee a privilege.213 Corporate obligations to
maintain promised confidentiality is limited to the amount of confidenti-
ality organizations have within their power granted by the law. Thus,
organizations cannot promise to keep factual revelations confidential in
the face of a valid discovery request that does not improperly invade the
attorney-client privilege.
Finally, there is no guarantee that an employee who discloses mis-
conduct to corporate counsel will not end up being the scapegoat at the
expense of a more legally sophisticated superior, who manages to remain
silent. 21 4  In other words, it is possible that the flawed attorney-client
dynamic that commentators attribute to government waiver policies actu-
ally pre-dates selective waiver.215 As a result, the alarms and doomsday
predictions over the degradation of the attomey-client privilege as a re-
sult of persistent waiver requests, could be much ado about nothing.
In essence, the only real protection an employee has is silence.216
But rarely do employees keep quiet about wrongdoing, either out of fear
of losing employment, loyalty to the company, or apprehension about
opposing a superior who has asked the employee to disclose the wrong-
doing.2 17 Whether the employee knows it or not, their communication
with corporate counsel is already "chilled," and there is no concrete evi-
dence that disclosure of that information during a government investiga-
tion will exacerbate that problem.
CONCLUSION
In today's enforcement environment, a waiver is not voluntary in a
real-world sense.218 The majority of courts have not caught on to that
fact and rule that the resulting disclosures are sufficiently voluntary to
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, at 11 (Sept. 12, 2006),
http://www.acca.com/public/attyclientpriv/coalitionsenjudtestimony.pdf. The submission reported
statistics from the survey conducted by the Association of Corporate Counsel that in-house lawyers
"believe" there will be a chilling effect on the candor of information from client. Id.
213. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2286 ("No pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail
against demand for the truth in a court ofjustice."); see Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682 n.21.
214. See United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 788 (2d Cir. 1976) (observing that a corpo-
ration could advance a defense that an employee had acted "ultra vires" on his own); MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2000); LERMAN, supra note 13, at 185.
215. Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response
to the Compelled- Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 897, 904 (2006).
216. White, 322 U.S. at 698-99.
217. Kathryn W. Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the Employee Owed
More Protection Than The Model Rules Provide?,'23 IND. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1990).
218. See Statement of Karen J. Mathis, President of the American Bar Association, before the
Committee on the Judiciary, at 4-5 (Sept 12, 2006) [hereinafter Statement of Karen J. Mathis],
available at http://www.abanet.org/.
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constitute a waiver.2 19 Thus, the common law does not take full consid-
eration of the legal authority wielded by government agencies to influ-
ence a waiver. In failing to recognize the pressures corporations face to
disclose materials and the lack of protection provided by current gov-
ernment practices and procedures, the Tenth Circuit, along with many
other courts and commentators, has lost sight of the larger picture in an
effort to protect the attorney-client privilege.
Now, more than ever, corporations have minimal protection from
government waiver requests. Since the DOJ and SEC have not ade-
quately addressed their current practices, 220 and because the courts can-
not seem to come to an understanding or define a clear rule regarding
selective waiver, Congress will have to address the matter.221 Congress
is the correct body of government to address the issue because a pro-
posed rule will alter the balance between two conflicting aspects of pub-
lic policy and will alter local variations that previously had undesirable
or ineffective results.222 Furthermore, Congress can override the con-
flicting case law and reach beyond limitations imposed on federal rules
to enact a statute applicable in the state courts and other forums not gov-
erned by Federal Rules of Evidence.223 With this oversight capacity,
Congress can send a message that current government policies that seek
waivers and the practical interpretations of prosecutors applying them are
at odds with the long-standing values of our jurisprudential system.224
219. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353 (noting that the government overstepped its bounds of
constitutionality when it pressured KPMG, facing indictment, into cutting off the legal fees of its
former personnel. The court found that KPMG's choice to do so was improperly influenced by the
Thompson Memorandum).
220. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
221. Congress is the correct governing body to enact a selective waiver rule because they have
congressional authority, conferred by the Commerce Clause, to regulate the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1940) (finding the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 is a valid delegation of constitutional power under the commerce clause). Simi-
larly, the Department of Justice is authorized, as an executive agency under the Judiciary Act of
1870, to enforce criminal and civil laws enacted by Congress. See Judiciary Act of 1870, ch. 150, 16
Stat. 162 (1870); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991) (finding that execu-
tive agencies may be called upon to enforce laws enacted under Congress' Article I powers). There-
fore, Congress, after enacting a selective waiver law, may call on other branches to assist in its
enforcement.
222. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (suggesting that Congress or the state legislatures should
consider implementing a proposed privilege); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074(b) (West 2007) ("Any such rule
creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless ap-
proved by an Act of Congress."); see Statement of Karen J. Mathis, supra note 218, at 13.
223. See Rosenblatt, supra note 176; see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947) (stating
the proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law, a conclusion mandated by the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)
("Under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution, '[t]he relative importance to the State of
its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law,' for 'any state law,
however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal
law, must yield."' (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962))); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
103 F.3d 1140, 1155 (3d Cir. 1997) (Congress "has recognized the importance of privilege rules
insofar as the truth-seeking process is concerned.. . It did so by identifying and designating the law
of privileges as a special area meriting greater legislative oversight.").
224. See Statement of Karen J. Mathis, supra note 218, at 13-14.
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The question then becomes: To what extent selective waiver should
be codified through congressional action? The popular "pro-
privilege/anti-waiver ''225 stance rejects selective waiver because it pur-
portedly weakens the attorney-client privilege;226 however, this position
fails to account for situations where a party exercised reasonable care
and prudence to protect information from disclosure to third parties, such
as a confidentiality agreement. 27 Other means, such as a new rule of
evidence, will provide scant relief from the problems that already plague
corporations. Reconstituting the privilege in such a way that takes into
consideration the current and foreseeable state of affairs will resolve the
circuit split and confirm the notion that privileges are not set in stone; but
rather, are meant to evolve over time. 28 Thus, reform efforts should be
directed towards defining the attorney-client privilege in a way that pre-
serves the protection in its most fundamental form, while encouraging
corporations to disclose information only in limited circumstances and
upon strict conformity with codified standards.
Adam Aldrich*
225. Brown, supra note 215, at 951.
226. See generally Statement of Karen J. Mathis, supra note 218.
227. Senator Spector of Pennsylvania introduced an attorney-client privilege bill in late 2006
that addressed problems that have developed since the Thompson Memorandum; however, the
ambiguous language of the proposal leaves open important questions concerning violations and
remedies if the law is broken. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://www.acc.com/public/attyclientpriv/thompsonmemoleg.pdf. Furthermore,
the categorical prohibition against waivers may create a worse situation than what we have now
because attorneys could stonewall prosecutors and render any investigation dead in the water. While
Senator Spector's bill is a well intentioned attempt to thwart the policies of various government
agencies, several issues need to be explored and clarified if Congress is going to pursue this or a
similar bill.
228. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958) (changes in privileges may be
"dictated by 'reason and experience').
* J.D. Candidate 2008.
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FEDERAL SENTENCING AND THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF
REASONABLENESS REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
This spring, the United States Supreme Court will consider how ap-
pellate courts have implemented the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines")' since rendering its opinion in United States v. Booker.2
At issue is whether the courts have violated Booker by giving the Guide-
lines excessive weight when reviewing district court sentences .
Issued in 2005, Booker held that mandatory Guidelines violated a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because they required
judges instead of juries to find facts that enhanced sentences.4 The Court
remedied the constitutional violation in a separate opinion by excising
two provisions from the federal sentencing statute.5 The first, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1), had mandated guideline sentences. 6 Removing this provi-
sion rendered the Guidelines "effectively advisory," 7 just one factor
among several that district courts would "consult ' 8 when imposing a
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 9 The court also excised a second
1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2006) [hereinafter USSG], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/TABCON06.htm.
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases relating to the
Guidelines: United States v. Rita (No. 06-5754) and United States v. Claiborne (No. 06-5618).
Supreme Court of the United States, Miscellaneous Orders of the Court (certiorari granted), No-
vember 3, 2006, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/l10306pzr.pdf.
3. See Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2.
4. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-27 (finding that the Sixth Amendment applied to mandatory
Guidelines). For an overview of Booker, see Craig Green, Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death
(and Rebirth?) of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93 GEO. L.J. 395 (2005).
5. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245, 259.
6. Id. at 245. Note that before Booker, district courts could depart from the Guidelines
range, but only in certain limited circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000).
7. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
8. Id. at 264.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) reads:
Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. The court shall impose a sentence suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph
(2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
shall consider -
(I) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed -
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for -
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provision relating to appellate standards of review of the mandatory
guideline sentences, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 10 Booker articulated a new
appellate standard whereby courts would review sentences for "unrea-
sonableness" in light of the § 3553(a) factors. 1
Though Booker was clear that the Guidelines' role in sentencing
and appellate review had changed, it was unclear exactly how.'2  The
Court did not explain what it would mean for judges to "consult" the
"effectively advisory" Guidelines, nor did it explain what weight they
would have among the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.13  The now-
amputated sentencing statute was similarly unclear, simply listing the
Guidelines among the sentencing factors. 14  Lacking specific guidance
from either Booker or the statute, federal courts themselves identified a
place for the Guidelines in the post-Booker landscape.
Some courts interpreted Booker as inaugurating a "sea change in
sentencing" and in the role of the Guidelines.15 This "Booker maximal-
ism ' ' 16 viewed Booker as having transformed a guideline-centric sentenc-
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of de
fendant as set forth in the guidelines-
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission... subject to any amendments made to
such guidelines by act of Congress... ; and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the defen
dant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guide
lines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission... taking into ac
count any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by an act of
Congress... ;
(5) any pertinent policy statement -
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission... subject to any amendments made to
such policy statement by an act of Congress... ; and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the defendant
is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar re-
cords who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
Id.
10. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
11. Id. at 260-61. The § 3553(a) factors are listed supra note 9.
12. See David J. D'Addio, Note, Sentencing After Booker. The Impact of Appellate Review on
Defendants' Rights, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 173, 176 (2006); Adam Lamparello, The Unreason-
ableness of "Reasonableness" Review: Assessing Appellate Sentencing Jurisprudence after Booker,
18 FED. SENT'G REP. 174 (2006); Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Institutional Concerns Inherent in
Sentencing Regimes: The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1350 (2005) ("What Booker has done depends on what Booker means. If [the
opinion] is prescribing 'advisory' guidelines in the purse sense of helpful, but legally nonbinding
advice to sentencing judges, this ruling would certainly transform the nature of federal
sentencing ... ").
13. See sources cited supra note 12. The potential problem of this ambiguity did not go
unnoticed at the time. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 311 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("[N]o one knows.
how advisory Guidelines and 'unreasonableness' review will function in practice.").
14. The Guidelines are listed as the fourth factor, § 3553(a)(4). See also Booker, 543 U.S. at
304-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (noting that the sentencing statute "provides no order of prior-
ity among all [the § 3553(a)] factors").
15. Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 665, 666-67 (2006).
16. Id. at 666.
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ing system into one where judges "exercise reasoned judgment in the
course of a holistic sentencing decision-making process.' 7  Booker
maximalism relied on a plain reading of Booker and § 3553(a) in arguing
that the Guidelines no longer had a privileged place in sentencing. In-
stead, they were "just one of a number of sentencing factors" for judges
to consider.1
8
Other courts interpreted Booker as having made only a "modest ad-
justment" to the Guidelines' role in sentencing.' 9 This "Booker minimal-
ism''1° saw the Guidelines, while no longer mandatory, as nevertheless
21
meriting "considerable weight" in sentencing and on appellate review.
Booker minimalism had different contours among different courts,2 2 but
its essence was always the same-i.e., that the Guidelines have a dispro-
portionate weight vis-A-vis the other § 3553(a) factors. 23 Courts justified
this approach by arguing, for example, that the Guidelines accounted for
the other § 3553(a) factors24 or that they had a special role in promoting
sentencing uniformity.
25
Booker directed appellate courts to review district court sentences
for "unreasonableness, 26 and several circuits adopted distinctly Booker
minimalist methods for doing so. One method treated guideline sen-
tences as "presumptively reasonable" when reviewed on appeal.27
17. Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing and Punishment: Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 387, 412 (2006).
18. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 986 (E.D. Wis. 2005); see also Simon v.
United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.N.Y. 2005). The Ranum opinion was the most prominent
early articulation of Booker maximalism. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND
POLICY 57 (Supp. 2005).
19. McConnell, supra note 15, at 666-67.
20. Id. at 666.
21. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005) (describing the promi-
nent role of the Guidelines in sentencing); United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir.
2006) (describing the "heavy weight" given to the Guidelines on appellate review). The Wilson
opinion, issued less than 24 hours after the Supreme Court handed down Booker, was the most
prominent early articulation of Booker minimalism. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 18, at 56.
22. See discussion infra Part l.A-B, Part IV.B. 1.
23. See McConnell, supra note 15, at 667.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2006) (asserting that
the Guidelines incorporate the § 3553(a) factors); United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 735 (6th
Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring) ("[T]he guidelines remain the one § 3553(a) factor that accounts
for all § 3553(a) factors."); Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The Guidelines, rather than
being at odds with the § 3553(a) factors, are instead the expert attempt of an experienced body to
weigh those factors in a variety of situations.").
25. See, e.g., Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 912; United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514,
519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en bane) ("To construct a reasonable sentence starting from scratch in every
case would defeat any chance at rough equality which remains a congressional objective."); Bu-
chanan, 449 F.3d at 738 (Sutton, J., concurring) ("Where else, at any rate, would a court of appeals
start in measuring the reasonableness of a sentence?"); United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 668
(8th Cir. 2006).
26. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61.
27. Six circuits have held that guideline sentences are presumptively reasonable. See United
States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 555 (5th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk,
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Courts would uphold these guideline sentences unless a party could show
unreasonableness in light of other § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 28 A sec-
ond popular Booker minimalist method of reasonableness review, "pro-
portionality," required that district courts provide "compelling reasons"
29whenever a sentence "substantially varie[d]" from the guideline range.
This spring, the Supreme Court will consider whether these two
Booker minimalist methods-presumptive reasonableness and propor-
tionality-can be part of a valid review for reasonableness. 30 An exami-
nation reveals that both are incompatible with Booker whenever there are
nonfrivolous § 3553(a) factors present for which the Guidelines either
fail to account or for which they inadequately account.
Part I of this comment outlines the Tenth Circuit's Booker minimal-
ist approach to reasonableness review, including its adoption of both
presumptive reasonableness and proportionality. Part II analyzes this
approach and the justifications the court offers for it. It also critiques the
court's apparent failure to address the "parsimony provision" at the heart
of § 3553(a). Part III argues that Booker minimalism is not unique to the
Tenth Circuit and that all of the other circuits share a guideline-centric
approach. Differences among circuits that have and have not adopted
presumptive reasonableness or proportionality, for example, tend to be
superficial rather than substantive. Part IV reviews what this spring's
two Supreme Court cases will mean for Booker minimalism. The super-
ficiality of the circuit disagreements about the issues the Court will con-
sider and the unusual facts in one of the cases raise interesting questions
about just what impact the decisions will have. Even if the Supreme
Court holds that presumptive reasonableness and proportionality are in-
valid methods of reasonableness review, it may have less of an impact on
Booker minimalism than might appear. Finally, Part V offers one ap-
proach to reasonableness review that rejects presumptive reasonableness
and proportionality whenever the Guidelines fail to account for or inade-
quately account for nonfrivolous factors that are properly considered
under § 3553(a). This approach would provide an appropriate balance
between guideline-centric Booker minimalism and the requirements of
Booker and § 3553(a).
415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006).
28. See, e.g., Mykytiuk, 435 F.3d at 608; Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Moreland,
437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729
(7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cage,
451 F.3d 585, 594 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1236-37 (11th Cir.
2006).
30. See Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2.
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I. BOOKER MINIMALISM AND THE TENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Booker3l requires appellate courts to review district
court sentences for reasonableness in light of the sentencing factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).32 These factors include the nature of the offense and
characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need for the sentence to
reflect the seriousness of the crime, to deter future criminal conduct, to
protect the public from further crimes, and to provide the defendant with
needed treatment.33  The statute also requires courts to consider the
Guidelines.3 4  If a sentence is unreasonable in light of these factors, it
must be reversed.3 5
While the Guidelines are only one § 3553(a) sentencing factor, the
essence of Booker minimalism is that they nevertheless have special
weight compared to the other factors.36 In its review of both guideline
and non-guideline sentences, the Tenth Circuit has adopted this Booker
minimalism. The court's preference for the Guidelines, though, is
checked by procedural requirements that ensure consideration of other
relevant § 3553(a) factors.
A. Components of Reasonableness Review and the Adoption of Pre-
sumptive Reasonableness
The Tenth Circuit outlined its approach to reasonableness review
and embraced Booker minimalism in United States v. Kristl.37 In Kristl,
the defendant pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm after having
been convicted of a felony.3 8 The district court calculated his guideline
range at 24-30 months, and sentenced him to 28 months. 39 The defen-
dant challenged the district court's guideline calculation and argued that
the sentence was unreasonable in light of Booker.40  While all of the
§ 3553(a) factors guide reasonableness review,4 ' Kristl's guideline-
specific appeal allowed the court to focus on the role of the Guidelines.
The court adopted a two-part approach to its sentencing review that
identified both procedural and substantive components of reasonable-
ness. 42  Procedural reasonableness asks whether a district court's sen-
31. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
32. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
33. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(1)-(2) (2000). All of the § 3553(a) factors a district court must con-
sider are listed supra note 9.
34. § 3553(a)(4).
35. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
36. See McConnell, supra note 15, at 667.
37. 437 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 2006).
38. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1052.
39. Id. at 1052-53.
40. Id. at 1053.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1055 ("[T]he reasonableness standard of review set forth in Booker necessarily
encompasses both the reasonableness of the length of the sentence, as well as the method by which
the sentence was calculated.").
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tence was "reasoned, or calculated using a legitimate method. ' ,43 In addi-
tion to a properly calculated guideline range, 44 procedural reasonableness
requires a district court to "consider[] the § 3553(a) factors and explain[]
its reasoning" for imposing a particular sentence.4 ' An improper guide-
line calculation or failure to consider a relevant § 3553(a) factor renders
a sentence procedurally unreasonable and therefore reversible.46 Because
claims of procedural unreasonableness assert that the district court made
a legal error, they are reviewed de novo on appeal.47
The second part of appellate reasonableness review is substantive.48
It asks whether "the underlying facts and conclusions support [the] par-
ticular sentence [length]" in light of the § 3553(a) factors.4 9 To assist in
this review for substantive reasonableness, the Tenth Circuit adopted a
Booker minimalist approach that gave the Guidelines a prominent role. 0
In particular, Kristl endorsed the approach of a number of other circuits
in holding that sentences within the guideline range are presumed rea-
sonable on appeal.51 This presumption of reasonableness is a "deferen-
tial standard" 52 that either a defendant or the government can rebut in
light of other § 3553(a) factors. 53 In the absence of such a rebuttal, how-
ever, a guideline sentence will be upheld as reasonable.54
After identifying the components of reasonableness review, Kristl
turned to the defendant's sentence.55  The court faulted the district
court's guideline calculation, finding that it had improperly accounted for
the defendant's criminal history.56 This error rendered the sentence pro-
cedurally unreasonable and resulted in a remand for resentencing.57
43. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 591 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Kristl, 437 F.3d at
1054-55.
44. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055. The Guidelines must always be calculated in every sentencing
decision, as they are listed in § 3553(a) as one of the factors that a sentencing judge must consider.
See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 748-49 (10th Cir. 2005).
45. Cage, 451 F.3d at 591.
46. Id.; Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1058-59.
47. See Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054 (noting a de novo review for claims that "consider[] the
district court's application" of the Guidelines or the other § 3553(a) factors); cf United States v.
Brown, 450 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir. 2006) ("We review the district court's interpretation of the Guide-
lines de novo.").
48. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
49. D'Addio, supra note 12, at 178.
50. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
51. Id. at 1053-55 (citing the adoption of presumptive reasonableness for guideline sentences
in the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth circuits, and adopting the presumption in the Tenth Circuit as
well).
52. Id. at 1054.
53. Id. at 1055.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1058-59.
57. Id. at 1059.
[Vol. 84:3
2007] FEDERAL SENTENCING & REASONABLENESS REVIEW 841
The framework for reasonableness review outlined in Kristl would
guide the Tenth Circuit in subsequent inquiries. 58 In addition to identify-
ing procedural and substantive components of reasonableness, Kristl held
that guideline sentences are presumed substantively reasonable. This
adoption of presumptive reasonableness marked the Tenth Circuit's en-
dorsement of Booker minimalism. The presumption meant that the
Guidelines would be the one § 3553(a) factor that always had to be con-
sidered and that would serve as the starting point in reasonableness re-
view.59 Presumptive reasonableness also gave the Guidelines a dispro-
portionate weight among the § 3553(a) sentencing factors because it pre-
sumed-in the absence of other evidence-that the Guidelines corre-
spond to reasonableness. 60  No other § 3553(a) factor had this special
weight.6a
B. Substantive Unreasonableness and Proportionality
The Tenth Circuit's method of reviewing non-guideline sentences
provides more evidence of Booker minimalism's prominence in the
court.
In United States v. Cage, 62 the court vacated a procedurally reason-
able non-guideline sentence after finding it substantively unreasonable.63
In that case, the defendant pled guilty to methamphetamine distribution
charges. 4 Her offense level and criminal history yielded a guideline
range of 46-57 months.65  The district court imposed a six-day sen-
tence,66 however, citing mitigating § 3553(a) factors as justification for
the variance.67 The factors included the defendant's son's medical prob-
lems, the defendant's minor role in the conspiracy, her lack of criminal
history, her education, employment history, and the unlikelihood she
would reoffend.68 Cage held that the district court properly considered
58. A number of subsequent Tenth Circuit reasonableness review cases cited Kristl. See, e.g.,
United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006); Cage, 451 F.3d at 591; United States
v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1116-17 (10th Cir. 2006).
59. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055; Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1264 ("The Guidelines continue to be the
starting point ... for this court's reasonableness review on appeal." (citing United States v. John H.
Sitting Bear, 436 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
60. See Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
61. See, e.g., Cage, 451 F.3d at 593 (noting that the Guidelines are "not just one factor among
many"); see also discussion infra Part I.B-C.
62. 451 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 2006).
63. Cage, 451 F.3d at 591. Cage was the Tenth Circuit's first substantively unreasonable
sentence after Booker. Id. ("This is an issue of first impression for this court; we have neither ex-
plained what causes a sentence below the recommended guidelines range sentence to be unreason-
able, nor how such decisions are treated on appeal."). Recall that in Kristl, the court vacated the
defendant's sentence on procedural rather than substantive grounds. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1058-59.
64. Cage, 451 F.3d at 587.
65. Id. at 588.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 588, 595.
68. Id. at 595.
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these mitigating factors under § 3553(a). 69  The problem with the sen-
tence, however, was in "the weight the district court placed on [the fac-
tors]. 7°
Cage then articulated a distinctly Booker minimalist method-
proportionality-of evaluating the substantive reasonableness of non-
guideline sentences. 7' Here, the six-day sentence was well below the
guideline range and not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness.72
The presumption of reasonableness for guideline sentences, however,
"[spoke] to how [the court] should consider sentences outside the guide-
lines range" as well. 73 The court held that for a non-guideline sentence
to withstand review for substantive reasonableness, the mitigating
§ 3553(a) factors must be proportional to the extent of the variance from
the guideline range. 74  Thus, an extraordinary variance "must be sup-
ported by extraordinary circumstances., 75  Applying the method to the
facts before it, Cage held that the sentence was unreasonable because the
defendant's circumstances did not justify such an "extraordinary" vari-
ance. 76
Though the variance in Cage was extreme, the case highlights the
influence of Booker minimalism in the Tenth Circuit's reasonableness
review. Regardless of the length of a sentence, the Guidelines are the
central measure of reasonableness. Sentences falling within them are
presumptively reasonable,77 while those falling outside of them must be
78
supported by justifications proportional to the variance.
The Tenth Circuit's reasonableness review for guideline as well as
non-guideline sentences therefore reflects a Booker minimalist approach.
69. Id. The Cage court did not explore the fact that some of the mitigating § 3553(a) factors
cited by the district court as reasons for varying the sentence downward were already accounted for
in the Guidelines. For example, a defendant's guideline offense level is already lowered if a defen-
dant had a "minimal" or "minor" role in the criminal activity. See USSG, supra note 1, § 3B1.2.
The Guidelines also account for a defendant's lack of criminal history. See id. § 4A1.1.
70. Cage, 451 F.3d at 595.
71. This spring, the Supreme Court will review precisely the same standard that the Cage
court elaborated here. See Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2 (discussing certiorari in
United States v. Claiborne).
72. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. (quoting United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he farther the
judge's sentence departs from the guidelines sentence . . . the more compelling the justification
based on factors in section 3553(a) that the judge must offer in order to enable the court of appeals to
assess the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.").
75. Id. (quoting United States v. Kendall, 446 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2006)). Cage emphasized
that departures above the Guidelines as well as those below are subject to the same appellate scru-
tiny. Id. at 595 n.5.
76. Id. at 594.
77. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054-55.
78. Subsequent Tenth Circuit cases have described proportionality in terms of degrees of
scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 907 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he extremity of
the variance between the actual sentence imposed and the applicable Guidelines range should deter-
mine the amount of scrutiny we give to the district court's substantive sentence.").
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C. Justifications for Booker Minimalism
Although the Guidelines are only one of the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors, the Tenth Circuit has justified giving them special weight in ap-
pellate review for three reasons.
First, the court has said that the Guidelines are the one § 3553(a)
factor that accounts for the other § 3553(a) factors.79 The Guidelines are
"the expert attempt" of the United States Sentencing Commission
("USSC") to "weigh [the § 3553(a) sentencing] factors in a variety of
situations." 80 As such, they "are generally an accurate application of
[these] factors" 8 ' and merit special weight.
82
Second, the court has said that in directing the USSC to promulgate
Guidelines, Congress intended that sentencing discretion "be limited by
the decisions of a publicly accountable body. 8 3  The Guidelines are
therefore unique among the § 3553(a) factors because they are "an ex-
pression of popular political will about sentencing." 84  Furthermore, in
saving the Guidelines by making them advisory, Booker "refus[ed] to use
the Sixth Amendment to nullify the entirety of Congress's purpose" in
establishing a responsive, democratic influence over sentencing. 85 Be-
cause that influence is represented in the Guidelines, they should con-
tinue to have a special place in appellate review.
Third, the court has asserted that Booker minimalism is important in
preventing "vastly divergent sentences" among those committing similar
crimes and having similar backgrounds.86 The court has emphasized that
Congress's intent in passing the 1984 Sentencing Act was promoting
sentencing uniformity.87 Because the Guidelines are the only sentencing
79. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594 (citing Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265); see also Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054
(citing United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 607 (7th Cir. 2005)). The Kristl court quoted
Mykytiuk's argument that Guidelines informed the other § 3553(a) factors, but did not explicitly
endorse this rationale itself, choosing instead to focus on the sentencing goal of uniformity. Id.
80. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265.
81. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594 (quoting Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265).
82. Id. at 593. ("It would be startling to discover that while Congress had created an expert
agency, approved the agency's members, directed the agency to promulgate Guidelines . . . and
adjusted those Guidelines over a period of fifteen years, that the resulting Guidelines did not well
serve" the § 3553(a)(2) purposes of sentencing. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d
910, 915 (D. Utah 2005))).
83. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 738).
87. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593 ("The ... approach, which we now adopt... make[s] the guide-
lines system advisory while maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the
offender's real conduct-a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that
Congress intended its Guidelines to achieve." (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246
(2005))).
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factor that provide a "uniform measure" in sentencing, they deserve spe-
cial weight among the § 3553(a) factors.88
D. Procedural Reasonableness as a Check on Booker Minimalism
While the Guidelines may have a special weight in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, deference to them is not absolute.89 One important limitation comes
in the distinction of procedural from substantive reasonableness.9" The
requirement that sentences be procedurally reasonable ensures that the
Guidelines are not the only relevant § 3553(a) factor used in sentenc-
ing.91
Procedural reasonableness requires, among other things, that a dis-
trict court consider a nonfrivolous argument based on § 3553(a) for a
non-guideline sentence. 92  In United States v. Sanchez-Juarez,93 the
Tenth Circuit vacated a sentence because the district court had apparently
failed to consider such an argument.94  In that case, the defendant dis-
puted a 16-level offense conduct increase in United States Sentencing
Guideline ("USSG") § 2L1.2.9' The defendant argued that the increase
was improper because it inaccurately accounted for a previous convic-
tion.96 At sentencing, the district court noted that it "[had] considered the
sentencing guidelines" but did not specifically address the argument
88. See Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 924 ("The only way of avoiding gross disparities in sen-
tencing from judge-to judge and district-to-district is for sentencing courts to apply some uniform
measure in all cases. The only standard currently available is the Sentencing Guidelines.").
89. The court has emphasized that the Guidelines cannot be "conclusively" reasonable be-
cause this would violate Booker's holding that the Guidelines are advisory. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054;
see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
90. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055; Cage, 451 F.3d at 591. Other circuits have also made this dis-
tinction. See Douglas A. Berman, Reasoning Through Reasonableness, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 142, 143 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/berman.html; D'Addio, supra note 12,
at 177, 179; see also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that reason-
ableness review "is not limited to consideration of the length of the sentence," but encompasses
procedural considerations as well); United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006)
("Reasonableness review involves both procedural and substantive components."); United States v.
Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005) (arguing that appellate courts must consider "not only the
length of the sentence but also the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district
court in reaching its sentencing determination"); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 488 (7th
Cir. 2005) ("[R]easonableness depends not only on the length of the sentence but on the process by
which it is imposed.").
91. See Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117; United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 675-
76 (7th Cir. 2005). Part IV examines why this distinction is important in this spring's Supreme
Court case reviewing presumptive reasonableness.
92. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117; cf United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir.
2006) ("[A] rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors should not suffice if at sentencing either the
defendant or the prosecution properly raises a ground of recognized legal merit (provided it has a
factual basis) and the court fails to address it." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); United States
v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Where a defendant raises a particular argument
in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defen-
dant's argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.").
93. 446 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2006).
94. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1118.
95. Id. at 1117. USSG § 2L1.2 is an offense conduct section in the Sentencing Guidelines
Manual relating to unlawful entry or stay in the United States. USSG, supra note 1, § 2L1.2.
96. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117.
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about USSG § 2L1.2. 97  The Sanchez-Juarez court held that this was
procedurally unreasonable:
[W]here a defendant has raised a nonfrivolous argument that the §
3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guidelines sentence and has ex-
pressly requested such a sentence, we must be able to discern from
the record that "the sentencing judge [did] not rest on the guidelines
alone, but ... consider[ed] whether the guidelines sentence actually
conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors."
98
Under the rule in Sanchez-Juarez, an unexplained guideline sentence will
not substitute for the § 3553(a) analysis procedural reasonableness re-
quires whenever a party makes a nonfrivolous argument about one of the
§ 3553(a) factors.
99
The presumption of reasonableness for guideline sentences, there-
fore, does not apply to the procedural component of a sentence. 100 In-
stead, it applies only to the sentence's substantive (length) component.',
This restriction on the scope of presumptive reasonableness is an impor-
tant limitation on Booker minimalism because it ensures that district
courts consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors rather than just the Guide-
lines.
10 2
II. EVALUATING THE BOOKER MINIMALIST APPROACH
The Tenth Circuit's approach to reasonableness review is problem-
atic on two major grounds. The first is that Booker minimalism lacks
support in the language of either United States v. Booker10 3 or the sen-
97. Id. at 1112.
98. Id. at 1117 (quoting Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 676); cf Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115 ("[A]
sentencing judge would commit a statutory error in violation of section 3553(a) if the judge failed to
'consider' the applicable Guidelines range (or arguably applicable ranges) as well as the other fac-
tors listed in section 3553(a) ....").
99. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117; cf Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554 ("Where a defendant
raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district
judge considered the defendant's argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.");
Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 675-76 ("[T]he sentencing judge may not rest on the guidelines alone, but
must, if asked by either party, consider whether the guidelines sentence actually conforms, in the
circumstances, to the statutory factors.").
100. See Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117; see also Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054 (noting a de novo
review for claims that "consider[] the district court's application" of the Guidelines or the other §
3553(a) factors).
101. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1.
102. Note, however, that a party must argue the nonfrivolous § 3553(a) factor(s) at sentencing.
A failure to do so may mean that a district court's guideline sentence will be upheld even if the court
failed to make a formal § 3553(a) analysis. See United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1222
(10th Cir. 2006) ("We do not require a ritualistic incantation to establish consideration of a legal
issue, nor do we demand that the district court recite any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its
responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider." (quoting
United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 2004))); see also United States v. Martinez,
455 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a sentencing court need not "consider individu-
ally each factor listed in § 3553(a) before issuing a sentence"); United States v. Paredes, 461 F.3d
1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2006).
103. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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tencing statute. The second is that the court's Booker minimalism has
not accounted for the parsimony provision in § 3553(a), which requires
that every sentence be the lowest necessary to achieve a number of sen-
tencing goals.
The justifications the court has offered for its approach only par-
tially address these problems. That the Guidelines reflect the § 3553(a)
factors and represent a democratic influence in sentencing are justifica-
tions that inaccurately account for the nature of the Guidelines. The
court's assertion that Booker minimalism promotes sentencing uniform-
ity, however, represents a stronger (albeit imperfect) justification for a
guideline-centric approach.
A. Lack of Textual Support for Booker Minimalism
When Booker excised the mandatory sentencing provision from the
sentencing statute, 10 4 it left the Guidelines as only one of several
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. 10 5 The Tenth Circuit nevertheless contin-
ued to view the Guidelines as "not just one factor among many."'10 6 Part
I showed that the Guidelines retained a disproportionate weight in appel-
late review compared to the other § 3553(a) factors. 10 7
The Booker opinion provides little textual support for Booker mini-
malism.10 8  One could argue that it hinted at the approach when it in-
structed courts to "consider Guidelines ranges" and to "tailor the sen-
tence in light of other [§ 3553(a)] statutory concerns."' 0 9 This could be
construed as instructing courts to give the Guidelines a prominent
weight. Booker minimalism does require that courts "consider" the
Guidelines as a starting point before "tailoring" them with the other
§ 3553(a) factors."0 One problem with this interpretation is that it rests
on a single ambiguous phrase from the opinion. Moreover, interpreting
it this way appears to conflict with other parts of Booker that do not indi-
cate that any one factor has special weight."' For example, another part
of the same opinion observes that without the mandatory provision, the
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000).
105. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
106. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 593 (10th Cir. 2006).
107. See discussion supra Part IA-B.
108. See, e.g., Stephen R. Sady, Guidelines Appeals: The Presumption of Reasonableness and
Reasonable Doubt, 18 FED SENT. R. 170 (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court's remedial opinion
in Booker "appears to specifically contemplate a reasonableness review unfettered by" Booker
minimalism and appellate review approaches such as presumptive reasonableness for guideline
sentences).
109. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46 (emphasis added).
110. See United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The Guidelines
continue to be the 'starting point' for district courts and for this court's reasonableness review on
appeal."); Cage, 451 F.3d at 592 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46); United States v. Andrews,
447 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 2006).
111. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 261 ("Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth
numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they
have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.").
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sentencing statute requires judges to "take account of the Guidelines to-
gether with other sentencing goals."
'"12
Nor does Booker minimalism follow from a plain reading of
§ 3553(a).1 3 The statute lists the Guidelines as the fourth of seven pri-
mary factors that a district court must consider when imposing a sen-
tence.' 4 It does not indicate a hierarchy among these factors" 5 or a pref-
erence for any."16 Along with Booker's silence about a minimalist ap-
proach, the sentencing statute's plain language provides critics with a
strong argument against Booker minimalism." 1
7
B. Lack of Consideration of the "Parsimony Provision"
Another problem with the Tenth Circuit's Booker minimalism is
that it has generally failed to address the "parsimony provision" in
§ 3553(a). The provision directs district courts to "impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary"" 8 to further policy goals in
§ 3553(a)(2)." 9 These goals include the need for a sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the crime, to deter future criminal conduct, to protect the
public from further crimes, and to provide the defendant with needed
treatment. 120 The Tenth Circuit has inadequately explored how its ap-
proach relates to the parsimony provision's requirement that sentences be
the lowest necessary to achieve these sentencing goals.'21
At times the court has appeared to confuse its appellate review for
reasonableness with a district court's obligation to impose a "sufficient,
but not greater than necessary" sentence. In United States v. Terrell,1
22
the court held that "just as we presume on appeal that a sentence within
the applicable guideline range is reasonable, so are district courts free to
112. Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). The statute is reprinted supra note 9.
114. Id. § 3553(a)(4).
115. Id. § 3553(a); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 304-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (noting
that the sentencing statute "provides no order of priority among all [the § 3553(a)] factors").
116. See Berman, supra note 90, at 143 ("Congress's nuanced sentencing instructions in §
3553(a) provide no textual basis for appellate courts to presume that all Guideline sentences are
reasonable.").
117. See id. at 142-44; Lamparello, supra note 12, at 174; Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra
Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, YALE L.J. POCKET PART, 137, 140 (2006),
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/gertner.html.
118. § 3553(a) (emphasis added).
119. Id. § 3553(a)(2).
120. Id. In their entirety, the section's policy provisions detail the need for a sentence im-
posed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to pro-
vide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.]
Id.
121. Id. § 3553(a).
122. 445 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2006).
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make the same presumption .... Booker, however, discussed rea-
sonableness in the context of appellate review of sentences, not in the
district courts' imposition of those sentences. 24 Reasonableness, and by
extension the presumption of reasonableness, are appellate rather than
sentencing devices. 125 A district court's responsibility under § 3553(a) is
not to impose a "reasonable" sentence, but to impose the lowest sentence
necessary to achieve the policy objectives in § 3553(a)(2). 126 Reason-
ableness is the standard by which the appellate court "judg[es] whether a
district court has accomplished [that] task." 127
The problem with the Tenth Circuit's confusion of the district and
appellate court roles is that it incorrectly tells district courts that a sen-
tence need only be "reasonable" rather than "sufficient, but not greater
than necessary." Shifting the district courts' focus to reasonableness can
lead to sentences that withstand appellate review for reasonableness but
nevertheless violate § 3553(a) because they are longer than necessary.
This problem is illustrated in United States v. Begay,'28 where the Tenth
Circuit noted that a district court "may impose a non-Guidelines sentence
if the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a) warrant it, even if a Guide-
lines sentence might also be reasonable."'129 Under § 3553(a)'s parsi-
mony provision, however, the district court must impose the lower sen-
tence. 130  The sentencing statute does not allow the district court to
choose a sentence from within a range of reasonable sentences; rather, it
requires a specific sentence. That specific sentence is the one "sufficient,
but not greater than necessary," to meet the goals of the sentencing stat-
ute. The Tenth Circuit has therefore improperly extended the concept of
reasonableness from the appellate level to the district court level.
Conflicts between Booker minimalism and the parsimony provision
are likely to occur whenever there are circumstances unaccounted for by
the Guidelines 13' but properly considered under other § 3553(a) fac-
123. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265 (emphasis added).
124. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61.
125. United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 740 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring); see
also United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 n.I (6th Cir. 2006) ("[A] district court's job is not
to impose a 'reasonable' sentence. Rather, a district court's mandate is to impose 'a sentence suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes' of section 3553(a)(2).").
126. § 3553(a); see also United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The
[sentencing] judge is not required-or indeed permitted-to 'presume' that a sentence within the
guidelines range is the correct sentence .... All he has to do is consider the guidelines and make
sure that the sentence he gives is within the statutory range and consistent with the sentencing factors
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." (internal citations omitted)).
127. Buchanan, 449 F.3d at 740 (Sutton, J., concurring) (quoting Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644
n.1).
128. 470 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2006).
129. Begay, 470 F.3d at 975-76 (emphasis added).
130. See United States v. Ministro-Tapia, 470 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[f]f a district
court were explicitly to conclude that two sentences equally served the statutory purpose of § 3553,
it could not, consistent with the parsimony clause, impose the higher.").
131. The Guidelines acknowledge that they fail to account for a number of possibly mitigating
"offender characteristics" that are properly considered under § 3553(a), such as a defendant's age,
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tors.132 The court has held that the Guidelines are "not just one factor
among many,"'' 33 and that they have a "heavy weight" in sentencing and
in appellate review.134 Yet it is unclear how or even whether the Guide-
lines account for a district court's primary § 3553(a) responsibility of
imposing a "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" sentence.
135
When there are mitigating circumstances present for which the Guide-
lines do not account, the "heavy weight" given to Guidelines may there-
fore result in a district court wrongly giving a sentence that is greater
than necessary.
The Tenth Circuit has also apparently failed to explore how the par-
simony provision specifically bears on its appellate review for reason-
ableness. A search of reported Tenth Circuit cases following Booker
shows that the court has rarely referenced the parsimony provision, ex-
cept when reprinting it as part of § 3553(a).1 36 Only in United States v.
Cage137 did the court discuss the parsimony provision as part of a district
court's sentencing responsibility. 138  Even then, though, the reference
was in passing and did not explore how the provision might relate to the
Guidelines. 139 Not knowing how the Guidelines relate to the parsimony
provision but nevertheless giving the Guidelines "heavy weight" impairs
the appellate court's judgment about the reasonableness or unreasonable-
ness of a district court's determination that a particular sentence was
"sufficient, but not greater than necessary."
This apparent failure to explore the relationship between the Guide-
lines and the parsimony provision is a result of the Tenth Circuit's
Booker minimalist approach. By endorsing presumptive reasonableness
and proportionality, the Tenth Circuit gave the Guidelines an important
weight in determining the reasonableness (or unreasonableness) of dis-
trict court sentences. 140  Yet it appears that in some instances the ap-
proach may incorrectly associate reasonableness with the guideline
educational skills, mental or physical condition, or family ties. See USSG, supra note 1, § 5Hl.1-
1.6; see also discussion infra Part I.C. 1.
132. A number of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors permit broad inquiry into the defendant's
characteristics. See, e.g., § 3553(a)(1) (instructing the district court to consider "the history and
characteristics of the defendant" when sentencing that defendant).
133. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
134. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1264.
135. The USSC has also not addressed this issue. See Berman, supra note 90, at 143 ("The
central command of § 3553(a) directs sentencing courts to 'impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes' of punishment .... The U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission has never fully explored-nor even formally addressed-whether the Guidelines serve this
mandate.").
136. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 415 F.3d 1234, 1249 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Resendiz-Patino, 420 F.3d 1177, 1184 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468
F.3d 1235, 1238 n.5 (10th Cir. 2006).
137. 451 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 2006).
138. Cage, 451 F.3d at 588.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055; Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
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range, possibly pushing district courts to impose sentences longer than
necessary.
C. Evaluating the Tenth Circuit's Justifications for Booker Minimalism
The justifications that the court has offered for its Booker minimal-
ism address the problems outlined above to varying degrees. As dis-
cussed previously, the Tenth Circuit has asserted that the Guidelines: (1)
reflect the other § 3553(a) factors, 141 (2) reflect a democratic influence in
sentencing, 42 and (3) promote sentencing uniformity.143 Implicit in these
justifications is that while Booker and § 3553(a) may not explicitly en-
dorse Booker minimalism, the Guidelines nevertheless have a unique
status among the § 3553(a) factors that justifies giving them special
weight.
1. The Guidelines Reflect the § 3553(a) Factors
The Tenth Circuit has asserted that the Guidelines are "generally an
accurate application of the factors listed in § 3553(a)."' 44 The Guidelines
are the product of "careful consideration" by an expert body-the
USSC-weighing and applying the sentencing factors "in a variety of
situations." 145 As such, the court has said, they merit special weight in
appellate review for reasonableness. 1
46
When sentencing a defendant, a district court takes into account two
types of considerations: "offense conduct" and "offender characteris-
tics. ' 147 Offense conduct relates to a defendant's actions on a particular
occasion: the type of crime committed, the harm that occurred, the
weapon used, the size of the financial loss, etc. 148 Offender characteris-
tics relate to a defendant's history or personal circumstances and can
include criminal history, employment status, physical or mental condi-
tion, or family and community ties.
149
141. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265.
142. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
143. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054.
144. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594 (citing Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265). This justification is not unique
to the Tenth Circuit. See also Buchanan, 449 F.3d at 735 (Sutton, J., concurring) ("[T]he guidelines
remain the one § 3553(a) factor that accounts for all § 3553(a) factors.").
145. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265. The USSC also views the Guidelines as reflecting the other
§ 3553(a) factors. See Statement of the Honorable Ricardo H. Hinojosa (United States Sentencing
Commission Chairman) before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Secu-
rity, February 10, 2005, at 4, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/hinojosa02l005.pdf
("[T]he factors the Sentencing Commission has been required to consider in developing the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines are a virtual mirror image of the factors sentencing courts are required to consider
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the Booker decision.").
146. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594.
147. Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in
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The Guidelines tend to focus on offense conduct 150 while simulta-
neously restricting consideration of offender characteristics.' 51 Section 2
of the Guidelines, devoted entirely to offense conduct, 52 requires district
courts to determine how numerous aspects of offense conduct correspond
to forty-three possible "offense levels."'' 53 At the same time, the Guide-
lines indicate that a number of offender characteristics are "not ordinarily
relevant" to a guideline range calculation. 54 These "not ordinarily rele-
vant" characteristics include: age (§ 5Hl.1); education and vocational
skills (§ 5H1.2); mental and emotional conditions (§ 5H1.3); physical
condition (§ 5H1.4); employment record (§ 5H1.5); family ties and re-
sponsibilities (§ 5H1.6); previous military, public, or charitable service
(§ 5H1. 11); and lack of guidance as a youth (§ 5H1.12).' 55 Interestingly,
the primary exception to the Guidelines' general exclusion of offender
characteristics is a defendant's criminal history, an aggravating factor
that when combined with the relevant offense level yields the guideline
sentencing range.156
While these offender characteristics may not be "ordinarily rele-
vant" to a guideline range calculation, they are always relevant to a sen-
tencing determination. The sentencing statute requires a district court to
"consider ... the history and characteristics of the defendant" when de-
termining a sentence.1 57 Yet as reviewed above, § 5H of the Guidelines
declares that much of this history and many of these characteristics are
"not ordinarily relevant" to a guideline calculation. 58
The Tenth Circuit's assertion that the Guidelines reflect the other
§ 3553(a) factors is therefore problematic because the Guidelines spe-
cifically exclude many offender characteristics relevant to a § 3553(a)
sentencing inquiry.1 59 By extension, the court's guideline-centric meth-
ods of reasonableness review (including the presumption of reasonable-
ness and proportionality) are also problematic whenever there are of-
fender characteristics unaccounted for by the Guidelines.
60
150. Id. at 282.
151. See id; Bowman, supra note 12, at 1347.
152. USSG, supra note 1, § 2.
153. Berman, supra note 147, at 282.
154. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H (introductory commentary).
155. Id. § 5H1.1-1.12; see also United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 986 (E.D. Wis.
2005) (identifying these and other characteristics not taken into account by the Guidelines).
156. Bowman, supra note 12, at 1324; Berman, supra note 147, at 283.
157. § 3553(a)(1).
158. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H (introductory commentary).
159. See Jason Hemandez, Presumptions of Reasonableness for Guideline Sentences After
Booker, 18 FED SENT. R. 252 (2006) ("[T]he section 3553(a) factors . .. tend to favor mitigating
circumstances due to restrictions on mitigating factors found in the Guidelines.").
160. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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The Tenth Circuit has implicitly recognized that the Guidelines im-
perfectly reflect the other § 3553(a) factors.1 61  In United States v.
Cage,162 for example, the district court justified a variance by citing a
number of mitigating offender characteristics, including the defendant's
educational level, work history, and extenuating family circumstances.
63
Section 5H of the Guidelines specifically excludes "education or voca-
tional skills," "employment record," and "family ties and responsibili-
ties ' from the guideline calculation. 64 Yet § 3553(a)(1) required the
district court to consider these circumstances when sentencing because
they related to the defendant's "history" and "characteristics.' '65 Cage
recognized this, observing that although the district court erred in the
weight it had given these factors, that they had been properly considered
under § 3553(a) was "beyond doubt."'166 In another case, United States v.
Mares,167 the court noted that a defendant's health problems could be
considered personal "history and characteristics" relevant under §
3553(a)( 1).168 The Guidelines, however, specifically exclude physical
condition from the guideline calculation.
169
The court's assertion that the Guidelines accurately reflect the other
§ 3553(a) factors is therefore flawed. They may generally reflect the
factors relating to offense conduct, but they specifically exclude numer-
ous offender characteristics relevant under § 3553(a).17
0
2. The Guidelines Reflect a Democratic Influence
The Tenth Circuit has also argued that the Guidelines are unique
because they reflect a democratic influence in sentencing. 17  According
to the court, Congress directed the USSC to promulgate the Guidelines
so that sentencing discretion would "be limited by the decisions of a pub-
licly accountable body.' 72  Because the Guidelines represent this "ex-
pression of popular political will," they deserve a special place among
the § 3553(a) factors.
173
161. Congress explicitly recognized this, having noted the need to "maintain[] sufficient flexi-
bility to permit individualized sentences" whenever warranted "by mitigating or aggravating factors
not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices." 28 U.S.C. §
991(b)(1)(B) (2000).
162. 451 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 2006). This case was discussed supra Part I.B.
163. Cage, 451 F.3d at 595.
164. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H1.2, § 5H1.5, § 5H1.6.
165. § 3553(a)(1) says that a sentencing court "shall consider" the "history and characteristics
of a defendant" when imposing a sentence. § 3553(a)(1).
166. Cage, 451 F.3d at 595.
167. 441 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2006).
168. Mares, 441 F.3d at 1161.
169. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H1.4.
170. Berman, supra note 147, at 282.
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One problem with this justification is how it conceives of the
USSC. The Commission was originally intended to be "a body of ex-
perts ... insulat[ed] from the distorting pressures of politics" rather than
a reflection of politics. 174 From this insulated position, the USSC was to
fashion the Guidelines to meet the "purposes of sentencing as set forth in
[§ 3553(a)(2).]' ' 175 The USSC has, however, come under the influence of
"popular political will" in a way that some have argued is detrimental.
Over the years, the "power to make and influence sentencing rules has
migrated... from the U.S. Sentencing Commission... toward political
actors in Congress and [the Department of Justice].' 7 6
The USSC's ability to independently fashion the Guidelines in ac-
cordance with its Congressional mandate has therefore been weak-
ened. 177  Furthermore, those external political forces tend to be "uni-
formly aligned in one direction-that of increasing penalties.' 78  In
some cases this brings the political influences in conflict with the policy
objectives in § 3553(a)(2), which require judges to adjust sentences in
light of a defendant's individual circumstances. 
179
The court's argument that the Guidelines deserve a special weight
because they reflect a democratic influence in sentencing is therefore
also problematic.
3. The Guidelines Promote Uniformity
Finally, the court has justified its Booker minimalism by arguing
that the Guidelines promote sentencing uniformity. 80 Though imperfect,
this justification does provide the court with a compelling basis for its
guideline-centric approach.
The strength of the uniformity justification is in the origin of the
sentencing statute and the Guidelines. After over a decade of debate
about disparity in sentencing, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform
Act as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.81 The
174. Bowman, supra note 12, at 1324 (internal citations omitted).
175. § 991(b)(1)(A). These are the same purposes in sentencing that judges are required to
consider when imposing a sentence-i.e., the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to deter future criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes, and to provide the
defendant with needed treatment. § 3553(a)(2).
176. Bowman, supra note 12, at 1319; see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a
Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236
(2005); Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional Sentenc-
ing After United States v. Booker: Why and How the Guidelines Do Not Comply With § 3553(a), 30
CHAMPION 32, 35-36 (2006) (noting, among other things, that the Department of Justice and other
law enforcement agencies "are allowed to communicate with the [USSC] in secret").
177. Bowman, supra note 12, at 1340-42 (discussing both the Justice Department's "decreas-
ing deference" to the USSC as well as Congressional usurpation of the USSC's role).
178. Id. at 1345.
179. See § 3553(a)(2), reprinted supra note 9.
180. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054; Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
181. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2005) [hereinafter USSC OVERVIEW], available at
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legislation established the USSC and charged it with promulgating the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 8 2  In doing so, Congress intended pri-
marily to structure the previously "unfettered sentencing discretion ac-
corded to federal trial judges" so as to achieve more uniformity and cer-
tainty in sentencing. 8 3  Congress specifically instructed the USSC to
draft Guidelines to avoid "unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct.. ,,1 84
Some have argued, however, that the inconspicuous placement of
sentencing uniformity among the § 3553(a) factors 85 means that the
Guidelines should be weighted as "only one of seven distinct sentencing
considerations."'' 86  The difficulty with this argument is that does not
account for the primary historical motivation of the sentencing statute,
which was promoting sentencing uniformity.1 87 Booker itself explicitly
acknowledged that "Congress' basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act
was to move the sentencing system in the direction of increased uniform-
ity.' 88 Indeed, the importance Congress placed on the Guidelines fur-
thering uniformity was evidenced by the pre-Booker requirement that
that judges impose guideline sentences in most circumstances.
89
The goal of uniformity cannot justify the types of Sixth Amendment
violations that Booker prohibited. 90 Yet Booker was clear that "the ap-
plication of a 'reasonableness standard' was intended to .. .[achieve]
'honesty,' 'uniformity,' and 'proportionality' in sentencing, and to help
in avoiding 'excessive sentencing disparities."" 91  The Guidelines are
uniquely capable of promoting these goals. 92  Even critics of Booker
minimalism acknowledge that the Guidelines "can help frame, inform,
http://www.ussc.gov/generaVUSSCoverview_2005.pdf. For a more detailed review of how the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines came to be enacted, see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of
Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 223 (1993).
182. USSC OVERVIEW, supra note 181, at 1.
183. Id. at 1-2; see also Bowman, supra note 12, at 1324 (indicating that one of Congress's
intentions in creating the USSC was drafting a "rationalized federal criminal code"). One prominent
proponent of the Sentencing Reform Act was federal judge Marvin Frankel, who had described the
prior discretionary sentencing system as being "at war with such concepts... as equality, objectiv-
ity, and consistency in the law." MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER 10 (1973).
184. § 991(b)(l)(B).
185. § 3553 (a)(6).
186. Berman, supra note 17, at 421-22.
187. See supra note 184.
188. Booker, 543 U.S. at 253.
189. 18 U.S.C. 3553(b)(1) (2000). Booker excised this provision. 543 U.S. at 245.
190. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 263 ("We cannot and do not claim that use of a 'reasonableness'
standard will provide the uniformity that Congress originally sought to secure.").
191. United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at
264); see also Bowman, supra note 12, at 1322 (outlining Congress's motivations in reforming the
sentencing system).
192. Maloney, 466 F.3d at 668 (noting that the Guidelines serve as "a benchmark" in reason-
ableness review). See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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and regularize the exercise of reasoned judgment by different sentencing
judges."'193  The numerous considerations, tables, and calculations pro-
vide an important means of achieving the sentencing uniformity that
Congress envisioned. 1
94
The Guidelines thus provide a mechanism for achieving uniformity.
The mechanism, though, may not always be perfect.' 95  As detailed
above, in many instances a guideline range will fail to reflect important
offender characteristics. 96  Yet by providing a calculated and uniform
numerical measure in the guideline ranges, the Guidelines have an im-
portant role in furthering Congress's original goals. This important role
justifies a prominent place for the Guidelines in appellate review.
Part V presents a standard of reasonableness review that accounts
for the strength of the Guidelines as well as their weaknesses.
III. BOOKER MINIMALISM IN THE OTHER CIRCUITS
Guideline-centric Booker minimalism likely originated in the Tenth
Circuit. The day after the Supreme Court handed down United States v.
Booker,'97 a United States District Court Judge in Utah, Paul Cassell,
articulated a strong argument for Booker minimalism. 98 The need for
sentencing uniformity justified giving the Guidelines heavy weight,
Judge Cassell argued, and variances should occur only "in unusual cases
for clearly identified and persuasive reasons."' 199 This Booker minimal-
ism viewed Booker as having made only a "modest adjustment" to the
Guidelines' role.2 °° While no longer mandatory, the Guidelines would
nevertheless continue to have a disproportionate weight in sentencing.20'
193. Berman, supra note 90, at 144.
194. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 924 (D. Utah 2005) ("The only way of
avoiding gross disparities in sentencing from judge-to-judge and district-to-district is for sentencing
courts to apply some uniform measure in all cases. The only standard currently available is the
Sentencing Guidelines."); see also Buchanan, 449 F.3d at 738 (Sutton, J., concurring) ("Where else,
at any rate, would a court of appeals start in measuring the reasonableness of a sentence?"); United
States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) ("To construct a reasonable
sentence starting from scratch in every case would defeat any chance at rough equality which re-
mains a congressional objective.").
195. Some have questioned how effective the Guidelines are at achieving uniformity. See
generally Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2006).
196. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
197. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
198. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005). See DEMLErrNER ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 56 ("Leading sentencing judges were quick to see the importance of illuminating
the relevance of the guidelines in a post-Booker world. Within 24 hours of the Booker ruling, U.S.
District Judge Paul Cassell ... had issued a long opinion on exactly this point."). The Tenth Circuit
endorsed Wilson and has incorporated it into its argument for Booker minimalism. See United States
v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 593 (10th Cir. 2006).
199. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
200. McConnell, supra note 15, at 666-67.
201. Id. at 667; Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Booker minimalism was not universal, though, and a number of
other district courts quickly rejected it.20 2 In doing so, they argued that
Booker significantly changed the role of the Guidelines and had dramati-
cally increased judges' sentencing discretion.20 3 Under this Booker
maximalist approach, the Guidelines were "just one of a number of sen-
tencing factors.,
20 4
By the summer of 2005, Booker minimalism had moved to the ap-
pellate level as several circuits held that guideline sentences were pre-
sumptively reasonable on appeal.20 5 Some circuits declined to endorse
this presumption out of concern that it might conflict with the
§ 3553(a) sentencing analysis that Booker mandated.20 6 Other differ-
ences among the circuits arose as some adopted proportionality when
reviewing non-guideline sentences, holding that "the farther the judge's
sentence departs from the guidelines... the more compelling the justifi-
cation based on factors in section 3553(a)" must be.207
At first, these circuit splits appeared to highlight very different ap-
proaches to reasonableness review. 20 8 However, an examination of the
relevant case law in the two years since Booker reveals that these differ-
ences among the circuits tended to be more superficial than substan-
tive.20 9  Booker maximalism did not move to the appellate level as
Booker minimalism had. Indeed, all of the circuits eventually adopted a
Booker minimalist approach to reasonableness review that gave the
Guidelines special weight among the § 3553(a) factors. 210  Whether a
circuit adopted presumptive reasonableness or proportionality was there-
fore less significant than might otherwise seem since the Guidelines re-
mained prominent in appellate review.211
202. See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985-86 (E.D. Wis. 2005); Simon
v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.N.Y. 2005).
203. McConnell, supra note 15, at 666 (describing how, under Booker maximalism, "district
courts are liberated to sentence criminal defendants in accordance with the judge's sense of individu-
alized justice, with the Guidelines merely taken into 'consideration' for what they are worth").
204. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 985; see also Simon, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
205. Sady, supra note 108, at 170 (citing United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th
Cir. 2005) and United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005) as among the first cases
endorsing presumptive reasonableness).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc); see
also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005).
207. United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005); cf United States v. Rattoballi,
452 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[W]e note that several other circuits have endorsed a rule that
requires district courts to offer a more compelling accounting the farther a sentence deviates from
the advisory Guidelines range .... [W]e have yet to adopt this standard as a rule in this circuit, and
do not do so here.").
208. See, e.g., DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 18, at 65.
209. See discussion infra Part IlI.A-C. Note that while circuit courts may have adopted
Booker minimalism, not all district courts have done so. Some weigh the Guidelines the same as
any other § 3553(a) factor. See, e.g., Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 986; Simon, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
210. See discussion infra Part III.A-C.
211. Part IV explores how this relates to the particular issues that the Supreme Court will
consider this spring.
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A. Reasonableness Review and the Presumption of Reasonableness
The clearest indicator of a court's Booker minimalist approach to
appellate review is its presumption of reasonableness for guideline sen-
212tences. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits
all endorse this presumption of reasonableness. 213  In these circuits, a
party challenging a guideline sentence must rebut the presumption of
214reasonableness in light of other § 3553(a) factors. 1  While the presump-
tion can function differently among these circuits,21 5 in all of them the
presumption gives the Guidelines a disproportionate weight compared to
the other sentencing factors.216
Five of the circuit courts-the First, Second, Third, Ninth, and
Eleventh-have declined to adopt this presumption of reasonableness for
guideline sentences, finding it "[un]helpful to talk about the guidelines as
'presumptively' controlling. 217  Though they formally reject the pre-
sumption, these courts tend to exhibit the same type of guideline-centric
Booker minimalism as those circuits that endorse it. For example, in all
circuits the Guidelines are the threshold consideration in sentencing as
well as in appellate review for reasonableness. 21 8 Furthermore, the cir-
cuits declining to endorse presumptive reasonableness nevertheless tend
to equate reasonableness with the Guidelines. The Second Circuit has
observed that "in the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sen-
tence . . . would be reasonable in the particular circumstances. 219 Simi-
212. See discussion supra Part I.A.
213. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435
F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716 (8th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006).
214. See, e.g., Alonzo, 435 F.3d at 554; Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608; Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
215. See discussion about the different meanings of presumptive reasonableness infra Part
IV.B. 1.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005); Cage, 451 F.3d at
593.
217. United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006); 440 F.3d at 518; see
also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005); 397 F.3d at 115; United States v.
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329-30 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Zavala, 443 F.3d 1165, 1168-70 (9th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 787 (11 th Cir. 2005).
218. See, e.g., Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518 ("[T]he district court will have to calculate the
applicable guidelines range ... before deciding whether to exercise its ... discretion to impose a
non-guidelines sentence. (emphasis added)); Cooper, 437 F.3d at 331 ("[The Guidelines] provide a
natural starting point for the determination of the appropriate level of punishment for criminal con-
duct."); United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[The] guideline range remains
the starting point for the sentencing decision."); United States v. Vargas-Garcia, 434 F.3d 345, 349
(5th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e must first consider the district court's calculation of the Guidelines before
turning to the broader reasonableness issues."); United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1279 (9th
Cir. 2006) (explaining that the first step in a reasonableness review is determining whether the
sentencing court correctly calculated the guideline range); United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261,
1264 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The Guidelines continue to be the starting point.., for this court's reason-
ableness review on appeal."); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("First, the
district court must consult the Guidelines and correctly calculate the range provided by the Guide-
lines.").
219. United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
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larly, the Third Circuit has held that a guideline sentence is "more likely
to be reasonable than one outside the guidelines range., 220 According to
the Ninth Circuit, "it is very likely that a Guideline calculation will yield
a site within the borders of reasonable sentencing territory. '221 And the
Eleventh Circuit has said that it would ordinarily "expect a sentence
within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.
'" 222
One prominent critic of Booker minimalism has argued that "nearly
all circuit court decisions are focused excessively on the guidelines when
judging reasonableness. '223  The special weight the circuits give the
Guidelines in relation to the other § 3553(a) factors is also reflected in
how they describe the Guidelines. For example, the First Circuit-which
has rejected presumptive reasonableness-has held that "the Guidelines
are more than just 'another [§ 3553(a)] factor.' '224 The Second Circuit,
another court rejecting presumptive reasonableness, describes the Guide-
lines as not "just 'another factor' in the statutory list. '225 This language
is strikingly similar to that of the Tenth Circuit, which has adopted pre-
sumptive reasonableness and has described the Guidelines as "not just
one factor among many., 226 In language and in use, therefore, all of the
circuits implement the Guidelines in much the same way.
B. Non-Guideline Sentences: Proportionality and Unreasonableness
Examining how circuits review non-guideline sentences for reason-
ableness provides more evidence of the prominence of Booker minimal-
ism. One method of reviewing these sentences is proportionality. Under
proportionality, "the farther the judge's sentence departs from the guide-
lines ... the more compelling the justification based on factors in section
3553(a)" must be.227
Not surprisingly, all of the circuits that have adopted presumptive
reasonableness for guideline sentences also evaluate non-guideline sen-
tences using proportionality.2
220. United States v. Lloyd, 469 F.3d 319, 321-22 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding a district court's
sentence when the sentencing judge indicated that "the guideline range is the thing that I should be
looking to primarily").
221. Zavala, 443 F.3dat 1170.
222. Talley, 431 F.3d at 787.
223. Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ (Aug. 22, 2006,
8:57AM).
224. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518. While the Jimenez-Beltre court justified its special
reliance on the Guidelines as "the only integration of the multiple factors," it emphasized that by
themselves the Guidelines are inadequate. Id.
225. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 133.
226. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
227. Dean, 414 F.3d at 729.
228. United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cit. 2006); United States v. Duhon,
440 F.3d 711, 715 (5th Cit. 2006); United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 495-497 (6th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029,
1033 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 594 (10th Cir. 2006).
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Significantly, two circuits that have formally rejected presumptive
reasonableness have nevertheless adopted proportionality. The First
Circuit has held that the farther a sentence varies from the guideline
range, "the more compelling the justification based on factors in section
3553(a)" must be. 229 The Eleventh Circuit has also held that "an extraor-
dinary reduction" from the guideline range "must be supported by ex-
traordinary circumstances. ' '230 More circuits have therefore adopted pro-
portionality than have adopted presumptive reasonableness.
Only the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have declined to for-
mally adopt either method of reasonableness review. However, even
these circuits use the Guidelines in a similar way to those endorsing pro-
portionality-i.e., as an important metric in evaluating the reasonable-
ness of a non-guideline sentence. For example, in United States v. Rat-
toballi,231 the Second Circuit expressly declined to adopt proportional-
ity232 but emphasized the special weight of the Guidelines and their role
"in calibrating the review for reasonableness."233  These circuits, like
those that use proportionality, closely examine a district court's variance
from the Guidelines by evaluating the "statement of reasons (or lack
thereof) for the sentence that it elect[ed] to impose. 234
The Guidelines thus have a central role in measuring reasonableness
in virtually all appellate review of district court sentencing.
C. Booker Minimalism and Post-Booker Sentencing Statistics
The Guidelines' place in appellate review among the circuits raises
an important issue in light of Booker's holding that mandatory Guide-
lines violate the Sixth Amendment.235 Per se unreasonableness for non-
guideline sentences would be constitutionally problematic under
Booker.2 36 Yet the circuits' treatment of the Guidelines may render them
outcome-determinative, an essentially mandatory regime indistinguish-
able from the one Booker struck down.
229. United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing the Seventh Circuit's Dean,
414 F.3d at 729).
230. United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1236-37 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
McVay, 447 F.3d 1348, 1357 (11 th Cir. 2006)).
231. 452 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2006).
232. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 134 ("[W]e have yet to adopt this [proportionality] standard as a
rule in this circuit, and do not do so here.").
233. Id. at 133; see also United States v. Ministro-Tapia, 470 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting that the Guidelines are to be used as the "benchmark" when considering a sentence).
234. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 134; cf Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 ("[W]hen the judge elects to give
a non-Guideline sentence, she should carefully articulate the reasons she concludes that the sentence
she has selected is appropriate for that defendant. These reasons should be fact specific .....
235. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-27.
236. Id. at 311 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("[A]ny system which held it per se unreasonable
(and hence reversible) for a sentencing judge to reject the Guidelines is indistinguishable from the
mandatory Guidelines system that the Court today holds unconstitutional.").
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One concern expressed about the presumption of reasonableness
and proportionality is the message that they send to district courts.
While § 3553(a) obligates district courts to impose a sentence "sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, '2 37 these popular appellate methods of
reasonableness review may have the effect of discouraging non-guideline
238sentences. As we have seen, however, even those circuits rejecting
presumptive reasonableness or proportionality tend to focus their appel-
late review around the Guidelines. According to critics, the atmosphere
of appellate review among every circuit "encourage[es] the sort of rote,
mechanistic reliance on the Guidelines that [the Booker substantive]
opinion found constitutionally problematic.,
239
Sentencing statistics bolster arguments that Booker failed to "radi-
cally transform[] essential federal sentencing dynamics" and that "post-
Booker sentencing may not be too different from pre-Booker sentenc-
ing." 240 In March 2006, the USSC issued a report about the impact of
Booker on federal sentencing.24' The report concluded that "Booker has
not radically altered many central features of the federal sentencing sys-
tem: Guideline calculations based on judicial fact-finding, and within-
guideline sentencing outcomes, remain the norm. 242  When guideline
sentences were combined with below-range sentences sponsored by the
Government, they equaled approximately 86 percent of all sentences.
243
One particularly telling statistic is that since Booker, only one court has
vacated a guideline sentence for substantive unreasonableness. 2 " The
rarity of such a holding reflects the prominence of the Guidelines among
circuit courts.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
238. United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 740 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring) ("If
I have one anxiety about the presumption [of reasonableness], it is the risk that it will cast a discour-
aging shadow on trial judges who otherwise would grant variances in exercising their independent
judgment.").
239. Berman, supra note 90, at 143.
240. Douglas A. Berman, Assessing Federal Sentencing After Booker, 17 FED. SENT. R. 291,
291-92 (2005); see also Gertner, supra note 11.7, at 140 (noting the similarities between pre-Booker
decisions and those in circuits that had adopted presumptive reasonableness); Frank 0. Bowman, III,
'Tis a Gift to be Simple: A Model Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 FED. SENT. R.
301 (2006) ("[T]he federal sentencing debate ... since Booker has mostly been about whether the
post-Booker guidelines are really any different from the pre-Booker guidelines." (citation omitted)).
241. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, March 2006, [hereinafter USSC FINAL REPORT], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/bookerreport/Booker-Report.pdf.
242. Douglas A. Berman, Now What? The Post-Booker Challenge for Congress and the Sen-
tencing Commission, 18 Fed. Sent. R. 157 (2006); see also USSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 241, at
vi ("The majority of federal cases continue to be sentenced in conformance with the sentencing
guidelines.").
243. USSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 241, at 46; see also Statement of the Honorable Ricardo
H. Hinojosa before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, March
16, 2006, at 6, available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report/031606Booker/ 2OTestimony.pdf.
Note that there are greater variances among district courts than among the circuits themselves. See
USSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 241, at 85-86.
244. United States v. Lazenby, 439 F. 3d 928, 934 (8th Cir. 2006).
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A review of case law and sentencing statistics therefore reveals that
Booker minimalism suffuses virtually all of appellate review.245 In every
circuit, guideline sentences "are accorded a greater degree of deference,
and engender far less scrutiny" than those outside of the Guidelines. 46
Differences between the circuits that have adopted presumptive reason-
ableness or proportionality and those that have not tend to be superficial
rather than substantive.
This case law and these statistics raise a question about what impact
it would have if the Supreme Court declares this spring that presumptive
reasonableness or proportionality are unconstitutional when even those
circuits not adopting them embrace guideline-centric Booker minimal-
ism.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FUTURE OF BOOKER MINIMALISM
The Supreme Court will address the presumption of reasonableness
and proportionality in two cases this spring. The cases have the potential
to widely impact reasonableness review in the circuit courts. Whether
they will have this impact, though, is uncertain.
A. Introduction: Rita, Claiborne, and the Tension and Competing Goals
of Sentencing
Congress created the USSC and charged it with establishing policies
in the federal sentencing system to address specific purposes.247 These
included the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the crime, to
deter future criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes,
and to provide defendants with needed treatment.248 Congress intended
that the Guidelines would "provide certainty and fairness" in meeting
these purposes, and that they would "avoid[] unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct.,
249
Congress also recognized the limitations of a structured sentencing
system. To meet its intended purposes, the system would also need to
"maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences"
whenever warranted by circumstances unaccounted for by the Guide-
lines.25° Sentencing would also need to account for the parsimony provi-
sion at the heart of § 3553(a), which required district courts to impose the
245. See Eric Citron, Sentencing Review: Judgement, Justice, and the Judiciary, 115 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 150, 150 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/citron.html (noting that
despite the fact some circuits have nominally rejected presumptive reasonableness for Guidelines
sentences, "one can comb through mountains of case law from any circuit before finding a guideline
sentence reversed as unreasonable").
246. Lamparello, supra note 12, at 174.
247. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2000).
248. Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000)).
249. § 991(b)(1)(B).
250. Id.
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lowest sentence needed ("sufficient, but not greater than necessary") in
each case.2 1' Reaching this lowest sentence requires a district court to
consider how each defendant's unique "history and characteristics" relate
to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 2
There is thus a tension in sentencing between the uniformity pro-
moted by the Guidelines on one side, and the exercise of independent
judicial discretion required by § 3553(a) and Booker on the other. The
popularity of the presumption of reasonableness and proportionality
among the circuit courts serves to highlight this tension.
The Supreme Court has chosen United States v. Rita and United
States v. Claiborne as the vehicles for addressing the proper balance be-
tween the Guidelines and the other § 3553(a) sentencing factors.253 Rita
asks whether Booker prohibits applying a presumption of reasonableness
to guideline sentences, and Claiborne asks whether Booker prohibits
254proportionality as a method of evaluating non-guideline sentences.
A closer examination of Rita and Claiborne raises questions about
how they might impact Booker minimalism as it exists in the circuit
courts. Part of the uncertainty stems from the unusual definition of pre-
sumptive reasonableness in Rita. Because the "presumption of reason-
ableness" in Rita functions differently than it does in most other circuits,
the Supreme Court could issue a narrow ruling that would preserve the
presumption as it exists in these other circuits.
Claiborne reflects a mainstream approach to proportionality, but it
too leaves questions about its impact. Part III detailed how circuit courts
have uniformly embraced Booker minimalism's guideline-centric ap-
proach. This is true even though only some have formally adopted pro-
portionality. This raises the question of what impact it would have if the
Court finds that proportionality violates Booker. How would this affect
circuits that have not formally endorsed it as a method of reasonableness
review but nevertheless employ a guideline-centric approach? A similar
question arises with Rita and presumptive reasonableness-i.e., if the
presumption is struck down, can courts nevertheless continue to give the
Guidelines disproportionate weight among the sentencing factors?
It is unclear to what extent Rita and Claiborne will address these
questions. The Supreme Court could choose to narrow the scope of its
rulings to promote unanimity on what has been a contentious issue.255 A
251. § 3553(a).
252. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
253. Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2.
254. Id.
255. Chief Justice John Roberts has emphasized the importance of the Court deciding issues on
the "narrowest possible ground" so as to "promote[] clarity and guidance for... the lower courts."
Chief Justice John Roberts, Commencement Address at the Georgetown University Law Center
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narrow ruling, though, may portend an uncertain future for both Booker
minimalism and reasonableness review.
B. United States v. Rita and the Presumption of Reasonableness
The impact of Rita will depend on whether the Supreme Court
chooses to review the presumption of reasonableness as it relates only to
the procedural component of a sentence, or if the Court chooses to re-
view how it relates to the substantive component of a sentence as well.
This is an important distinction because it marks the difference between
an opinion that would have a broad effect and one that would have only a
limited effect.
1. Two Different Approaches to the Presumption of Reasonable-
ness
When reviewing district court sentences, the majority of circuits
have divided reasonableness into procedural and substantive compo-
nents.256 Procedural reasonableness asks whether the district court cor-
rectly calculated the applicable guideline range257 and whether it "con-
sidered the § 3553(a) factors and explained its reasoning" when imposing
a particular sentence. 258  Substantive reasonableness considers whether
the length of the sentence was reasonable in light of the facts of the case
and relevant § 3553(a) factors.
25 9
(May 21, 2006). The contentiousness of the issue is apparent in the fact that both the substantive and
remedial Booker opinions split 5-4. See McConnell, supra note 15, at 677-78.
256. Berman, supra note 90, at 143; D'Addio, supra note 12, at 177, 179; see also United
States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006) ("Reasonableness review involves both pro-
cedural and substantive components."); United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005)
(arguing that appellate courts must consider "not only the length of the sentence but also the factors
evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determina-
tion"); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 488 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[R]easonableness depends not
only on the length of the sentence but on the process by which it is imposed."); United States v.
Shannon, 414 F.3d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing procedural and substantive errors in sentenc-
ing); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he reasonableness standard
of review set forth in Booker necessarily encompasses both the reasonableness of the length of the
sentence, as well as the method by which the sentence was calculated.").
257. See, e.g., Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
258. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 591 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054-55); see also United States v. Dexta, 470 F.3d 612, 614-15
(6th Cir. 2006) ("[A] sentence is procedurally reasonable if the record demonstrates that the sentenc-
ing court addressed the relevant factors in reaching its conclusion"). Circuits that have not adopted
presumptive reasonableness have also recognized that reasonableness has a procedural component.
See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[A] sentencing judge would commit
a statutory error in violation of section 3553(a) if the judge failed to 'consider' the applicable Guide-
lines range (or arguably applicable ranges) as well as the other factors listed in section
3553(a) ...."); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2005) ("To determine if the
court acted reasonably in imposing the resulting sentence, we must first be satisfied the court exer-
cised its discretion by considering the relevant factors.").
259. See, e.g., United States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting the substantive
component of reasonableness review relates to "the length of the sentence") (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted); Paladino, 401 F.3d at 488 (noting that one aspect of reasonableness is
"the length of the sentence"); United States v. Mateo, 471 F.3d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 2006) ("We
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:3
As discussed in Part I, procedural reasonableness is a check on
Booker minimalism because in theory it prohibits courts from relying
solely on the Guidelines.260 An important part of procedural reasonable-
ness is "ensur[ing] that a sentencing court explains its reasoning to a suf-
ficient degree to allow for reasonable appellate review.",261 Section
3553(c) of the sentencing statute requires a district court "at the time of
sentencing" to "state in open court the reasons for the imposition of the
particular sentence., 262  The district court must therefore show that it
accounted for not only the Guidelines, but any other relevant § 3553(a)
factors raised by a defendant or by the government.263 A district court's
failure to address a nonfrivolous § 3553(a) argument renders the sentence
procedurally unreasonable and it should be vacated.26
In most circuits, the presumption of reasonableness does not attach
to the procedural component of a district court's sentence, even if that
sentence falls within the Guidelines.265 In fact, claims of procedural un-
determine substantive reasonableness by reference to the actual length of the sentence imposed in
relation to the sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a).").
260. See discussion supra Part I.D.
261. Dexta, 470 F.3d at 614.
262. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000).
263. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he sen-
tencing judge may not rest on the guidelines alone, but must, if asked by either party, consider
whether the guidelines sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors.");
Steven L. Chanenson, Write On!, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 146, 146 (2006)
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/chanenson.html ("[T]he sentencing judge must explain his
reasons, and meaningfully document how he grappled with the § 3553(a) factors to reach the sen-
tence imposed.").
264. Chanenson, supra note 263, at 148 ("[A] number of appellate panels have enforced the
statutory reasons requirement and reversed in cases in which the judge failed to provide a sufficient
explanation of the logic behind the sentence."); see also Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434 (holding that a
district court's sentence "may be procedurally unreasonable ... if the district court provides an
inadequate statement of reasons [under § 3553(a)]"); United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554
(6th Cir. 2006) ("Where a defendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the
record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant's argument and that the
judge explained the basis for rejecting it."); Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 676 ("[T]he sentencing judge
may not rest on the guidelines alone, but must, if asked by either party, consider whether the guide-
lines sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors."); United States v.
Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[W]here a defendant has raised a nonfrivo-
Ious argument that the § 3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guidelines sentence.., we must be able to
discern from the record that the sentencing judge [did] not rest on the guidelines alone." (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). Circuits rejecting presumptive reasonableness have held the
same. See, e.g., Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329 ("[A] rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors should not
suffice if at sentencing either the defendant or the prosecution properly raises a ground of recognized
legal merit (provided it has a factual basis) and the court fails to address it." (citation and quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Diaz-Arqueta, 447 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006) (reversing the
district court's sentence because it failed to consider relevant § 3553(a) factors). Note that despite
these strong authorities, sentencing statistics suggest that violations of procedural reasonableness are
not always reversed on such grounds. See discussion supra Part III.C; see also Comment Post of
Jeff Hurd to Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ (Jan. 20, 2007, 10:15
EST) and Response Post of Douglas Berman (Jan. 20, 2007, 10:15 EST) (noting that while many
circuits claim to reverse for procedural unreasonableness, sentencing statistics suggest they rarely
do).
265. See, e.g., Richardson. 437 F.3d at 554 (noting that the presumption of reasonableness
"does not relieve the sentencing court of its obligation to explain to the parties and the reviewing
court its reasons for imposing a particular sentence"); United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491,496 (6th
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reasonableness assert that the district court made a legal error, and as
such they are reviewed de novo on appeal.266 This is because while the
Guidelines might be an important factor in reasonableness review, "[a]
district court may not presume that they produce the 'correct' sen-
tence. 26 7 Booker itself indicated that part of reasonableness review re-
quires considering whether the district court accounted for relevant
§ 3553(a) factors: "Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth nu-
merous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide
appellate courts . . . in determining whether a sentence is unreason-
able.,,268
A district court's failure to indicate how it considered relevant
§ 3553(a) factors would leave the appellate court unable to determine
whether the district court weighted those factors reasonably or unrea-
sonably. 269 For this reason an appellate court may not presume the pro-
cedural reasonableness of a sentence simply because it falls within the
guideline range.2 7 ° Instead, the court must be able to determine clearly
from the record that the district court considered any relevant § 3553(a)
factors raised by a party.2 7'
That most appellate courts do not presume a guideline sentence is
procedurally reasonable means that the presumption applies only to the
substantive component of a sentence-i.e., its length.272  Indeed, it is
only after the appellate court is satisfied that the district court's sentence
was procedurally reasonable that the presumption of reasonableness or-
dinarily becomes relevant.273
Cir. 2006) (discussing the presumption of reasonableness in the context of substantive reasonable-
ness); Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 675-76; Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117.
266. See, e.g., Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054 (noting a de novo review for claims that "consider[] the
district court's application" of the Guidelines or the other § 3553(a) factors).
267. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); Cun-
ningham, 429 F.3d at 675-76.
268. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
269. See Chanenson, supra note 263, at 148 ("The key is to provide a window into the discre-
tionary sentencing process and to afford appellate courts something substantive to review.").
270. See, e.g., Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679 ("[W]henever a district judge is required to make
a discretionary ruling that is subject to appellate review, we have to satisfy ourselves, before we can
conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion, that he exercised his discretion, that is, that he
considered the factors relevant to that exercise." (emphasis added)); Demaree, 459 F.3d at 794-95.
271. Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679; Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554; Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at
1117.
272. Dexta, 470 F.3d at 614-15 (discussing the presumption of reasonableness in the context of
substantive reasonableness); Davis, 458 F.3d at 496 (discussing the presumption of reasonableness
in the context of substantive reasonableness); Cage, 451 F.3d at 591 (distinguishing procedural from
substantive reasonableness and discussing the presumption of reasonableness in a substantive con-
text); Mateo, 471 F.3d at 1166 ("We determine substantive reasonableness by reference to the actual
length of the sentence imposed in relation to the sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a).").
273. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 734 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing the
presumption of reasonableness in the context of substantive reasonableness); Davis, 458 F.3d at 496
(discussing the presumption of reasonableness in the context of substantive reasonableness). Further
evidence for this comes in the fact that when the district court's error is procedural, courts do not
usually apply the presumption of reasonableness. See, e.g., Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 680 (vacating
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Significantly, not all circuits treat the presumption of reasonable-
ness this way. The Fifth Circuit in particular appears to have adopted a
more dramatic Booker minimalist approach to appellate review. Under
the Fifth Circuit's approach, a district court's guideline calculation en-
compasses both procedural and substantive reasonableness.274 If a sen-
tence falls within the guideline range, on appeal the court "infer[s] that
the [district court] has considered all the [§ 3553(a) sentencing] fac-
tors., 275 The district court's failure to address a defendant's specific and
non-frivolous § 3553(a) arguments for a variance would not necessarily
constitute procedural error.276 Instead, "[w]hen the judge exercises her
discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states for
the record that she is doing so, little explanation is required.,
277
The Fifth Circuit's application of presumptive reasonableness to
both procedural and substantive components of a sentence is unusual,
however, and other circuits have explicitly rejected it.278  That the ap-
proach exists, though, is significant in the Rita case.
2. United States v. Rita
Although United States v. Rita comes from the Fourth Circuit, it
represents the unusual type of presumptive reasonableness that conflates
the procedural and substantive components of a sentence. Under the
majority rule outlined in the previous section, the facts in Rita would in
theory have led most circuits to vacate the sentence as procedurally un-
reasonable.279 Interestingly, this means that they would have decided the
case without presumptive reasonableness ever being relevant.28°
In Rita, the court reviewed a defendant's appeal from a jury convic-
tion and sentence on charges of perjury, obstruction of justice, and mak-
ing false statements. 281 The district court had sentenced the defendant to
33-months' imprisonment, which was within the guideline range.282 On
the lower court's sentence but neither discussing presumptive reasonableness nor "express[ing] [any]
view on the proper sentence"); Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117 (failing to consider presumptive
reasonableness when the error was procedural).
274. United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Sam,
467 F.3d 857, 864 (5th Cir. 2006) ("When the district court imposes a sentence falling within a
properly calculated Guidelines range, that sentence is presumptively reasonable and 'little explana-
tion is required."' (quoting Mares, 402 F.3d at 519)).
275. Mares, 402 F.3d at 519.
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329-30 ("At least one court has held a sentencing judge is
presumed to have considered all of the § 3553(a) factors ifa sentence is imposed within the applica-
ble guidelines range. United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005). We decline to
follow this approach.").
279. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
280. This is because the presumption of reasonableness typically becomes relevant only after
the appellate court has determined that a district court's sentence was procedurally reasonable. See
discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
281. United States v. Rita, 177 Fed. Appx. 357, 358 (4th Cir. 2006).
282. Rita, 177 Fed. Appx. at 358.
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appeal, the Rita court noted that a guideline sentence was entitled to pre-
sumption of reasonableness.2 83 The court held that the district court
correctly calculated the guideline range, "consider[ed] the factors set
forth in § 3553(a)," and consequently affirmed.284
Despite the Rita court's assertion that the district court had "con-
sider[ed] the factors set forth in § 3553(a)," the record appeared to show
that it had not.2 85 Before sentencing, the defendant argued for a below-
guideline variance based on his military service record, various health
problems, that he did not represent a threat to the public, and that he
would be a "likely ... target" in prison for having worked as a law en-
forcement officer with the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service.286 Prior to imposing its sentence, however, the district court
noted only that it was "unable to find that the sentencing guideline range
•.. is an inappropriate guideline range [for the crimes] . . . and under
3553, certainly the public needs to be protected., 287 The record did not
reflect any consideration of the defendant's arguments based on his mili-
tary record, physical condition, or service as a law enforcement offi-
cer.
2 8 8
Each of the defendant's arguments for a mitigated sentence were
unaccounted for in the Guidelines and would be properly considered
under § 3553(a). The guideline policy statements indicate that the
Guidelines do not account for a defendant's physical condition
(§ 5H1.4), employment record (§ 5H1.5), or previous military service
(§ 5H1.11).219 Yet § 3553(a) says that these factors "shall" be considered
"in determining the particular sentence to be imposed ' 290 because they
relate to "the history and characteristics of the defendant., 291 Addition-
ally, the district court failed to address the defendant's argument that his
physical safety in prison would be jeopardized because he had been a law
enforcement officer. Under § 3553(a)(2)(D), however, the district court
must consider the need to provide the defendant with "correctional
treatment in the most effective manner. 2 92 As such, all of the defen-
dant's § 3553(a) arguments that the district court ignored were relevant
and nonfrivolous.
283. Id. (citing United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006)).
284. Id.
285. Brief for Petitioner at 48, Rita v. United States, No. 06-5754 (Dec. 18, 2006), available at
http://www.fpdmdnc.org/Rita/RitaMeritsBrief.Final.pdf.
286. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 13-16, Rita v. United States, No. 06-5754 (Dec. 18,
2006).
287. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 285, at 48.
288. Id.
289. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H1.4, § 5H1.5, § 5H1. 11.
290. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
291. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
292. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
In asserting that the district court had "consider[ed] the factors set
forth in § 3553(a)" when the record appeared to reflect that it had not, the
Rita court conflated procedural and substantive reasonableness in a way
similar to that of the Fifth Circuit.293 Instead of vacating the sentence for
procedural unreasonableness, Rita "infer[red] that the [district court]
[had] considered all the [§ 3553(a) sentencing] factors" 294 simply be-
cause the sentence was a guideline sentence. Rita presumed that because
the sentence was a guideline sentence, it was both procedurally and sub-
stantively reasonable.
As detailed above, in most circuits a district court's failure to con-
sider a defendant's arguments about mitigating § 3553(a) factors would
render the sentence procedurally unreasonable.295 In fact, the Fourth
Circuit itself has stated this as well. In United States v. Moreland,296 the
court held that "[r]easonableness review involves both procedural and
substantive components," and a district court's sentence "may be proce-
durally unreasonable . .. if the district court provides an inadequate
statement of reasons [under § 3553(a)]. 297 Under the approach used by
most circuits-including the Fourth-the district court's sentence in Rita
should therefore have been reversed as procedurally unreasonable. 98
3. The Uncertain Effect of Rita
That the "presumption of reasonableness" in Rita means something
different than what it means in most circuits leaves a question about what
impact it would have if the Supreme Court were to rule that the presump-
tion violates Booker. According to the order list in Rita,299 the Court will
review three questions: (1) whether the district court's sentence was rea-
sonable, (2) whether Booker prohibits the presumption of reasonableness
for guideline sentences, and (3) whether the presumption can justify a
sentence unaccompanied by an explicit analysis of relevant § 3553(a)
factors.300 To affirm, the Supreme Court would have to find that a pre-
sumption of reasonableness can validly apply to both procedural (Ques-
tion 3) and substantive (Question 2) components of a sentence.
To vacate the sentence, however, the Court may-but need not-
decide the procedural and substantive questions. The facts in Rita would
allow the Court to remand the case on either (or both) of these issues.
293. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
294. Mares, 402 F.3d at 519.
295. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
296. 437 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2006).
297. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434.
298. In theory these courts would have reversed on these facts. In practice, though, proce-
durally unreasonable sentences are sometimes affirmed even though they are procedurally unreason-
able. See supra note 264 (discussing how statistics seem to indicate that at least some procedurally
unreasonable sentences are nevertheless affirmed).
299. See Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2.
300. Id.
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The Court could narrow the scope of its opinion by holding only that the
appellate court improperly applied the presumption of reasonableness to
the procedural component of the sentence. This would leave the ques-
tion of whether the presumption can apply to a sentence's substantive
component unanswered.
If the Court narrows its opinion in this way and holds only that Rita
erred in affirming the sentence because the district court did not consider
the defendant's § 3553(a) arguments, it would not represent a dramatic
departure from what most circuits already claim to be doing. Most cir-
cuits treat procedural reasonableness as a prerequisite to presumptive
reasonableness.30 1 Unlike in Rita, these circuits generally do not pre-
sume a sentence is procedurally reasonable simply because it falls within
the Guidelines. Only after the appellate court is satisfied that the district
court's sentence was procedurally reasonable does the presumption of
reasonableness become relevant-i.e., as it relates to the substantive
(length) component of the sentence.30 2 A decision striking down Rita on
narrow procedural reasonableness grounds would therefore leave the
majority of circuits exactly where they are currently.
At least one member of the Supreme Court has expressed a desire to
narrow the scope of the Court's rulings to promote unanimity on conten-
tious issues.30 3 A narrow opinion in Rita focused only on procedural
reasonableness may promote such unanimity within the Court, but it
would come at the price of a lost opportunity to clarify what role the
Guidelines should have in the substantive aspect of reasonableness re-
view. An opinion addressing how presumptive reasonableness applies
substantively to a sentence would have a much broader effect and would
assist courts in identifying the proper role of the Guidelines after Booker.
Part V proposes one approach to reasonableness review that ad-
dresses this substantive issue.
C. United States v. Claiborne and Proportionality
In the second Booker minimalism case to be decided this spring,
United States v. Claiborne,3° 4 the Supreme Court will review proportion-
ality and whether it is consistent with Booker to require that a district
court show extraordinary circumstances whenever its sentence substan-
tially varies from the Guidelines. 30 5 As detailed in Part III, all of the cir-
cuits except the Second, Third, and Ninth have adopted proportionality
as a part of their reasonableness review.30 6 The central issue that Clai-
301. See discussion supra Part 1V.B. 1.
302. Id.
303. Chief Justice John Roberts in particular has expressed this inclination. See supra note
255.
304. 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006).
305. See Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2.
306. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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borne presents is whether Booker permits an approach wherein the
Guidelines serve as the metric for determining if a sentence is unreason-
able.
As in Rita, the important question in Claiborne is how the Supreme
Court addresses the issue before it. Depending on how narrowly or
broadly the Court frames Claiborne, the case may or may not have a
substantial impact on guideline-centric Booker minimalism among the
circuits.
1. United States v. Claiborne
In Claiborne, the district court correctly calculated a 37-46 month
guideline range resulting from the defendant's guilty pleas for possession
of cocaine base.30 7 The court acknowledged the guideline range but sen-
tenced the defendant to 15 months.30 8 It justified the variance based on
the defendant's lack of criminal history, youth, the small quantity of
drugs involved, and the court's opinion that he was unlikely to commit
similar crimes in the future. 30 9 The government appealed the 15-month
sentence as unreasonable under § 3553(a).31 °
On appeal, Claiborne vacated the district court's below-guideline
sentence as substantively unreasonable. 31' The court examined the rea-
sons the district judge had cited for the variance and criticized some on




While the district court had "properly considered" the unlikelihood the
defendant would reoffend as a basis for its variance, Claiborne disputed
the weight that the finding should have based on the fact that the defen-
dant had been charged with possession of cocaine on more than one oc-
casion in the past.313 The Claiborne court did not comment on the dis-
trict court's other justification about the defendant's young age, but nev-
ertheless found that the district court's reasons for varying the sentence
were not "extraordinary. 3 14 Because a district court's reasons for vary-
ing a sentence must be compelling "to the extent of the difference be-
tween the [Guidelines] advisory range and the sentence imposed, 315 the
district court's "60 percent" downward variance from the lower end of
the Guideline range was "extraordinary... [and] not supported by com-
parably extraordinary circumstances.,
316








315. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423,426-27 (7th Cir. 2005)).
316. Id. The discrepancy between a sentence and the applicable guideline range is typically
described as either a percentage of a sentence's variance from the guideline range or simply the
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2. Proportionality: Non-Guideline Sentences Presumptively Unrea-
sonable?
Proportionality in Claiborne, as in other circuits, employs levels of
scrutiny when evaluating non-guideline sentences. District courts must
justify such sentences by citing extenuating offender characteristics or
offense conduct proportional to the extent of the variance.3 t7 Proportion-
ality asks if, in light of the extenuating § 3553(a) factors, the non-
guideline sentence was reasonable.3 t8
Appellate review of non-guideline sentences is an important issue
because it relates to the extent judges have discretion to individually tai-
lor sentences. 31 9  That the Guidelines were "advisory" and that judges
had more discretion to vary sentences is precisely what prevented the
Guidelines from being declared unconstitutional in Booker.320  Examin-
ing proportionality is therefore important because "it is the non-
Guideline presumptions, rather than the guideline presumptions, that
express most clearly the threat of appellate reversal associated with this
exercise of discretion.,
321
If proportionality means that non-guideline sentences are presumed
unreasonable on appeal, then post-Booker sentencing begins to look like
the mandatory system that Booker struck down.322 Claiborne arises from
the Eighth Circuit, which has held that guideline sentences are presump-
tively reasonable.323 When a court adopting presumptive reasonableness
also adopts proportionality, the question naturally arises whether there is
a presumption of unreasonableness for non-guideline sentences. The
circuit courts that have addressed this question have held that non-
guideline sentences are not presumptively unreasonable. 324  The courts
number of months' difference between the sentence and the guideline range. Compare Claiborne,
439 F.3d at 481 (focusing on the "60 percent" variance from the lower end of the guideline range),
with United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2006) (focusing on the "number of the
number of offense levels traversed by a variance").
317. See discussion supra Part IllB; see also United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 907 (10th
Cir. 2006) ("[T]he extremity of the variance between the actual sentence imposed and the applicable
Guidelines range should determine the amount of scrutiny we give to the district court's substantive
sentence.").
318. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594-95.
319. Citron, supra note 245, at 151.
320. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
321. Citron, supra note 245, at 151.
322. Hernandez, supra note 159, at 252.
323. Lincoln, 413 F.3d at 716.
324. See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 664-665 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Although sentences within the Guidelines range
are afforded a presumption of reasonableness, sentences falling outside the Guidelines range are
neither presumptively reasonable nor presumptively unreasonable."); United States v. Howard, 454
F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that although guideline
sentences are presumptively reasonable, it "does not mean, however, that a variance sentence is
presumptively unreasonable" (citation omitted)).
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recognize that such a holding "would transform an 'effectively advisory'
system.., into an effectively mandatory one" that violates Booker.
325
Interestingly, though, courts do not ignore the fact that guideline
sentences are presumptively reasonable when weighing non-guideline
sentences. 326 Indeed, in some cases "the presumption in favor of guide-
line sentences has been cited as a decisional factor in several cases where
the sentence imposed was a downward variance. 327
The fact that the presumption for Guideline sentences was even cited
in these cases suggests that the presumption's influence has begun to
creep into judges' consideration of all sentences .... In other words,
the very inference that should not be drawn from the presumption-
that non-Guideline sentences are presumptively unreasonable-may
be taking hold.
328
Regardless of what the circuit courts have asserted, using presumptive
reasonableness as a method of evaluating guideline sentences along with
proportionality as a method of evaluating non-guideline sentences may
be creating an implicit presumption of unreasonableness for non-
guideline sentences. This is an important issue that Claiborne allows the
Supreme Court to consider.
Part V proposes one approach to reasonableness review that would
refine the use of proportionality and address the concern that it inhibits
judicial discretion in violation of Booker.
3. Impact of Claiborne
The difficulty in evaluating proportionality is that the nature of its
inquiry-whether circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to justify
a substantial variance-"is not one that allows for precision in measure-
ment." 329 The Tenth Circuit, for example, has noted that "there are no
strict guideposts that invoke certain levels of scrutiny; there is no for-
mula into which we input the degree of divergence in order to generate
precisely how compelling the district court's reasons need be. 33 ° The
rule requiring "extraordinary circumstances" for "substantial variances"
may be so vague that it means very little outside the fact-specific context
of each particular case.
In Claiborne, the Supreme Court therefore faces the difficulty of
weighing an issue that is admittedly ambiguous and that varies in every
325. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1239-40 (quoting Moreland, 437 F.3d at 433).
326. Hemandez, supra note 159, at 252; see, e.g., Cage, 451 F.3d at 593 ("Our holding in
Kristl, that within-the-guidelines sentences are entitled to a presumption of reasonableness, speaks to
how we should consider sentences outside the guidelines range." (emphasis added)).
327. Hernandez, supra note 159, at 252.
328. Id. (internal footnote omitted).
329. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1240.
330. Id.
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instance. The Court will be reviewing whether circuits have erred in
requiring "extraordinary" circumstances when sentences "substantially"
vary from the Guidelines. Yet the circuits themselves have acknowl-
edged that these are difficult terms to define in a way that would allow
for a ruling that applies in every circuit.
The Claiborne case, like Rita, leaves the Court with significant lati-
tude in deciding the issue before it. What the decision will mean for
lower courts depends on how broadly the Supreme Court defines propor-
tionality. How would its rejection of proportionality affect those circuits
who do not explicitly adopt proportionality but nevertheless find the
Guidelines helpful "in calibrating the review for reasonableness"?
331
Would courts still be permitted to identify the Guidelines as "not just
another factor" and as deserving "heavy weight" in reasonableness re-
view?
332
These questions relate to the basic issue that Booker minimalism
presents-i.e., whether the Guidelines have a special weight in sentenc-
ing and in appellate review among the § 3553(a) factors. If the Court
rules on proportionality but fails to address the underlying issue of
Booker minimalism, the pattern of guideline sentences that has occurred
in the aftermath of Booker may continue.
V. BALANCING BOOKER MINIMALISM WITH BOOKER AND § 3553(a)
As previously discussed,333 Rita and Claiborne highlight the tension
existing between Booker minimalism on one side and the exercise of
independent judicial discretion required by § 3553(a) and Booker on the
other. The specific issues in these cases-presumptive reasonableness
and proportionality-are the vehicles that allow for the Supreme Court to
consider this tension.
A. A New Standard of Reasonableness Review
One way to balance this tension would be for district courts to im-
pose non-guideline sentences whenever the Guidelines fail to account for
or inadequately account for offense conduct or offender characteristics.
This would mean that the presumption of reasonableness and proportion-
ality violate Booker whenever nonfrivolous circumstances exist for
which the Guidelines do not already account or for which they inade-
quately account.334 This approach would provide an appropriate balance
between guideline-centric Booker minimalism and the requirements of
Booker and § 3553(a). It may also represent an improved approach to
331. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 133.
332. See Cage, 451 F.3d at 593; United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006).
333. See supra Part IV.A.
334. 1 am sincerely grateful to Benji McMurray for providing this basic formulation and for
assisting in developing it. See United States v. Sosa-Acosta, 06-4174, Appellant's Br. at 12-13.
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reasonableness review in the Tenth Circuit and is one way of addressing
Rita and Claiborne.
The Guidelines already account for a number of factors properly
considered under § 3553(a).3 35 This is not surprising considering that
Congress explicitly instructed the USSC to promulgate Guidelines that
would meet the "purposes of sentencing as set forth in [§ 3553(a)(2)]. ' 336
These are the same purposes that all of the § 3553(a) factors are directed
toward-i.e., the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense, to deter future criminal conduct, to protect the public from further
crimes, and to provide the defendant with needed treatment.337 So, for
example, the Guidelines contain a number of "adjustments" that can be
made to a guideline calculation based on the role that a defendant had in
a crime.338 If the defendant's role was "minimal" or "minor," it may
justify up to a four-level decrease in that defendant's offense level.33 9
Or, a defendant admitting guilt is entitled to a three-level decrease in his
or her offense level calculation. 340 A defendant's previous criminal his-
tory or lack thereof is also already part of the guideline calculation.341
When the Guidelines account for all relevant § 3553(a) factors in a
particular case, a guideline-centric approach is appropriate. In such
cases, a presumption of reasonableness for guideline sentences would not
violate Booker because the Guidelines reflect the relevant offender char-
acteristics and offense conduct.342 For the same reason, proportionality
would be a valid method of reviewing the sentence if it fell outside the
Guidelines.
As detailed in Part II, the Guidelines expressly avoid consideration
of a number of possibly mitigating offender characteristics.343 Because
these characteristics "are difficult to measure systematically and cannot
be easily plotted on a sentencing chart,",344 they are not ordinarily re-
flected in a guideline range. Such characteristics include, among others,
a defendant's age, physical or mental status, education, and military or
civil service.345
335. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 735-36 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (detailing how the Guidelines reflect other § 3553(a) factors); United States v. Wilson,
350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 915 (D. Utah 2005).
336. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2000).
337. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000).
338. USSG, supra note 1, § 3B 1.2.
339. Id.
340. Id. § 3El.1.
341. Id. § 4Al.1.
342. Note that this presumption would apply only to the substantive as opposed to the proce-
dural component of the sentence. See discussion supra Part IVA. I.
343. See supra Part II.C. 1.
344. Berman, supra note 147, at 290.
345. See USSG, supra note 1, § 5H1.1-1.12.
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Whenever such circumstances are present, the presumption of rea-
sonableness and proportionality inhibit the judicial discretion required by
Booker and § 3553(a).346 The reason these circumstances are not in-
cluded in the Guidelines is precisely because they require the type of
individualized judicial consideration that Congress had envisioned in
§ 3553(a) and that Booker had mandated. Their presence in a particular
case means that the Guidelines, by themselves, inadequately reflect the
relevant sentencing concerns. In such cases, presumptive reasonableness
and proportionality impair appellate courts' reasonableness review by
unjustifiably centering it around the Guidelines.
B. Cases Where the Guidelines Inadequately Reflect § 3553(a) Factors
Even in those cases where the Guidelines account for all relevant
§ 3553(a) factors, presumptive reasonableness and proportionality may
yet be inappropriate.
In particular, they should not be used whenever the Guidelines in-
adequately account for either offense conduct or offender characteris-
tics. 347 These situations can arise frequently. The most prominent and
criticized example of the Guidelines inadequately accounting for offense
conduct is the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity in sentencing.
348
Under this system, it takes 100 times less crack cocaine than it does
powder cocaine to equal the same offense level.349  Though the
crack/powder cocaine disparity may receive the most attention, other
examples can be found as well. One federal district court sentenced a
defendant to time served plus three months of supervised release for ille-
gal possession of a sawed-off shotgun even though the guideline range
called for a 20-30 month sentence.35 ° In justifying this variance, the
court cited the "almost innocent circumstances surrounding the shorten-
346. This applies only to nonfrivolous circumstances and arguments. See, e.g., United States v.
Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005) ("A sentencing judge has no more duty than we
appellate judges do to discuss every argument made by a litigant; arguments clearly without merit
can, and for the sake ofjudicial economy should, be passed over in silence." (citations omitted)).
347. Amy Baron-Evans, National Sentencing Resource Counsel for the Federal Public and
Community Defenders, has compiled a number of instances where courts have determined that the
Guidelines inaccurately account for offense conduct or offender characteristics. See Sentencing
Post-Booker, Apr. 10, 2006, at 13-14, http://www.fd.org/pdf lib/sentencing41006.pdf. The Myers
example given in this paragraph comes from Baron-Evans's compilation.
348. Id. at 15-16. The United States Sentencing Commission has questioned whether this
disparity is justified. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY viii (2002) [hereinafter USSC SPECIAL
REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/rcongress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf, see also
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST
FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW (2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/drugpolicy/
cracksinsystem_20061025.pdf.
349. USSC SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 348, at iv. Note that this is an issue in Claiborne as
well. United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 480-81 (8th Cir. 2006).
350. United States v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
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ing of the Defendant's gun" as one of a number of circumstances inade-
quately accounted for in the Guidelines.351
Courts have also recognized that the career offender Guideline
(USSG § 4B 1.1) in particular "can produce a penalty greater than neces-
sary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing." 352 For example, the Second
Circuit has noted that:
In some circumstances, a large disparity in [the relationship between
the Guideline-mandated increase and the nature of the previous
crime] might indicate that the career offender sentence provides a de-
terrent effect so in excess of what is required in light of the prior sen-
tences and especially the time served on those sentences as to consti-
tute a mitigating circumstance present "to a degree" not adequately
considered by the Commission.
353
In at least one instance the Tenth Circuit has expressed "grave misgiv-
ings" about whether the § 4B 1.1 career offender Guideline accurately
accounted for the facts in a particular case.3 54 In an opinion authored by
Judge McConnell, the court questioned whether a procedurally proper
16-level guideline enhancement for a previous conviction was neverthe-
less unreasonable in light of the nature of that previous crime. 355 Though
the defendant's attorney failed to raise the issue, the court on its own
indicated that this would be an instance where "an exercise of Booker
discretion could mitigate a sentence that does not fit the particular facts
of the case. 356
Presumptive reasonableness and proportionality thus violate Booker
not only when the Guidelines fail to address particular circumstances, but
also when the they fail to address the circumstances adequately. Prohib-
iting these methods of appellate review in such instances ensures that all
relevant offense conduct and offender characteristics are taken into ac-
count and that courts are able to appropriately exercise the judicial dis-
cretion required by § 3553(a).357
351. Myers, 353 F. Supp at 1032.
352. United States v. Fernandez, 436 F. Supp. 2d 983, 988 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (citing United
States v. Mishoe, 241 F.3d 214, 220 (2d Cir. 2001)).
353. Mishoe, 241 F.3d at 220.
354. United States v. Hemandez-Castillo, 449 F.3d 1127, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006).
355. Hernandez-Castillo, 449 F.3d at 1131.
356. Id. at 1132. Note that the Sanchez-Juarez case, which outlined the requirements of proce-
dural reasonableness in the Tenth Circuit, resulted from a defendant arguing that the Guidelines
inadequately accounted for a previous conviction. United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109,
1117 (10th Cir. 2006). See discussion supra Part I.D.
357. Cf Berman, supra note 147, at 288 ("[N]o matter what theories or goals are pursued
within a sentencing system, both offense conduct and offender characteristics should play a signifi-
cant role in sentencing decisionmaking.").
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CONCLUSION
United States v. Booker rendered the Guidelines "effectively advi-
sory," but post-Booker case law and sentencing statistics indicate that
courts nevertheless continued to view them as more than advisory. In-
deed, most adopted a "Booker minimalist" approach that interpreted the
case as having made only a modest adjustment to the role of the Guide-
lines. Though no longer mandatory, the Guidelines maintained a special
weight in sentencing and in appellate review compared to the other §
3553(a) sentencing factors.
The Tenth Circuit provides an example of how many appellate
courts adopted a Booker minimalist approach in reviewing district court
sentences for reasonableness. The court presumes that guideline sen-
tences are reasonable, but requires district courts to justify non-guideline
sentences by citing extenuating circumstances proportional to the extent
of the variances. Not all circuits adopted the "presumption of reason-
ableness" and "proportionality" methods of reviewing guideline and non-
guideline sentences. But even these circuits exhibit a Booker minimalist
approach to their review that tends to equate the Guidelines with reason-
ableness.
This spring, the Supreme Court will consider the presumption of
reasonableness and proportionality in the Rita and Claiborne cases. At
issue is whether these methods of appellate review violate Booker. The
prominence of Booker minimalism among even those circuits that reject
presumptive reasonableness and proportionality raises an important ques-
tion about what effect it would have if the Court were to strike down
either method. If the Court fails to address the underlying issue of
Booker minimalism-i.e., that the Guidelines have a special weight
among the § 3553(a) factors-the post-Booker pattern of guideline sen-
tences may continue.
In addition, the unusual definition of "presumption of reasonable-
ness" in Rita means that the Supreme Court could fashion a narrow opin-
ion that would have only a limited impact. Whereas in almost every cir-
cuit the presumption of reasonableness applies only to the substantive
(length) component of a district court's sentence, in Rita it applies to the
procedural component as well. The Court could reject the presumption
as it applies to procedural reasonableness without addressing its ordinary
application to substantive reasonableness. A narrow opinion focused
only on this procedural component might achieve greater unanimity
within the Court, but it would come at the price of a lost opportunity to
address how the presumption of reasonableness ordinarily functions in
appellate review.
The underlying issue in the Rita and Claiborne cases is the tension
that exists between Booker minimalism on one side and the exercise of
independent judicial discretion required by § 3553(a) and Booker on the
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
other. One compelling justification for guideline-centric Booker mini-
malism is the important role of the Guidelines in promoting sentencing
uniformity. The justification is imperfect, though, because the Guide-
lines do not account for a number of circumstances that judges must al-
ways consider when fashioning a "sufficient, but not greater than neces-
sary" sentence under § 3553(a). The Guidelines do not account for these
circumstances precisely because they merit individualized judicial con-
sideration. Furthermore, even when the Guidelines account for certain
circumstances, they may do so inadequately. Common examples include
the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity and the occasionally rigid ca-
reer offender guideline section. The individualized judicial consideration
required by Booker and § 3553(a) is therefore undermined by Booker
minimalism whenever the Guidelines fail to account for or inadequately
account for all relevant sentencing considerations.
One way to balance this tension would be for district courts to im-
pose non-guideline sentences whenever the Guidelines fail to account for
or inadequately account for offense conduct or offender characteristics.
This would mean that appellate courts should refrain from using the pre-
sumption of reasonableness or proportionality whenever nonfrivolous
circumstances exist for which the Guidelines do not already account or
for which they inadequately account. Rejecting presumptive reasonable-
ness or proportionality when these circumstances are present prevents
courts from unjustifiably centering their appellate review around the
Guidelines.
The approach to reasonableness review outlined here incorporates
the goal of sentencing uniformity but ensures that courts also account for
defendants' individual circumstances. A Booker minimalist approach
can aid courts in pursuing uniformity, but true uniformity can only be
achieved when circumstances that the Guidelines ignore or inaccurately
reflect are also considered. The sentencing statute, after all, calls for
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, not sentencing disparities
per se.358 Rejecting presumptive reasonableness or proportionality in
these cases may not yield a "formal outcome equality," 359 but any dis-
parities that result would not be unwarranted.36 ° Uniformity would thus
be achieved not by requiring equal sentencing outcomes, but by ensuring
that every defendant's sentence reflects the proper balance of sentencing
considerations. District courts should be secure in their ability to exer-
358. § 3553(a)(6).
359. Marc L. Miller, The Foundations of Law: Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J.
271,277 (2005)
360. § 3553(a)(6); see also Miller, supra note 359, at 275 (noting that "[Congress] sought to
reduce 'unwarranted' sentencing disparities though guidelines" and that variations were implicitly
warranted in the "listing [of] various factors for the Commission to consider .... ).
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cise "reasoned judgment '' 36' in sentencing whenever the Guidelines fail
to account for important § 3553(a) factors.
Jeffrey S. Hurd
361. Berman, supra note 17, at 388; see also Gertner, supra note 117, at 140-41 ("Reasonable-
ness review should mean . . . interpreting the Guidelines not as atomistic civil code rules, but in
context, in the light of all the § 3553(a) purposes.").
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PEOPLES V. CCA DETENTION CENTERS:
THE TENTH CIRCUIT LIMITS INMATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The costs of operating state-run prison systems are becoming in-
creasingly prolific. As a result, many states have resorted to using pri-
vately-run prisons to defray the costs, a strategy that appears to be work-
ing.' Practical and moral arguments regarding the privatization of pris-
ons aside, this development has also given rise to various legal questions.
One of these questions is whether federal prisoners may bring a damages
suit against the employees of these private prisons for constitutional vio-
lations.
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics2 in which it held that federal
agents may be held liable for monetary damages for constitutional viola-
tions.3 The increasing privatization of prisons has raised the issue of
whether an analogous suit may be brought against the employees of pri-
vately-run prisons. In Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers,4 a split deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit was the first circuit court to hold that the exis-
tence of a state remedy precluded the need for a federal cause of action
and thus denied Mr. Peoples relief.5 This decision was later vacated by a
twelve judge en banc decision that split 6-6.6 Subsequently, the Fourth
Circuit, citing Peoples, also held that these claims do not state a federal
cause of action when there is an adequate state law remedy.7 However,
district courts in other circuits have held that the existence of a state law
cause of action does not preclude federal relief.8 Thus, this issue has
divided not only the Tenth Circuit judges, but also the circuits them-
I. On average, states with 20% or more privately-run prisons had an average increase in
prison costs from 1997-2001 of 24.34%. This is significantly less than the increase for states with
less than 20% privately-run prisons, 32.72%. Importantly, of the six states in the Tenth Circuit,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Oklahoma have more than 20% privately-run prisons. In Utah, a state
with less than 20% privately run prisons, the cost per diem is $125.40, whereas in Oklahoma, the
cost is $43.34. Paul Guppy, Policy Brief, Private Prisons and the Public Interest: Improving Qual-
ity and Reducing Cost through Competition, WASH. POLICY CENTER, Feb. 2003, available at
http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/ConOutPrivatization/PBGuppyPrisonsPubliclnterest.html.
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
3. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
4. 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005) (2-1 decision), vacated, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006)
(en banc).
5. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108.
6. Peoples, 449 F.3d at 1099.
7. Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 296 (4th Cir. 2006).
8. See Vector Research Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys, 76 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir.
1996); Showengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1987).
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selves and is a subject that, as stated by Circuit Judge Ebel in his dissent-
ing opinion in Peoples, "ought to be decided by the Supreme Court."9
Part I of this article discusses the background of how causes of ac-
tion against federal officers evolved from related statutory provisions.
Part II discusses the majority and dissenting opinions from Peoples v.
CCA Detention Centers. Part III discusses related decisions from other
circuits. Part IV analyzes these conflicting views and argues that the
Tenth Circuit's position on this issue is inconsistent with Bivens' under-
lying rationale. Finally, in Part V, this comment concludes that this is an
issue that will likely reoccur frequently and will thus necessitate a Su-
preme Court decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Officers in state-run prisons may be sued for constitutional viola-
tions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."° In addition, since 1949, the Supreme
Court has held that federal officers may be sued for injunctive relief for
federal violations." However, until 1971, the Supreme Court had yet to
rule whether a plaintiff could sue federal officers for constitutional viola-
tions for money damages. 12 In Bivens, the Court answered this question
in the affirmative. 13 An analysis of the question whether private prison
employees should be subject to suits for damages flowing from constitu-
tional violations requires discussion of Bivens and its progeny.
9. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108 n.2 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omis-
sion taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
Thus, in order to prevail in a suit against a State under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove "that there was
state action. The reason for this is fundamental. The [F]ifth and [F]ourteenth Amendments, which.
. .guarantee due process of law, apply to the acts of state and federal governments, and not to the
acts of private parties or entities." Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration,
38 AM. U. L. REv. 531, 577 (1989). However, this potential for liability is tempered by the avail-
ability of qualified immunity. See Paul Howard Morris, The Impact of Constitutional Liability on
the Privatization Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 52 VAND. L. REV. 489, 504-08 (1999).
11. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 588 (4th ed. 2003) (citing Larson v. Do-
mestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949)).
12. Id.
13. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
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A. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics
Mr. Bivens alleged that federal narcotics agents entered his apart-
ment, arrested him in front of his family, and thoroughly searched his
home for drugs. 14 In addition, he was later forced to submit to a visual
strip search.' 5 He was never prosecuted. 6 Mr. Bivens brought suit in
district court, claiming the searches were in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.' 7 He sought money damages from the officers for
his humiliation and pain and suffering.' 8 The district court and Second
Circuit Court of Appeals both dismissed the case, holding that it "failed
to state a cause of action."19 Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that
"the Fourth Amendment does not provide a basis for a federal cause of
action for damages arising out of an unreasonable search and seizure.,
20
The courts concluded that Mr. Bivens' proper avenue of relief was
through a state law trespass claim.
2'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a violation of the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures "gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon...
unconstitutional conduct., 22 Specifically, the Court held that a constitu-
tional claim should not be confined to a state cause of action because
"the interests protected by state laws regulating ... the invasion of pri-
vacy[] and those protected by the Fourth Amendment[] ... may be in-
consistent or even hostile., 23 In addition, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protections are not "co-extensive to those found under state
law.",24  Finally, the Court concluded that even though the Fourth
Amendment does not explicitly allow for an award of money damages
for its violation, "'it is well settled that where legal rights have been in-
vaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done."'25 Thus, the Court reasoned that it may imply a constitu-
14. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971).
15. Id. Specifically, Mr. Bivens "claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental suffering." Id. at 3 89-90.
16. MICHAEL G. COLLINS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 350 (3d ed. 2001).
17. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
18. Id. at 390.
19. Id.
20. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 591 (citing Bivens. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 719 (2d. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
21. See Bivens, 409 F.2d 718, 726 (2d. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. 12, 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
22. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
23. Id. at 394.
24. Lumen N. Mulligan, Why Bivens Won't Die: The Legacy of Peoples v. CCA Detention
Centers, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 685, 688 (2005) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392-94).
25. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
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26tional cause of action when three conditions were met. First, there
must be a federal statute granting a right to sue.2 Second, there must be
no "special factors counseling hesitation.' '28 Finally, there must be no
special congressional declaration stating that money damages may not be
awarded for constitutional violations. 29 As none of these three considera-




Since Bivens was decided, the Court has consistently refused to ex-
pand its scope. In Davis v. Passman,31 the Court faced the question of
whether a congressman's female aide, who was fired because the con-
gressman wanted a male aide, could bring a Bivens claim.32 The Court
determined that Bivens was not necessary because the Fifth Amendment
directly implied a cause of action.33
In Carlson v. Green,34 a mother sued prison officials on behalf of
her deceased son, who she claimed was the victim of a violation of the
Eighth Amendment's guarantee from cruel and unusual punishment.35
She alleged that there had been gross inadequacies at the federal prison
where he had been incarcerated.36 For the first time, the Court was faced
with a situation where an alternate federal remedy was available, in this
case under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).37 In response to the
prison's claims that the FTCA precluded the Bivens claim, the Court
referenced language in Bivens and Davis that stated that the alternative
congressional remedy must be "explicitly declared to be a substitute for
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effec-
tive., 38 In addition, the Court held that there were four other reasons
why the Bivens claim should be allowed.39 First, the Bivens claim "in
addition to compensating victims, serves a deterrent purpose. ' '4° Second,
punitive damages were available in Bivens actions, but statutorily prohib-
ited in FTCA actions. 41 Third, jury trials are allowed in Bivens actions,





31. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
32. Davis, 442 U.S. at 230.
33. See id. at 243-44.
34. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
35. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16.
36. Id. at 16 n.1.
37. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 598.
38. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; Davis, 442 U.S. 245-47).
39. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20-2 1.
40. Id. at 21.
41. Id. at 21-22.
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but forbidden under the FTCA.42 Finally, the FTCA claims exist only if
"the [s]tate in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a
cause of action., 43  For these reasons the Court concluded that Ms.
Green's Bivens claim stated a valid cause of action. However, Davis and
Carlson are the only two instances when the Court has allowed money
damages against federal officers for constitutional violations.44
Most of the subsequent litigation involving Bivens claims has re-
stricted the cause of action's scope.45 For example, in Bush v. Lucas,46 a
NASA employee sued under the First Amendment, claiming he had been
demoted for critical statements he had made about the agency.47 The
Supreme Court upheld the district court's ruling that a Bivens cause of
action did not exist because of "the comprehensive procedural and sub-
stantive provisions giving meaningful remedies. 4a Moving away from
the "equally effective" language of Carlson, the Court held that a con-
gressionally created remedy would be sufficient to bar a Bivens claim, if
it provides a "meaningful remed[y]" . . . even if the other remedy does
not "provide complete relief for the plaintiff."49 Similarly, in Schweiker
v. Chilicky,50 the Court found the existence of merely adequate alterna-
tive congressional remedies to be dispositive. 51 In Schweiker, social se-
curity beneficiaries sued federal officers for violation of their due process
rights when they were denied their social security.52 The Court held that
"[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has
provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitu-
tional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we
have not created additional Bivens remedies. 53  Thus, both Bush and
Schweiker limited Bivens actions to circumstances in which created
remedies are inadequate. They dispensed with the notion that these
remedies must provide equal relief as those given by a Bivens cause of
action.
In addition to these restrictions, the Court also held in FDIC v.
Meyer54 that Bivens claims are not available against federal agencies.
55
A unanimous Court held that "an extension of Bivens to agencies of the
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. at 23.
44. Mulligan, supra note 24, at 689.
45. Id. at 689 (writing that Davis and Carlson are the only two cases where Bivens claims for
monetary damages against federal officers have been allowed.); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Male-
sko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001).
46. 42 U.S. 367 (1983).
47. Bush, 42 U.S. at 367.
48. Id. at 368.
49. Id. at 386-88.
50. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
51. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 425.
52. Id. at 417-19.
53. Id. at 423.
54. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
55. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486.
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federal government is not supported by the logic of Bivens itself.,
56 Jus-
tice Thomas, writing for the majority, stated "[i]t must be remembered
that the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.,
57
Similarly, in Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko,58 the
Court considered whether a federal inmate may bring a Bivens claim
against a privately run halfway house under contract with the Bureau of
Prisons.59 Mr. Malesko, who had a heart condition that entitled him to
use an elevator to get to his fifth floor room, was forced by an employee
to use the stairs.60 He suffered a heart attack.61 In its decision, the Court,
relying heavily on Meyer, held that the purpose of Bivens, is "to deter
individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations. 62
Also, the Court reasoned that because prisoners in federal institutions are
precluded from suing the Bureau of Prisons for constitutional violations,
a Bivens claim would be inappropriate.63 Finally, the Court held that the
existence of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons pre-
cluded a Bivens claim.64 However, the Court also made note that state
law tort claims were also available that are "unavailable to prisoners
housed in [g]overnment facilities.,, 65 This observation is especially sur-
prising in light of Bivens and Carlson, which stated that state tort causes
of action are insufficient to protect constitutional interests.66
Thus, while Bivens created a cause of action for damages claims
against federal officers for constitutional violations, subsequent decisions
have limited its scope. In Carlson, the Court held that only an equally
effective alternate remedy could prevent Bivens' application.67 Later, in
Bush and Schweiker, the Court held that even comparatively incomplete
remedies could bar a Bivens claim.68 Similarly, in Meyer the Court held
that Bivens claims are not available against federal agencies. 69 Finally,
in Malesko the Court concluded that the existence of alternate causes of
actions precluded Bivens from applying to suits against private organiza-
tions.70 Thus, the next logical question is whether employees of private
56. Id.
57. Id. at 485.
58. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
59. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 63.
60. Id. at 64.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 70; see also Mulligan, supra note 24, at 693 (characterizing this as the "no-entity-
liability principle").
63. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72; see also Mulligan, supra note 24, at 694 (characterizing this
as the "symmetry principle").
64. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74; see also Mulligan, supra note 24, at 694 (charactering this as the
"alternative-relief principle").
65. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72-73.
66. Mulligan, supra note 24, at 694 (describing the Malesko decision as "quite exceptional
given [the Court's] rulings in Bivens and Carlson...
67. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19.
68. Bush, 42 U.S. at 368; Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 425.
69. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486.
70. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74.
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organizations may be sued for constitutional violations under Bivens, a
situation addressed in Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers.7'
II. PEOPLES V. CCA DETENTION CENTERS
A. Facts
Mr. Peoples was a federal prisoner being held in a pretrial detention
center in Leavenworth, Kansas.72 The center was run by Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA), a for-profit corporation under contract
with the U.S. Marshals Service. 73 When Mr. Peoples arrived at the de-
tention center in July 2001, the Marshals Service directed CCA to hold
him at the Leavenworth facility while he awaited trial in Missouri.
CCA placed Mr. Peoples in isolation for thirteen months.75 Initially, Mr.
Peoples was segregated for administrative reasons. 76 However, the Mar-
shals Service and CCA determined that Mr. Peoples was an escape risk
and continued to keep him segregated without telling him why he was
being kept out of the general population.77 In addition, he was not al-
lowed a hearing on his segregation status for five months and did not
have access to a law library.78 He could, however, obtain legal materials
through an attorney, though he was limited to cases for which he had
exact citations.79 In addition, Mr. Peoples believed that his phone calls to
his attorneys were being monitored by CCA staff.
80
After thirteen months, Mr. Peoples was released into Pod-H of the
general population.81 Once there, he began to file several informal and
formal grievances to the CCA staff. In these complaints, he voiced his
concerns that he would be physically assaulted by the Mexican Mafia
gang, who were also in Pod-H, because of his affiliation with the Moor-
ish Science Group.82 Nonetheless, CCA did not transfer him.83 On the
morning of August 1, 2001, the Mexican Mafia assaulted Mr. Peoples. 
84
Again, he was not transferred.8 5 Later that same day, the gang attacked
71. 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005).
72. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1093.
73. Id.
74. Id.






81. Id. at 1093.
82. Id.; see also Brief for Appellant at 5, Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 449 F.3d 1097
(10th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-3071).
83. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1093.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1093-94.
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86him again. This time, however, they used padlocks, chains, and full
87 1soda cans. After this attack, CCA transferred Mr. Peoples to Pod-A.88
Mr. Peoples filed suit in the District of Kansas (Peoples 1), alleging
violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. 89 He sought punitive and
compensatory damages and the court construed his claim to implicate a
Bivens cause of action.90 Citing Malesko, the court held that because
"other remedies [were] available-including state negligence actions-
the Supreme Court would not extend Bivens to private employees of gov-
ernment contractors." 9' Accordingly, the court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.92
Mr. Peoples also filed a Bivens action in connection with his thir-
teen-month segregation and for his allegedly monitored phone calls
(Peoples 1/). 9 3 The district court rejected the defendants' jurisdictional
arguments.94 Instead, the court found that "because the Tenth Circuit has
not fully addressed the issue, the court will assume arguendo that a
Bivens action against individual employees is available and will examine
the sufficiency of the plaintiffs complaint., 95 The judge then granted all
of the defendants' motions to dismiss. 96 Mr. Peoples appealed both rul-
ings to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.97
B. The Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit, in a two-judge ruling (over a vigorous dissent
from Judge Ebel), began by addressing whether the court had proper
subject-matter jurisdiction.98 The court held that Mr. Peoples' claims
"easily [met] the basic requirements for federal-question jurisdiction"
and thus both district courts had proper subject-matter jurisdiction.99
Next, the court addressed whether a person may bring a Bivens
claim against employees of a private prison. 00 After first discussing
Bivens and its progeny, the court held that "there is no implied private
right of action for damages under Bivens against employees of a private
prison for alleged constitutional deprivations when alternative state or









95. Id. at 1094-95.
96. Id. at 1095.
97. Id. at 1094-95.
98. dat 1095.
99. Id. at 1095-96.
100. Id at 1096.
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federal causes of action for damages are available to the plaintiff."' 0 '
The court based its holding on Malesko, which held "that the purpose of
Bivens is only to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action
against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally [as in
Carlson], or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any
alternative remedy [as in Davis].'' 2
The court then anticipated the argument that Carlson should control
this case. 0 3 It distinguished between Carlson and Mr. Peoples' claim by
arguing that Carlson involved a situation where the FTCA allowed suit
against the United States, but there was no cause of action against indi-
vidual officers. 1°4 In other words, the cause of action against private
individuals was "otherwise nonexistent."'0 5 To buttress this reading of
Carlson, the court admitted that it recognized the tension between Carl-
son and Malesko, but resolved to side with the last decided case. 10 6 In
conclusion, the court held:
[A] Bivens claim should not be implied unless the plaintiff has no
other means of redress or unless he is seeking an otherwise nonexis-
tent cause of action against the individual defendant. Therefore, we
will not imply a Bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private
prison facility when we conclude that there exists an alternative cause
of action arising under either state or federal law against the individ-
ual defendant for the harm created by the constitutional depriva-
tion. 107
Accordingly, the court looked to whether Mr. Peoples could have
brought his claims in Kansas courts to determine the existence of alterna-
tive causes of action. 0 8 For Mr. Peoples' Eighth Amendment claims, the
court found that Kansas law provides that the prison guards owe a duty
to prevent "reasonably foreseeable injuries caused by fellow inmates"
and therefore Mr. Peoples could have brought a negligence action against
the individual guards. 0 9 Thus, because an alternative cause of action
existed, Mr. Peoples' Eighth Amendment Bivens claim could not be im-
plied.' 0 In addition, the court found that Mr. Peoples' Fifth Amendment
claims regarding his thirteen-month segregation and lack of access to a
law library did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and were
101. Id. at 1101.
102. Id. (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70).
103. Peoples, 422 U.S. at 1101.
104. Id. at 1102.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1103.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1104. Actually, the court first looked to Kansas precedent in deciding that this is the
proper duty owed to an inmate. Id.
110. ldat1105.
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therefore properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)."'1 As to his allegation
that his calls to his lawyer were being monitored, the court found that
"Kansas law criminally prohibits third parties from unlawfully monitor-
ing phone calls without the permission of at least one of the communi-
cants."' 12  Thus, because all of Mr. Peoples' claims could have either
been brought under Kansas law or failed to state a claim, the court denied
him relief.' 
13
C. Judge Ebel's Concurrence and Dissent
Judge Ebel agreed that the court had proper subject matter jurisdic-
tion.' 14  However, he believed that precedent, parallelism, uniformity,
and deterrence demanded a Bivens cause of action for Mr. Peoples'
claims. 11 5 First, he argued that, contrary to the majority's opinion, the
plaintiff in Carlson could have brought a state law tort claim.1 16 Specifi-
cally, he stated, "If a state tort suit brought against a federal employee is
not a meaningful substitute for a constitutional right of action, then an
identical suit brought against a private prison employee similarly should
not be a meaningful substitute for a constitutional right of action."
'1 17
Second, he argued that the majority's opinion violates Malesko's public
and private symmetry principle because a prisoner in a governmentally-
run prison may sue individuals but, according to the majority's opinion, a
prisoner in a privately-run prison may not. 18  Third, Judge Ebel criti-
cized the majority for making Bivens remedies, which are constitutional
in nature, contingent upon state laws. 119 This results in a lack of uni-
formity that the Carlson Court sought to avoid. 120 Finally, he argued that
the majority opinion undermines one of Bivens' primary goals, which is
to deter individual officers from committing constitutional violations. '
2'
111. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) states:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, coun-
terclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted ....
FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
112. Peoples, 422 U.S. at 1108 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4002 (West 2005); State v.
Roudybush, 686 P.2d 100, 108 (Kan. 1984)).
113. Peoples, 422 U.S. at 1108.
114. Id. (Ebel, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1108-13 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1109 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Ebel, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1110-11 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1112-13 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1112 (Ebel, J., dissenting). Specifically, the Court stated "it is obvious that the
liability of federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights should be governed by
uniform rules." Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23.
121. Peoples, 422 U.S. at 1113.
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The Tenth Circuit reviewed Mr. Peoples' claims again in an en banc
decision. 22 The twelve-judge panel split evenly on whether a "Bivens
action is available against employees of a privately-operated prison.'
' 23
Thus, because there was no majority, the court vacated the Tenth Cir-
cuit's initial decision, and affirmed the district court's holding in Peoples
11.124
III. OTHER CIRCUIT DECISIONS THAT DISCUSS THE AVAILABILITY OF A
BIVENS CLAIM AGAINST EMPLOYEES OF PRIVATE PRISONS
There is a split of authority about whether a Bivens claim may be
brought against a private individual acting under federal authority. 25
Many of these cases have dealt with whether the private authority that
employed the defendants was acting in concert with federal authority.
126
Importantly, these cases operate under the assumption that if the private
entity and its employees are operating under the color of government
authority, a Bivens action is appropriate. These cases support the idea
that private actors may be sued under Bivens if they are acting as federal
agents. In essence, these courts have looked at Mr. Peoples' claims from
a different direction.
However, only three district courts and one other circuit court have
determined whether a state law remedy precludes a Bivens claim against
an employee of a privately-operated prison. 127  The District of Rhode
Island is particularly divided. In the 2003 case Sarro v. Cornell Correc-
tions, Inc.,128 it held that a federal prisoner may bring a Bivens claim
against employee-guards of a private-prison operator.129 Specifically, the
court held that "a private party acting under color of federal law may be
liable under Bivens."' 30 In addition, the court was persuaded by the fact
that "there is no manifestation of any Congressional intent to preclude
122. Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
123. Peoples, 449 F.3d at 1099.
124. Id. The Tenth Circuit en banc decision only upheld the district court's holding from
Peoples I1 because the court in Peoples I held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction and
therefore never reached a decision on whether a suit could be brought against employees of pri-
vately-operated prisons. Id. at 1098.
125. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 610.
126. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11 at 609-10. Compare Kauffman v. Anglo-Am. Sch. of
Sofia, 28 F.3d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that school established in Bulgaria for American and
British diplomats' children was not a federal agency and therefore exempt from Bivens liability),
with Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys P.C., 76 F.3d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that company's attorneys who had conducted a search with U.S. Marshalls at a competitor's
premises were "federal agents"), and Dobyns v. E-Sys., 667 F.2d 1219, 1225 (5th Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing that a government contractor whose peacekeeping mission was a "function which undoubtedly is
traditionally exclusively reserved to the state" and therefore was subject to Bivens liability) (citation
omitted). See also Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1333 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that employee of government contractor could bring Bivens claims against private defen-
dant because defendant was a "federal actor[]").
127. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1100.
128. 248 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.R.I. 2003).
129. Id. at 52
130. ld. at 58.
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courts from awarding damages to prisoners at privately-operated prisons
for violations of their constitutional rights to the same extent that dam-
ages might be awarded to prisoners in publicly-operated prisons.' 131 The
Sarro court also addressed whether the plaintiff could have brought a §
1983 action against the defendants. 132  The court held that because §
1983 requires a violation to be committed "under color of state law," the
plaintiffs state action could not be allowed because "maintaining cus-
tody of federal prisoners is neither a power 'possessed by virtue of state
law' nor one that has been 'traditionally exclusively reserved to the
state.""' 133 The court also looked to Malesko 's statement that the purpose
of Bivens was "to deter individual federal officers from committing con-
stitutional violations.'
' 34
A year and half later, in Lacedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Detention Fa-
cility,135 a very similar claim came before another District of Rhode Is-
land judge against the same defendants. 36 This time, however, the court
held that the very same institution was a private corporation and found
Malesko dispositive.137  In the alternative, it held that "the individual
prison guards at the Wyatt Facility carry out the traditional public func-
tion, derive their authority over the Plaintiff from state and, therefore, act
under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.',13 Thus, the guards
were state actors who "had no federal authority to act." 139
In addition to the Sarro court, the District of New Jersey also held
that a federal prisoner may bring a Bivens claim against individual em-
ployees of a private company.140 In Jama v. U.S. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service,14 1 the court was persuaded by the Sarro court's rea-
soning that private-prison guards were "federal actors, performing public
functions."'142 Also, the court found the Sarro court's interpretation of
Malesko to be persuasive: "[M]aking the federal remedies available to a
prisoner at a privately-operated institution contingent upon whether there
are adequate state law remedies ...would cause the availability of a
Bivens remedy to vary according to the state in which the institution is
located, a result that Bivens, itself sought to avoid."'143  However, it
131. Id. at 61.
132. Id. at 63-64.
133. Id. (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 62 (citation omitted).
135. 334 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D.R.I. 2004)
136. Lacedra, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 114. The Donald Wyatt Detention Facility is run by Cornell
Corrections, Inc., the named defendant in Sarro. Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 52. The facility was a
named defendant in the Sarro case. Id.
137. 334 F. Supp. 2d at 138. However, this part of the opinion seems to make no mention of
the claims against the individual officers.
138. Id. at 142.
139. Id. at 141.
140. Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 338 (D.N.J. 2004).
141. 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D.N.J. 2004).
142. Jama, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
143. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 63).
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should be noted that the Jama court made specific mention of the fact
that a § 1983 action was unavailable. 144 Nonetheless, because the Jama
court adopted Sarro's reasoning, it can assumed that it was also per-
suaded by Sarro's holding that the private-prison guards are not acting
"'under color of state law.' 45
Only one other circuit court has directly addressed whether a pris-
oner may bring a damages claim against the individual guard employees
of a privately-run prison. 46 In Holly v. Scott, the Fourth Circuit ex-
pressly adopted the Peoples court's reasoning. 47 The court stated that
they agreed that "an inmate in a privately run federal correctional facility
does not require a Bivens cause of action where state law provides him
with an effective remedy.'
148
IV. ANALYSIS
The debate about whether a prisoner is able to bring a Bivens claim
for damages against officers in privately run prisons is only likely to in-
tensify. In 2001, 12.3% of all federal prisoners were incarcerated in pri-
vately run prisons, and that number is likely to increase.' 49 As more and
more prisoners are incarcerated in private prisons, the instances of pris-
oner constitutional violation claims will also increase. Thus, this will be
an issue that is likely to pervade our courts for the foreseeable future and
ultimately must be resolved by the Supreme Court. The question, then,
is how the Supreme Court should decide these claims. Should it side
with the Tenth Circuit, and hold that the existence of a state law cause of
action precludes a Bivens claim for damages? Or should it side with the
Sarro court and Judge Ebel, and find that Bivens actions should be al-
lowed in spite of the existence of a state law cause of action?
When Bivens and its progeny are viewed in their entirety and in
light of their rationale, it is clear that the Supreme Court must rule in
favor of allowing Bivens claims for damages against officers in privately-
run prisons. First, the existence of state law causes of action do not pro-
vide the same remedies that federal causes of action for constitutional
causes of action provide. Second, the Tenth Circuit's reliance on Male-
sko was unwarranted because the Malesko Court was operating on the
assumption that claims against officers in privately-run prisons were
permissible. Third, the purpose of Bivens and its progeny, as stated in
Malesko, is to deter individual officers from committing constitutional
144. ld. at 361.
145. Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
146. Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2006).
147. Holly, 434 F.3d at 296.
148. Id.
149. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 4 (citing PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BULLETIN NCJ 195189, PRISONERS IN 2001
1(2002)).
20071
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
violations. Fourth, as demonstrated by precedent and by the prior stipu-
lation of CCA, officers in these private prisons are essentially govern-
ment actors. Fifth, not allowing Bivens claims against officers in private
prisons would have the anomalous result of allowing federal constitu-
tional claims only when the offense was committed in a federal prison or
if a privately-held prisoner brings a claim under a state cause of action.
Finally, it is unlikely that an elected body can be relied upon to protect
inmate constitutional rights and therefore it must fall to the courts.
A. State Law Causes ofAction Provide Incomplete Remedies
The existence of a state law cause of action has never been disposi-
tive in determining whether a Bivens cause of action is available. 50 In
fact, Bivens and its progeny state the opposite. For example, in Bivens,
the Court held that a federal cause of action was available "regardless of
whether the State in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would
prohibit or penalize the identical act . . " . In fact, the defendant in
Bivens argued that the existence of a state tort claim precluded the plain-
tiff from bringing a federal claim, but the Court held that state tort law
might not provide an adequate remedy. 52  In addition, in his concur-
rence, Justice Harlan stated that the availability of a federal remedy
should not depend on where the violation occurs because this idea is "in-
compatible with the presumed availability of federal equitable relief."'53
In essence, this situation will provide for "inconsistent and uncertain"
remedies for constitutional violations. 154 This concern was also present
in Carlson, where the Court allowed a Bivens claim despite the existence
of a state tort cause of action.1 55 The Court stated that the "liability of
federal agents for the violation of constitutional rights should not depend
on where the violation occurred.' ' 156 Prisoners should not have to depend
on state law to provide a remedy for the abuse of federal power.
150. See Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1109 (10th Cir. 2005) (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) ("A state tort cause of action (not predicated on a constitutional violation) is not an
adequate alternative remedy for a constitutional violation."); see also Brief for Appellant, supra note
82, at 20 ("The district court's conclusion that state law tort remedies automatically provide a substi-
tute for Bivens is incorrect .... ).
151. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971).
152. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394-95.
153. Id. at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1112 (Ebel, J., dissenting)
(arguing that under the majority's approach, a private-prison employee's liability will "depend on
the varying contours of state law").
154. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 24 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J., con-
curring)).
155. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
156. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24; accord Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1109 (Ebel, J., dissenting) ("If the
presence of a tort claim against individual officers was not sufficient to preclude a Bivens remedy
against those officers in Carlson, so too should the availability of state-law tort claims against the
instant defendants here be an insufficient substitute for the constitutional cause of action Bivens
provides.").
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Furthermore, state law tort claims are, by definition, related to state
tort law. They do not implicate federal constitutional law. Without a
Bivens cause of action, Mr. Peoples would be completely unable to bring
a claim for the violation of one of his most fundamental rights, freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment. 57 In addition, this difficulty is mul-
tiplied by the realities of our federal prison system. In many cases, state
law remedies will be unable to provide a remedy for constitutional viola-
tions because most federal prisoners are transferred frequently and have
limited access to lawyers. 158  This makes it very difficult for them to
bring state law tort actions for a state in which they are no longer impris-
oned.
Thus, Supreme Court precedent, the inherent inconsistency of state
law, and the realities of our federal prison system virtually guarantee that
state law remedies provide incomplete protection for inmate rights. As a
consequence, the existence of a state law cause of action should not be a
dispositive factor in determining whether a Bivens cause of action for
damages against officers in private prisons should be allowed. Indeed,
"[c]onstitutional rights cannot be adequately safeguarded by a patchwork
of state tort law ... ,, 159
B. The Tenth Circuit's Reliance on Malesko is Unwarranted
In Peoples, the Tenth Circuit based its holding on an incomplete
consideration of Malesko, which held "that the purpose of Bivens is only
to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual
officers .... 6 0  In the end, the Court held that Bivens actions could not
be maintained against private corporations. However, it is important to
note that both parties in Malesko had assumed that a Bivens cause of
action could be brought against the individual officers of a private corpo-
ration.' 61 In fact, this assumption formed the basis for the Court's ration-
ale for holding that the company that employed those officers could not
be sued. The Court stated that if it held that the corporation could be
sued, "claimants will focus their [attention] on it, and not the individual
157. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 20-21; see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) ("[l1t is true that a state-law tort remedy could be brought against the individual prison
guards as to one of the claims, but perhaps not as to the other two claims which involve different
conduct ... ").
158. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 21 n.5. See also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1112 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) ("Non-uniform rules of liability . . . do little to protect constitutional rights and may
undermine the settled expectations of prisoners and prison guards, who may be transferred among
different privately-run federal prison facilities located in different states.").
159. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 22.
160. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1101 (majority opinion) (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 70 (2001)).
161. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 14 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 13, Malesko, 534
U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860) and Brief for Respondent at 8, 12, Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No.
00-860)); see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1110 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court in Malesko
"clearly assumed the availability of a [Bivens] remedy against the employees of [the] prison.").
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directly responsible for the alleged injury."' 162 Furthermore, Justice Ste-
vens, in his dissent, stated that "the reasoning of the [majority] opinion
relies, at least in part, on the availability of a remedy against employees
of private prisons."' 163 In other words, the precedent heavily relied upon
by the Tenth Circuit in Peoples actually assumed the opposite position,
that officers in private corporations could be sued for damages under a
Bivens claim. Thus, the Tenth Circuit's reading of Malesko is limited at
best, and ignores a fundamental assumption upon which the Court based
its holding. Instead, the Tenth Circuit based its holding on peripheral
language that clearly was not intended to be construed in a way that pre-
vented inmates from bringing Bivens claims against individual officers in
private prisons.' 64 This is especially true given that both parties and the
Court assumed that this was permissible.
65
C. Officers in Private Prisons Are Government Actors
In holding that a prisoner could bring a Bivens claim against officers
of a private prison, the Sarro court recognized that the power to incarcer-
ate people "whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive preroga-
tive of the state. This is a truly unique function and has been tradition-
ally and exclusively reserved to the state... [this] function is not altered
[if] the government contract[s] to have criminal defendants incarcerated
at privately operated institutions.' 66 These guards serve the exact same
function as their federal counterparts. They exercise the same uniquely
governmental authority of depriving citizens of their right to liberty.
1 67
Principles of symmetry and consistency demand equal treatment of fed-
erally-run and privately-run prisons.1
68
In addition, the D.C. district court has historically viewed CCA as a
government actor when it is under contract with state governments or the
District of Columbia. 169 Moreover, CCA's officers have been sued for
constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, and in those
cases CCA never argued that their officers were not government ac-
162. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added); see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at
26.
163. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 79 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Brief for Appellant, supra
note 82, at 26-27.
164. The Tenth Circuit based its holding on the phrase "otherwise nonexistent cause of action"
in Malesko. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1101 (majority opinion) (citing Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70). How-
ever, given that state law causes of action provide incomplete remedies for federal rights, a remedy
for a constitutional violation is "otherwise nonexistent."
165. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
166. Sarro v. Cornell Corr., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 61 (D.R.I. 2003) (citation omitted); see
also United States v. Thomas, 240 F.3d 445, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a guard at a private
prison was a public official for the purposes of a federal bribery statute).
167. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 12.
168. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1110-11 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion as
undercutting "the important policy objective of promoting public-private symmetry" of liability).
169. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 13.
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tors. 17  In fact, in one of its Supreme Court briefs, CCA even admitted
that its employees were acting under color of state law.171 Thus, it is
difficult to imagine why CCA would be a government actor in a state law
scenario and not in a federal scenario. In fact, this situation is even more
difficult to imagine if it is followed to its logical conclusion. If Bivens
claims are not allowed against officers at private prisons, then causes of
action for federal constitutional violations will be allowed when the
prison contracts with a state government and will not be allowed when
the prison contracts with the federal government.
1 72
D. Bivens' Central Goal of Deterrence is Severely Limited
As stated in Malesko, "Bivens from its inception has been based...
on the deterrence of individual officers who commit unconstitutional
acts.' 7 3 Essentially, the purpose of Bivens is to prevent those exercising
government authority from committing constitutional violations. 74 For
example, in Carlson, the Court stated that "because the Bivens remedy is
recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the
FTCA remedy against the government.' 75 If Bivens' central goal is to
deter individual officers, there is no reason why officers in privately-run
prisons who are acting under color of federal law should be allowed to
commit constitutional violations without the threat of a Bivens claim. 1
76
Deterring officers in privately-run prisons from committing constitu-
tional violations is just as important as deterring officers in federal insti-
tutions.
In fact, it could be argued that deterring constitutional violations is
even more vital in privately-run prisons. On average, private prisons
have a staff-to-prisoner ratio 15% below public prisons.' 77 This higher
frequency of unsupervised prisoners might very well lead to a higher rate
170. Id. See generally Beaudry v. Corrections Corp. of America, 331 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir.
2003). See supra note 10 for a discussion of § 1983 litigation.
171. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 13-14 (citing Brief of Petitioners at 19, Richardson
v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (No. 96-318)).
172. Brief of Appellant, supra note 82 at 14 (describing this situation as "untenable") (citation
omitted).
173. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71; see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) ( "[T]he
purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.").
174. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 15; see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) (stating that individual deterrence is the "primary goal of a Bivens remedy").
175. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21. The Court also stated that "[i]t is almost axiomatic that the threat
of damages has a deterrent effect, surely particularly so when the individual official faces personal
financial liability." Id.
176. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 16; see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) ("[S]tate-law claim[s] may be more limited than would be a Bivens action. Accordingly,
any deterrent value provided by individualized tort suits against private prison guards is significantly
undercut.").
177. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 18 (citing JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN NCJ 181249, EMERGING
ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 52 (2001)).
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of dangerous occurrences at these private prisons. 178 In addition, in order
to maximize profits, private prisons accept more violent prisoners than
their federal counterparts. 179 These factors translate to a higher risk of
frequent, violent occurrences that will necessarily require guard and in-
mate conflicts. A Bivens cause of action is needed in these situations
because of this higher potential for 'constitutional violations and in no
event should the standard be lower for officers in privately-run institu-
tions.
E. Not Allowing Bivens Claims for Officers in Private Prisons Will Pro-
duce Anomalous Results
If Bivens claims are not allowed against officers at private prisons,
inconsistent situations will result. For example, guards at privately-run
prisons under contract with state governments are liable for constitu-
tional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.180 However, if Bivens claims
are not allowed against employees of private prisons under contract with
the federal government, then state officers will be subject to greater li-
ability than federal officers in the area of constitutional violations.
81
Clearly, not only is this unfair to victims at federally-contracted prisons,
but also this is at odds with the idea of federalism.' 82 This result is even
more bizarre in specific reference to CCA, which contracts with both
state and federal governments. 83 To hold the same officers liable for
constitutional violations only according to their employer's contract is
strange at best, and at worst, patently affects the substantive constitu-
tional rights of inmates.
In addition to the inconsistency that varies according to state and
federal contracts, there is an anomaly between the liability of federal
officers and private officers.' 84 Simply stated, Bivens allows for an in-
mate to bring a claim for constitutional violations against a federal offi-
cer. However, in the Tenth Circuit, if a federal officer happens to be
employed by a government contractor, that inmate has no remedy for
constitutional violations. This inconsistency has no basis. Furthermore,
in Malesko, the Court held that an important reason why prisoners could
not sue private entities was that their federal counterparts were immune
178. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 18.
179. See id. (citing Daniel Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison
Management, 29 NEw ENG. J. ON GRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 33 n.201 (2003)).
180. See supra note 10 for a discussion of § 1983 litigation.
181. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 29; see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1111 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court ... has recognized sound jurisprudential reasons for parallelism [between
state and federal actor liability], as different standards for claims against state and federal actors
would be incongruous and confusing.").
182. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 30 (quoting Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22 ("The
'constitutional design' would be stood on its head if federal officials did not face at least the same
liability as state officials guilty of the same constitutional transgression.")).
183. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 30.
184. See Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1111 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (describing this as "public-private
symmetry"); see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 31-32.
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from suit.' 85 Specifically, the Court argued that "no federal prisoners
enjoy" the right to sue the organization that incarcerates them.186 There
is no reason for this symmetry to be disrupted when determining the li-
ability of individual officers. Indeed, this may very well result in the
federal government choosing to increase the number of prisoners held by
private prisons because of the limited liability of officers employed pri-
vately.'87
F. If the Courts Don't Do It ....
The majority opinion in Peoples acknowledges and even agrees
with the dissent's assertions that "there are certainly significant policy
arguments that favor extending Bivens to the case at hand . . . .In our
view, however, extending this judicially created remedy so that it more
closely mirrors a statutory remedy is a decision best left for Congress. 188
However, it seems highly unlikely that Congress as an elected body will
ever want to answer to constituents about legislation that extends pris-
oner rights. The courts have historically played a role in the American
system to safeguard of the rights of citizens that may not be able to pro-
tect themselves. However, because the majority agrees that there are
significant reasons to allow a Bivens claim but then does nothing, it is
certain that these policies will go unfulfilled.
CONCLUSION
Given the ever-increasing number of private prisons, the question of
whether prisoners may sue employees of those prisons is one that will
continue to plague our courts. Moreover, the important constitutional
implications have led to strong opinions on both sides of the issue. The
Supreme Court's inconsistent jurisprudence on the issue has led to con-
fusion and that confusion will continue to create a division among the
circuit courts on the issue. This will eventually lead to some circuits
allowing Bivens claims for constitutional violations and some not. Be-
cause a scenario where prisoners will only be allowed to sue for constitu-
tional violations based on where they are being held is untenable, the
Supreme Court will need to determine whether a Bivens claim may be
brought against employees of private prison corporations.
On a more local level, in Peoples, the Tenth Circuit severely limited
the rights of inmates. This decision has far-reaching constitutional im-
plications. Unfortunately, given Bivens and its progeny's ultimate goal,
deterrence, these implications were not intended by the Supreme Court.
In fact, the case relied on most heavily by the Tenth Circuit, Malesko,
actually supports the conclusion that Bivens claims should be allowed
185. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 31-32.
186. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72.
187. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 30.
188. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1103 (majority opinion).
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against officers in private prisons. In addition, the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion will produce anomalous results because not only will employees of
state-run prisons be subject to greater liability for constitutional viola-
tions than their federal counterparts, but also employees of federal pris-
ons will be subject to greater liability than employees of federally-
contracted private prisons. Finally, instead of safeguarding the rights of
those without the power to do so, the Tenth Circuit urged Congress, a
political body, to pass legislation. Given these powerful reasons for al-
lowing Bivens claims against officers at private prisons, combined with
the majority's hesitation in not allowing these claims, it is likely that this
decision will be revisited many times in the future
Erik Lemmon*
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Kaplan and Professor Moffat for their assistance in preparing this comment and my wife,
Laura, for her tireless support.
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ENGLISH-ONLY POLICIES IN THE WORKPLACE: DISPARATE
IMPACT COMPARED TO THE EEOC GUIDELINES
INTRODUCTION
According to the 2000 census, in the United States between 1990
and 2000 the foreign-born population increased by more than half.1 The
2000 census also revealed that forty-seven million people speak a lan-
guage other than English at home.2 The number of employees who speak
a foreign language at work has also increased substantially.3 In order to
combat problems associated with this increase, such as effective supervi-
sion, safety, efficiency, and workplace disruptions,4 employers are im-
plementing English-only policies. English-only policies prohibit speak-
ing any language except English during some or all of the work day. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") reports that the
increased use of these policies by employers led to quintuple complaints
by employees alleging discrimination on the basis of English-only rules
between 1996 and 2000.5
These complaints have arisen because language is a part of national
origin, which is protected under Title VII. While protection arises under
Title VII, there is a split between the Ninth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit
over how to analyze cases concerning discrimination based on national
origin as a result of English-only policies. This split highlights compet-
ing values: the value of language as a part of a person's national origin
and the value of an employer's freedom in determining how to run his or
her business safely and efficiently.6
In addressing these competing values, there are two possible ap-
proaches: 1) the EEOC Guidelines; and 2) disparate impact analysis.
The EEOC Guidelines presume English-only policies lead to discrimina-
1. Nolan Malone, Kaari F. Baluja, Joseph M. Costanzo & Cynthia J. Davis, The Foreign-
Born Population: 2000, Census 2000 Brief, 2, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-34.pdf ("Between 1990 and 2000, the foreign-born
population increased by 57 percent, from 19.8 million to 31.1 million, compared with an increase of
9.3 percent for the native population and 13 percent for the total U.S. population.").
2. Hyon B. Shin & Rosalind Bruno, Language Use and English-Speaking Ability: 2000,
Census 2000 Brief, at 2, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf ("The
number and percentage of people in the United States who spoke a language other than English at
home increased between 1990 and 2000. In 2000, 18 percent of the total population aged 5 and
over, or 47.0 million people, reported they spoke a language other than English at home.").
3. See Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in
the Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265,267 (1990).
4. See id. at 305-16.
5. HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND PRACTICE 81 (2d'ed. 2001).
6. Perea, supra note 3, at 315 ("[E]mployers may be able to justify English-only rules that
are not unduly discriminatory, based on safety and efficiency.").
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tion in the workplace.7 In contrast, the disparate impact analysis requires
the employee to carry the initial burden of proving the policy led to dis-
crimination or harm.8
The Ninth Circuit has been the leading source of case law on the is-
sue of English-only policies. In 1993, the Ninth Circuit explicitly re-
jected the EEOC guidelines and applied a disparate impact analysis to
find that an employer did not discriminate based on an English-only pol-
icy.9 This was the controlling decision on English-only policies until a
2006 decision from the Tenth Circuit in Maldonado v. City of Altus.'
0
The Tenth Circuit decision departed from the current law in the Ninth
Circuit by not explicitly rejecting or adopting the EEOC guidelines on
English-only policies.1" Rather, the Tenth Circuit discussed the EEOC
guidelines and also applied a disparate impact analysis to find that sum-
mary judgment for the employer was not appropriate. 12
The split between the Ninth and the Tenth Circuit is important be-
cause it shows that there is a conflict over what analysis, the EEOC
guidelines or disparate impact, courts should utilize in considering Eng-
lish-only policies. It is imperative that the courts use one analysis or the
other because applying both creates confusion over what policies em-
ployers can implement without violating the law and what rights em-
ployees have to speak a foreign language in the workplace. The dispa-
rate impact analysis should be applied, not the EEOC guidelines, because
disparate impact balances the importance of language with the impor-
tance of allowing employers to run safe and efficient businesses; and a
disparate impact analysis is also consistent with legislative intent.
Part I of this comment addresses the disparate treatment and dispa-
rate impact analyses used for claims arising under Title VII. Part I also
reviews the EEOC guidelines and their treatment of English-only poli-
cies. Part II of this comment explores the Ninth Circuit decisions regard-
ing challenges to English-only policies. Part III discusses the lower
courts' decisions and provides a detailed review of Maldonado. Part IV
analyzes the disparate impact approach and the EEOC guidelines and
argues that the disparate impact approach properly balances the rights of
employers and employees, unlike the EEOC guidelines, because dispa-
rate impact protects language as a part of national origin, while also al-
lowing employers to run safe and efficient businesses. Part IV also ar-
gues that the disparate impact approach is consistent with the legislative
intent of Title VII.
7. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (West 2007).
8. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1304 (10th Cir. 2006).
9. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993).
10. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1306.
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I. BACKGROUND
Claims based on national origin arise under Title VII, which re-
quires either a disparate treatment or a disparate impact analysis. The
EEOC, in contrast, has specific guidelines for addressing discrimination
claims as a result of English-only policies.
A. Title VII
Under Title VII § 2000e-2(a):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.
13
Courts and legal commentators assert that speaking a foreign language
may make someone a protected group member based on national ori-
gin. 14 Therefore, claims concerning English-only policies fall under Title
VII as either disparate treatment claims or disparate impact claims based
on national origin.' 5  In the employment context, disparate treatment
protects employees against employment practices or policies involving
intentional discrimination, while disparate impact protects employees
against policies or practices that are substantively neutral, but lead to
discrimination in practice.
1. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment applies when an employer intentionally dis-
criminates against an employee, usually through an employment action
such as hiring, firing or an employment policy, because that employee is
a protected group member based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin under Title VII. 16 The Supreme Court set out a method for prov-
ing disparate treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.7 First,
the Court determined that the plaintiff employee bears the initial burden
of proof in a disparate treatment claim.' 8 If that burden is satisfied, the
burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employment action or policy.' 9 If the em-
13. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West 2007).
14. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union of Oklahoma Foundation as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 6, Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-
6062) [hereinafter Brief for ACLU] ("Courts have long recognized that an individual's primary
language is a trait closely tied to national origin."); Wayne N. Outten & Kathleen Peratis, National
Origin Discrimination, 676 PLI/Lit 291, 299-300, 318-23 (2002); Perea, supra note 3, at 274-79.
15. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993).
16. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484.
17. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).




ployer succeeds, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the
employer's nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision or
policy is a pretext for discrimination.2 °
The underlying theory of disparate treatment is that a policy or em-
ployment decision is discriminatory when an employer treats an em-
ployee differently "because of' race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin, the protected characteristics covered by Title VII. 21 In Hazen Pa-
per Company v. Biggins,22 the Supreme Court decision turned on
whether an employee was terminated because of his age in violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) or if the employee
was terminated because his pension was about to vest, which while ille-
gal, did not violate the ADEA.23 The Court concluded that even if the
reason for the employment action, firing the employee to prevent his
retirement plan from vesting, was "correlated with" his age, the correla-
tion was not enough to prove discrimination "because of' age.24
Challenges to English-only policies usually involve policies that re-
quire all groups to speak English. Even though this type of policy may
correlate to national origin, because it treats all employees the same way
and does not single out employees because of national origin, the policy
will not ordinarily lead to disparate treatment. In order to prove that an
employer implemented an English-only policy because of an employee's
national origin, the policy would have to be drafted to require "members
of one national origin group to speak English while allowing members of
another national origin group to speak another language., 26 An English-
only policy will usually not be drafted this way. Instead, an English-only
policy is more likely to require all employees to speak English, which is
substantively neutral, 27 but may have a disparate impact on non-English
speaking employees in practice.
2. Disparate Impact
The disparate impact burden-shifting analysis was established in
1971 in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Company.28 The key differ-
ence between disparate treatment and disparate impact is that disparate
treatment addresses a policy with a discriminatory intent, while disparate
impact addresses a policy that leads to discrimination in practice.29
20. Id. at 804.
21. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
22. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 604.
23. Id. at 609-11.
24. Id. at 611.
25. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 5, at 80.
26. David T. Wiley, Note, Whose Proof.: Deference to EEOC Guidelines on Disparate
Impact Discrimination Analysis of "English-Only '" Rules, 29 GA. L. REV. 539, 549 (1995).
27. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 5, at 80 ("[E]mployer practices or rules based on language
characteristics will usually... be neutral on their face.").
28. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971).
29. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484.
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Twenty years later, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act") reaffirmed
that the standard outlined by Griggs is the standard that should be ap-
plied in disparate impact cases.30
The Griggs disparate impact analysis has four parts. First, the
plaintiff employee must identify a discriminatory practice, which in the
context of this paper is an English-only policy.31 Second, the plaintiff
employee must show that the practice has a discriminatory impact in
operation, regardless of the employer's intent.32 To show this discrimi-
natory impact, the employee may not simply claim that the policy
harmed members of his or her protected class.33 The employee must
prove that the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" were
denied to the protected class and that this was a significant harm that did
not affect employees that were not part of the protected class.34 Third,
the employer may show business necessity as an affirmative defense.35
The Court in Griggs emphasized that in a disparate impact analysis
"[t]he touchstone is business necessity" because "good intent or absence
of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures.,'36 To
protect employees from the "consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation," the Griggs Court found that there must be a
business necessity to justify an employment policy or procedure that
discriminates in practice.37
While the description of business necessity from the Griggs case is
ambiguous, the 1991 Act affirmed that under Griggs the employer had
the burden of proof to show business necessity as an affirmative defense
"to justify a practice shown to have a disparate impact. 38 The 1991 Act
stated that "statistical reports, validation studies, expert testimony, [or]
prior successful experience" may prove business necessity. 39 Despite the
lack of a clear definition of business necessity, the burden lies with the
employer to show business necessity once an employee proves a policy
creates a disparate impact.
Finally, if the employer proves business necessity the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff employee who can still prove a Title VII violation by
showing there is a lesser discriminatory alternative to the English-only
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (West 2007); H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 24 (1991) ("In Griggs
and its progeny, the courts fashioned a workable and widely accepted set of legal principles for
resolving the problems caused by employment practices which, while neutral on their face, dispro-
portionately exclude qualified workers on the basis of their sex, national origin, race or religion.").
31. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
32. Id.
33. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
34. Id.
35. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
36. Id. at 431-32.
37. Id. at 432.
38. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(l), at 28 (1991).
39. Id., at 38.
2007] 905
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
policy.40 The employee can prove this by showing that another method
would serve the employer's purposes without the disparate impact of the
current practice. 41 For example, if an employer requires all potential job
applicants without a high school diploma to pass a standardized test to be
considered for a job and the test excludes a particular race, the employee
may show there are other tests or methods of selecting viable job appli-
cants as a less discriminatory alternative.42
In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,43 the Su-
preme Court found that a statute requiring a hiring preference for veter-
ans, which excluded mostly women, was not discriminatory based on sex
because all non-veterans, male and female alike, were equally burdened
by the statute. 44 A policy has a disparate impact when it places a group
protected under Title VII at a relative disadvantage, not when it places
protected and non-protected groups alike at a disadvantage.45
Under an English-only policy requiring all employees to speak Eng-
lish without exception, employees are treated equally for the purposes of
disparate treatment analysis and are not entitled to recover for discrimi-
nation.46 However, because non-English speakers may be alienated from
the English speakers and placed at a disadvantage in practice, disparate
impact analysis provides a promising alternative for proving discrimina-
tion. While facially neutral, these policies have a more burdensome ef-
fect on persons of particular national origins.4 7 Accordingly, most claims
regarding English-only policies should require a disparate impact analy-
sis.
B. EEOC Guidelines
The EEOC guidelines recommend different burdens specifically for
cases dealing with English-only policies. 48 First, the EEOC guidelines
state that an English-only policy "requiring employees to speak only
English at all times" creates a presumption that the policy violates Title
VII.4 9 Second, the guidelines address English-only policies applied only
at certain times.50 An employer may show that the policy is "justified by
business necessity" under the guidelines only if the English-only policy
is limited to specific periods during the workday.51 Finally, there must
40. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 376-77 (1988).
41. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 42 (1991).
42. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-33; PLAYER, supra note 40, at 376-77.
43. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
44. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275.
45. See id.
46. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
47. See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1298; Spun. Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483; Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct.,
838 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1988).
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be notice of the English-only policy or any employment action taken
against an employee based on the policy will be considered evidence of a
Title VII violation.52
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT
While many lower courts have considered English-only policies in
the workplace since the enactment of the EEOC guidelines, the Ninth
Circuit has been the leading source of case law on the issue.53
A. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corporation
5 4
A radio disc jockey was fired when he refused to comply with an
English-only order from his employer to alter his radio personality by
eliminating the "street Spanish" used in his program." The employer
decided to eliminate Spanish because the show was not attracting the
Hispanic demographic.
56
The Ninth Circuit primarily applied a disparate treatment analysis.
57
The court found that the radio station did not have a discriminatory mo-
tive for ordering an English-only approach on the radio show. 8 The
court found the decision was made strictly based on the radio station's
attempt to attract listeners.59 Therefore, the court concluded summary
judgment for the employer was properly granted.60
The court briefly discussed the employee's disparate impact claim,
citing Griggs for the requirement that the employee has the burden of
establishing a prima facie disparate impact case.6' The court concluded
that the lower court properly decided that the policy did not "dispropor-
tionately disadvantage" Hispanics and, therefore, the employee did not
establish a prima facie case.
62
B. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court
6 3
The Municipal Court in Los Angeles employed bilingual deputy
court clerks to translate for the Spanish speaking public.64 The Munici-
pal Court put a policy into place requiring English-only at all times dur-
ing the work day, unless employees were translating for a member of the
52. Id.
53. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 838
F.2d 1031, 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
54. 813 F.2d 1406 (9" Cir. 1987).
55. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1408.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1409.
58. Id. at 1410.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1411.
61. Id. at 1412.
62. Id.
63. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036.
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public.65 Originally, this policy did not include breaks, but it was ex-
tended so that English was required during lunch and breaks.66
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction issued by the
district court to prevent employers from enforcing the English-only pol-
icy.67 After establishing that "language is an important aspect of national
origin" and discussing the requirements from the EEOC guidelines, the
court adopted the EEOC's "business necessity test.' ' 68 The court also
went on to find that "[t]here can be no doubt that the use of disparate
impact analysis is appropriate here., 69 The court affirmed that the Eng-
lish-only policy created a disparate impact because "the prohibition on
intra-employee communications in Spanish is sweeping in nature and has
a direct effect on the general atmosphere and environment of the work
place., 70 Next, the court found that all of the business necessities pre-
sented by the employer were not adequate, including the justifications
that the United States is an English speaking country and California is an
English speaking state; permitting Spanish to be spoken by employees
outside of their work duties is disruptive; the policy promotes racial har-
mony; and supervisors do not speak or understand Spanish.71 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the injunction was proper.72
C. Garcia v. Spun Steak
73
An English-only policy was implemented by the employer, a poul-
try and meat products producer, to promote racial harmony, improve
worker safety, and facilitate better supervision.74 The policy allowed
employees to speak Spanish during breaks and excluded employees who
did not speak English.75  Two bilingual employees, production line
workers for the company, received warning letters when they violated
the policy and were no longer allowed to work next to each other.76
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gutierrez, the Ninth
Circuit in Spun Steak explicitly rejected the EEOC guidelines and ap-
plied a disparate impact analysis.77 The court reasoned that the EEOC




68. Id. at 1039-40.
69. Id. at 1040.
70. Id. at 1041.
71. Id. at 1041-44.
72. Id. at 1045.
73. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
74. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77, Id. at 1489.
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run a business and the prevention of discrimination, which was inconsis-
tent with the legislative intent of Title VII.
78
The court also noted that while the facts in the case did not show a
Title VII violation:
Whether a working environment is infused with discrimination is a
factual question, one for which a per se rule is particularly inappro-
priate. The dynamics of an individual workplace are enormously
complex; we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the introduc-
tion of an English-only policy, in every workplace, will always have
the same effect.
79
Under the disparate impact analysis, the court concluded that the em-
ployees did not establish a prima facie case.80 The court emphasized that
there was no evidence that the policy created a hostile working environ-
ment.81 The court also noted that the employees did not have a right to
self-expression in the workplace, and as bilingual speakers they were
only inconvenienced by the policy.82 Finally, the court concluded that
even though the bilingual employees did not establish a prima facie case,
the case for monolingual employees was remanded to consider if the
policy created a disparate impact on those employees.83
III. TENTH CIRCUIT
The district courts in the Tenth Circuit did not follow the lead of the
Ninth Circuit. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit failed to take a definitive
stance on the EEOC guidelines or the disparate impact analysis.
A. Lower Court Decisions Leading up to Maldonado
The decisions of the district courts in the Tenth Circuit leading up to
Maldonado v. City of Altus,8 4 failed to embrace either the disparate im-
pact analysis or the EEOC guidelines.85
In Tran v. Standard Motor Products,86 employees alleged an Eng-
lish-only policy that was applied during employee-supervisor meetings
and while employees were working violated Title VII. 87 The district
court analyzed the issue on the premise that while the Tenth Circuit had
78. Id. at 1489-90.
79. Id. at 1489 (responding to the employees' request for the court to adopt a per se rule that
English-only policies always create a hostile working environment).
80. Id. at 1490.
81. Id. at 1489.
82, Id. at 1487-88.
83. Id. at 1490.
84. 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006).
85. Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Sys., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1327-28 (D.N.M. 2005),
Olivarez v. Centura Health Corp., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224-25 (D. Colo. 2002), Tran v. Standard
Motor Products Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1210-11 (D. Kan. 1998).
86. 10 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Kan. 1998).
87. Tran, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
2007]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
"not addressed the issue" of the EEOC guidelines, the guidelines "offer
some guidance. 88 Based on this, the court found that the business ne-
cessities given by the employer including: "(1) to ensure that all employ-
ees and supervisors could understand each other during cell meetings; (2)
to prevent injuries through effective communication on the production
floor; and (3) to prevent non-Vietnamese employees from feeling as if
they were being talked about by Vietnamese employees" did prove le-
gitimate business necessities for the policy.89 The court also found that
even if these were not business necessities, the employee did not prove
that the policy led to discrimination or "adversely affected his employ-
ment in any way."90 Therefore, the court upheld summary judgment for
the employer.9 However, the court pointed out that the analysis was
fact-based and "the court does not foreclose the possibility that in some
circumstances, an English-only policy may constitute a violation of Title
VIi."
92
The court in Olivarez v. Centura Health Corporation93 similarly
skirted the issue of the EEOC Guidelines.94 An employee, unsatisfied
with the way the employer handled his complaints of discrimination, quit
his job and alleged disparate treatment under Title VII, in part because of
a policy prohibiting Spanish. 95 Here, the district court did not adopt or
reject the EEOC guidelines, even though the employer relied on the
EEOC guidelines to prove business necessity. 96 Instead the court, grant-
ing summary judgment for the employer, simply stated the employee did
not show that the English-only policy "resulted in a job detriment to
him."
97
Like in Tran and Olivarez, the court in Barber v. Lovelace Sandia
Health Systems 98 also declined to definitively adopt or reject the EEOC
guidelines, but still considered the guidelines while analyzing the Eng-
lish-only policy.99 The employer, Lovelace, a New Mexico health care
provider, announced the implementation of an English-only policy at a
staff meeting at one of its facilities. 100 Two bilingual employees, work-
ing at the Lovelace facility at the time, felt they were carefully scruti-
nized to make sure they were not using Spanish after the policy was im-
88. Id. at 1210.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1211.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1211n.18.
93. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Colo. 2002).
94. See Olivarez, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-25.
95. Id. at 1220-21, 1223.
96. See id at 1224.
97. Id. at 1225.
98. 409 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (D.N.M. 2005).
99. See Barber, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 1327-28.
100. Id. at 1319.
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plemented.' 0 ' One employee resigned and the other was transferred to
another Lovelace clinic. 0 2 The district court stated that in analyzing the
case it would presume that the Tenth Circuit would give deference to the
EEOC guidelines and presume that the employees established a prima
facie case of disparate treatment.10 3 Under these assumptions, the court
found that the employer had a "legitimate and non-discriminatory reason
for the policy."' 04 Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for
the employer.'0 5
All of these cases show that the lower courts did not want to adopt
or reject the EEOC guidelines without guidance from the Tenth Cir-
cuit. °6 However, instead of offering guidance, the Tenth Circuit failed
to clarify this confusion by embracing a disparate impact analysis and
referencing the EEOC guidelines in an opinion considering an English-
only policy. 1
07
B. Maldonado v. City of Altus' °8
In 2002, the City of Altus, Oklahoma, established an English-only
policy. 10 9 The policy required City employees to speak English for all
"work related and business communications during the work day."'" 0
However, the policy allowed employees to communicate with a Spanish
speaking "citizen, business owner, organization or criminal suspect" in
Spanish, and the policy did not apply during lunch, breaks, or when em-
ployees were involved in personal conversations."' The policy also al-
lowed employees with limited English skills to "discuss the situation
with the department head and the Human Resources Director to deter-
mine what accommodation is required and feasible."
'1 12
Once the written policy was established, the employees claimed that
in practice the policy was more expansive than the written requirements
specified." 3 The employees asserted that the policy restricted them from
speaking Spanish whenever a non-Spanish speaker was present, includ-
ing during breaks and on the phone.' 14 The employees also complained
that they were teased by non-Spanish speaking employees about the Eng-
101. Id. at 1320.
102. Id. at 1324-25.
103. Id. at 1335-36.
104. Id. at 1337-38.
105. Id. at 1334.
106. See id. at 1334-35; Olivarez v. Centura Health Corp., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224-25 (D.
Colo. 2002); Tran v. Standard Motor Prod., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1210 (D. Kan. 1998).
107. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1303-06 (10th Cir. 2006).
108. 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006).
109. Maldonado, 433 F.3d 1294 at 1299-1300.
110. Id. at 1299.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1300.
114. Id.
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lish-only policy."l 5 The City's Street Commissioner was aware of the
tension the policy created because he told one of the Spanish speaking
employees that "he was informing them of the English-only policy in
private because [he] had concerns about 'the other guys making fun of
[them].""' 16
The employer claimed the policy was put in place to facilitate effec-
tive radio communication on the city radios, to address complaints that
non-Spanish speaking coworkers felt uncomfortable when Spanish
speaking employees were "speaking in front of them in a language they
could not understand," and to increase safety around heavy equipment.
1 7
The EEOC tried to resolve the dispute over the policy and was unsuc-
cessful.1 18 The district court granted summary judgment and dismissed
all of the employee's claims, including the claim that Title VII was vio-
lated under a disparate impact and a disparate treatment analysis. 19
The Tenth Circuit considered a claim of discrimination based on na-
tional origin under Title VII, in addition to several other claims not aris-
ing under Title VII.
120
The court addressed the employees' Title VII claim using a dispa-
rate impact analysis. First, the court began by confirming that an Eng-
lish-only policy may qualify as national origin discrimination.12 1  The
court also established that the employees did not have to prove discrimi-
natory intent; they just had to prove that the policy led to disparate im-
pact, in this case by creating a hostile working environment for Hispanics
based on the English-only policy. 22 Second, the court explained that
once an employee establishes disparate impact, the employer has the
burden to show business necessity as articulated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs. 123
The court analyzed the employee's prima facie case, explaining that
when determining if there is enough harm to establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact, each English-only policy case "turns on its facts."
The court cited the teasing and the extension of the English-only policy
into breaks, lunch hours, and private phone calls as evidence "that the
English-only policy creates a hostile atmosphere for Hispanics in their
workplace."'
124
115. Id. at 1301.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1300.
118. Id. at 1301.
119. Id. at 1302.
120. Id. at 1298 (discussing all the claims brought by the plaintiffs including equal protection
claims, a claim of retaliation, and a claim that the First Amendment was violated by the policy).
121. Id. at 1303.
122. Id. at 1303-04.
123. Id. at 1304.
124. Id.
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Next, the court considered the EEOC guidelines. The court hesi-
tated to make a decision on the effect of the guidelines, pointing out that
while the Ninth Circuit rejected the guidelines altogether, the decision in
this case only required the court to find that the EEOC was reasonable on
the matter so it would not be "unreasonable for a juror to agree that the
City's English-only policy created a hostile work environment for its
Hispanic employees."'' 25  In its final conclusion, the Tenth Circuit did
not adopt the EEOC guidelines stating:
[W]e are not suggesting that the guideline is evidence admissible at
trial or should be incorporated in a jury instruction. What we are say-
ing is only that a juror presented with the evidence presently on the
record in this case would not be unreasonable in finding that a hostile
work environment existed.
126
The court also found that a reasonable person may find there was not a
business necessity for the English-only policy, so summary judgment for
the employer was not appropriate.
127
Finally, the court found summary judgment on the disparate treat-
ment claim was not proper because the employees had evidence of a hos-
tile work environment, which may show the employer's intent to dis-
criminate.128
IV. ANALYSIS
There is value in language as a reflection of culture and ethnicity,
but there is also value in allowing employers to run their businesses
safely and effectively. The disparate impact analysis under Title VII
balances these values and is also consistent with the legislative intent of
Title VII.
A. Problems with the EEOC Guidelines
The contrast between the EEOC guidelines and a disparate impact
analysis illustrates the problems with applying the guidelines. The
EEOC guidelines differ from a disparate impact analysis because they
create a presumption that English-only policies discriminate based on
national origin without requiring proof of discrimination. 129 Unlike dis-
parate impact, once there is evidence proving an employer implemented
an English-only policy at all times or only at certain times, an employee
is relieved of any burden of proving the policy led to discrimination or
125. Idat 1305-06.
126. Id. at 1306.
127. Id. at 1307
128. Id. at 1308; see also id. at 1298 (reversing summary judgment on the intentional discrimi-
nation and equal protection claims and affirming summary judgment on the remaining claims, in-
cluding a claim of retaliation and a claim that the First Amendment was violated by the policy).
129. Outten & Peratis, supra note 14, at 299-300, 321.
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caused harm to employees in a Title VII protected class.' 30 Additionally,
even if there is no discrimination or harm, a policy applied at all times
will be presumed to violate Title VII under the EEOC guidelines. 131 A
policy applied only at certain times may not violate Title VII under the
EEOC guidelines if there is a business necessity for the policy, but this
presumption again arises without a requirement that there is discrimina-
tion or harm to an employee in a Title VII protected class.
32
This is problematic because without harm, the Supreme Court has
found there is no actionable discrimination claim. 33 In a sexual harass-
ment case arising under Title VII, the Supreme Court found that harm
must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment"' in
order for there to be an actionable discrimination claim. 34 Even though
the case concerned intentional sexual harassment, the Ninth Circuit, con-
sidering an English-only policy, relied on the case to find that discrimi-
nation must be severe or pervasive because the Supreme Court's ration-
ale also applied to neutral policies that led to discrimination.135
The presumption under the EEOC guidelines that an English-only
policy discriminates also requires an employer that implemented an Eng-
lish-only policy at certain times to provide a defense for discrimination
that may have never occurred or harm that is not "pervasive."' 3 6 If the
policy is applied at all times, the employer has no defense, even if the
policy does not lead to discrimination or harm. 37 Under the EEOC
guidelines, discrimination would be presumed in the case of the radio DJ
in Jurado who was limited by an English-only policy that did not allow
him to continue to use "street Spanish" in his radio program, regardless
of whether this limitation was harmful or discriminatory. 138 Disparate
impact, on the other hand, recognizes that if there is no discrimination or
harm, an employer should not be penalized for an employment policy.
39
In the case of the radio DJ, the DJ may still show discrimination, but if
there is no discrimination in practice or harm as a result of the policy, the
case ends and there is no need for the employer to show business neces-
sity to defend a non-discriminatory practice.14
0
The EEOC's attempt to place the burden for a Title VII claim con-
cerning an English-only policy on the employer demonstrates its failure
130. Jd. at 320-21.
131. Id.
132. Id
133. See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,67 (1986).
134. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
135. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488-89 (9th Cir. 1993).
136. Spun Steak, 998 F. 2d at 1489.
137. See Outten & Peratis, supra note 14, at 320-21.
138. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987).
139. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1409.
140. See id.
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to recognize judicial precedent, academic and scholarly analysis, and the
legislative intent of the 1991 Act. Furthermore, the EEOC ignores the
valid competing interests of employers and employees when considering
a discrimination claim under Title VII.
14 1
B. Disparate Impact Protects Employee Language and Employer Rights
1. Language and National Origin
Language is an integral part of national origin because language is a
reflection of a person's culture and ethnicity. As a result, discrimination
can occur based on the language a person speaks. Accordingly, language
as a part of national origin can be protected under Title VII.1
42
Sociologists and sociolinguistics recognize that language is part of
national origin because it is a reflection of ethnicity, community, and
cultural traits. 143 The existence in American society of foreign language
newspapers, television, and schools demonstrates that foreign language is
a thread that links communities and cultures that speak common lan-
guages together. 144 For example, Spanish is the language used by the
ancestors of Latinos and links that population together by national ori-
gin.145 Language also affects the way a person's national origin is per-
ceived because people react to others based "upon our perception of
their racial and ethnic status ... [e]thnic 'traits' and personal characteris-
tics are often more accurate predictors of prejudicial behavior than a per-
son's actual national origin."'146 Courts have also recognized that lan-
guage is tied to culture and ethnicity making it a part of a person's na-
tional origin. 147
In Gutierrez, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of lan-
guage. 148 The court discussed the merits of having a multicultural soci-
ety and explained the connection between a culture and that culture's
language stating that "language remains an important link to ... ethnic
141. See 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2(k) (West 2007); Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67 (1986); Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2006); Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993); Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1039-40
(9th Cir. 1988); H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 24 (1991); Outten & Peratis, supra note 14, at 321.
142. Brief for ACLU, supra note 14, at 5-6; Outten & Peratis, supra note 14, at 299-300, 318-
23; Perea, supra note 3, at 274-79.
143. Perea, supra note 3, at 276 ("It is through the expression of ethnicity, one's cultural conti-
nuity and cultural traits, that 'national origin' has perceptible meaning. Primary language is recog-
nized in sociology and sociolinguistics as a fundamental aspect of ethnicity.").
144. Id. at 278 ("The existence in the United States of a thriving ethnic mother-tongue press,
non-English commercial broadcasting, and schools designed to preserve foreign languages demon-
strates that primary language is fundamental to ethnicity.").
145. David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousin's Lost Their Accents: Understanding the
Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism,
Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1347, 1364 (1997).
146. Outten & Peratis, supra note 14, at 300-01.
147. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039.
148. See id at 1038-40.
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culture and identity... [t]he primary language not only conveys certain
concepts, but is itself an affirmation of that culture."' 149 The court ex-
plained that in order to protect language it adopted the "EEOC's business
necessity test."' 150 By specifically adopting the business necessity part of
the EEOC guidelines, this decision shows that it is not necessary to apply
the EEOC guidelines as a whole to protect language as a part of national
origin. Disparate impact uses business necessity and does not presume
harm, which is consistent with the Gutierrez court's emphasis on the
proper "balance" between the "individual's interest in speaking his pri-
mary language and any possible need of the employer."'15' When the
court adopted a business necessity test and applied the disparate impact
analysis to come to a result that protected the employees from discrimi-
nation based on national origin, the court demonstrated that disparate
impact should be applied, rather than the EEOC guidelines.
152
In contrast, the Spun Steak court properly rejected the EEOC guide-
lines, but failed to consider the importance of language. The court fo-
cused on the fact that the bilingual employees spoke English, and there-
fore, were able to comply with the English-only policy. 53 The court's
focus on the feasibility of compliance with the English-only policy was
misplaced. Title VII protects employees from policies they should not
have to comply with because the policies interfere with the culture and
ethnicity associated with language as a part of national origin. 154  The
court should have focused on whether the English-only policy discrimi-
nated because it limited, classified, or segregated the employees. 5 5 The
Maldonado court corrected this by applying disparate impact to protect
language as a part of national origin without focusing on the ability of a
bilingual speaker to comply with an English-only rule.'
56
The Tenth Circuit in Maldonado demonstrated that language can be
protected under the disparate impact analysis by making the role of lan-
guage an integral part of the disparate impact analysis. 7 By comparing
an English-only policy to a policy requiring religious groups to wear a
badge, the Maldonado court properly addressed the protection required
for employees with a primary language other than English. The court
explained:
149. Id. at 1039.
150. Id. at 1040.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1040, 1044-45.
153. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
154. See Cameron, supra note 145, at 1352-54.
155. Id. at 1362 ("The fair-and literal-reading of the statute is that limiting, segregating, or
classifying an employee 'in any way' which would even 'tend' to deprive her of employment oppor-
tunities, or to 'adversely affect' her employment status, is 'unlawful."').
156. Juliet Stumpf, English-Only Cases: Litigating the Diverse Workplace, 34 A.B.A. SEC.
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 6 (2006).
157. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1304-05.
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A policy requiring each employee to wear a badge noting his or her
religion, for example, might well engender extreme discomfort in a
reasonable employee who belongs to a minority religion, even if no
co-worker utters a word on the matter. Here, the very fact that the
City would forbid Hispanics from using their preferred language
could reasonably be construed as an expression of hostility to His-
panics.
158
Based on the understanding of the value of language as a part of national
origin, the employee was able show a prima facie case that an English-
only policy caused disparate impact based on national origin. 59 The
court referenced the EEOC guidelines only to show that it is reasonable
for a jury to conclude there may be a hostile work environment as the
result of an English-only policy, not to show that national origin can only
be protected by a presumption that English-only policies always create a
hostile work environment. 160 This demonstrates that the Tenth Circuit
did not need to apply the EEOC guidelines to protect employees from
discrimination.
2. Employer Rights
There is no exact definition of the business necessity that employers
are required to prove in a disparate impact analysis.' 61 However, there is
good reason for allowing employers to make decisions on how to effec-
tively run their businesses.
First, employers need the freedom to enact policies to run their busi-
nesses safely. In an article focusing on the importance of protecting lan-
guage as a part of national origin, the author concedes that effective su-
pervision is a legitimate business justification for an English-only pol-
icy.' 62 Moreover, if employers need employees to work in hazardous
work environments it is in the best interest of the employer, as well as
the employee, that there is effective communication in case of an emer-
gency: "In hazardous or potentially hazardous work environments or in
emergency situations, safety is always a legitimate business interest.
1 63
The argument may be made that hazardous work environments are
not safer when an English-only policy is in place. In the extreme, the
argument may be extended to claim that these policies prevent an em-
ployee from reporting an emergency situation because that employee
cannot report the emergency in English, but is afraid to violate the policy
158. Id. at 1305.
159. See id. at 1304-06.
160. Id. at 1306.
161. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(1), at 32-35 (1991).
162. Perea, supra note 3, at 307.
163. Linda M. Mealey, Note, English-Only Rules and "Innocent" Employers: Clarifying
National Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact Theory under Title VII, 74 MINN. L. REV.
387, 434 (1989).
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by reporting it in his or her primary language. 164  The court in
Maldonado counters this argument effectively when it points out that,
"[i]t would be unreasonable to take offense at a requirement that all pi-
lots flying into an airport speak English in communications with the
tower or between planes. ' 65 The Maldonado court's analogy demon-
strates that employers are entitled to run a safe business and implement
policies to facilitate safety.' 66 The EEOC guidelines fail to reflect this
legitimate right of employers by placing the burden to show business
necessity on the employer first, regardless of whether the policy has a
discriminatory impact. 1
67
Second, an employer needs the freedom to run his or her business
productively and efficiently. 68 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the
freedom of a business to make policies to run a productive business in
Jurado.169 The court, applying a disparate treatment analysis and a dis-
parate impact analysis, emphasized that a radio DJ can be required to use
English only on his program because "[s]uccess in radio depends on ap-
pealing to specific segments of the listening community," which is a le-
gitimate business interest.1 70 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit, in a case on
an English-only policy issued before the EEOC guidelines, recognized
that "[j]udges, who have neither business experience nor the problem of
meeting the employees' payroll, do not have the power to preempt an
employer's business judgment.'
17 1
The Ninth Circuit went even further in recognizing the rights of
employers to run their businesses in Spun Steak noting that:
A privilege, however, is by definition given at the employer's discre-
tion; . . . an employer may allow employees to converse on the job,
but only during certain times of the day or during the performance of
certain tasks. The employer may proscribe certain topics as inappro-
priate during working hours or may even forbid the use of certain
words, such as profanity. 
172
While these cases emphasize the rights of employers, the
Maldonado court's analysis of business necessity shows that while busi-
nesses are allowed some deference to make policies to effectively and
safely run their businesses, a disparate impact analysis does not over-
164. Lisa L. Behm, Comment, Protecting Linguistic Minorities under Title VII: The Need for
Judicial Deference to the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 81
MARQ. L. REv. 569, 599 (1998).
165. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305.
166. See id. at 1306-07.
167. Id. at 1305.
168. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975) (discuss-
ing an employer's right to determine how to properly run a business).
169. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1410.
170. Id.
171. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1980).
172. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
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value this deference to employer's needs at the cost of allowing dis-
crimination against employees. 173 For example, the Maldonado court
indicates that an English-only policy to facilitate communication over the
company radio may be a legitimate business necessity. 174 However, the
court found that there was no evidence that the policy was enacted to
correct this problem or that the problem even existed, so the court did not
affirm summary judgment for the employer. 75 This demonstrates that
properly applied, business necessity does not sacrifice employees' rights
because employers must have a legitimate business necessity, not just an
explanation, for a policy that discriminates in practice. 176 Moreover, the
Amicus Curiae Brief from the ACLU on the side of the employees in
Maldonado, while favoring the EEOC guidelines, spent half the brief
applying a disparate impact analysis, showing it is a standard that can be
applied fairly.' 77 Overall, the Maldonado court's opinion demonstrates
that a disparate impact analysis can be applied to balance the rights of
employers and prevent discrimination, without protecting employees or
employers to the disadvantage of the other party.
C. Legislative Intent
The 1991 Act unequivocally demonstrated the legislative intent to
codify the disparate impact analysis set forth in Griggs.'78 The House
Report noted that "[t]he Griggs decision has had an extraordinarily posi-
tive impact on the American Workplace."' 179 Moreover, the House Re-
port on the 1991 Act pointed out the test set forth by Griggs favors both
employers and employees by improving working conditions and improv-
ing procedures and standards used by employers.'
80
Even prior to 1991, courts considered the legislative intent of Title
VII to create a balance between preventing discrimination and preserving
an employer's freedom to run a business.' 8' The Supreme Court, in a
case considering gender discrimination under Title VII, stated that its
repeated "emphasis on 'business necessity' in disparate-impact cases...
and on 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason[s]' in disparate-treatment
cases ... results from our awareness of Title VII's balance between em-
ployee rights and employer prerogatives."'182 In contrast, the approach in
the EEOC guidelines of presuming that an English-only policy is dis-
173. See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1306.
174. See id at 1306-07.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 1306.
177. Brief for ACLU, supra note 14, at 9.
178. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 23-28 (1991).
179. Id. at 25.
180. Id ("Major corporations have had to rethink their personnel policies .... In doing so,
many found that they have improved the working conditions of all employees ... there have been
improvements in their procedures and standards .... ").
181. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242-43 (1989).
182. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242-43.
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criminatory fails to achieve this balance because it favors "employee
rights" over "employer prerogatives. 183
In rejecting the EEOC guidelines in Spun Steak, the Ninth Circuit
recognized the guidelines go against the legislative intent behind Title
VII:
It is clear that Congress intended a balance to be struck in preventing
discrimination and preserving the independence of the employer. In
striking that balance, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff in a
disparate impact case must prove the alleged discriminatory effect
before the burden shifts to the employer. The EEOC Guideline at is-
sue here contravenes that policy by presuming that an English-only
policy has a disparate impact in the absence of proof.
18 4
The Tenth Circuit opinion in Maldonado is not consistent with the
legislative intent of Title VII because the court refers to the EEOC guide-
lines, but applies a disparate impact analysis. The court pointed out the
EEOC guidelines are "'not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority"' and proceeded to give minimal importance to the EEOC
guidelines. 185 However, instead of deferring to the legislative intent of
Title VII and proceeding with the disparate impact analysis that the opin-
ion relied on up until that point, the court pointed out that while it is "not
suggesting that the guideline is evidence admissible at trial or should be
incorporated in a jury instruction," it is suggesting that the guidelines are
an "indication of what a reasonable, informed person may think about the
impact of an English-only work rule on minority employees, even if we
might not draw the same inference."'1 86 In light of this discussion of the
EEOC guidelines, it may have been logical for the court to draw a con-
clusion about the role of the EEOC guidelines and a separate conclusion
about a disparate impact analysis, but the court did not draw a conclusion
on either analysis. 187 Also, the court cited the EEOC guidelines to de-
termine that a reasonable jury may conclude that an English-only policy
creates a hostile work environment. 188 However, a reasonable jury may
draw the same reasonable conclusions based on a disparate impact analy-
sis, and therefore, any reference to the EEOC guidelines is unnecessary
and confusing. 189 While the court failed to recognize the legislative in-
tent of Title VII, it still properly applied a disparate impact analysis.
The impact of this inconsistency in the courts is demonstrated in the
brief drafted by the ACLU on the side of the employees in Maldonado
183. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90.
184. Id. at 1490.
185. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305-06 (citing Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90).
186. Id. at 1306.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1303-06.
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that was compelled to apply both the EEOC guidelines and a disparate
impact analysis. 190 This confusion can be corrected if future decisions
from all the circuits follow the legislative intent of Title VII and use a
disparate impact analysis.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between the Ninth Circuit's complete rejection of the
EEOC guidelines and the Tenth Circuit's hesitation to reject the guide-
lines outright demonstrates that there needs to be an affirmative decision
on what standard to apply when an English-only policy is at issue. The
EEOC guidelines presume that English-only policies cause harm, while a
disparate impact analysis uses burden shifting, which preserves the bal-
ance between the needs of employers and the protection of employees
from discrimination. Without a definitive adoption of a disparate impact
analysis or the EEOC guidelines, employers and employees cannot know
what policies constitute discrimination under Title VII. In order to re-
solve this conflict, the disparate impact approach should be uniformly
accepted. As the country's foreign population continues to grow, Title
VII's protection of national origin becomes increasingly important and
the disparate impact approach should be utilized by the courts in order to
preserve legislative intent, protect employers by allowing employers to
run business safely and effectively, and protect language as an integral
part of a person's national origin.
Melissa Meitus*
190. Brief for ACLU, supra note 14, at 9.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to
thank my parents, my brother, and Jeremy Loew for their endless support, as well as Prof. Martin J.
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FORESTS ON FIRE: THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT,
FOREST SERVICE DISCRETION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS IN A TIME OF EXTRAORDINARY WILDFIRE
DANGER
INTRODUCTION
The western United States currently struggles with wildfire condi-
tions, which threaten people and property more than ever before.1  In
2006, wildfires burned over 9.8 million acres,2 encompassing an area
more than twice the size of New Jersey.3 Heat,4 drought, 5 high forest
density, and forest mismanagement 6 contribute to the recent increased
danger.7 These factors combine to compromise tree health and increase
1. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, HEALTHY FORESTS: AN INITIATIVE FOR
WILDFIRE PREVENTION AND STRONGER COMMUNITIES 4 (2002) [hereinafter HFI], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/healthyforests/HealthyForests-v2.pdf (noting that wildfires
killed nearly 200 firefighters during the last decade. An example of the increased threat is the recent
Hayman fire, which "was five times bigger than the previous largest fire in Colorado's modem
history, and forced evacuations in over 80 communities." Id. In 2002, the Hayman fire and other
Colorado wildfires forced 77,000 residents to evacuate for periods of up to several weeks. Id. at 5.
Thus, wildfires forced more than 1.5 percent of Coloradans to evacuate. See Colorado QuickFacts
from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/08000.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2007) (Colorado population statistics); see also Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping
Public Land Policy in an Era of Ecology and Litigation, 36 ENV. L. 301, 302 (2006) (noting "[a]
spate of record-setting fire seasons have seen millions of acres burned, hundreds of homes destroyed,
numerous lives lost, and multi-million dollar fire suppression bills"). But see infra notes 49-62, 73
and accompanying text (discussing the idea that humans cause most of the dangers associated with
wildfires). See also Forest Guardians, Appeal of the County Line Vegetation Management Project
Record of Decision and Environmental Impact Statement Rio Grande National Forest Conejos Peak
Ranger District (2005), available at http://www.fguardians.org/library/paper.asp?nMode =
I &nLibrarylD=240 (expressing the view that the government exaggerates the danger).
2. Wildland Fire Statistics, http://www.nifc.gov/stats/firesacres.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2007).
3. Christopher Smith, Wildfires Take the Worst Toll in Acreage Since '60, SEATTLE TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2006, available at* http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003257891_
wildfires 14.html.
4. EPA: Global Warming: Climate, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/
climate.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (noting that global warming likely causes the increased
temperatures).
5. U.S. Drought Monitor, http://drought.unl.edu/dm/monitor.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2007)
(on file with author) (indicating that "severe droughts" currently affect certain areas in each Tenth
Circuit state).
6. STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA 242-60 (1997). Likely the most biologically signifi-
cant element of forest mismanagement in the western United States is fire suppression. Id. (noting
that the movement toward widespread, comprehensive fire suppression began about a century ago).
7. Keiter, supra note 1, at 314-15 (noting that 22,000 communities and over 39 million acres
in national forests "face an unnaturally high fire danger" and indicating that many experts define the
threat as an "unprecedented forest health crisis"); National Interagency Fire Center, National Year-
to-Date Report on Fires and Acres Burned by State (Dec. 17, 2006),
http://www.nifc.gov/stats/ytd_st.htm; National Interagency Fire Center, Total Wildland Fires and
Acres (1960-2005), http://www.nifc.gov/stats/firesacres.html (demonstrating that more acres
burned in 2006 than any year on record).
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the number of trees that are dead and dry.8 One significant cause of the
current high rate of tree mortality is a recent bark beetle infestation. 9
These beetles attack stressed trees, and have killed millions of trees in
recent years.10
To combat the forest's volatility, President George W. Bush an-
nounced the Healthy Forest Initiative ("HFI") in 2002, and Congress
enacted the Healthy Forests Restoration Act ("HFRA") in 2003, both of
which call for swift action." Both the HFI and HFRA purport to combat
wildfire danger by streamlining regulations that control some Forest Ser-
vice projects.1 2 Specifically, the HFI and HFRA allow the Forest Service
to forgo environmental analysis before planning, implementing, and
completing certain logging projects. 13 Additionally, the directives strip
the judiciary of its jurisdiction to hear cases involving some projects.
14
The HFI and HFRA ostensibly aim to protect people, property, and forest
health by increasing the Forest Service's ability to quickly and efficiently
treat at-risk forests.
15
Decision makers must balance the restoration of ecosystem health
against the safety of people and property. Ecosystems are delicate, dy-
namic, and dependent on specific elements and events.' 6 Modifications
to any part of an ecosystem may cause profound consequences. 7 Scien-
tists generally agree that fire is an integral part of most ecosystems.18
Although ecosystems need fire, many people want to eliminate wildfires
because they threaten human safety and property. This presents an espe-
8. Northern Arizona University Ecological Restoration Institute, Fire Season and Forest
Restoration Update (2006), http://www.eri.nau.edu/cms/content/view/702/906/ [hereinafter Fire
Season and Forest Restoration Update].
9. Id. It is important to understand that bark beetle infestations are natural, cyclical events,
which periodically occur in many healthy forests. Therese M. Pollard & Robert A. Haack, Reading
the Lines Under Bark, ENTOMOLOGY NOTES 25 (1998), available at
http://insects.ummz.lsa.umich.edu/MES/notes/entnote25.pdf.
10. PAIGE LEWIS ET AL., COLO. DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Div. OF FORESTRY, REPORT
ON THE HEALTH OF COLORADO'S FORESTS 2004, SPECIAL ISSUE: PONDEROSA PINE FORESTS 1
(2004), available at http://csfs.colostate.edu/libray/pdfs/fhr/04fhr.pdf (noting that, in Colorado, the
beetle infestation killed "approximately 1.2 million trees" in 2004, "nearly one hundred times the
mortality reported in 1996").
11. Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-148, 117 Stat. 1887 (2003)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 6501-6591 (West 2007)); HFI, supra note 1, at 2.
12. 16 U.S.C.A. § 6501; HFI, supra note 1, at 2; see also Colo. Wild, Heartwood v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2006) (describing of the relevant regulations).
13. 16 U.S.C.A. § 6514; HFI, supra note 1, at 13; see also Colo. Wild, 435 F.3d at 1209.
14. 16 U.S.C.A. § 6515.
15. 16 U.S.C.A. § 6501; United States Dept. of Agriculture, Fact Sheet, Making a Difference:
Fishlake National Forest - Utah, http://www.healthyforests.gov/projects/stateprojects/00-ut-fish-
lake-nf.pdf (stating that "[iut was clear that action needed to occur quickly to decrease the threats of
uncharacteristically intense and severe wildfires"). But see Forest Guardians, supra note 1 (noting
that many environmentalists are skeptical about the Forest Service's true intentions). "The Healthy
Forests Restoration Act of 2003 .. .used forest insect outbreaks as a justification for increasing
logging and limiting environmental protections." Id.
16. See generally ALDO LEOPOLD, SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1968).
17. Id.
18. Keiter, supra note 1, at 303.
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cially difficult problem because ecosystems are complex and not entirely
understood. Ill-conceived projects could eventuate in short-term wildfire
relief, while ultimately increasing future danger and causing long-lasting
harm to ecosystem health.
This year the Tenth Circuit ruled on four cases concerning Forest
Service logging projects promulgated under the HFI and HFRA.19 These
cases are important because they illustrate how the court interprets the
recent directives. The Tenth Circuit struggled with the legislation's sig-
nificant grant of Forest Service deference and recognized that misguided
projects may have potentially severe consequences.20 Each Tenth Circuit
case involved projects in forest regions with high wildfire danger, which
targeted areas endangered by or susceptible to high tree mortality, caused
bark beetle infestation.2' Therefore, bark beetles are an important ele-
ment of the litigation. Embedded in the cases is the issue of who should
play essential roles in striking the balance between wildfire danger and
ecosystem health, i.e., should the Forest Service have unfettered discre-
tion or should courts adjudge the legality of Forest Service projects?
This article explores the relationship between wildfire danger, eco-
system health, bark beetles, agency discretion, and judicial oversight.
The purpose of this paper is fourfold. Part I examines the biological and
social factors related to wildfires in lodgepole pine ecosystems and pon-
derosa pine ecosystems, and the bark beetles'2 2 role therein. Part II spot-
lights this issue's timeliness and importance to public policy. Part III
scrutinizes recent changes in the law and analyzes the two most recent
Tenth Circuit decisions involving logging projects and bark beetles. Part
IV articulates a well-reasoned set of rules, which support responsible
thinning projects and incorporate black letter law, dicta, and generally
accepted science.
19. The cases are: Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006);
Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 443 F.3d 732 (10th Cir. 2006); Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 439
F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2006); and Colo. Wild, Heartwoodv. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204 (10th
Cir. 2006). When referencing logging or thinning, this paper does not refer to all logging or thinning
projects. This paper only addresses pre-fire projects in wildfire prone areas that use recently enacted
legislation to avoid environmental regulations and judicial oversight. There are substantial issues
regarding post-fire timber salvaging projects. Keiter, supra note 1, at 334-36. While it seems dubi-
ous that recent jurisdiction-stripping statutes that reduce required environmental analyses are either
necessary or beneficial for post-fire projects, that topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 155-98.
21. Ecology Ctr., Inc., 451 F.3d at 1186-88; Utah Envtl. Cong., 443 F.3d at 737-38; Utah
Envtl. Cong., 439 F.3d at 1187; Colo. Wild, Heartwood, 435 F.3d at 1212.
22. There are many different species of bark beetles, each consuming the bark of one pre-
ferred species of evergreen tree. Tom DeGomez & Beverly Loomis, Firewood and Bark Beetles in
the Southwest, THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, Sept, 2005, at 2, available
at http://cals.arizona.edu/pubs/insects/azl370.pdf. Differences exist between the species, but the
issues involving the species are similar; they kill trees and make forests more susceptible to devastat-
ing wildfires. Id.
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I. THE SCIENCE
This section describes wildfire's role in healthy lodgepole pine for-
ests and ponderosa pine forests. It also illustrates humans' impacts on
those ecosystems and explains the problems associated with the wildland
urban interface and bark beetles.
A. Wildfires in Healthy Lodgepole Pine Ecosystems and Ponderosa Pine
Ecosystems
To understand fire behavior in a healthy forest, one must first rec-
ognize the dynamics of a healthy forest. Wildfires play divergent roles
in different ecosystems. Some ecosystems need frequent, small fires,
and other ecosystems depend on infrequent, large fires.23 Wildfires are a
complicated necessary element of most terrestrial ecosystems.24 Numer-
ous ecosystems exist in the Tenth Circuit,25 most of which naturally ex-
perience fire.26 In the Tenth Circuit region, wildfires in lodgepole pine
ecosystems and ponderosa pine ecosystems present the most significant
risk to people and their property; therefore, this paper focuses on these
ecosystems.27
1. Healthy Lodgepole Pine Ecosystems
Lodgepole pine ecosystems commonly occur at middle elevations
(between 8,000 to 10,000 feet in Colorado).28 High tree density typifies
this ecosystem.29 Generally, the risk of a large wildfire is high in some
tree stands, but low in others. 30  Lodgepole pine seeds open when ex-
posed to fire and flourish in bare, sunny areas, like those recently devas-
tated by a large wildfire.31 Thus, lodgepole pine regeneration depends on
23. See generally Colorado State Forest Service, Colorado's Major Tree Species,
http://csfs.colostate.edu/majortrees.htm (last visited Jan. .20, 2007) (listing the major tree species in
Colorado, describing their preferred ecosystem, and indicating their relationship with fire).
24. PYNE, supra note 6, at 34-44.
25. Scheidler Center for Science Learning, Mesa State College, Ecosystems of Colorado,
http://www.mesastate.edu/schools/snsm/shideler/ecosys.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (listing
Colorado ecosystems as grassland, semidesert shrubland, pinon-juniper woodland, riparian land,
montane shrubland, montane forest, subalpine forest, treeline, and alpine tundra).
26. Colorado State Forest Service, supra note 23.
27. Wildfires in these ecosystems are the most dangerous due to the ecosystem's size, typical
proximity to the wildland urban interface, and the amount of highly combustible fuel.
28. Colorado Natural Heritage Program, Rocky Mountain Lodgepole Pine Forest,
http://www.cnhp.colostate.edu/projects/eco-systems/pdf/RMLodgepolePineForest.pdf (last
visited Jan. 20, 2007).
29. Id.
30. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Younger stands are typically more resistant
to events such as bark beetle infestations, while other, older, less vigorous tree stands are unable to
resist outbreaks and are more susceptible to fire. See Scott Condon, Bark Beetles Converge on
Pitkin County Buffet Table, ASPEN TIMES, Apr. 25, 2006, available at
http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20060425/NEWS/I 04250028&SearchlD=7326358606296.
31. 1 RUSSELL M. BuRNS & BARBARA H. HONKALA, SILVICS OF NORTH AMERICA 604
(1990), available at http://www.na.fs.fed.us/pubs/silvics manual/volume_l/silvics-voll.pdf; Fires
and Chainsaws, THE VOICE FOR THE WILD (Biodiversity Conservation Alliance), Summer 2005, at
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large, stand replacing, crown fires for regeneration. The result is a
dense, evenly-aged stand.33 Over time, isolated wildfires result in a mo-
saic of many tree stands of different ages.34
2. Healthy Ponderosa Pine Ecosystems
Relatively few trees populate mature, healthy ponderosa pine for-
ests. 35 This lower elevation ecosystem (generally between 6,000 to 8,000
feet in Colorado) 36 typically contains old trees, which create a high can-
opy-well above the forest bottom. 37  Grasses, shrubs, and seedling
trees, that seldom become large and well-developed, cover the forest
bottom. 38 In this ecosystem, wildfires periodically burn the underbrush
but seldom reach the forest canopy.39 Ponderosa pine ecosystem fires
bum at relatively low temperatures, generally encompass small areas,
and infrequently become catastrophic crown fires.40 While these low
intensity fires rarely affect mature trees, they do suppress undergrowth,
thereby reducing competition for mature trees.4 1 This promotes the pro-
longed viability of mature trees, prevents fire ladders from forming, and
thins the forest naturally. Today, healthy ponderosa pine forests and
lodgepole pine forests are both anomalies in the western United States.43
4, available at http://www.voiceforthewild.org/general/newsletter/theVoicefortheWildSummer
2005.pdf.
32. Colorado Natural Heritage Program, supra note 28 (noting that moderate ground fires do
not play a significant role in lodgepole pine ecosystems); Fires and Chainsaws, supra note 31.
33. BURNS & HONKALA, supra note 31, at 608; Fires and Chainsaws, supra note 31, at 6.
34. See Condon, supra note 30.
35. Robert L. Peters et al., Managing for Forest Ecosystem Health: A Reassessment of the
"Forest Health Crisis," http://www.defenders.org/bio-fh00.html (click on Section 5) (last visited
Jan. 20, 2007) (noting that periodic wildfires reduce forest density).
36. Biotic Communities of the Colorado Plateau: Ponderosa Pine Forest,
http://www.cpluhna.nau.edu/Biota/ponderosa forest.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
37. HFI, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that typical ponderosa pine forests were 15 times less
dense a century ago).
38. Fires and Chainsaws, supra note 31, at 4.
39. Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1156-57 (10th Cir. 2004); see Peters et al.,
supra note 35.
40. Biodiversity, 357 F.3d at 1156-57.
41. Id.
42. U.S. Forest Serv., Sustaining Alpine and Forest Ecosystems: Development of Manage-
ment Alternatives for Fire-Prone and Fire-Dependent Ecosystems in Colorado and the Black Hills,
http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/landscapes/Fire/Fuelreduce.shtml (last visited Jan: 20, 2007) [hereinafter
U.S. Forest Serv., Sustaining Alpine and Forest Ecosystems] (defining a fire ladder as plant material
that is high enough to spread a fire to the forest canopy); see Peters et al., supra note 35 (click on
Section 5).
43. Dominick A. DellaSala et al., Forest Health: Moving Beyond Rhetoric to Restore Healthy
Landscapes in the Inland Northwest, 23 WILDLIFE SOC'Y BULL. 346 (1995), available at
http://maps.wildrockies.org/ecosystem-defense/Science Documents/DellaSala et al 1995.pdf; see
also "Forests," in PAUL HARRISON & FRED PEARCE, AAAS ATLAS OF POPULATION AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 127 (2001), available at http://atlas.aaas.org/pdf/127-30.pdf (noting that people have
logged 95% of the forests in the United States).
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B. Wildfires in Today's Unhealthy Lodgepole Pine and Ponderosa Pine
Ecosystems
Unnaturally high wildfire danger currently threatens lodgepole pine
ecosystems and ponderosa pine ecosystems in Tenth Circuit forests.
44
Different factors elevate the danger in each ecosystem, but wildfires in
both ecosystems threaten people and property; therefore, similar issues
arise.
1. Wildfires in Today's Unhealthy Lodgepole Pine Ecosystems
Probably the biggest problem in lodgepole pine ecosystems in the
Tenth Circuit results from a century of fire suppression.45 Removal of
fire from lodgepole pine forests resulted in the lack of a mosaic of vari-
ously aged tree stands.46 One hundred years of broad fire suppression
resulted in a high proportion of old trees, because no young trees re-
placed tree stands consumed by catastrophic fire events.47 Thus, lodge-
pole pine forests in the Tenth Circuit are unvarying, uniformly declining
in vigor, and simultaneously susceptible to events like bark beetle infes-
tations.48 Widespread bark beetle infestations, high tree mortality, and
extraordinary fire danger mark the aging tree stands in the Tenth Circuit.
2. Wildfires in Today's Unhealthy Ponderosa Pine Ecosystems
The effects on the ponderosa pine ecosystem are equally profound.
When settlers came to the Rockies more than a century ago, they could
drive a wagon through the old growth ponderosa pine forests.49 Now,
trees are so dense that a person cannot even walk through some of those
same forests. 50 In most of the western United States, overdeveloped un-
derstories and immature canopies comprise ponderosa pine forests.51
Years of fire suppression, logging, and grazing have caused this ecologi-
cal crisis.52 High tree density, one of the most significant results of the
degradation, provides more fuel for wildfires.53 Consequently, wildfires
44. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
45. Fires and Chainsaws, supra note 31, at 4.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Condon, supra note 30 (noting that 90% of the trees "are in the aged classification[,]" "the
vast majority of lodgepole pines in the state are 100 years of age and older[,]... [and] [t]rees more
than 80 years old are susceptible to mountain pine beetles").
49. USDA Forest Service - Healthy Forest Initiative,
http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/hfi/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
50. Id. (noting that historic, healthy ponderosa pine forests had around 25 mature trees per
acre and "[t]oday the same forest may have more than 1,000 trees on the same acre").
51. Josd F. Negr6n & John B. Popp, Probability of Ponderosa Pine Infestation by Mountain
Beetle in the Colorado Front Range, 191 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 17, 25 (2004).
52. Biodiversity, 357 F.3d at 1156; Peters et al., supra note 35 (click on Section 4). But, the
Forest Service claims that grazing does not result in dramatically increased wildfire danger. Inter-
view with Mr. Rick Cables, Rocky Mountain Regional Forest Ranger, United States Forest Service,
in Denver, Colo. (Oct. 18, 2006).
53. Negrrn & Popp, supra note 51.
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in today's ponderosa pine forests bum hotter and faster, and consume
larger areas.54 Some experts warn that the "risk of catastrophic natural
disturbances [such as wildfires] has become probable in many areas."
55
Thus, human impact on forest ecosystems in the Tenth Circuit has caused
massive, widespread wildfire susceptibility in lodgepole pine ecosystems
and ponderosa pine ecosystems.
C. The Wildland Urban Interface Problem
The wildland urban interface constitutes areas where people build
homes and other structures amongst undeveloped vegetation.56 Humans
are moving into forested areas at a dramatic rate, especially in the west-
ern United States.57 This current, dramatic rise in human relocation from
cities to wooded areas causes the wildland urban interface to grow.58 A
good example of this migration is the Colorado Front Range, where
builders develop approximately 10 acres in or around forests every
hour.5 9 Mr. Rick Cables, Rocky Mountain Regional Forest Ranger, de-
scribed the effects of this trend as "homes in a sea of green. ' ' 60 This geo-
graphic expansion of human population results in an increased number of
homes and businesses susceptible to wildfires. 61 The current wildfire
danger results directly from a century of mismanaged forests, unfavor-
able climate conditions, and urban sprawl.6 z  Bark beetle infestations
compound the problem.
D. The Bark Beetle
The bark beetle is "the most destructive forest insect in western
North America.' '63 These beetles kill trees, thereby increasing fire dan-
54. See Biodiversity, 357 F.3d at 1156-57.
55. U.S. Forest Serv., Sustaining Alpine and Forest Ecosystems, supra note 42.
56. V. C. Radelhoff et al., The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States, 15
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 799 (2005), available at http://silvis.forest.wisc.edu/publications/
PDFs/Radeloff etal ea2005.pdf.
57. FORESTS AT THE WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE: CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 3
(Susan W. Vince et al. eds., CRC Press 2005) [hereinafter FORESTS AT THE WILDLIFE-URBAN
INTERFACE] (noting that the increase doubled in the past ten years).
58. Id. at 3 ("A recent inventory of the nation's land base indicated that 2.2 million acres of
rural and open space land were lost to development each year... much of this newly developed land
had been forested. Urban expansion into the countryside has not only displaced ... [the] forest, it
has also mixed with these rural lands."); Radelhoff, supra note 56, at 799 (noting that "39% of all
houses" in the "coterminous United States" are in the wildland urban interface); Interview with Rick
Cables, supra note 52 (stating that "people live in forests now, more than ever").
59. DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW; CASES AND MATERIALS 1148
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds. 2002).
60. Interview with Rick Cables, supra note 52 (describing his visual observations of the
Colorado Front Range wildland urban interface during flyovers).
61. U.S. Forest Serv., Four Threats - Quick Facts (2006), http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/four-
threats/facts/fire-fucls.shtml [hereinafter U.S. Forest Serv., Four Threats].
62. See supra Part I.B. 1.; see also FORESTS AT THE WILDLIFE-URBAN INTERFACE, supra note
57.
63. Barbara J. Bentz, Mountain Pine Beetle Population Sampling: Inferences from Lindgren
Pheromone Traps and Tree Emergence Cages, 36 CANADIAN J. FOREST RES. 351 (2006) (citing R.L.
2007) 929
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ger because dead trees dry and become more combustible.64 A couple of
years after a severe bark beetle infestation, a forest can morph into a gi-
ant stand of kindling.65 A few years later, many of the dead trees fall and
increase fuel on the forest floor.66
Many factors and a long series of events caused the current beetle
outbreak in lodgepole pine ecosystems in Tenth Circuit forests. In short,
recent elevated temperatures, drought conditions, and high tree density
contribute to increased tree stress.67 Bark beetles target and decimate
stressed trees.68  Stressed trees exude a compound that attracts the bee-
tles. 69  Once a beetle finds a suitable host tree, it emits pheromones,
which entice additional beetles. 70 The beetles then consume the inside of
the tree's bark, which almost always kills the tree.7 ' Most scientists
theorize that bark beetle infestations are nature's way of thinning forests
that are too dense.72 The threat of wildfires is a portentous consequence
of this cycle.7 3 Despite the fact that bark beetles play an important role
in forest ecosystems, they are on a collision course with the public policy
interests of protecting human safety and property.74
The massive scale of bark beetle infestations escalates the magni-
tude of the problem. Scientific evidence indicates that bark beetles are
responsible for more than 20% of tree mortality in some forests. 75 Other
research found that bark beetles infested nearly 40% of trees in sample
areas. 76 Bark beetle infestations are common in the wildland urban inter-
Furniss & V.M. Caroline, Western Forest Insects, USDA Forest Serv. Misc. Pub. 1339 (1977),
available at http://www.usu.edulbeetle/documents/2006Bentz_%20MPBTrapping.pdf.
64. Fire Season and Forest Restoration Update, supra note 8.
65. See Arizona Forest Health, http://ag.arizona.edu/extension/fhi/bbfaq.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2007) [hereinafter FAQ].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Negr6n & Popp, supra note 5 1, at 23; see also Pollard & Haack, supra note 9.
69. FAQ, supra note 65.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Pollard & Haack, supra note 9.
73. Id. It is important to understand that bark beetles are one of many causes of wildfire
danger; humans are another cause. Fire Ecology Page, http://www.pacificbio.org/Projects/
Fire200 1/fireecology.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (noting that "[a]pproximately 90% of fires in
the last decade have been human-caused, either through negligence, accident or intentional arson").
Arguably, this fact and the trend of human migration into forested areas combine to make humans
the primary cause of most wildfires. See National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Wildlife Origin and
Cause Determination Handbook, National Wildfire Coordinating Group 65 (2005), available at
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/nfesl874/nfesl874.pdf (listing wildfire causes as lightning, camp-
ing, smoking, debris burning, arson, equipment use, railroad, children, power lines, cutting, welding,
grinding, firearm use, blasting, structures, glass refraction, glass magnification, spontaneous com-
bustion, flare stack, and pit fires).
74. Negrrn & Popp, supra note 51, at 17.
75. USDA Forest Serv., Sustaining Alpine Forest Ecosystems: Landscape Pathology, Disease
Economics, and impact Assessment (2006), http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/landscapes/Research/
Economics.shtml.
76. Appeal of County Line Vegetation Management Project Record of Decision and Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement Rio Grande National Forest Conejos Peak Ranger District at 12-13,
filed Sept. 19, 2005, available at http://www.fguardians.org/legal/appeal-county-line-vegetation-
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face, 7 thereby compounding the problem to an even greater extent. In
the end, these infestations increase the likelihood of wildfires and
threaten tens of thousands of people, their homes, and their businesses.
78
II. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
Why are bark beetles currently at the center of some Tenth Circuit
litigation? The answer is simple: they increase fire danger. Addressing
wildfire danger is important because: (1) it has economic ramifications
for the Forest Service; (2) it may represent an excuse to log forests; and
(3) it threatens people and property.
A. Economic Ramifications for the Forest Service
The Forest Service struggles with budgetary problems, losing mil-
lions of dollars annually on logging projects.80 Regulations contribute to
these budgetary difficulties.8' Unnecessary or inefficient regulations
may overburden the Forest Service and waste time and money. 2  The
Forest Service claims that voluminous statutes, many of which are nearly
incomprehensible or contradictory, impede its efficiency.8 3 Streamlining
the process is appropriate when it ameliorates budgetary problems and
EIS-rio-grande-forest_9-19-05.pdf [hereinafter Appeal of County Line] (citing T.T. Veblen et al.,
Disturbance Regime and Disturbance Interactions in a Rocky Mountain Subalpine Forest, 82 J.
ECOL. 125 (1994)).
77. FORESTS AT THE WILDLIFE-URBAN INTERFACE, supra note 57, at 3; DellaSala et al., supra
note 43, at 353. For example, Colorado's Front Range, the mountainous area just west of Boulder,
Denver, and Colorado Springs, has a dramatic bark beetle problem, Negr6n & Popp, supra note 51,
at 18 (noting that bark beetles killed almost half a million trees in 2001, the majority of which were
in the Colorado Front Range); U.S. Forest Serv., Sustaining Alpine and Forest Ecosystems, supra
note 42.
78. HFI, supra note 1, at 1.
79. See Appeal of County Line, supra note 76, at 12-13.
80. Id. (stating that logging in the 10th Circuit is essentially never a money-making proposi-
tion due to typical tree type, tree size, and costs associated with road construction). See generally
RANDALL O'TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE 98-137 (Island Press 1988).
81. Keiter, supra note 1, at 337.
82. The basis for this assertion is not costs associated with litigation. It is debatable whether
costs of litigation significantly hinder the Forest Service. First, only a small percentage of projects
are litigated. Second, if the court enjoins a project, the hindrance is not the regulation, but rather the
Forest Service's failure to follow the law. Additionally, litigation costs are minimal in the context of
this article's argument, i.e., projects involving pre-fire fuel reduction. Robert Keiter explains:
Thus far, comparatively little fire-related litigation has involved challenges to pre-fire
hazardous fuel reduction projects or suppression policy decisions. In the few reported
cases involving challenges solely to hazardous fuel reduction project proposals, the courts
have usually sustained agency decisions against NEPA, NFMA, and other claims, finding
that the proposals have been adequately analyzed and documented. But when the agen-
cies have sought to justify post-fire salvage logging projects on hazardous fuel removal
or disease prevention grounds, the courts have not been as receptive.
Id. at 336.
83. Interview with Rick Cables, supra note 52. The government passed these laws over the
course of a century, during which time leadership changed, agency goals mutated, and biological
understanding morphed. See generally Federico Cheever, The United States Forest Service and
National Park Service: Paradoxical Mandates, Powerful Founders, and the Rise and Fall ofAgency
Discretion, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 625 (1997).
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poses little environmental risk. 4 Responding to this concern, President
George W. Bush and Congress recently decreased the Forest Service's
accountability and diminished its responsibility to complete environ-
mental analyses. These efforts to increase Forest Service efficiency
probably exceeded the limits of reasonable mitigation of the problem.
Diminishing Forest Service accountability creates new, and likely more
serious, problems because projects have long-lasting, widespread, and
significant effects.
B. Wildfires May Represent an Excuse to Log
The Forest Service's propensity to use wildfire danger and bark
beetles to justify the approval of logging projects constitutes another
public policy concern.86 The Forest Service's budget problems provide
an incentive to manipulate the classification of projects into categories
that allow for abbreviated regulations and no judicial review. Using leg-
islation in this way contradicts the drafters' intent.8 7 Legislation should
not prevent courts from striking down projects that employ this distor-
tion. Allowing the Forest Service to manipulate statutes in this manner
constitutes irresponsible public policy.
C. Danger to People and Property
88
Wildfires threaten vast portions of the western United States. 89 "A
spate of record-setting fire seasons have seen millions of acres burned,
hundreds of homes destroyed, numerous lives lost, and multi-million
dollar fire suppression bills." 90  In Colorado, 2.4 million acres in the
Front Range are "at high risk to catastrophic fire." 91 Wildfires similarly
endanger an additional 6.3 million acres in Colorado. 92 Misguided man-
agement of this fragile situation could result in billions of dollars of
waste, further degradation of habitat, and destruction of sensitive plant
84. See infra Part IV.A. (detailing circumstances when an abbreviated process is rational).
Streamlining the process is sometimes beneficial because laws related to fire are "an uncoordinated
and fragmented welter of organic statutory provisions, environmental protection mandates, annual
budget riders, site-specific legislation, judicial decisions, policy documents, management plans, and
diverse state statutory prohibitions." See Keiter, supra note 1, at 303-04. A primary example of a
circumstance that warrants this streamlined process is thinning projects in the wildland urban inter-
face. See infra Part W.A.
85. See infra Part III.B.2.
86. Forest Guardians, supra note 1.
87. Employing this legislation to approve projects where wildfires do not significantly endan-
ger people or property represents using bark beetles as a smokescreen to log. Both cases addressed
in this paper involve proposed logging projects in forests that are far from any significant human
population. See RandMcNally, http://randmcnally.com/ (click on "online maps," type in "Cedar
City, UT," zoom into magnification level 5) (showing that Fishlake National Forest and Dixie Na-
tional Forest are not in close proximity to any communities).
88. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
89. See U.S. Forest Serv., Four Threats, supra note 61.
90. Keiter, supra note 1, at 302.
91. U.S. Forest Serv., Sustaining Alpine and Forest Ecosystems, supra note 42.
92. Id.
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and animal species.93 The end result of mismanagement could be the
emergence of even higher wildfire volatility and amplified threats to
people and property.94
In order to mitigate the threat to people and property, Congress
must fully understand the potential ramifications of its legislation. It is
equally important that Forest Service projects fall within the parameters
of legislative intent. If a Forest Service project is not consistent with the
legislative intent, courts should enjoin the project. Solving this problem
requires a prudent analysis that protects short-term interests and ensures
long-term ecological health, both of which eventuate in the protection of
people and property.95
III. THE LAW
By scrutinizing administrative standards, statutes, and recent Tenth
Circuit cases, this section illustrates the amount of deference that courts
give Forest Service decisions and explains the Forest Service's role in
creating regulations.
A. Administrative Review
Before delving into applicable statutes and recent Tenth Circuit de-
cisions regarding logging in beetle-infested and wildfire-endangered
areas, one must understand the relevant administrative framework. The
Forest Service provides input during the legislative drafting process and
writes the administrative appeals regulations, both of which define the
legality of its own actions.96 A Forest Service official approves logging
93. U.S. Forest Serv., Four Threats, supra note 61.
94. For example, if the Forest Service logs in a manner that prevents a healthy, mature canopy
with few fuel ladders, fire danger will increase over time. See generally Press Release, Tom DeGo-
mez, Forest Health Specialist, University of Arizona, Status of the Pine Bark Beetle Outbreak in
Arizona (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://ag.arizona.edu/extension/fh/news-releases/06-23-04.pdf.
Examples of projects that fail to effectively mitigate wildfire volatility exist in the Tenth Circuit.
See Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2006) (describing a
proposal that included logging aspen stands, which bark beetles do not infest); DellaSala et al., supra
note 43, at 346. See generally National Forest Protection Alliance, Myths and Facts About Logging
National Forests, http://www.rso.comell.edu/snrc/documents/NFPA_MythsFacts.pdf (last visited
Jan. 20, 2007).
95. This article focuses on methods that seem feasible for large-scale governmental imple-
mentation. Many solutions seem plausible for smaller scale treatments, such as those on an individ-
ual's property. USDA Forest Serv., Mountain Pine Beetle: Solar Treatment Kills Mountain Pine
Beetles in Pine Logs, Sustaining and Alpine and Forest Ecosystems
http://www.fs.fed.us/rmlandscapes/Solutions/Pinebeetle (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). These methods
generally require significant expenditures of time and money, but may be practicable for property
owners. See id. (stating that these techniques include solarization, which is essentially cutting down
infested trees and wrapping them in plastic; thus, trapping the bark beetles); DeGomez & Loomis,
supra, note 22. This creates a greenhouse-like environment where temperatures exceed 160 degrees.
See FAQ, supra note 65. Pesticides are effective against trees that are not already infested, but they
are toxic to many animals in addition to bark beetles. Id. Finally, traps exist that capture beetles
after attracting them via pheromones. Bentz, supra note 63, at 351-52; see FAQ, supra note 65
(noting that traps are not currently practical for controlling beetle populations, but suggesting that
researchers may develop a trap that could decrease the beetle population).
96. See Colo. Wild v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2006).
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permit sales.97 If a party files a complaint against the Forest Service, a
Forest Service official hears the petition and adjudges the legality of the
Forest Service plan or action.98 During this petition, the Forest Service
official has discretion to interpret applicable statutes.99 The Tenth Cir-
cuit recently commented on the problematic outcome of this process:
The demonstration of compliance with the applicable regulatory re-
gime heightens the transparency and legitimacy of the Forest Service
when it dons multiple hats: it is the institution that issues the legal
provision, the institution that is subject to the provision, and the insti-
tution charged with the power to interpret the provision.l°0
During the administrative appeal, plaintiffs sometimes face the nearly
insurmountable task of proving to the Forest Service that it broke a rule
that it created and freely interprets. 0 1  The plaintiffs next hurdle in-
volves the judicial appeals process, in which the appellate court102 gives
strong deference to the Forest Service's administrative decision. 10 3 This
procedure is favorable to the Forest Service and detrimental to the plain-
tiff.
104
97. See Ecology Ctr., 451F.3d at 1195.
98. See id.
99. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
100. Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3dat 1195.
101. See Colo. Wild, 435 F.3d at 1214. In all four cases on which this paper focuses, the Forest
Service ruled in its own favor, finding no merit in the plaintiffs claims. Ecology Cr., 451 F.3d at
1184; Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 443 F.3d 732, 740 (10th Cir. 2006).
102. Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1564 (noting that in the 10th Cir-
cuit, a trial court is functionally analogous to an appellate court when reviewing an administrative
decision).
103. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."); see also Colo. Envtl. Coal.
v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the deference is applied in special
force, "especially when that interpretation involves questions of scientific methodology").
104. Utah Envtl. Cong., 439 F.3d at 1188 (noting that courts review decisions by the Forest
Service under the Administrative Procedures Act and courts will only set aside a Forest Service
decision if it is a "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." (citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (West 2007))); see also Jon A. Souder & Sally F. Fairfax,
Arbitrary Administrators, Capricious Bureaucrats, and Prudent Trustees: Does it Matter in the
Review of 18 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 165, 168-69 (1997) (citing MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO
GUARDS THE GUARDIANS (1988)) (espousing a very critical view of the review process and charac-
terizing it as involving "idiot" and "lunacy" standards). This paper does not suggest that the admin-
istrative process' inherent flaws approach idiocy or lunacy. However, the system does provide
potential avenues that remove checks and balances on Forest Service interests. This framework
should heighten the court's responsibility of ensuring that agencies act within the boundaries of
relevant statutory guidelines.
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Thus, the Forest Service helps create partisan laws that are inher-
ently discretionary and self-regulatory.10 5 Since courts usually defer to
Forest Service administrative decisions, °6 this process creates a system
fraught with biased decision-making and inequality of powers. 0 7 There-
fore, in order to guard against abuses of power, courts must be prudent
when assessing whether projects comply with laws.10 8 While the Forest
Service is afforded generous deference, it still must comply with statutes
such as NEPA and NFMA.
B. Pertinent Statutes and Directives
1. NEPA and NFMA: The Environmental Movement' 0 9
In the 1970's Congress acknowledged the importance of careful en-
vironmental analysis for Forest Service projects, such as logging pro-
jects, by enacting The National Environmental Policy Act of 1970
("NEPA") and The National Forest Management Act of 1976
("NFMA")." 0  These Acts address "the Forest Service's well-
documented penchant for harvesting commercial timber" by creating a
procedural and substantive framework for agency projects.11" ' NEPA and
NFMA require the Forest Service to complete environmental analyses
and restrict projects with significant impacts.' 2  Most litigation over
Forest Service projects involves these acts." 3  Therefore, this section
illustrates some specific requirements of NEPA and NFMA.
NEPA is a procedural statute that requires agencies, including the
Forest Service, to consider and publicly disclose an action's impacts and
alternative projects. 1 4 NEPA's goals are "[t]o declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and
welfare of man[.]" '"1 5 To accomplish these goals, NEPA compels federal
agencies to analyze the environmental impacts of "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment[.]" 1 6 Ini-
105. Colo. Wild, 435 F.3d at 1213 (noting that the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary
and capricious standard is narrow). HFI and HFRA compound this problem by reducing the oppor-
tunity for judicial review. See infra Part 1I.B.2.
106. Colo. Wild, 435 F.3d at 1213.
107. See Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3d at 1195.
108. One of the biggest problems with HF! and HFRA is that they remove this judicial over-
sight in some circumstances. See infra Part III.B.2.
109. Additional statutes such as the Endangered Species Act also control Forest Service ac-
tions. See Keiter supra note 1, at 333.
110. Id. at 332-33.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 333.
113. Id.
114. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West 2007).
115. Id.
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332; see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 332-33 (1989).
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tially, an agency must take a "hard look"' 1 7 at the project's environ-
mental effects and evaluate its impact by performing an Environmental
Assessment. An Environmental Assessment must provide "sufficient
evidence and analysis" and determine if the action will significantly af-
fect the environment.119 If an Environmental Assessment indicates no
significant effects, NEPA requires no additional analysis. 120  If the
agency finds that a proposed action may have significant environmental
effects, it must perform an Environmental Impact Statement.' 2 1 In addi-
tion to establishing an environmental procedural framework for agency
actions, NEPA established the Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ"), an advisory council appointed by the President. 122 Reporting
to the President, the CEQ develops and recommends national environ-
mental policies, reviews federal programs, conducts investigations, and
may institute amendments to NEPA.
123
NFMA is a substantive statute, which controls agency actions, in-
cluding the Forest Service, and places restrictions on land manage-
ment.124 NFMA designates National Forests for "multiple use" and re-
quires that Forest Service projects ensure a "sustained yield."'125 In order
to insure that its goals are met, NFMA requires the use of the "best avail-
able science.' 26  NFMA demands that decisions are based on "current
information and guidance,"'127 which rely upon "[c]omprehensive evalua-
tions ... [of] ecological conditions and trends that contribute to sustain-
ability.' 28 NFMA requires the Forest Service to identify and monitor
populations of specific species, 129 called "management indicator spe-
117. SeeEcologyCtr.,451F.3d at 1189.
118. Utah Envtl. Cong., 443 F.3d at 736 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2005)).
119. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2005)).
120. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1) (2005).
121. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b) (2005); see infra Part III.B.2 (describing the recent legislation that
deregulates requirements to perform Environmental Impact Statements and Environmental Assess-
ments in some situations).
122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4342 (West 2007); Clean Air, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/
aboutceq.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
123. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4344 (1)-(8) (West 2007). See generally Clean Air, supra note 122. The
CEQ is empowered to amend NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1504.1(c). In fact, CEQ has recently decreased
NEPA's strength by creating "categorical exclusions" which allow some Forest Service thinning
projects to proceed without environmental regulations. See Fact Sheet, Administrative Actions to
Implement the President's Healthy Forests Initiative December 12, 2002 at 3-4, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/hfi_usda-doi fact sheet_12-11-02.pdf. The effects of these cate-
gorical exclusions are discussed in depth in Part III.B.2.
124. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(a) (West 2007).
125. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(e)(1). Multiple uses include timber, so long as its harvest is sustain-
able. Id.
126. 36 C.F.R. § 219.6(a)(3)(b)(iii) (2005).
127. 36 C.F.R. § 219.3 (2003).
128. 36 C.F.R. § 219.6(a)(1) (2003).
129. In order to satisfy this requirement, the Forest Service must use quantitative data. 36
C.F.R. § 219.6 (2003).
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cies,"'130 which indicate a project's overall effects on the health of the
entire ecosystem. 
131
2. HFI and HFRA: The Jurisdiction-Stripping Movement
Widespread, deadly, and destructive fires devastated the western
United States at the turn of the twenty-first century and President Bush
reacted.32 With the stated goal of increasing agency efficiency and sup-
pressing wildfires, the President announced the HFI.133  While the HFI
was not substantively significant, it had great procedural significance.
34
The HFI effectively dissolved many NEPA requirements by adopting the
CEQ's new categorical exclusions for fuel reduction thinning projects up
to 4,500 acres for high-risk areas outside the wildland urban interface,
35
and small, live tree harvests. 136 The categorical exclusions establish an
avenue for the Forest Service to avoid performing an Environmental Im-
pact Statement and an Environmental Assessment. 37  Some categorical
exclusions are subject to an "extraordinary circumstances" limitation,
which precludes situations that may cause a "significant environmental
effect[.]"' 138  The statutory definition of categorical exclusions also re-
quires that a project have no significant cumulative or individual envi-
ronmental effect. 139 The HFI also weakened the judicial appeals process
by restricting the parties who may appeal project decisions, restricting
appeals of categorical exclusions, and eliminating certain types of ap-
peals altogether.140 Professor Robert Keiter recently summarized HFI as
130. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1) (2003).
131. Id; Utah Envtl. Congress, 439 F.3d at 1188.
132. Keiter, supra note 1, at 332.
133. Id. at 337-39.
134. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2005); Colo. Wild, 435 F.3d at 1209. This also results in the lack of a
public release of environmental analysis and potential alternative projects. Id.; see also U.S. Forest
Service Manual § 1909.15(30.3) (2004).
135. U.S. Forest Service Manual § 1909.15(31.2)(10) (2004) (noting that no more than 1000 of
those acres can employ mechanical thinning).
136. Id. The Forest Service may harvest healthy tree stands up to 70 acres or may thin dead
tree stands up to 250 acres and avoid environmental regulation and judicial oversight. Id
137. 10 C.F.R. § 51.21-22; Colo. Wild, 435 F.3d at 1209. Altogether, Forest Service regula-
tions stipulate 24 categorical exclusions, most of which are quite reasonable. See U.S. Forest Ser-
vice Manual § 1909.15(31.2) (2004) (listing current categorical exclusions). Circumstances with
limited effects such as trail construction, utility line maintenance, native plant regeneration, and so
on, should remain categorical exclusions.
138. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2005). Extraordinary circumstances also switch the burden of proof.
139. See infra note 166 (defining cumulative effects). It is problematic that categorical exclu-
sions, by definition, have no cumulative impact, because common sense dictates that some categori-
cal exclusions must have a cumulative effect. For example, a 4500-acre thinning project promul-
gated under a categorical exclusion (which could be adjacent to multiple other 4500 acre thinning
projects promulgated under a categorical exclusion) would most definitely have a cumulative impact
on the environment.
140. There is some doubt as to whether the Healthy Forest Initiative will survive intact. See
Keiter, supra note 1, at 340-42; see also infra note 179.
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"a targeted assault on the basic legal framework governing forest man-
agement in the name of efficiency and safety.'
141
In 2003, Congress followed the President's lead by passing the
HFRA. The HFRA was a collaborative effort that addressed some envi-
ronmental concerns, but like the HFI, it removed judicial oversight from
some Forest Service actions and eliminated the requirement for certain
environmental analyses. 142 The HFRA dedicated over three quarters of a
billion dollars 143 to achieve its purpose of "reducing wildfire risk to com-
munities, municipal water supplies, and other at-risk Federal land
through a collaborative process of planning, prioritizing, and implement-
ing hazardous fuel reduction projects[.]"' 44 Similar to the HFI, the
HFRA supported expedited judicial review and the CEQ's categorical
exclusions. 45 While HFRA does provide the environmental upshot of
protecting endangered species and creating a tree diameter cap, 146 these
environmental protections are insignificant when compared to the harm
that may result from HFRA's jurisdiction stripping and deregulation of
environmental analysis. Professor Robert Keiter summarized the prob-
lematic effects of HFI and HFRA:
[T]he public land agencies are no longer directly accountable for
their fire-related management decisions. The principal legal account-
ability mechanisms--the NFMA planning standards, NEPA environ-
mental analysis requirements, ESA consultation mandates, and re-
lated administrative and judicial review opportunities--have all been
modified in the name of managerial efficiency. At the planning level,
the Forest Service's revised NFMA rules have eliminated NEPA
compliance from planning level decisions and jettisoned key biodi-
versity and other management standards, thus effectively insulating
most fire-related and other forest planning decisions from judicial re-
view. At the project level, under the HFRA and the Healthy Forests
Initiative reforms, NEPA and NFMA compliance obligations have
been significantly curtailed too. Add on the recent ESA consultation
reforms and revised administrative appeal regulations, and the agen-
cies face few explicit legal constraints when making important fire-
related management decisions, as well as little likelihood of adminis-
trative or judicial intervention. 147
141. Keiter, supra note 1, at 343 ("It is hard to see these reforms as anything other than an
overt effort to significantly reduce judicial oversight opportunities by removing substantive legal
mandates from forest management and eliminating NEPA-based procedural requirements from the
planning process."). Id.
142. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 6501 (West 2007).
143. 16 U.S.C.A. § 6518.
144. 16 U.S.C.A. § 6501.
145. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 6514-6516.
146. Keiter, supra note 1, at 344-45.
147. Id. at 368-69.
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NEPA, NFMA, HFI, and HFRA all assert a goal of promoting for-
est health, 48 although they attempt to achieve this goal in quite disparate
manners. NEPA and NFMA empower environmental ideals by requiring
analyses and accountability. 149 HFI and HFRA eliminate requirements
for environmental analysis, reduce judicial oversight, and weaken NEPA
and NFMA. 150 The President and Congress agree that an integral part of
promoting forest health includes the elimination of conditions that lead to
catastrophic wildfire danger.' 51 They attempt to achieve that goal by de-
regulating the Forest Service and increasing its discretion. A de-
regulated Forest Service with significant discretion enacted the blanket
fire suppression philosophy, which contributed to the current predica-
ment.' Granting the Forest Service that responsibility again could
eventuate in the same results-mismanagement and disaster. Legislation
should not restrain courts from ensuring that the Forest Service complies
with the law. Rather, courts should probe the reasoning behind Forest
Service projects. In a recent, classic deference case, Utah Environmental
Congress v. Bosworth,15 3 the Tenth Circuit was unwilling to examine the
subject matter of the case and thus, failed to probe the Forest Service's
reasoning. 1
54
C. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Utah Environmental Congress v. Bosworth'55
a. Facts and Procedural History
In Utah Environmental Congress, the plaintiff challenged a 123-
acre thinning project. 56 The project, which treated bark beetle infested
trees in Utah's Fishlake National Forest, was not located in the wildland
urban interface. 57 The Forest Service approved the project pursuant to
the Forest Service's categorical exclusion for thinning projects on small
parcels. 58  The Forest Service proceeded without public comment or
148. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (West 2007); 16 U.S.C.A. § 6501 (West 2007); 42 U.S.C.A. §
4321 (West 2007); HFI, supra note 1, at 1.
149. See supra Part I11.B.1.
150. See supra Part III.B.2.
151. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(a) (West 2007); 16 U.S.C.A. § 6501 (West 2007); 42 U.S.C.A. §
4321 (West 2007); see also HFI, supra note 1, at 1.
152. Keiter, supra note 1, at 306.
153. 443 F.3d 732 (10th Cir. 2006).
154. Id. at 738-40.
155. Id. at 732.
156. Id. at 735.
157. Id. It is noteworthy that this logging project was not likely to reduce wildfire danger to
humans. It was in an unpopulated area far from communities. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text. The Forest Service claims that this project guarded human interests by protecting watersheds.
See Interview with Rick Cables, supra note 52. But, considering the project's small size and isolated
location, its connection to protecting people and property against wildfires seems attenuated. See
supra note 87.
158. Utah Envtl. Cong., 443 F.3d at 735.
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disclosure of alternative projects.159 The plaintiff, Utah Environmental
Congress, claimed that the Forest Service violated the Administrative
Procedure Act's requirement of a cumulative effects analysis and
NEPA's public comment and disclosure requirement. 60 The Forest Ser-
vice rejected the petition.161 Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the categorical exclusion was
appropriate, no extraordinary circumstances existed, and HFRA allowed
the preclusion of public comment and disclosure of alternatives. 1
62
b. Tenth Circuit Rationale
The Tenth Circuit avoided considering the subject matter of this
case by deferring to the Forest Service administrative decision. 163 The
opinion enunciated the rule that lower courts may not fail "to consider an
important aspect of the problem" and must consider "relevant facts."''
64
The court addressed the possibility that the proposal would have cumula-
tive effects. 165 The opinion cited the definition of cumulative effects as
follows:
[I]mpact on the environment which results from the incremental im-
pact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-
Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative im-
pacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant
actions taking place over a period of time.1
66
The court reasoned that logging projects on small parcels could not have
a cumulative effect because, "[b]y definition, . . . a categorical exclusion
does not create a significant environmental effect; consequently, the cu-
mulative effects analysis required by an environmental assessment need
not be performed."'
167
Considering the extraordinary circumstances exception to categori-
cal exclusions, 168 the court conceded, "it may be conceptually possible
for a large number of small projects to collectively create conditions that
could significantly affect the environment.'' 169 The court acknowledged
that "the degree of the potential effect of a proposed action on ... re-
source conditions" determines whether there are extraordinary circum-
159. Id. at 740.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 739.
162. Id. at 735.
163. Id. at 739.
164. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)).
165. Id. at 740-41.
166. Id. at 740 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2005)).
167. Id. at 741 (noting that cumulative impacts are synonymous with cumulative effects).
168. Id. at 740-41.
169. Id. at 741.
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stances. 170 The court stopped short of assessing the big picture and enter-
taining the idea of carving out a new exception for thinning to mitigate
wildfire danger. 171
c. Discussion and Recommendations
This case makes some of the effects of the recent legislation readily
apparent. By removing some regulatory constraints, HFRA allowed the
Tenth Circuit to avoid examining potential environmental concerns.
Rather than recognizing that (1) thinning projects may increase dramati-
cally in beetle-infested areas, and (2) those thinning projects may have a
considerable effect, the Tenth Circuit's circular reasoning 172 gave defer-
ence to the Forest Service administrative court's technical aptitude and
summarily dismissed the claim. 173 Thus, the court sidestepped the possi-
bility that many small projects may combine to have a cumulative effect.
Courts may add additional extraordinary circumstances to the list if
those circumstances have some "significant effect."'174  Therefore, the
court could have continued its analysis of significant effects. 75  The
court should have considered the significance of effects more broadly
when it examined extraordinary circumstances. Wildfires threaten mil-
lions of acres. 176 Frequently, treating these at-risk areas is the best course
of action.177 Therefore, numerous projects may ensue. 78 The combined
effects of these numerous projects may be significant. Employing rea-
soning and accepted science, the court should have recognized that the
combined impact of potential projects could be significant.
The Forest Service creates the list of extraordinary circumstances;
thus, it can add a new type of project to the list of extraordinary circum-
stances. The Forest Service should create a new class that includes small
parcel logging projects in remote areas179 that attempt to mitigate wildfire
170. Id. at 743.
171. See id.
172. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (quoting the Tenth Circuit's circular reason-
ing).
173. Utah Envtl. Cong., 443 F.3d at 735.
174. See id. at 735-38; Colo. Wild, 435 F.3d at 1211 (noting that the list is not all-inclusive and
"extraordinary circumstances include, but are not limited to" a list of circumstances).
175. See supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
178. The President and Congress expressed the goal of increased logging to mitigate wildfire
danger. See, e.g., Keiter, supra note 1, at 344-45 (noting that the legislature suggests aggressively
removing trees in order to reduce fire danger).
179. "Remote areas" are outside the wildland urban interface. A logical definition of a "remote
area" is a roadless area. Roadless areas contain "no provision for the passage of motorized transpor-
tation and which is at least 100,000 acres in extent." 25 C.F.R. § 265.1 (2005). It is noteworthy that
laws affecting roadless areas might be in flux. The Clinton Administration provided environmental
protections for roadless areas. These protections dissipated quickly under George W. Bush's ad-
ministration, but Bush's efforts to reduce protections in roadless areas may prove unsuccessful. "A
federal court [] struck down President Bush's effort to undo protections for roadless forests and
reinstated President Clinton's Roadless Area Conservation Rule. The Clinton roadless rule protects
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danger related to bark beetle infestations.180 The number of acres af-
fected by the beetles and the possibility of numerous ill-conceived land
management strategies necessitates this new exception. The new class
would increase the chance of long-term ecological success by requiring
environmental analysis. Since the Forest Service drafts the regulations, it
would be most efficient for it to create the exception. If the aforemen-
tioned analysis does not persuade the Forest Service, Congress should
add the new class. If both the Forest Service and Congress fail to create
the exception, the Tenth Circuit should exercise its power to do so by
interpreting extraordinary circumstances.
2. Ecology Center v. United States Forest Service'
81
a. Facts and Procedural History
This case involved a larger-scale tree density reduction project in
Utah's Dixie National Forest.182 No categorical exclusion applied to the
project because it encompassed 11,835 acres, 552 acres of which were
subject to clear cutting. 183 The forest was in a state of degradation. 18 4 Its
high tree density yielded unhealthy trees and high wildfire danger. 85
Thus, the benefit of agency action 86 seemed apparent. The plaintiff,
Ecology Center, filed a petition claiming that the Forest Service did not
assess its proposed action using the "best available science.' 87  Once
again, the Forest Service rejected the petition, but in this case, the Tenth
Circuit enjoined the project.1
88
b. Tenth Circuit Rationale
In assessing the Forest Service's decision, the Tenth Circuit noted
that while affording deference to the lower court, "our inquiry must 'be
searching and careful."" 89 The opinion then asserted that higher courts
about one-third of the acreage in National Forests from most logging and road construction." News-
room, Center for Native Ecosystems, http://www.nativeecosystems.org/newsroom (follow "Clinton
Roadless Rule Reinstated" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). In addition to reintroducing
NEPA's requirement for environmental analysis, public disclosure, and public comment, this recent
issuance of a nationwide injunction against projects using Bush's regulatory scheme could restrict
future logging projects in roadless areas. See generally Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck 459 F.3d
954, 966 (9th Cir. 2006); Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
180. The creation of the new class of extraordinary circumstances would not be necessary if
Congress amended HFRA. See infra note 237.
181. 451 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).
182. Ecology Ctr. v. Russell, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1312 (D.C. Utah 2005).
183. Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3d at 1187.
184. Id. at 1186.
185. Seeid. at 1187.
186. Agency action does not just mean a logging project. Even though the NFMA and HFI
focus primarily on mechanical thinning, prescribed or controlled bums are also effective agency
actions. These actions are frequently preferable because, in addition to thinning the forest, they
return nutrients to the soil.
187. Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3d at 1195.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1183 (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)).
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generally submit to lower courts when evidence is "legitimately conflict-
ing," but this presumption is rebuttable and "the agency action may be
overturned."'19 In the court's "careful search" it found no "legitimately
conflicting" information as to the Forest Service's failure to consider the
"best available science."' 91 In fact, the court indicated that the logging
plan departed from what the Forest Service recognized as the "best avail-
able science."' 92 The location of the proposed project is habitat for the
Northern Goshawk. 93 Under the NFMA and the Dixie Forest Plan, the
Forest Service has a duty to take special care to ensure the hawk's viabil-
ity. 194 Further, the Northern Goshawk is a "sensitive species" and the
Dixie Forest Plan stipulates the goshawk as a management indicator spe-
cies. 195 The Forest Service did not include the Northern Goshawk as a
management indicator species, thereby failing to satisfy the legislation.
196
Next, the court addressed the meaning of best available science.
197
While noting that no black letter definition exists, the court explained
that the Forest Service must use "the most accurate, reliable, and relevant
... good-science" data.
198
c. Discussion and Recommendations
Creating a clear, concrete definition for best available science
would provide effective guidelines for responsible forest thinning.
Therefore, courts should adopt a bright line rule defining best available
science as that which restores overall forest health and reduces the threat
of catastrophic fire in the wildland urban interface.' 99 Specifically, the
rule should be the product of carefully inspecting scientifically legitimate
data. The rule would allow removing dead or dying trees and thinning
smaller tees in dense forests in the wildland urban interface. This would
provide the Forest Service with guidance, which could result in more
predictable judicial outcomes and more efficient procedures. Further, by
conforming to these guidelines, the Forest Service would likely benefit
from decreased litigation. Of course, the guidelines would be dynamic
and capable of changing as science evolves.
190. Id. at 1188-89.
191. Id. at 1188.
192. Id. at 1193-94.
193. Id. at 1186 (citing Inland Empire Pub. Lands v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 759 (9th
Cir. 1996)). The Northern Goshawk population is dramatically decreasing and in 2002 the popula-
tion was between 20-30 hawks. Id at 1187.
194. Id. at 1186 (citing Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 759).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1195.
197. Id. at 1194.
198. Id.
199. The rationale for the definition of best available science parallels the rationale for the
categorical exclusion proposed infra Part V.A.
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IV. VIABLE SOLUTIONS: CREATING STANDARDS THAT INCORPORATE
LAW, SCIENCE, AND RATIONALITY
Any proposed solution will likely cost money; therefore, a para-
mount issue is who should pay. Many people believe that individuals
who assume the risk of living in wildfire-prone areas should not benefit
from the government subsidization of an inherently dangerous lifestyle
choice that degrades the environment. 200 This argument begins with the
idea that people living in mountainous, forested areas subject themselves
to a greater chance of encountering a wildfire. 20 1 Therefore, these people
should pay their own way via increased insurance premiums, higher
taxes, or privatized thinning projects.20 2 This concept analogizes indi-
viduals living in the wildland urban interface to those living on a flood
plain or a coastal area that is overly susceptible to hurricanes. 20 3 People
living in those at-risk areas generally pay increased insurance premi-
ums.204  States sometimes use their police power to impose restrictive
zoning in especially at-risk areas.20 5 Maybe homeowners in the wildland
urban interface should be subject to similar regulations. This deincen-
tivization may deter relocation into fire-prone areas and could promote
movement back to urban areas. The fact that a significant number of
endangered homes are second homes in mountain resort areas strength-
ens this argument, i.e., why should the majority of taxpayers who cannot
afford to live in the mountains subsidize the wealthy few who can afford
to live in the mountains? Many would argue that common people should
not be forced to subsidize an obviously dangerous, ecologically degrad-
ing, and expensive luxury.
Though compelling, this argument faces significant hurdles.20 6 The
government would have to implement it prospectively; thus, it would
address only future wildfire threats, and not the current threat. The im-
position of immediate, significant economic requirements on individuals
living in at-risk areas could threaten those people's livelihoods. Gradual
administration would not generate enough money to immediately combat
the problem and would be a less effective deterrent. Thus, the idea of
200. See DellaSala et al., supra note 43, at 354; see also All Things Considered: Bark Beetles
Spark Western Wildfire Threat (National Public Radio broadcast July 15, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5560058).




205. Keiter, supra note 1, at 382-83.
206. States depend on many at-risk areas for tourism revenue. Increased taxes, insurance, and
privatized thinning projects could significantly impact already skyrocketing lodging, food, and ski
lift ticket prices. This may deter tourists. States and powerful political groups would disapprove of
this consequence. Finally, a tremendous number of people live in at-risk areas. In fact, some studies
indicate that nearly 4 out of every 10 homes are in the wildland urban interface. Radeloff et al.,
supra note 56, at 799. Resort areas are commonly at-risk for wildfires and many of the residents are
politically powerful and wealthy. This group, dominant in both numbers and status, could represent
a formidable opposition to the imposition of a new fiscal burden.
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paying one's own way for a luxury and the concept of deterring undesir-
able activities should be a part of the long-term solution. However, solv-
ing the immediate problem requires additional measures.
Developing workable options for immediately mitigating the wild-
fire danger must begin with the recognition that the problem directly
results from past mistakes.2 °7 In an executive press release prior to the
adoption of the HFI, President Bush attributed the current problem of
"unnaturally extreme fires" to "a century of well-intentioned but mis-
guided land management., 20 8 The President called for "[r]enewed efforts
to restore our public lands to healthy conditions" and implied the need
for wise and forward-thinking land management.0 9
Despite acknowledging the failures of "well-intentioned but mis-
guided land management" of the past, the HFI states that careful analysis
of current management results in "needless red tape and lawsuits. 2t0
The President emphasizes the urgency of wildfire management, and
claims that an immediate, anticipatory attack is necessary to defeat wild-
fire risk. 211 He states "it is imperative that we act quickly. '2 2 While this
situation is urgent, it seems wise to support action that is rational as well
as rapid.213  Hasty actions are likely to give rise to long-term failure,
which could endanger future generations. Prospective, yet rapid actions
that employ foresight are superior to rash decisions. Decision makers
must not repeat the mistakes of past "well-intentioned but misguided
land management[.],, 214 The HFI is flawed because increased knowledge
and long-term efficacy is worth a little time and effort; therefore, most
projects should involve judicial oversight and in-depth environmental
analysis of agency actions.
207. HFI, supra note 1, at 4; DellaSala et al., supra note 43, at 346.
208. HFI, supra note 1, at 1; Peters et al., supra note 35 (click on Executive Summary) ("The
record of past mistakes shows that forest management must be redesigned to protect forest ecosys-
tem health if the nation's forests are to sustainably provide us with economic benefits ... Rather
than legislate ill-advised, wholesale measures to cut more trees -- the very thing that caused many
existing problems with forest ecosystem health -- the nation needs a coordinated, ecosystem-focused
strategy that uses appropriate restoration techniques based on the best available science and carefully
evaluated as to environmental impacts.").
209. HFI, supra note 1, at I.
210. Id. at 1-2.
211. Id. at 10.
212. Id.
213. This article recognizes the urgency posed by wildfire danger, but suggests a less frantic
approach. Natural threats are cyclic and the bark beetle infestations may lose momentum naturally.
A good comparison by analogy is the fire danger caused by the dwarf mistletoe infection in the
Rocky Mountains nearly ten years ago. See generally Kurt F. Kipfmueller & William Baker, Fires
and Dwarf Mistletoe in a Rocky Mountain Lodgepole Pine Ecosystem, 108 FOREST ECOLOGY &
MGMT. 77-78 (1998). Just as many people were bracing for a fight against the mistletoe, its danger
declined dramatically. Another example is the Blue Mountain's recovery from western spruce
budworm and Douglas-fir tussock moth outbreaks. Peters et al., supra note 35 (click on Section 3)
("Even in areas where disease or insect outbreaks are occurring, natural recovery is often relatively
rapid.").
214. HFI, supranote 1, at 1.
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After being carefully analyzed, acceptable projects should employ
practices that incorporate established methods for reducing risk. Experts
agree that reducing catastrophic fire danger in the wildland urban inter-
face requires removing excess fuel, especially dead, highly combustible
trees. 21 5 "A good rule to remember is '[i]f the tree is brown cut it down,
if in doubt cut it out.,,, 21 6 Research indicates "that a combination of thin-
ning and prescribed burning, developed as elements of a site-specific
treatment, can effectively restore... forests.,, 2 17 "Such treatments can []
decrease the severity of natural or human-caused fires., 21 8 Many envi-
ronmental groups agree:
Some areas of forest -- particularly those dry forest types that have
been most altered as a result of past logging, livestock grazing and
fire suppression -- have become so dense with smaller trees that fire
cannot be safely or successfully reintroduced without first reducing
fuel loads. In overly dense stands, thinning some of the smaller trees
from below the tree canopy has potential to facilitate fire's return and
thereby improve forest ecosystem health.
219
Forest management tools include natural fire, prescribed fire, and elimi-
nation of grazing.220 Additionally, experts agree that preventative meas-
ures can limit bark beetle infestations.22 ' The first step towards prevent-
ing bark beetle infestations is decreasing tree density via thinning.222
These scientific statements demonstrate that that thinning sometimes
increases forest health while protecting people and property.
Despite this evidence, some environmental groups advocate a do-
nothing approach.2 23 This argument begins with the premise that legisla-
tion such as HFI and HFRA is not acceptable because laws should re-
quire environmental analysis and judicial oversight.224  Courts should
hold the Forest Service accountable for following the law, analyzing
215. The reintroduction of fire into its natural role is preferable, but the balancing act of pro-
tecting people and property and allowing fires to bum in the wildland urban interface is precarious.
When the reintroduction goes bad, it can be devastating. Recent examples of fire's danger to the
wildland urban interface include a prescribed bum near Los Alamos, New Mexico that nearly over-
took the city in 2000 and the 2003 wildfires in southern California, which destroyed 3,600 homes
and killed 24 people. Keiter, supra note 1, at 310-I1. Therefore, while the vast majority of people
agree that blanket fire suppression is bad, incautious reintroduction is similarly dangerous. Conse-
quently, a well-reasoned balance between reintroduction and selective suppression seems essential.
216. Press Release, Tom DeGomez, supra note 94.
217. Fire Season and Forest Restoration Update, supra note 8.
218. Id.
219. Peters et al., supra note 35 (click on Section 5). See generally Front Range Fuels Treat-
ment Partnership (FRFTP), http://www.frftp.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (providing information
about the Colorado State Forest Service's fuels reduction efforts).
220. See FAQ, supra note 65.
221. Press Release, Tom DeGomez, supra note 94.
222. Id.
223. Appeal of County Line, supra note 76, at 9-10.
224. Id. at 9.
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environmental impacts, and publicly disclosing findings. 225 At this point
in the analysis, the do-nothing approach is well-reasoned, but some envi-
ronmental groups choose to focus on issues other than protecting human
safety and property from wildfires.226 Some of these groups advocate
minimal government protection for property located in the wildland ur-
ban interface.227 They only support protecting property located in sig-
nificant population centers.228 Their argument contends that individuals
who choose to live in dangerous areas assume the inherent risks associ-
ated with their choice of residence and they should be on their own to
deal with the consequences.229 Contrary to this contention, judicial
precedent and public sentiment indicate that deterring this danger is tre-
mendously important.23° Many environmental groups seem to gloss over
this fundamental issue and avoid aggressively addressing the wildfire
threats to human safety and property. 23' Failing to focus on this threat is
a fatal flaw that renders the do-nothing approach unfavorable.232 There-
fore, in addition to proposing a new extraordinary circumstance 233 and
defining best available science,234 this article acknowledges that the For-
est Service should sometimes selectively thin at-risk forests in the wild-
land urban interface.235
Well-reasoned thinning of certain at-risk forests, is preferable, but
difficult to describe comprehensively. The starting point for such a defi-
nition should be the goals expressed by Congress and the President: pro-
225. Id. at 6 (asking the court to follow Congress's intention, as expressed in NEPA and
NFMA, which requires environmental analysis and mandates taking a "hard look" at potential im-
pacts).
226. Forest Guardian argues that the government exaggerates the fire risk due to beetle infesta-
tions, wildfires may be desirable, and thinning will not reduce wildfire threat. Id. at 12-16. Despite
the fact that these arguments likely have biological merit, they are flawed because they do not ad-
dress the reality that a few short years ago, Tenth Circuit judges, potential jurors, and politicians
watched the Hayman fire on the nightly news and breathed its smoke all summer. Further, the fact
that many decision makers have property in threatened areas decreases their chance for success.
Arguably, environmental groups would be more successful if they recognized their audience and
acknowledged that protecting people and property is paramount.
227. Id.
228. All Things Considered, supra note 200 (interview with Sloan Shoemaker of Colorado's
Wilderness Workshop, where Shoemaker suggested that homeowners, not government, should bear
the risk and assume the responsibility of living in areas with high wildfire danger).
229. Id.
230. Appeal of County Line, supra note 76, at 8-10.
231. Id. Courts are concerned with the underlying issue of protecting people and property
against wildfires. Forest Guardians' argument would be more persuasive if it addressed mitigating
the danger in an ecologically responsible manner rather than focusing on the percent of trees cut
down and the effects on beetle populations. Id.
232. Keiter, supra note 1, at 316 (supporting a similar conclusion, "[o]ver the long term, these
all-or-nothing approaches will not reliably restore ecologically healthy forests or safeguard adjacent
communities. Thus, the real policy debate is over how and where to use prescribed fire and selective
cutting to reduce fuel loads, ensure human safety, and restore forest ecosystems.").
233. See supra Part III.C. 1.c.
234. See supra Part III.C.2.c.
235. See infra Part IV.A. But, one should remember that prescribed fires are sometimes the
most effective solution to this problem, so long as they do not significantly endanger people and
property.
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tect human safety, protect property, and increase forest health.236 A logi-
cal approach to solving this dilemma involves two phases. Phase I ad-
dresses pre-fire projects, which mitigate wildfire conditions in the wild-
land urban interface by removing dead, dry trees. Phase I addresses the
most urgent threats and its goal is reduction of wildfire danger to people
and property in the wildland urban interface. Phase II responds to all
other projects that address pre-fire fuel reduction projects. The goal of
these projects is to combat less urgent threats to people and property and
increase forest health.
Currently, the HFI and HFRA markedly increase the Forest Ser-
vice's efficiency for projects in both proposed phases, but the price for
the efficiency is too high. The Forest Service should not have such broad
discretion for these projects because there is no general consensus as to
the most effective method for protecting people and property from wild-
fires and restoring forest health. Therefore, Congress should amend the
HFRA and reduce the scope of categorical exclusions.237 Congress
should reinstate environmental analysis for the most impactful and ex-
pansive actions currently listed as categorical exclusions. Additionally,
Congress should amend the HFRA and restore judicial oversight for all
Forest Service plans, even those that remain listed as categorical exclu-
sions.238 This is important because it would reestablish accountability for
Forest Service actions and ensure that the Forest Service serves the goals
of protecting people and property and restoring forest health.
236. See HFI, supra note 1, at 1.
237. This congressional remedy is timely because of the current political landscape. HFI and
HFRA were both the product of Republican control of the Executive Branch, the House of Represen-
tatives, and Congress. The newly elected Democratic Congress may be more amenable to protecting
environmental ideals. "Democrat Barbara Boxer is replacing Republican James Inhofe as chairman
of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee[.]" Froma Harrop, Red Orbit - Science -
Commentary - At Last, U.S. Might Act on Global Warming, Red Orbit Breaking News, December
21, 2006, available at http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/776929/commentary at last
us might act onglobal warming/index.html?source-rscience. Political changes such as these
could mean that Congress will amend the HFRA. Congress should remove the expansive categorical
exclusions enacted by HFRA and explicitly reestablish judicial oversight. If Congress desired main-
taining some Forest Service discretion, it could allow for judicial review of agency regulations, but
not for specific agency actions. Thus, petitioners could not challenge individual projects, but could
challenge the rules that create the framework for the projects.
238. The effect of restoring judicial oversight for the plans described in this article would be de




A. Phase I Projects. A New Categorical Exclusion
239
Congress should create a new categorical exclusion for projects of
urgency so great that a new categorical exclusion is appropriate. These
few circumstances occur when the environmental effects of projects are
well-known, the risks of inaction are significant, the window for effec-
tive action is brief, and the costs associated with analysis are high.24°
One of the circumstances that should be a categorical exclusion is selec-
tively removing dead and dying trees in the wildland urban interface.24'
This categorical exclusion aims to protect people and their property.242
When implementing these projects, the rules would require the Forest
Service to utilize specific methods that increase forest health, decrease
fire danger, and minimize environmental effects. Further, the rule would
employ limitations similar to those on current categorical exclusions.
For example, the rule would require the Forest Service to comply with
the Endangered Species Act.
This categorical exclusion should incorporate significant guidelines.
Most important, the Forest Service should initially commence projects
close to areas with significant value, such as population centers-the
higher the population, the higher the priority. Next, the Forest Service
should initiate projects near other valuable areas, such as ski resorts and
campgrounds. After treating forests directly adjacent to these locations,
the projects should continue into the forest, creating wildfire barriers. If
possible, the Forest Service should not construct new roads.243 It stands
to reason that populated, at-risk areas already contain roads. If no road
239. Implementation of Phase I Projects would cost a significant amount of money, but mitiga-
tion of catastrophic fire danger in the wildland urban interface would offset some of the costs. In
addition to spending significant capital on wildfire disaster relief every year, the government spends
billions of dollars fighting fires. Reduction of fire danger would result in a reduction of fire fighting
expenditures. In fact, some studies indicate that implementation of projects similar those suggested
in Phase I would actually save the government money. See Larry Mason et al., Investments in Fuel
Removal Avoids Public Costs, RTI FACTSHEET 28: RURAL FOREST COMMUNITY ISSUES, May 2004,
available at http://www.ruraltech.org/pubs/factsheets/fs028/fs_28.pdf.
240. These circumstances exist when there is a general consensus about the environmental
effects of the project and concerns for safety are high.
241. Standing dead trees are vitally important for wildlife; therefore, a predetermined number
of dead trees should remain. A Snagging Issue - National Wildlife Federation,
http://habitat.thecolumbiarecord.com/default.asp?item=182340 (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (noting
that "dead or downed trees in various states of decay - provide vital habitat for as many as 1200
species of wildlife nationwide. Despite the importance of snags to wildlife, many modem forestry
practices encourage the removal of dead wood from the forest floor.").
242. It is important to note that thinning in areas already affected by bark beetles does not
effectively reduce bark beetle populations, but it does reduce fire threat by removing highly combus-
tible fuel. Press Release, Tom DeGomez, supra note 94. After bark beetles infest a tree, they kill it
and move on to the next tree, so removing a tree only reduces bark beetle populations if the tree is
currently infested and if it is then burned or solarized. Id. Thus, the first at-risk category only ad-
dresses wildfire risks linked to bark beetles, because it will not decrease bark beetle populations. Id.
243. There may exist situations where insignificant road additions, like turnouts or loading
areas would be necessary, but the Forest Service should mitigate any such disturbances once the
project is complete; thus, allowing the forest a greater chance of recovery.
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exists, it is unlikely that thinning will significantly protect the wildland
urban interface.
As a general rule, this categorical exclusion should not apply to
trees that do not pose a significant wildfire threat. For example, bark
beetles do not infest aspens and aspens pose a very low fire threat.2"
Thus, the Forest Service should not log aspen trees under this categorical
exclusion. Finally, there should be a diameter limit for removed trees.
For example, the rule would prohibit the Forest Service from removing
trees with a diameter greater than twelve inches. 245 This would remove
the economic incentive to abuse the categorical exclusion. In other
words, these projects would be unattractive money makers because
smaller trees are worth very little. This would help ensure that the Forest
Service does not dress up a timber sale as crisis intervention. Finally,
these projects would be useless if the forest was not allowed to return to
its natural state. Therefore, when practicable, the Forest Service should
allow the reintroduction of fire and disallow grazing.
The immediate treatment of localized bark beetle outbreaks (i.e.,
when the beetles are still in the tree) serves as another example of an
appropriate project under this categorical exclusion. If the Forest Service
treats such infestations in a timely manner, it can kill the bark beetles by
cutting down and burning the infested trees.246 This does involve cutting
down a high percentage of trees in the affected area, but these trees
would succumb to the bark beetles, anyway. These areas generally en-
compass a small geographic region; thus, a project is quite localized.247
Burning the trees kills the beetles and, thus, stops them from attacking
other trees. The opportunity to execute this type of project is uncommon,
but sometimes quite valuable. 248 Regulations requiring in-depth analyses
prevent these projects because the Forest Service has only 120 days until
the beetles emerge from the trees to find and kill new host trees.249 The
rule would require the Forest Service to complete a program Environ-
mental Assessment, which would determine the general effects of poten-
tial future projects. This requirement would provide environmental safe-
guards, while allowing rapid agency response to localized outbreaks.
244. Fire and Chainsaws, supra note 31, at 5 (stating that "aspen stands are fire resistant);
Saskatchewan Forest Centre, A Guide to Managing Community Wildfire Risk, available at
http://www.saskforestcentre.ca/uploaded/Guideto ManagingCommunity Wildfire Risk.pdf
(noting that "[a]spen stands are one of the least volatile fuel types)."
245. The Forest Service should leave some large dead trees standing. They are important
wildlife habitat for animals such as cavity nesting birds and predatory birds. See generally Cavity-
Nesting Birds of North America, Agricultural Handbook 511 (United States Forest Service; Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.) November 1977, available at
http://www.na.fs.fed.us/spfo/pubs/wildlife/nestingbirds/.






B. Phase II Projects
Pre-fire fuel reduction projects that respond to less significant
threats to people and property comprise Phase 11.250 These projects con-
sist of essentially any pre-fire fuel reduction projects not covered under
Phase I. Within the context of Phase II projects, environmental regula-
tions and judicial oversight are more important than Forest Service effi-
ciency. No categorical exclusions apply to these projects; compliance
with NEPA and NFMA is worth the sacrifice of agency efficiency.
Thus, the jurisdiction stripping and deregulatory effects of HFI and
HFRA should not apply to these projects.
These projects respond to a less considerable threat, but the projects
may still be important because they respond to threats to people, prop-
erty, and forest health. Therefore, the Forest Service may proceed with
Phase II projects, so long as they comply with NEPA and NFMA. When
considering appropriate agency action in these areas, the proposed rule
would require the Forest Service to consider a range of alternatives in-
cluding thinning, prescribed burning, or no treatment at all. The pro-
posed rule would also require the Forest Service to consider a hands-off
approach, which would allow some wildfires to bum naturally since eco-
systems recover from even the most catastrophic fire events.251 A great
example of this is Yellowstone, where the ecosystem is recovering mi-
raculously following the 1.5 million acre fire of 1988.52 The rule would
require Forest Service thinning projects in Phase II forests to attempt to
replicate natural events, thereby making the forest less susceptible to
future bark beetle outbreak and catastrophic, widespread wildfires. An
example of a project included in this phase is live tree thinning inside
and outside of the wildland urban interface. These projects are useful
because they decrease tree competition and can eventuate in healthier,
more resistant trees. 3
C. Proposed Rules' Impact on the Tenth Circuit
The proposed rules would impact litigation over logging projects
and general logging practices in the Tenth Circuit. These changes would
reinstitute judicial oversight and most environmental analysis eliminated
by HFI and HFRA. Had such regulations been in effect, they would
have prevented the Forest Service from using a categorical exclusion in
250. Phase I projects purposefully exclude dead tree removal outside the wildland urban inter-
face and live tree thinning inside the wildland urban interface because the threat they pose fits within
Phase 11.
251. Yellowstone National Park - Wildland Fire in Yellowstone (U.S. National Park Service),
http://www.nps.gov/yell/naturescience/fire.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
252. Id.
253. Some basic guidelines include removing the trees after October if possible, burning or
covering infected trees with plastic, and removing thrash from the forests. See Press Release, Tom
DeGomez, supra note 94 (describing effective methods for removing dead, infested, or overly dense
trees).
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Utah Environmental Congress v. Bosworth.254 The project occurred in a
very remote location; the closest population center was 22 miles away in
Richfield, Utah.255 Richfield's population is fewer than 7,000 people.
256
The proposed rule would require environmental analysis for such pro-
jects because they do not pose an immediate threat to person or property
and they may have a cumulative effect. The new rule would have had no
affect on Ecology Center, Inc. v. United States Forest Service.257 That
case did not involve a categorical exclusion. 8 The plaintiffs filed the
action because the Forest Service's clear omission of Northern Goshawk
as a management indicator species represented a failure to consider best
available science. 25 9 The result of the case would remain unchanged
under the proposed rules because the Forest Service action would still
represent a failure to consider the best available science.
The proposed rules re-empower the courts and individuals who wish
to file a complaint. Additionally, the proposed rules require reinstitution
of most environmental regulations. These rules also strengthen environ-
mental regulations by requiring the Forest Service to consider the com-
bined effects of many small projects. The proposed rules allow stream-
lined, prophylactic treatment of some at-risk areas in the wildland urban
interface to continue. Therefore, projects near areas with significant
value would be cheaper and faster. These projects would help curb wild-
fire dangers in many communities, but they would do so under the con-
straints of a framework that supports long-term forest health.
In the end, the proposed rules recognize situations that warrant
speedy action with abbreviated regulatory processes, but they limit these
situations. The rules also recognize the congressional and presidential
goals of protecting people, property, and forest health. Finally, the pro-
posed rules do not limit the Forest Service's ability to conduct any log-
ging projects; they simply subject the Forest Service to judicial oversight
and require the Forest Service to comply with environmental regulations.
The Tenth Circuit would benefit from the rules because of the positive
effects on human safety, protection of property, and forest health.
CONCLUSION
There is a general consensus that the government should protect
people and property and rehabilitate forest ecosystems. Conditions in
lodgepole pine and ponderosa pine ecosystems render unnaturally ex-
treme and widespread fire danger, which threaten people and property.
254. 443 F.3d 732 (10th Cir. 2006).
255. Utah Envtl. Congress, 443 F.3d at 737-38.
256. Richfield, Utah, http://www.citytowninfo.com/places/utah/richfield (last visited Jan. 20,
2007).
257. 451 F.3d 1183 (lOth Cir. 2006).
258. See Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3d at 1185-88.
259. Id. at 1195.
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These forests could actually erupt into massive fires, encompassing mil-
lions of acres, and releasing the energy equivalent of atomic bombs.
However, current forest dynamics make the goals of protecting people,
property, and forest health very difficult. Protection requires rational
land management, but authorities disagree about how to best solve the
problem.
President Bush and Congress support a solution that seems destined
for failure for two reasons. First, stripping the judiciary of its jurisdiction
to adjudicate Forest Service actions is unwise because it creates unfet-
tered Forest Service discretion. Second, blanket removal of the require-
ment to perform certain environmental analyses forebodes the reoccur-
rence of past failures. There are situations in which Forest Service pro-
jects should be streamlined, but those situations are limited and should be
closely monitored so as to avoid their misapplication. These situations
must provide a compromise between environmental issues like protecting
intact ecosystems, legal issues such as maintaining jurisdiction, agency
issues like retaining some discretion, and policy issues like protecting the
wildland urban interface.
The Forest Service must take some action to mitigate wildfire dan-
ger. Wildfires threaten huge areas and scientists predict that devastating
wildfires are probable in many forests. Many of the endangered forests
are near homes and businesses. Congress should bridge the gap between
science and the law by creating laws that mitigate the ramifications of a
century of forest degradation. Long-term sustainability of forest ecosys-
tems and the return to healthy forests requires careful adherence to ra-
tional standards, rather than reactive, unchecked, short-sighted actions.
Therefore, careful, selective thinning in areas where humans and their
property are at risk is the most reasonable course of action. This protects
the public from wildfires and envisions the future. The Tenth Circuit
should require Forest Service projects to comply with the legislative in-
tent of protecting people, property, and forest health. The proposed defi-
nition of best available science, a new extraordinary circumstance, and
amendments to the list of categorical exceptions would satisfy the public
policy interest of protecting people and their property.
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THE ONGOING STRUGGLE TO DETERMINE FEDERAL
"ARISING UNDER" JURISDICTION IN COPYRIGHT: THE
COMPLETE PREEMPTION EXCEPTION TO THE
WELL PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE
INTRODUCTION
Copyright is one of the oldest institutionally protected rights in the
United States. The notion of federally protected copyright originated in
the United States Constitution in 1787.1 One of the powers the Constitu-
tion grants to Congress is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ' '  What is
omitted from these instructions is how the government should promote
progress and protect rights. To what extent must the government protect
these rights? How can citizens raise grievances that their rights have
been infringed upon? Who should hear and adjudicate these grievances?
Although copyright was not a prominent issue in the early years of
the republic, advances in technology have greatly increased the number
and variety of actual and potential copyright cases. Cases involving
copyright issues present one persistent jurisdictional question: what
makes a copyright case a federal case? Copyright owners regularly li-
cense or assign their rights in contractual agreements and the breach of
such an agreement may give rise to a breach of contract claim, a claim
for copyright infringement, or both. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright cases.3  Yet
determining when a case is a "copyright" case is not always straightfor-
ward.
Infringement of copyright is a violation of the federal Copyright Act
and therefore a federal claim. 4 However, breach of contract is a state law
cause of action and therefore undeserving of federal jurisdiction.5 In
response to claims brought under state law, the defendant may assert
counterclaims or defenses based in federal copyright law. In this con-
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Id.
3. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (West 2007) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent,
plant variety protection and copyright cases.").
4. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) (West 2007).
5. See generally Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 285 (6th Cir. 2005) (delineating between
state and federal causes of action in a copyright case).
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text, a court must determine whether the case properly belongs in state or
federal court.
In 1964, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
established a test for determining whether a copyright claim deserves
federal jurisdiction. In TB. Harms Co. v. Eliscu,6 the court attempted to
formulate a rule to resolve "whether and how a complaint implicates the
Copyright Act.",7 The three-part TB. Harms test was praised by leading
copyright scholars8 but also suffered from a variety of misinterpretations
and was subsequently applied by various courts in a contradictory man-
ner.9 Only in 2000 did the Second Circuit emerge from this confusion to
clarify the TB. Harms test and promulgate the well pleaded complaint
rule as the standard for determining federal copyright jurisdiction.10 In
2002 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the primacy of the well
pleaded complaint rule for determining whether cases gamer federal ju-
risdiction under § 1338(a)."
'While it might appear that all federal courts should fall into line
with the Supreme Court, some circuits have not adopted the rule. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not address the
question of what test to apply to determine jurisdiction in a copyright suit
until Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co. 12 in 2006. Ab-
sent a Supreme Court opinion on the use of the well pleaded complaint
rule in the copyright context, there continues to be noteworthy scholarly
discourse questioning the wisdom of the rule.
Although the well pleaded complaint rule has distinct weaknesses, it
remains the best standard for determining federal jurisdiction in copy-
right cases. The developing complete preemption doctrine-when ap-
plied in the copyright contexts-ameliorates one of the well pleaded
complaint rule's significant weaknesses. Complete preemption applies
when the force of a federal statute is so extraordinary that it converts a
state law complaint into a federal claim.' 3  State law claims that are
equivalent to copyright infringement claims can be completely pre-
empted by the Copyright Act and removed to federal court even if they
do not state a federal claim.'
4
6. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
7. Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 348 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing T.B.
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2nd Cir. 1964)).
8. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 349 (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
12.01[A]).
9. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 351 n.4.
10. Id. at 355.
11. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002).
12. 459 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2006).
13. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)).
14. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 286-87.
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Applying the complete preemption doctrine as an exception to the
well pleaded complaint rule provides a practical solution to some of the
well pleaded complaint rule's shortcomings. It addresses concerns about
these shortcomings while still achieving the desired consistency and uni-
formity that the well pleaded complaint rule provides.
Part I of this article describes the case law addressing whether a
case "arises under" the Copyright Act and therefore enjoys federal juris-
diction. This part focuses on significant copyright decisions handed
down by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Part II describes Image
Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co.' 5 and the Tenth Circuit's
adoption of the Second Circuit's well pleaded complaint rule in copy-
right cases. Part III identifies the Supreme Court's guidance in establish-
ing the well pleaded complaint rule and the frequent intersection of con-
tract and copyright claims.
Part IV analyzes the underpinnings of the well pleaded complaint
rule and identifies arguments supporting the rule and promoting uniform-
ity among the federal courts in determining copyright jurisdiction. Part
IV goes on to note the shortcomings of competing standards and address
arguments against the rule. In an effort to tackle a significant weakness
of the well pleaded complaint rule, this article suggests applying the
complete preemption doctrine as an exception to the well pleaded com-
plaint rule.
I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S REIGN IN "ARISING UNDER" COPYRIGHT
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Groundwork
Article I of the Constitution provides Congress the power to secure
to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their works. 16 Under Ar-
ticle III, the federal judiciary is given the power to adjudicate all cases
arising under the Constitution and the laws of the United States., 7 Con-
gress established copyrights in the early years of the republic and,
through the Copyright Act of 1976,18 gave the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over copyright claims.' 9
Congress established federal jurisdiction over copyright claims in
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction
shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety pro-
15. 459 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2006).
16. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
18. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 2007).
19. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a).
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tection and copyright cases. 2 ° Courts have wrestled with the meaning of
"arising under" in the copyright framework since the enactment of §
1338(a). 21 There has been an ongoing struggle to define exactly when a
claim "arises under" the Copyright Act and therefore garners federal
jurisdiction.22 A suit that simply mentions or involves copyright does not
necessarily "arise under" the Copyright Act and therefore does not nec-
essarily come before a federal court. 3
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to consider the
definition of "arising under" in the realm of copyright, 4 it has decided
cases addressing § 1338(a)'s "arising under" language.25 American Well
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.26 involved a patent claim that began in
state court, was removed to federal district court, and appealed to the
27Supreme Court. Justice Holmes explained that "[a] suit arises under
the law that creates the cause of action., 28 The plaintiff in American
Well Works did not seek relief under federal patent law and the Court
therefore ruled that it belonged in state court.29 Justice Holmes' concise
statement laid a foundation for approaches to "arising under" jurisdiction
in copyright as well as patent cases.30
B. T.B. Harms Company v. Eliscu
Almost fifty years after Justice Holmes discussed the "arising un-
der" language in § 1338(a), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the issue in TB. Harms Co. v. Eliscu.31 The court's decision
subsequently suffered a variety of interpretations and ignited a polarized
scholarly debate that continues to smolder.
The T.B. Harms Company brought an action for declaratory judg-
ment and equitable relief in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York, claiming that under a contract with Eliscu, Harms owned
renewal copyrights in songs Eliscu co-authored.32 The plaintiff asserted
20. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (West 2007).
21. Christopher D. Birrer, A Jurisdictional "Nightmare ": Determining When an Interdepend-
ent Copyright and Contract Claim "Arises Under" the Copyright Act in Scholastic Entertainment,
Inc. v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 276 (2004).
22. James M. McCarthy, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: When Does a Case Involving
the Breach of a Copyright Licensing Contract "Arise Under" the Copyright Act?, 19 DAYTON L.
REv. 165, 169 (1993).
23. Id.
24. Amy B. Cohen, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and the Copyright Laws, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
337, 351 (1993).
25. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916); Holmes
Group, Inc., 535 U.S. at 829-30.
26. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
27. Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 258.
28. Id. at 260.
29. Id.
30. Daniel E. Wanat, Copyright and Contracts: The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts Under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a), 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 361, 366 (2001).
31. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
32. TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 824-25.
[Vol. 84:3
WELL PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE
federal jurisdiction subject to § 1338(a) and the defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
and lack of federal jurisdiction. 33 The district court judge dismissed the
complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction and Harms appealed.34
Writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Friendly
acknowledged the utility of Justice Holmes' American Well Works test in
explaining federal jurisdiction in "a great many cases, notably copyright
and patent infringement actions." 35  Yet, noting that Holmes' formula
was "more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was
intended," Friendly found that "Harms' claim [wa]s not within Holmes'
definition."
36
Facing a need for clarification and mindful of how difficult it was to
formulate, the Second Circuit arrived at a three-part test for establishing
when an action "arises under" the Copyright Act.37 Federal jurisdiction
shall be conferred
if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the
Act... or asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act... or, at
the very least and more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinc-
tive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the dis-
position of the claim.
38
Judge Friendly noted that federal jurisdiction is held to exist when a
claim is brought for copyright infringement but also observed that "the
jurisdictional statute does not speak in terms of infringement, and the
undoubted truth that a claim for infringement 'arises under' the Copy-
right Act does not establish that nothing else can. 3 9 Friendly went on to
examine the ways in which federal jurisdiction might be appropriate for
Harms' claims, including if the complaint showed a need for determining
the meaning or application of a federal law. 40 Federal jurisdiction could
even be found where the issue might seem to be one of local law as long
as the federal interest was dominant.41 T.B. Harms became the leading
case on how and whether a claim "arises under" the Copyright Act.42
33. Id. at 825.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 826.
36. Id. at 827.
37. Id. at 828.
38. Id..
39. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825.
40. Id. at 827.
41. Id. at 827-28.
42. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 169.
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C. The T.B. Harms Fallout
Many courts relied on the TB. Harms test to determine federal
copyright jurisdiction,43 but the application was inconsistent."a Interpre-
tations of the opinion ultimately crystallized into two general jurisdic-
tional tests: the "well pleaded complaint" rule
45 and the "essence test. 'A46
The well pleaded complaint approach determines jurisdiction solely
on the pleadings submitted by the plaintiff and views the surrounding
circumstances of the suit as irrelevant to the choice of jurisdiction.47 The
well pleaded complaint standard follows from the first facet of the TB.
Harms test, which allows federal jurisdiction "if the complaint is for a
remedy expressly granted by the Act.",48 There is also support for this
standard in the Second Circuit's determination that federal jurisdiction
exists when the plaintiffs pleading is directed toward infringement and
not the license itself.
49
In contrast, the essence test attempts to distill the "essence" of the
claim as a basis for jurisdictional determination. 50 Under this standard,
courts should establish the "essence" of the plaintiff's claim and only
grant federal jurisdiction to matters of legitimate federal significance. 51
Development of the essence test can also be traced to language in the
T.B. Harms case. First, the TB. Harms district court explained that the
formal allegations must yield to the substance of the claim.52 The "mere
circumstance" that the suit "incidentally" centered on copyright did not,
on its own, justify federal jurisdiction.5 3  Second, Judge Friendly in-
structed that provisions conferring federal jurisdiction should be read
narrowly to avoid depriving state courts of jurisdiction over cases that
have little federal significance. 54 Under the essence test, courts should
look beyond the face of the complaint to determine the "essence" of the
claim and only allow federal jurisdiction where the thrust of the case
"arises under" the Copyright Act.
43. Cohen, supra note 24, at 362.
44. Id.
45. Birrer, supra note 21, at 286.
46. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 179.
47. Cohen, supra note 24, at 371-72. This standard is also applied to other areas of federal
jurisdiction to determine whether a complaint "arises under" federal law.
48. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 175 (citing T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2nd
Cir. 1964)).




53. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 226 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
54. Birrer, supra note 21, at 283.
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D. Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers
After twenty-eight years of conflicting decisions,55 in 1992 the Sec-
ond Circuit adopted the essence test in Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publish-
ers.56 Harris Schoenberg, an author, brought a federal suit against his
publisher for breach of their publication agreement and infringement on
his copyrighted work.57 The defendants' former attorney appealed his
conviction for contempt and questioned the jurisdiction of the federal
district court.
58
Referring to select previous Second Circuit decisions, 59 the Schoen-
berg court determined that a district court may "refer to evidence outside
of the pleadings" to decide subject matter jurisdiction.60 This conflicted
with American Well Works61 as well as an earlier Justice Holmes deci-
sion which explained that "the party who brings a suit is master to decide
what law he will rely upon, and therefore does determine whether he will
bring a 'suit arising under' the ... law of the United States by his decla-
ration or bill."62
Schoenberg advocated a three-part essence test to "clarify the
proper approach" for determining whether a suit "arises under" the
Copyright Act and therefore deserves federal jurisdiction.63 First, the
court must ascertain whether an infringement claim is only "incidental"
to a determination of ownership or rights under a copyright.64  If the
claim is not merely incidental, the court must examine whether the com-
plaint alleges a breach of the contract licensing or assigning the copy-
right.65 If such a breach is alleged, there is federal jurisdiction, but if the
complaint merely alleges a breach of contract then the court must en-
deavor to take a third step.66 If the breach was so material as to create a
right of rescission in the grantor, then the claim arises under the Copy-
right Act.67
The Schoenberg court acknowledged that the last two steps would
often determine the "essence" of the claim and that, "in practice," the
55. Wanat, supra note 30, at 385-86.
56. 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992).
57. Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 928.
58. Id. at 930.
59. Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 932 (citing T.B. Harms, 226 F. Supp. at 337; Costello Pub. Co. v.
Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
60. Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 933.
61. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
62. Edwin E. Richards, Drafting Licenses to Guide Whether Potential Disputes Lie in Con-
tract or Infringement, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH J. 45, 50 (2002) (citing Fair v. Kohler Die & Spe-
cialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)).
63. Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 932.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 932-33.
67. Id. at 933.
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three steps would merge into one 8.6  Despite the Second Circuit's effort
to clarify the law, the Schoenberg essence test was met with criticism
69
and was eventually invalidated.70
E. Basset v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
In Basset v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe71 the Second Circuit re-
sponded to criticisms and rejected the essence test that it established in
the Schoenberg decision.72 Debra Basset contracted to produce a film for
the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe in an agreement that granted Basset ex-
clusive rights to the film.73 After Basset wrote and delivered a script, the
tribe told Basset that it was terminating the agreement.74 The tribe con-
tinued to pursue production of the film and Basset brought suit seeking
an injunction and other copyright remedies.75
The Basset court reviewed the T.B. Harms opinion,76 addressed
criticisms of that decision, 77 and then questioned the wisdom of Schoen-
berg.78 The court identified a number of shortcomings in finding the
essence test "unworkable."-79 First, the court noted the perverse possibil-
ity that, under Schoenberg, only those cases with a strong defense would
warrant federal jurisdiction.8 0  A court could deny a plaintiff a federal
forum and, therefore, the benefit of copyright remedies because her
copyright claims were incidental to her contract dispute.81 "A plaintiff
with meritorious copyright claims and entitlement to the special remedies
provided by the Act [could be] deprived of these remedies merely be-
cause the first hurdle of proving entitlement is a showing of a contractual
right. "1
82
The Basset court identified a second Schoenberg shortcoming: the
essence test is "based more on the defense than on the demands asserted
in the complaint. 83 A plaintiff might not be able to establish whether to
file her complaint in federal or state court because the jurisdictional de-
termination would be based on the defendant's response.84 Furthermore,
a court might not know the "essence" of the plaintiffs claim simply
68. Id.
69. Birrer, supra note 21, at 292-93.
70. Id. at 288.
71. 204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000).
72. Birrer, supra note 21, at 288.
73. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 346.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 348-51.
77. Id. at 351 n.4.
78. Id. at 352-55.
79. Id. at 352.
80. Richards, supra note 62, at 49.
81. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 352.
82. Id. at 352-53.
83. Id. at 353.
84. Id.
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based on the complaint.8 5 The Basset court felt that this inability to pre-
dict jurisdiction under the essence test was a "major problem."
8 6
A final shortcoming of the essence test is that it "requires the court
to make complex factual determinations relating to the merits at the out-
set of the litigation-before the court has any familiarity with the case."
87
Such determinations could "require extensive hearings and fact finding"
and could recur "at each stage of Schoenberg's three-step formula." 8
The Basset court expressed concern that jurisdiction would be decided by
determining the "essence" of the claim even though the "essence" could
not be determined solely on the pleadings.89
After rejecting the essence test, the court went on to establish the
well pleaded complaint rule for determining jurisdiction in copyright
cases. 90 The court harkened back to Justice Holmes' American Well
Works decision in maintaining that "a suit arises under the law that cre-
ates the cause of action"91 and that jurisdiction should be based upon the
content of the plaintiff's complaint. 92 This established the well pleaded
complaint rule as the standard for determining federal "arising under"
jurisdiction in copyright. The court determined that because Basset's
complaint alleged a violation of the Copyright Act and sought injunctive
relief provided by the Act, the action deserved federal jurisdiction.93
II. 1MAGE SOFTWARE, INC. V. REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS Co.
While a number of federal circuits have adopted the well pleaded
complaint rule in copyright, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit only recently enunciated its stance on federal "arising un-
der' jurisdiction for copyright claims. In image Software, Inc. v. Rey-
nolds & Reynolds Co.,94 the court took the opportunity to adopt the well
pleaded complaint rule for determining whether a copyright case arises
under the laws of the United States.
A. Facts
Plaintiff Image Software Inc. ("Image") developed imaging soft-
ware to capture and archive business reports, alleviating the need for
handling paper documents. 95 Defendant Reynolds and Reynolds Com-
85. Id. at 353-54.
86. Id. at 354 n. 1I (citing Cohen, supra note 24, at 374).
87. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 354.
88. Id.
89. Wanat, supra note 30, at 390.
90. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 352-55.
91. Id. at 355 (citing Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916)).
92. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355 (citing Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75 (1914)).
93. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355-56.
94. 459 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2006).
95. Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1169 (D. Colo.
2003).
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pany ("Reynolds") aimed to market Image's product to car dealerships
and entered into a licensing agreement with image96 to this end.97 Pur-
suant to a 1994 agreement, Image sold Reynolds perpetual and non-
exclusive licenses to the software for a one-time fee.98 Image granted
Reynolds the right to use, market, and distribute the software9 9 and
agreed to make subsequent upgrades available to Reynolds for an ar-
ranged fee.100
In 1996, Image and Reynolds entered into a subsequent agreement,
providing Reynolds with an updated version of the software, Release
5.5.10 The 1996 agreement also allowed either party to terminate the
license upon ninety days notice. 10 2 Reynolds terminated the agreement
in 2002, and Image informed Reynolds that Reynolds could no longer
use the licensed software. 10 3 Reynolds, however, continued to use and
distribute Release 5.5. Image brought suit, charging that Reynolds' use
infringed on Image's copyright.1 4
Pursuant to an arbitration clause in the 1994 agreement, Reynolds
filed a motion to stay federal litigation and compel arbitration. 0 5 The
district court granted the arbitration motion, an arbitrator granted Rey-
nolds almost $400,000 in damages, and the district court confirmed the
arbitrator's order.'0 6 Image subsequently appealed, challenging the dis-
trict court's order and jurisdiction.
0 7
B. Decision
In addressing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals noted that although the parties in the case never
questioned the federal courts' jurisdiction, the district court rightfully
raised the issue sua sponte. 10 8 The district court invoked federal jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1331109 and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)" and deter-
mined that the complaint pled a federal copyright claim."' The district
96. Image, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. The agreement was executed by ISI, parent company of
Image. Id.
97. Image, 459 F.3d at 1047.
98. Image, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
99. Image, 459 F.3d at 1047.
100. Image, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-70.
101. Image, 459 F.3d at 1047.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Image, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
105. Image, 459 F.3d at 1047.
106. Id. at 1047-48.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2007) ("[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
110. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a). ("[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trademarks.")
111. Image, 273 F. Supp. 2dat l171.
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court applied the well pleaded complaint rule and found that it had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction because image had requested relief under the
federal Copyright Act. 12 The district court relied on Basset v. Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe, 13 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, taking the "oppor-
tunity to adopt the Second Circuit's analytical approach." ' 14 The Tenth
Circuit's decision quotes liberally from Basset in embracing the well
pleaded complaint rule as "'[t]he most frequently cited test' for determin-
ing whether an action arises under the Copyright Act."'1 15
In adopting the Second Circuit test, the court engaged in a retelling
of the history of Basset, including a recitation of the problems with the
essence test. 16 The court also recounted a more recent Ninth Circuit
decision that similarly adopted the well pleaded complaint rule. 17 Ap-
plying the Second Circuit's well pleaded complaint rule to the Image
case, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower court decision and affirmed
that the federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction over Image's copy-
right claim." 
8
III. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE WELL
PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE
There is a history of Supreme Court support for applying the well
pleaded complaint rule to determine jurisdiction for cases "arising under"
federal laws such as § 1338(a)." 9 The Court recently reaffirmed that the
well pleaded complaint rule should be applied to cases questioning pat-
ents in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.'
20
This rule should also apply to copyright because patent and copyright are
treated similarly under § 1338(a).' 2' In addition, acts of Congress sug-
gest that the well pleaded complaint rule should determine jurisdictional
questions in copyright cases.
A. Supreme Court Support
The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed the primacy of
the well pleaded complaint rule and established a solid statutory founda-
tion for its application. 22 Although Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
112. Id.
113. 204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000).
114. Image, 459 F.3d at 1049.
115. Id. (quoting Gener-Villar v. Adcom Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 2005)).
116. Image, 459 F.3d at 1050.
117. Id. at 1050 n.7 (citing Scholastic Entr't, Inc. v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc., 336 F.3d 982,
985-86 (9th Cir. 2003)).
118. lmage, 459F.3dat 1051.
119. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 258, 260 (1916).
120. 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002).
121. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (West 2007) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks."). In construing "arising under" jurisdiction for § 1338(a), the Holmes
Group decision applies to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, and trademarks. Id.
122. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 830.
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Circulation Systems, Inc., addressed a patent law claim, 23 the ruling ap-
plies to copyright because both areas of law are addressed in §
1338(a). 124 In Holmes Group, the Court noted that the strength of §
1338(a) draws from its "linguistic consistency" with § 1331,125 which
confers federal jurisdiction on "all civil actions arising under the Consti-
tution, laws or treaties of the United States."'
126
The Court in Holmes Group stated that "the well-pleaded-complaint
rule has long governed whether a case 'arises under' federal law for pur-
poses of § 1331.' 27 The "arising under" language is the same in § 1331
and § 1338(a) so the well pleaded complaint rule should determine juris-
diction in § 1338(a) cases as well. The Court bolstered its support of the
well pleaded complaint rule by noting that to allow a counterclaim to
establish "arising under" jurisdiction would "contravene the longstanding
policies underlying our precedents."'' 28 Although the Tenth Circuit did
not cite Holmes Group in its Image decision, deliberate adoption of the
well pleaded complaint rule brings the Tenth Circuit into line with the
high court's prevailing decision.
As the Holmes Group court explained, the "linguistic consistency"
of §§ 1331 and 1338(a) provides statutory support for the well pleaded
complaint rule.129 It establishes uniformity between "arising under" ju-
risdiction for copyright claims under § 1338(a) and general "arising un-
der" jurisdiction for all cases of original federal jurisdiction under §
1331. This, in turn, maintains the primacy of the well pleaded complaint
rule by requiring that all cases garnering federal jurisdiction "arise un-
der" federal law.
B. The Statutory Outlook
Is § 1338(a) necessary if it grants jurisdiction identical to § 1331?
Section 1331 grants original federal jurisdiction to any case arising under
the laws of the United States. 130  Section 1338(a)-granting the same
jurisdiction but referring to patents, plant variety, copyrights and trade-
marks-seems redundant. The reason for these different provisions is
not clear. One may conclude that the use of the well pleaded complaint
rule for cases "arising under" § 1331 implies the use of the rule for cases
123. Id.
124. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a).
125. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 829-30 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.
486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988)).
126. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.
127. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 830 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S.
125, 127-28 (1974) (per curiam)).
128. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 831.
129. Id. at 829-30.
130. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.
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"arising under" § 1338(a). 3 ' The broad use of the well pleaded com-
plaint rule for all federal questions under § 1331 supports the consistent
use of the rule for questions involving copyright.
The Copyright Act of 1976 established exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion for all copyright claims and made copyright law federal law.'
32
Since § 1331 grants original federal jurisdiction to all claims arising un-
der federal law and all copyright claims arise under federal law, the use
of the well pleaded complaint rule for § 1331 questions implies its use
for copyright questions. This statutory consistency provides further sup-
port for the use of the well pleaded complaint rule in determining copy-
right jurisdiction.
C. Copyright and Contract
The frequent relationship between copyright and contract is inextri-
cably related to the discussion of "arising under" jurisdiction and the
well pleaded complaint rule. Copyright owners regularly use contracts to
license or assign their rights. 133 Disputes relating to these contracts arise
and some of these disputes result in lawsuits. If one of the parties seeks
federal jurisdiction, the court must use the well pleaded complaint rule to
determine whether the suit "arises under" the Copyright Act.
34
There is an inherent tension between state and federal law in copy-
right claims because the breach of a license or assignment of a copyright
may raise a contract claim (state law), a claim of infringement (federal
law), or both. Courts must focus on the plaintiffs allegations to deter-
mine whether the dispute is primarily a federal concern, outweighing the
issues of state contract law.
35
In general, courts have held that a suit by a copyright holder for
royalties under a license or agreement does not arise under the copyright
laws of the United States and does not deserve federal jurisdiction. 136 In
TB. Harms, Judge Friendly suggested a situation where the plaintiff li-
censed his copyright and the defendant forfeited the grant. 1
37
[I]n such cases federal jurisdiction is held to exist if the plaintiff has
directed his pleading against the offending use, referring to the li-
cense only by way of anticipatory replication, but not if he has sued
131. John Donofrio & Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.:
The Application of Federal Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1835, 1837-38 (1996).
132. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (a) (West 2007).
133. See 17 U.S.C.A § 201(d); McCarthy, supra note 22, at 165 n.2.
134. Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1051 (10th Cir. 2006).
135. Cohen, supra note 24, at 392-94.
136. See Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 502 (1926) (stating a general rule for patent
which concurrently applies to copyright).
137. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964).
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to set the license aside, seeking recovery for unauthorized use only
incidentally or not at all.13
8
Friendly explained that, in order to gamer federal jurisdiction, a
copyright claim must allege infringement and offending use and not
breach of the contract that originally permitted the use.
139
The scenario Judge Friendly envisioned matches the circumstances
of Image. Image and Reynolds had an agreement licensing Image's
software, Reynolds terminated the agreement, and Image brought suit
alleging infringement.140  These circumstances demonstrate the impor-
tance of following the well pleaded complaint rule. A plaintiff alleging
copyright infringement, not breach of the licensing agreement or assign-
ment, deserves federal jurisdiction. A complaint that raises state claims
belongs in state court.
IV. THE WELL PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE AND THE FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT JURISDICTION
In spite of some weaknesses-discussed below-the well pleaded
complaint rule remains the majority rule for determining jurisdiction for
copyright claims. The well pleaded complaint rule maintains the long-
held principle that the plaintiff is master of his complaint, it encourages
uniformity in determining the venue for copyright claims, and it is the
better choice when viewed in light of the shortcomings of the essence
test. However, use of the well pleaded complaint rule may fail to result
in federal jurisdiction for state contract claims that implicate significant
copyright issues and therefore belong in federal court. This article pro-
poses an exception to the rule to ameliorate this problem.
A. Importance of the Well Pleaded Complaint Rule
1. Plaintiff as Master of His Complaint
It is well established that the plaintiff is the master of his com-
plaint.' 4' As such, the plaintiff has complete discretion in choosing
where to bring his case. A plaintiff praying for state court adjudication is
given deference in electing to bring a state, not federal, claim.142 The
essence test allows a defendant to frustrate the plaintiffs choice of a state
forum by raising a federal issue in a counterclaim.143 A defendant should
not be allowed to defeat a plaintiff's choice of a state court forum simply
138. TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825.
139. See id.
140. image, 459 F.3d at 1047.
141. Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vor-
nado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482
U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
142. Cohen, supra note 24, at 382-83.
143. Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 349 (2d. Cir. 2000).
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by including a federal counterclaim.144 The well pleaded complaint rule
rightly places the plaintiff in charge of his suit by allowing him to choose
the jurisdiction in which he will be heard.
The creativity of a defendant's response should not be allowed to al-
ter a plaintiffs choice of venue. To permit the defendant to deliberately
frustrate the plaintiffs prerogative undermines the balance of power in
the adversary system. The well pleaded complaint rule maintains a
plaintiffs right to determine the whether a state or federal court will re-
solve the dispute.
2. Uniformity
Another advantage of the well pleaded complaint rule is that it pro-
vides uniformity for the courts and the parties. There are a host of rea-
sons why uniformity is desirable and this article will highlight four such
reasons: doctrinal stability, equal treatment across the federal system,
the desirability of appearing before judges with expertise in particular
areas of law, and discouraging forum shopping and gamesmanship.
The well pleaded complaint rule promotes uniformity in the applica-
tion of copyright law by granting federal jurisdiction only to litigants
whose prayer for relief "arises under" copyright on the face of the com-
plaint. By ensuring that federal courts are the exclusive forum for genu-
inely pled copyright cases, the rule increases consistency. 45  The rule
allows parties to consistently determine where their case will be heard;
allowing the federal courts to have a monopoly on copyright law helps to
maintain a desirable level of doctrinal stability. 46  The well pleaded
complaint rule directs only appropriate copyright cases to the federal
courts in the spirit of true federal "arising under" jurisdiction.
Uniformity in the application of federal law increases the likelihood
that similarly situated parties will receive equal treatment. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly recognized that this consistency is desir-
able. 148 Equal treatment is an ideal for which all levels of American jus-
tice strive. It is a fundamental tenet of the legal system that "like cases
should be treated alike.', 149 Universal adoption of the well pleaded com-
plaint rule makes it more likely that copyright litigants can expect reli-
able jurisdictional results anywhere in the federal court system.
144. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 831-32.
145. Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, the Well Pleaded Complaint, and Federal Juris-
diction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 38 (2004).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Donald L. Doemberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 597, 615 (1987)).
149. Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit "Choice of Law ": Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1207 (1996).
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Another benefit of uniformity in federal question jurisdiction is that
it puts copyright disputes in the hands of judges with expertise in the
area."5 Funneling copyright cases to the federal courts benefits all par-
ties because federal judges are better equipped to adjudicate disputes
involving questions of federal copyright law. Application of the well
pleaded complaint rule ensures that federal copyright cases are only
heard by federal judges. Litigants will be better served by federal judges
applying federal law when deciding federal copyright cases.
Uniformity in determining copyright jurisdiction will also discour-
age parties from forum shopping. If the fair resolution of a claim hinges
upon whether a court favors the well pleaded complaint rule or the es-
sence test, forum shopping will result. Different circuits applying differ-
ent standards for resolving copyright jurisdiction allows litigants to ma-
nipulate the administration of justice. 15' There are inherent inequities in
a system where a plaintiff can expect to find federal jurisdiction for his
claim in one circuit while being relegated to state court in another circuit.
This could lead to venue bias, disharmony, and unequal treatment.
The Image decision increases uniformity by bringing the Tenth Cir-
cuit into line with other circuits that have adopted the well pleaded com-
plaint rule for determining "arising under" copyright jurisdiction.15 2 The
image court noted that it had previously endorsed the well pleaded com-
plaint standard in Ausherman v. Stump.'53 In that 1981 decision, the
Tenth Circuit found that a patent infringement action brought under a
contract claim did not garner federal jurisdiction. 154 The Ausherman case
arose during a period of Second Circuit indecision-after T.B. Harms,
prior to Schoenberg, and long before Bassett. Although the Tenth Cir-
cuit had previously adopted the well pleaded complaint rule in Ausher-
man, 55 it cited growing support for the rule when explicitly adopting it
in image.'56 By highlighting other circuits' consistent embrace of the
well pleaded complaint rule, the Tenth Circuit took a noteworthy and
admirable step in pursuit of uniformity.
The Tenth Circuit's acknowledgment of other circuits' adoption of
the well pleaded complaint rule highlights the importance of having a
universal standard for "arising under" federal jurisdiction. The Second
Circuit has long been a source of federal circuit precedent in copyright
150. Cotropia, supra note 145, at 38.
151. See Schaffner, supra note 149, at 1193 (citing Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1677 (1990)).
152. Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1051 n.10 (10th Cir.
2006) (citing Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 350-51 (2d Cir. 2000)) (noting
that the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had adopted the Second Circuit's ap-
proach).
153. 643 F.2d 715, 718 (10th Cir. 1981).
154. Ausherman, 643 F.2d at 718.
155. Id.
156. Image, 459 F.3d at 1049.
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law 157 and it is not surprising that other circuits have followed its lead.
The judicial system is stronger when it operates with uniformity regard-
ing a particular issue.
B. Inadequacies of the Essence Test
Adoption of the well pleaded complaint rule is especially appropri-
ate in light of the inadequacies of the essence test. The essence test re-
quires the court to consider the complaint and all the surrounding cir-
cumstances to resolve the jurisdictional question.158 This forces the court
to determine jurisdiction before it can assess the "essence" of the case.
This is impractical and may undermine a claimant's legitimate choice of
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is normally determined at the outset of a case, long be-
fore formal argument of the issues before the court. Yet the essence test
seeks to determine jurisdiction based on a full understanding of the is-
sues and each party's respective arguments. There is an inherent contra-
diction in achieving a jurisdictional determination early in the case based
on inquiry into issues that cannot be understood at such an early stage.
159
Even if a court adequately determines the "essence" of a case at the
outset, the essence test can deprive a plaintiff with legitimate copyright
claims of a venue to pursue relief.1 60 Under the essence test, a plaintiff
bringing suit for relief under the Copyright Act can be denied access to
the federal courts if the district court determines that the copyright claims
are incidental to a contract dispute. 6  The injustice of such a denial is
that this plaintiff is left to plead his case in state court and is denied the
benefit of copyright remedies.
C. Addressing Arguments Against the Well Pleaded Complaint Rule
The Second Circuit's long period of indecision on the standard for
determining when suits "arise under" the Copyright Act testifies to the
volatility of the issue. Although many circuits have adopted the well
pleaded complaint rule, 62 there are still arguments against its implemen-
tation. Addressing three of these grievances illuminates a justified pref-
erence for the well pleaded complaint rule and an opportunity to improve
its application.
Policy implications fuel some of the arguments against the well
pleaded complaint rule. 163 One criticism is that failing to consider fed-
157. See Mark R. Kravitz, Developments in the Second Circuit: 1997-1998, 18 QUINNIPIAC L.
REv. 809, 848-49 (1999).
158. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 180.
159. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 354.
160. Id. at 352.
161. Id. at 352-53.
162. Image, 459 F.3d at 1051 n.10.
163. Cotropia, supra note 145, at 37.
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eral law counterclaims as a basis for jurisdiction may frustrate the inter-
ests of the counterclaiming party. Yet allowing a counterclaim to estab-
lish federal jurisdiction inherently frustrates a plaintiff pursuing state
court jurisdiction. In either circumstance, one party's jurisdictional pref-
erence will be thwarted.
Consider a plaintiff pursuing a state breach of contract claim and a
defendant with a federal copyright counterclaim. In the absence of the
well pleaded complaint rule the counterclaimant may remove the case to
federal court over the objections of the plaintiff who originally filed the
case in state court. Abiding by the mantra that the plaintiff is master of
his complaint, 164 the well pleaded complaint rule rightly supports the
plaintiffs interest in maintaining jurisdiction in the forum in which he
brought his complaint. Although application of the rule may fail to sat-
isfy the counterclaiming defendant, the plaintiff is master of his com-
plaint and deserves to have his state claim adjudicated.
In Bassett, the Second Circuit addressed another criticism of the
well pleaded complaint rule: by allowing any plaintiff to gain federal
jurisdiction by raising a federal copyright claim, the federal courts will
be flooded by cases that are truly contract disputes.165 The court dis-
missed this potentiality with historical fact. 16 6 During the twenty-eight
years between TB. Harms and Schoenberg, there was no evidence of the
well pleaded complaint rule resulting in an overwhelming increase of
Second Circuit copyright suits where the only disputes were over con-
tract or ownership. 167 This information refutes the fear that the well
pleaded complaint rule will result in an unmanageable increase of ques-
tionable copyright cases. The Bassett court maintained that the well
pleaded complaint rule should be the standard by which all federal cir-
cuits determine copyright jurisdiction. 168
Another grievance with the well pleaded complaint rule is that it
will frustrate the legitimate interests of the parties.' 69 This argument
maintains that a plaintiff can use the well pleaded complaint rule to trap a
federal copyright counterclaim in state court.170 This plaintiff could file a
potentially federal case in state court to prevent a defendant from plead-
ing in federal court. 71 This is a genuinely unfortunate possibility. A
defendant with a valid federal counterclaim could be denied a federal
forum and federal copyright remedies.
164. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. at 25.
165. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 351.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 352-53.
169. Cotropia, supra note 145, at 37.
170. Id. at 47.
171. Id.
[Vol. 84:3
WELL PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE
Yet failing to implement the well pleaded complaint rule could have
similarly unjust ramifications. A plaintiff filing a state law claim in state
court could be frustrated by a defendant whose federal counterclaim re-
moves the case to federal court. This potentiality is equally unfortunate.
The well pleaded complaint rule allows for the possibility that an un-
scrupulous party could game the system for an unfair advantage. This
possibility is a regrettable consequence of many bright-line rules. How-
ever, the tradition, uniformity, and predictability of the well pleaded
complaint rule make it the better option. An exception to the well
pleaded complaint rule offers relief in those cases where a state court
claim legitimately deserves federal jurisdiction.
D. The Complete Preemption Exception to the Well Pleaded Complaint
Rule
While the well pleaded complaint rule is the best path for determin-
ing jurisdiction in contract and copyright cases, there are circumstances
that may unjustly prevent a party from appearing in federal court.172 The
doctrine of complete preemption addresses many of these circumstances
and should function as a valuable doctrinal tool in resolving jurisdic-
tional disputes in the copyright context. The combination of the well
pleaded complaint rule and the complete preemption doctrine offers a
solution to determining "arising under" jurisdiction for copyright.
The preemption doctrine embodies the basic notion that a federal
law can supersede or supplant a state law or regulation when the two
conflict. 173 Preemption generally applies to matters that are so signifi-
cantly national in character that the federal law preempts the state law.
174
Complete preemption is a relatively new doctrine that has been held to
operate when a federal statute's preemptive force is so overwhelming
that it converts an ordinary state law complaint into a federal complaint
for the purposes of the well pleaded complaint rule.
75
Complete preemption applies when federal statutory language dem-
onstrates clear congressional intent that claims not only be preempted by
federal law but also that they be removable.' 76 As noted above, the fed-
eral Copyright Act grants exclusive federal jurisdiction for all copyright-
related issues. 177 Congress directed that the universe of copyright be
172. As noted above, under the well pleaded complaint rule a legitimate copyright case may be
stuck in state court because of the way the complaint is drafted by the plaintiff.
173. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (8th ed. 2004).
174. Amy J. Everhart, Ritchie v. Williams and the Complete Preemption Doctrine in Copy-
right: The New Federal/State Debate, 42 TENN. BAR JOURNAL 18, 18 (2006).
175. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 303 (8th ed. 2004).
176. Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 553 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987)).
177. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (West 2007). Specifically, § 301(a) identifies all rights within
the general scope of copyright as exclusively federal. Id.
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restricted to the federal arena. 178 This provides the basis for applying
complete preemption to copyright.
Courts have applied the complete preemption doctrine in copyright
cases by removing cases to federal court that would otherwise, under the
well pleaded complaint rule, remain in state court.17 9 In Ritchie v. Wil-
liams, 18 musical artist Robert Ritchie (aka Kid Rock) filed a federal
trademark infringement action against promoter Alvin Williams. 181 Less
than two months later, Ritchie's former record company (for which Wil-
liams served as Vice President) brought.suit in Michigan State Court
alleging various state law claims. 82 The state action included claims for
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, misrepresentation, conversion and
injunctive relief.183 Williams claimed that he and Ritchie entered into a
contract which granted Williams publication, performance, and distribu-
tion rights to songs written by Ritchie. 184 Ritchie subsequently cancelled
the agreement, going on to fame and fortune.
185
Ritchie sought to remove the state action to federal court and the
federal court held that Williams' claims were "clearly based in copy-
right."'186 Many of the state court claims were covered by § 106 of the
Copyright Act: the rights to reproduce, distribute and perform the copy-
righted work.187 The well pleaded complaint rule would have mandated
state court jurisdiction for these claims because Williams' original claims
prayed for state court remedies for violations of state laws. The federal
court used the complete preemption doctrine to recharacterize the state
court claims as copyright claims and grant federal jurisdiction. 
188
As exemplified in Ritchie v. Williams, the complete preemption
doctrine is a practical exception to the well pleaded complaint rule.189 It
is especially applicable in copyright law where rights are assigned and
licensed in contracts. While the cause of action may be a state claim for
breach of contract, misrepresentation, or unjust enrichment, complete
preemption allows a court to examine the complaint and determine
whether it implicates significant federal interests.
178. Id.
179. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 285; Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 301
(2d Cir. 2004); Rosciszewski v. Arete Associates, Inc., I F.3d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 1993).
180. 395 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2005).
181. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
182. Id. at 287 n.2.
183. Order Granting Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Deny-
ing Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Ritchie v. Williams, No.
01-71712 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Order Granting Summary Judgment].
184. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
185. Id.
186. Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 183, at 19.
187. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2007).
188. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
189. Everhart, supra note 174, at 20.
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Ritchie v. Williams is an example of a case where copyright claims
were masked in state court causes of action perhaps to avoid federal ju-
risdiction. Williams claimed that Ritchie granted Williams the rights to
Ritchie's music in an agreement that was to expire in 1993.190 Williams
brought his state court claims in 2001 but the statute of limitations on a
copyright claim is only three years and therefore would have expired in
1996. Williams may have brought his claims in state court because his
federal claims would have been barred under to the statute of limitations.
Under the well pleaded complaint rule, this case would have been
stuck in state court because the face of the complaint did not pray for
relief under the Copyright Act (or any other federal law). As proponents
of the essence test would note, this application of the well pleaded com-
plaint rule would have prevented Ritchie from having his legitimate
copyright issues resolved in federal court. The complete preemption
doctrine solves this shortcoming of the well pleaded complaint rule by
allowing removal to federal court.
There are two requirements that must be satisfied for a state court
claim to be preempted under the Copyright Act: (1) the work must fall
within the scope of copyright; and (2) the state law rights must be
equivalent to rights granted federal copyright protection.' 9' In Ritchie,
the disputed works were musical works which garner copyright protec-
tion under § 102(a)(2) of the Copyright Act.1 92 Williams' state claims
alleged that Ritchie was unjustly enriched by these works and that
Ritchie breached his contract assigning Williams the rights to these
works.193 Federal copyright law protects these same rights that Ritchie
was accused of infringing.1 94 In this example, complete preemption
justly removed Ritchie from state to federal court.
The complete preemption exception to the well pleaded complaint
rule solves a problem in classifying "arising under" jurisdiction for copy-
right claims. While the well pleaded complaint rule is generally superior
in determining copyright jurisdiction, its vulnerability is the risk that a
valid copyright claim could be characterized in state law terms to avoid
federal jurisdiction. Application of the complete preemption doctrine
addresses this shortcoming by providing an avenue for state claims to be
heard in federal court without depriving plaintiffs and the courts of the
benefits of the well pleaded complaint rule. Courts should employ the
well pleaded complaint rule in conjunction with the complete preemption
doctrine to keep copyright claims out of state court and ensure that par-
ties with valid copyright claims will be heard in federal court.
190. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
191. Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 300 (6th Cir. 2004).
192. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(2) (West 2007) ("Copyright protection subsists, in . . . musical
works.").
193. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
194. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106.
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CONCLUSION
The importance of federal uniformity cannot be overstated. Until
the Supreme Court decides an issue, the circuit courts of appeals are en-
trusted with determining the best path in a disputed area of law. The
Tenth Circuit should be commended for taking the opportunity to adopt
the well pleaded complaint rule and promoting consistency in federal
"arising under" copyright jurisdiction. While all circuits have not em-
braced the test, Image places the Tenth Circuit in the clear majority.
195
The well pleaded complaint rule has limitations that require atten-
tion. It fails to ensure that all legitimate copyright claims arrive in fed-
eral court. Yet the primary alternative (the essence test) is a worse op-
tion. Arguments against the well pleaded complaint rule leave courts
without a standard that allows for equal treatment of all parties. The
equitable determination of federal or state jurisdiction "poses among the
knottiest procedural problems in copyright jurisprudence. 196 The pre-
sent lack of alternatives suggests the need for a fresh proposal.
Both the well pleaded complaint rule and the complete preemption
doctrine are established principles of modern jurisprudence. A signifi-
cant shortcoming of the well pleaded complaint rule is the possibility that
a defendant with legitimate copyright claims will be denied federal juris-
diction by a plaintiff pleading breach of contract claims in state court.
Application of complete preemption addresses this shortcoming and acts
as a valuable exception to the well pleaded complaint rule. Implementa-
tion of this amendment to the rule should be applied across the federal
circuits to provide uniform jurisdictional determinations
The Tenth Circuit is right to adopt the well pleaded complaint rule
for copyright and the Second Circuit has put a concerted effort into es-
tablishing a bright line rule. As the ongoing development of technology
continues to make demands upon copyright law, the jurisprudence must
adapt and craft rules that meet the demands of the system.
David Ratner*
195. The image court referenced Bassett's assertion that the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have all adopted the Second Circuit's angle on this jurisdictional determination.
Image, 459 F.3d at 1051 n.9 (citing Bassett, 204 F.3d at 350-51). Other cases adopting the well
pleaded complaint rule include: Lindy v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 1367, 1369 (3d Cir. 1974); Spearman v.
Exxon Coal USA, 16 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 1994) (dissent); Scandinavian Satellite Sys. v. Prime TVLtd.,
291 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
196. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMERON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[A] (2003).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to
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AID FOR WOMEN V. FOULSTON:
THE CREATION OF A MINOR'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND A
NEW PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD
INTRODUCTION
Forty-six percent of teens aged fifteen to nineteen have had sex at
least once.' This startling statistic raises the question of how the state,
which has an interest in protecting its youth, should deal with underage
sex. Some people argue for promoting abstinence, others argue for pro-
viding contraceptives; some argue for education in schools, others for
parental education. There are a variety of ways to deal with the problem,
and some are more controversial than others. Kansas Attorney General
Phill Kline found one of the most controversial ways to protect teenagers
from the harms of sex, implemented it in an attorney general opinion,
and faced the inevitable public critique and lawsuits over his choice of
protection.
In 2003, Attorney General Kline issued an advisory opinion requir-
ing doctors, teachers, police officers, counselors, and other similarly
situated professionals to report all instances of consensual underage sex
to the state's social service department.2 Not surprisingly, those required
to report brought suit seeking to enjoin the enforcement of his opinion.
In Aid for Women v. Foulston,3 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was
presented with the constitutionality of Attorney General Kline's advisory
opinion.
This note will discuss the case in its entirety, various issues sur-
rounding it, the precedent set by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
the motivation behind Attorney General Kline's interpretation. Part I
will address the factual background of Aid for Women and the main legal
issues involved. Part II will discuss Aid for Women, including the trial
court decision and the remanded case. Part III will examine the prece-
dent set by Aid for Women, arguing that the court was correct in recog-
nizing a minor's right to privacy for the first time, but improperly applied
1. JOYCE C. ABMA ET AL., TEENAGERS IN THE UNITED STATES: SEXUAL ACTIVITY,
CONTRACEPTIVE USE, AND CHILDBEARING, 2002 1 (Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Vital and Health
Statistics, Series 23, No. 24, 2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/
sr_23/sr23_024.pdf.
2. See 2003 Kan. AG LEXIS 22, at *3, 18-19 (2003). Attorney General Kline refers to
consensual sex between two underage partners as "the rape of a child." Press Release, Office of
Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline, Statement of Attorney General Kline Concerning Federal
District Court Ruling in Underage Reporting Case (Apr. 18, 2006), http://www.kansas.gov/
ksag/Press/2006/0418_underagereporting.htm. He is referring to the fact that anytime one person
under the age of sixteen has sex in Kansas it is statutory rape. If two people under sixteen have sex
this is statutory rape as well.
3. 441 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2006).
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and limited the preliminary injunction standard by assuming all govern-
ment action taken pursuant to a statutory scheme is necessarily in the
public interest. Part IV attempts to explain the motivation behind the
Kline opinion and the repeated connection academia makes between this
case and the ongoing abortion debate. Part IV further explores the cost
of the lawsuit and why Phill Kline appealed the grant of a preliminary
injunction, but failed to appeal the permanent injunction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. K.S.A. § 38-1522-The Reporting Statute
Kansas law requires certain professionals 4 who have "reason to sus-
pect that a child has been injured as a result of ... sexual abuse" to "re-
port the matter promptly" to the Kansas Department of Social and Reha-
bilitation Services (the "SRS").5
"Sexual abuse," as used in the reporting statute, is defined as "any
act committed with a child which is described in article 35, chapter 21 of
the Kansas Statutes Annotated .... Article 35 criminalizes a variety of
sexual activity, including voluntary sexual activity involving minors un-
der sixteen.7 Therefore, a professional subject to the reporting statute
must notify the SRS when there is evidence of injury resulting from sex-
4. Professionals required to report include:
Persons licensed to practice the healing arts or dentistry; persons licensed to practice op-
tometry; ... licensed psychologists; ... licensed clinical psychotherapists; licensed pro-
fessional or practical nurses examining, attending or treating a child under the age of 18;
teachers, school administrators or other employees of a school which the child is attend-
ing; ... licensed professional counselors; licensed clinical professional counselors; regis-
tered alcohol and drug abuse counselors; ... licensed social workers; firefighters; emer-
gency medical services personnel; juvenile intake and assessment workers; and law
enforcement officers.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522(a) (2006).
5. Id.
6. § 38-1502(c).
7. § 21-3502(a)(2). For example, article 35 criminalizes:
[E]ngaging in any of the following acts with a child who is 14 or more years of age but
less than 16 years of age: (1) any lewd fondling or touching of the person of either the
child or the offender, done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sex-
ual desires of either the child or the offender, or both; or (2) soliciting the child to engage
in any lewd fondling or touching of the person of another with the intent to arouse or sat-
isfy the sexual desires of the child, the offender or another.
§ 21-3503(a); and:
engaging in voluntary: (1) Sexual intercourse; (2) sodomy; or (3) lewd fondling or touch-
ing with a child who is 14 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age and the of-
fender is less than 19 years of age and less than four years of age older than the child and
the child and the offender are the only parties involved and are members of the opposite
sex.
§ 21-3522(a). It is important to note that this statute makes voluntary sexual activity between minors
under sixteen illegal in Kansas. Id. Where "consensual" is used in this paper and in the statutes,
read "voluntary," as minors under sixteen are not legally capable of consenting, as regards sex or
contracts.
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ual conduct involving minors under sixteen, voluntary or not.8 Failure to
make such a report is a misdemeanor.9
B. Reporting and Investigation Policies of the SRS
Reports of sexual abuse are usually made to the SRS.' 0 When a re-
port of alleged abuse is made, an intake screener collects information
from the reporter about the minor, the alleged perpetrator, and the mi-
nor's caretaker." The screener then determines whether "the department
has the statutory authority to proceed and whether the interests of the
child require further action to be taken.' 2 Where the report does not
meet the statutory definitions or "indicates lifestyle issues which do not
directly harm children,"' 3 "the department may determine the case will
not be accepted for investigation and assessment (the report is 'screened
out').' 14 There are several situations in which the SRS screens out re-
ports of abuse.' 5 Among the listed situations is "[m]utual sexual explora-
tion of age-mates (no force, power differential, or incest issues)."'
16
Cathy Hubbard, the SRS Program Administrator for the Protection Unit
of Child and Family Services, testified that "one reason. such cases are
not investigated further is because it is impossible to identify which child
is the victim and which is the perpetrator.'
' 7
The information provided in any screened out report is entered into
a database (Family and Child Tracking System) which allows the SRS to
check for any prior reports made or any other evidence that would indi-
cate a need for further inquiry.18 No information is provided to the police
department and no SRS services are provided. 19 At trial, the SRS re-
gional director Jean Hogan testified that she was unaware of any criminal
proceedings brought as a result of a screened out report.20  The SRS's
policy of screening out voluntary underage sexual activity is long-
8. See Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 2006); see also 2003
Kan. AG LEXIS 22, at *3 (2003).
9. § 38-1522(f).
10. § 38-1522(c). The Reporting Statute provides for different procedures of reporting when
the office is closed or the abuse occurred in an SRS institution, but generally the report is made to
the SRS. § 38-1522 (c), (d).
11. Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
12. KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL §§ 1300, 1360 (July 2006) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter SRS MANUAL].
13. Id. §§ 1360, 1361.
14. Id. § 1360.
15. Id. § 1361.
16. Id. § 1361(b). The SRS testified that they consider "age-mates" to be persons within three
years of each other. Aid for Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 n.4.
17. Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
18. SRS MANUAL, supra note 12, § 1370.
19. Aid for Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
20. Id.
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standing, and there is no evidence that the legislature ever intended to
change that policy.
21
C. The Function of the Attorney General and Attorney General Opinions
The state attorney general is a member of the executive branch and
acts as the legal representative for the state. 22 As such, he or she is re-
sponsible for the prosecution and defense of all actions, civil and crimi-
nal, in which the state is a party.23 In addition, the attorney general is
required to answer questions put to him or her by all county attorneys or
any member of the legislative or executive branch.24 Such opinions are
not binding on the judiciary, although they are given special considera-
tion as persuasive authority.25 Nonetheless, "the opinions of the attorney
general have in no sense the effect of judicial utterances. 26
In Kansas specifically, "[t]he Attorney General .. . is not only al-
lowed to, but also required to render an opinion on his interpretation of
the law .... ,,27 However, final interpretation of the law is an exclusive
judicial function that cannot be infringed upon by the executive or legis-
lative branches.28 Thus, an attorney general opinion in Kansas "cannot
effectively amend legislation by reinterpreting its language through an
'advisory' opinion., 29 Furthermore, Kansas attorney general opinions
are not binding on district or county attorneys in Kansas.30
As a member of the executive branch, the attorney general is
charged with the task of enforcing the laws as they are written, refraining
from interpreting the law in any significant way.31 Of course, with every
act of enforcement comes an act of interpretation, as the attorney general
must interpret and understand the laws he or she is implementing. How-
ever, the attorney general, in enforcing the laws, is bound by the interpre-
tations set forth by the courts.32 Thus, any enforcement actions must be
consistent with the common law of the jurisdiction in question. 33 Attor-
ney General Kline is bound by the common law of Kansas, the Supreme
Court, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in rendering opinions and
enforcing existing laws like the Kansas Reporting Statute.
21. Id. at 1099.
22. State v. Finch, 280 P. 910, 911 (Kan. 1929).
23. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-702 (2006).
24. Id. § 75-704.
25. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney General § 11 (2006).
26. Id.
27. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1103 (D. Kan. 2006).
28. Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1103-04.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1106.
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D. Conflicting Attorney General Advisory Opinions
The reporting statute has been subject to two contradictory attorney
general opinions since its enactment in 1982.14 In 1992 Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Stephan opined that the reporting statute "does not require
reporting of all suspected child abuse; it requires reporting in situations
where there is 'reason to suspect the child has been injured' as a result of
abuse. 35  Stephan recognized that sexual abuse included voluntary sex
between age-mates under sixteen.36 However, he construed the statute
strictly against the state and opined that the statute only required report-
ing "where there is 'reason to suspect the child has been injured' as a
result of abuse. 37 Stephan examined the legislative history of the stat-
ute, which indicated that the legislature took affirmative steps to add
"injuries resulting from" to the statute's language, and determined that
the legislature intended reporting only where injury was present.38 He
left the definition of injury broad, noting that emotional injury would
suffice, but refused to find mere evidence of consensual sexual relations
injurious as a matter of law.39
The reporting statute was interpreted again in 2003 when Senator
Mark Gilstrap from the 5th District of Kansas asked Attorney General
Phill Kline "under what circumstances does an abortion doctor need to
report rape and or sexual abuse on a minor?' 4° In Phill Kline's response,
he opined that all sex between minors is injurious as a matter of law, and
therefore any evidence of sexual abuse, including voluntary sexual activ-
ity between age-mates under sixteen, must be reported to the SRS.4'
Attorney General Kline's conclusion that "the act of rape, whether
forcible or 'statutory,' is an act that is inherently injurious and harmful"
was "limited to the specific offenses involving sexual intercourse with a
female under the age of 16. "42 His opinion was based largely on cases
"from at least 42 states" that "have unanimously held that sexual abuse
of a child is so inherently injurious to the victim that harm, or intent to
34. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522.
35. 1992 Kan. AG LEXIS 48, at *3-4 (1992).
36. See id. at *3.
37. Id. at *3.4 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at *8-9. Attorney General Stephan had some difficulty in determining the meaning of
injury as there was no definition in the statute, nor in the legislative history. Id.
39. Id. at *9-10. Attorney General Stephan also noted that case law did not consider preg-
nancy, the chief indicator of sexual activity, an injury but rather a natural condition. Id. (citing
Carter v. Howard, 86 P.2d 451, 455 (Or. 1939)). They further found this determination consistent
with Kansas law, which provides no cause of action for the birth of a normal, healthy child. Id. at
*10 (citing Byrd v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d 459 (Kan. 1985); Johnson v. Elkins, 736 P.2d 935,
939 (Kan. 1987)).
40. Letter from Mark S. Gilstrap, Kansas State Senator, 5th District, to The Honorable Phill
Kline, State of Kansas Attorney General (Jan. 13, 2003) (on file with author). Senator Gilstrap
asked for the opinion at the request of one of his constituents. E-Mail from Mark S. Gilstrap, Kansas
State Senator, 5th District, to author (Sept. 28, 2006) (on file with author).
41. 2003 Kan. AG LEXIS 22, at *2-3 (2003).
42. Id. at *5-6, *8 n.15.
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harm, is inferred as a matter of law. ' ' 3  In addition, Kline relied upon
cases tending to show that statutory rape laws are for the "protect[ion]
[of] juveniles from improvident acts."44 From this general premise, At-
torney General Kline inferred that consensual sex between minors is "in-
jurious as a matter of law.
'45
Attorney General Kline noted the broad consequences of his opin-
ion.4 6 Aside from mandatory reporting requirements for abortion doctors
faced with a pregnant minor, other situations that would trigger a man-
dated reporter's obligation include any time there is evidence of sexual
activity.47 Thus, included professionals must report to the SRS when a
minor seeks medical attention for a sexually transmitted disease, prenatal
care for a pregnant minor, and a teenage girl who seeks birth control and
discloses that she has already been sexually active.48
Attorney General Kline ended his opinion with a reminder that the
function of the judiciary is to interpret laws as they are written and in-
tended, and not to legislate from the bench.49
II. AID FOR WOMEN V. FOULSTON5 °
A. Initial Trial Court Action
About four months after Attorney General Kline issued his opinion,
a group of affected medical professionals brought suit in the United
43. Id. at *11 (citing Mfrs. & Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 498 S.E.2d 222, 226 n.1 (S.C.
1998) and cases cited therein). Harvey involved whether a grandparent's insurance policy covered
them for the molestation of their five grandchildren. The court held that intent to harm the child
could be inferred from the act, and therefore the incidents were not "accidents" as the defendant's
claimed, and therefore were not covered. Harvey, 498 S.E.2d at 226-27. The "cases cited therein"
all dealt with a similar problem, that is, whether insurance carriers were required to pay for an
adult's sexual abuse of minors. 2003 Kan. AG LEXIS 22, * 11-13 (2003). The inclusion of "harm,
or intent to harm" is no mistake. Id. at * 11-12 (emphasis added). None of the cited cases inferred
harm, but rather intent to harm. Thus, attributing truth to the latter part of the disjunctive clause is
the only correct reading. It is a matter of common sense that harm and intent to harm are separate
concepts-mere intent to harm cannot, without further action, actually harm a person.
44. 2003 Kan. AG LEXIS 22, at *18-19 (2003) (citing Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464, 469 (1981); State ex. rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (1993)). The cita-
tions provided for these cases are inaccurate on many levels (one case simply does not exist, another
cites to forty plus pages to support an integral proposition that can only be supported by a very
strained reading of the case law). Thus, assessing the validity of the Kline opinion's use of prece-
dent is difficult at best.
45. 2003 Kan. AG LEXIS 22, at * 18 (2003).
46. Id. at *19. He also noted that the opinion spoke to concerns not raised by Senator Gil-
strap's question, which was specific to abortion doctors. Letter from Mark S. Gilstrap, Kan. State
Senator, 5th Dist., to The Honorable Phill Kline, State of Kansas Attorney Gen. (Jan. 13, 2003) (on
file with author).
47. 2003 Kan. AG LEXIS 22, at *19 (2003). Mandated reporters include anyone listed in the
statute.
48. Id. Other instances of evidence of sexual activity which mandate reporting undoubtedly
exist, such as any time a student seeks a teacher's or counselor's advice on sexual activity already
performed, but these are the three instances Attorney General Kline specifically noted in his opinion.
Id.
49. Id. at *19-20.
50. 441 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2006).
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States District Court for the District of Kansas seeking a preliminary
injunction and declaratory relief against enforcement of the Kline inter-
pretation.51
The plaintiffs sought relief on three grounds: 1) the reporting statute
as interpreted is unconstitutional because it fails to give plaintiffs fair
notice of when reporting is required; 2) the reporting statute as inter-
preted inhibits the minor's ability to obtain contraception and prevents
them from obtaining abortions confidentially; and 3) the reporting statute
as interpreted is unconstitutional because it violates a minor's right to
informational privacy without serving a "legitimate, compelling or im-
portant state interest., 52 The trial court ultimately granted the prelimi-
nary injunction.
B. Tenth Circuit Review
The Kansas Attorney General's office appealed the grant of a pre-
liminary injunction to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 53 The Tenth
Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing to assert both their own and
their minor patients' rights, but held that the issuance of a preliminary
injunction was an abuse of discretion and remanded for a trial on the
merits.54 The court held that the plaintiffs did not stand a "substantial
likelihood of success on the merits" on the minor privacy claim, as mi-
nors do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their criminal
sexual conduct.
55
Generally, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction,
a plaintiff must establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits, (2) that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the
preliminary injunction is denied, (3) that the threatened injury to the
plaintiff outweighs the injury to the defendant(s) caused by the pre-
liminary injunction, and (4) that an injunction is not adverse to the
public interest.
56
However, in Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining Co.,57 the Tenth
Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit in holding that the
"substantial likelihood of success requirement" for a preliminary injunc-
tion may be lowered to a "fair grounds for litigation" standard when the
other three requirements for a preliminary injunction are met. 8  The
Court qualified this reduced standard in Heideman v. South Salt Lake
51. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1275 (D. Kan. 2004).
52. Aidfor Women, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 1280.
53. Aidfor Women, 441 F.3d at 1106.
54. Id. at 1121.
55. Id. at 1118.
56. Id. at 1115 (citing Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d
1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 2001)).
57. 338 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1964).
58. Continental Oil Co., 338 F.2d at 781-82.
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City59 in holding "where . . . a preliminary injunction seeks to stay gov-
ernmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or
regulatory scheme, the less rigorous fair-ground-for-litigation standard
should not be applied.
60
In Aid for Women, the Tenth Circuit assumed for the first time that
"all governmental action taken pursuant to a statutory scheme is 'taken in
the public interest.-' 61 As such, the Heideman rule was inapplicable, and
the heightened "substantial likelihood of success" standard was applied.
Starting with the first element, the court held that the plaintiffs had
not met their burden of showing a "substantial likelihood of success on
the merits" for two reasons.62 First, because voluntary sexual activity
between age-mates is criminal in Kansas, the minor patients were effec-
tively put "on notice" that their activities were not protected by the right
63to privacy. Thus, "minors may not have any privacy rights in their
concededly criminal sexual conduct." 4
The court found support for this holding in a line of Tenth Circuit
cases holding that "a validly enacted law places citizens on notice that
violations thereof do not fall within the realm of privacy. Criminal activ-
ity is... not protected by the right to privacy. 65 Both Nilson v. Layton
City66 and Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards and Training67 involved
plaintiffs who claimed that their privacy rights had been violated by dis-
closure of prior sexual misconduct.
In Nilson, a police officer disclosed information to a news reporter
about Nilson's prior conviction for sexual abuse.68 The plaintiffs claim
was rejected, in part because "[f]aws proscribing sexual abuse place [the
plaintiff] on notice that violations thereof do not fall within the constitu-
tionally protected privacy realm., 69 In Stidham, a peace officer claimed
that his employer violated his right to privacy by disclosing allegedly
false accusations that he had raped a young woman.70 While noting the
sensitive nature of the information, the court concluded once again that
59. 348 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2003).
60. Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189 (quoting Sweeney v. Bane, 996 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir.
1993)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
61. Aidfor Women, 441 F.3d at 1115 n.15.
62. Id. at 1117.
63. Id. at 1118.
64. Id. at 1117.
65. Id. (quoting Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also Stidham
v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1155 (10th Cir. 2001); Mangels v. Pena, 789
F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Validly enacted drug laws put citizens on notice that this realm is
not a private one. Accurate information concerning such unlawful activity is not encompassed by
any right of confidentiality ...."),
66. Nilson, 45 F.3d at 370.
67. Stidham, 265 F.3d at 1149.
68. 45 F.3d at 370-71.
69. Id. at 372.
70. 265 F.3d at 1149.
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"a validly enacted law places citizens on notice that violations thereof do
not fall into the realm of privacy.' Since consensual sex between mi-
nors is illegal in Kansas, the court concluded that the minors did not en-
joy a privacy right in their criminal sexual conduct.72
Second, the court concluded that even if the reasoning from Nilson
and Stidham did not apply, the plaintiffs had not "'clearly and unequivo-
cally' shown that the balance between their privacy rights and the gov-
ernment's interests in requiring reporting is substantially likely to weigh
in their favor.,
73
Typically, if a plaintiff can demonstrate a legitimate expectation of
privacy, they must still show that the "balance between their privacy
interests and the government's interests in requiring [disclosure] is sub-
stantially likely to weigh in their favor," and that there are less intrusive
means of achieving the desired end.74 However, the court found that
when dealing with the privacy rights of minors, the test to apply is
whether disclosure of confidential information "serves any significant
state interest ... that is not present in the case of an adult., 75 Thus, a
balancing test must be performed between the state's interest and the
minor's countervailing privacy rights.76
The court found that the balance weighed in the state's favor.77
First, the state has a compelling interest in enforcing its criminal laws.78
Since sexual activity between minors under sixteen is illegal in Kansas,
the state has a significant interest in obtaining information that will lead
to the arrest of those in violation of the law. Second, the state has a
strong parens patriae interest in protecting minors. 79 By providing the
state with information regarding sexual abuse, the state is better equipped
to advance the best interests of minors. 80 Third, the state has a signifi-
cant interests in promoting the health of its citizens, and even more so
when dealing with minors. 8' "Reporting instances of illegal sexual abuse
71. Id. at 1155 (quoting Nilson, 45 F.3d at 372). Justice Herrera's dissenting opinion took
issue with the reliance on these cases. He found them factually distinguishable as both Nilson and
Stidham involved "rights of privacy information regarding the plaintiffs' own criminal conduct. In
contrast, the reporting statute at issue here requires an infringement of the privacy rights of victims,
and not just perpetrators, of criminal conduct." Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1125
(10th Cir. 2006) (Herrera, J., dissenting). Justice Herrera's dissent was followed, in part, by the
Indiana Court of Appeals in Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Carter, 854 N.E.2d 853, 877 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006).
72. See Aidfor Women, 441 F.3d at 1118.
73. Id. at 1118-19.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1119 (plurality opinion) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693
(1977)).
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enables the state of Kansas to protect the health of its citizens, especially
children.
82
Finally, two factors serve to diminish the privacy rights of the plain-
tiffs' minor patients.8 3 First, the underlying sexual conduct is criminal.84
Even assuming that the minors have a legitimate expectation that their
"concededly criminal" conduct will not be revealed, the court found this
diminished the minor's privacy interest in such activity. Second, "the
fact that the privacy rights asserted are . . . [those] of minors diminishes
the strength of those rights somewhat."86  Since the state has broader
authority to regulate the conduct of minors than of adults, their privacy
rights in personal sexual activity are not as strong as adults, thus dimin-
ishing their privacy interests.
87
The court was careful to state that it was not deciding exactly how
the balance would come out, rather noting that these factors merely re-
duced the likelihood of success for the plaintiffs, such that they could not
show a "substantial likelihood of success on the merits., 88 Accordingly,
the court held that the preliminary injunction was granted in error.89
The court ended its discussion by criticizing the trial court for fail-
ing to address the remaining elements of a preliminary injunction.90
First, the district court did not address "whether there would be irrepara-
ble injury in the absence of this preliminary injunction." 91 Second, in
regard to the third factor (whether the threatened injury to the plaintiff
outweighs the injury to the defendants caused by the preliminary injunc-
tion), "the district court did not even identify any possible harm to the
Defendants from the injunction. 92 As to the plaintiffs, the court merely
stated that even a limited disclosure of such personal information could
have "large implications" for the well-being of minors.93 "'[L]arge im-
plications' is not equivalent to harm, and such vague language does not
indicate the sort of analysis properly involved in evaluating this factor." 94
Finally, the district court failed to engage in an explicit analysis of
whether the preliminary injunction would be adverse to the public inter-








90. See id. at 1120-21. The remaining elements are: (2) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the preliminary injunction is denied, (3) the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the
injury to the defendant(s) caused by the preliminary injunction, and (4) the injunction is not adverse
to the public interest. Dominion Video Satellite, Inc., 269 F.3d at 1154 (citing Utah Licensed Bever-
age Ass'n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (10th Cir. 2001)).
91. Aidfor Women, 441 F.3dat 1120.
92. Id. at 1121.
93. Id. (quoting Aid for Women, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 1288).
94. Aid for Women, 441 F.3d at 1121.
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est.95 Rather, it simply stated that "the parties operated under the 1992
advisory opinion for a substantial period of time without discernable
problems. 96 Thus, the district court abused its discretion in failing to
analyze the remaining three factors to the liking of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
97
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Plaintiffs
had standing to litigate their claims and raise the privacy interests of their
minor patients, but denied the preliminary injunction and remanded the
case for further proceedings consistent with their opinion.9
C. Remanded Case
On remand, the United States District Court for the District of Kan-
sas granted permanent injunctive and declaratory relief for the plaintiffs,
thus preventing the enforcement of Attorney General Kline's interpreta-
tion of the reporting statute.99
The court took a decidedly different approach to deciding the case
this time, focusing heavily on the interpretation of the reporting statute
itself and taking special care to cure the defects of the previous deci-
sion.1
00
First, the court found the reporting statute "clear[ly] and unambigu-
ous[ly]" required reporting only where there is evidence of injury as a
result of sexual abuse.' 0 ' The court examined the statute by breaking it
into two separate components. 102 The statute recognizes "that a manda-
tory reporter must identify two things: 1) there is reason to suspect that
the child has been injured; and 2) the injury resulted from sexual
abuse."'13  Under the Kline interpretation, mandatory reporters would
only have to identify that sexual abuse had taken place, keeping in mind
that consensual sex between age-mates under sixteen is "sexual abuse" in
Kansas.' °4 Under Attorney General Kline's reading, the court opined,
"the requirement of an 'injury' in the reporting statute is rendered mean-
ingless."' 5
The court noted that the legislature, through the language of the
statute and the intentional inclusion of "injury," "acknowledged that not
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting Aidfor Women, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 1288).
97. Aidfor Women, 441 F.3d at 1121.
98. Id.
99. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1116 (D. Kan. 2006).
100. Id. at 1101, 1114-16.
101. Id. at 1101.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id at 1101-02.
105. Id. at 1102. The reporting statute states: "(a) When any of the following persons has
reason to suspect that a child has been injured as a result of... sexual abuse, the person shall report
the matter promptly [to the SRS]." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522(a) (2006).
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all illegal sexual activity involving a minor necessarily results in 'in-
jury.' 10 6 Strictly adhering to the canons of statutory construction, the
court held that mandatory reporting of sexual abuse of a minor is only
required where accompanied by evidence of injury.
10 7
In addition to violating the plain language of the statute, the court
found that Attorney General Kline's interpretation, "wrongly rede-
fine[ed] the common understanding of both state agencies [SRS] and
mandatory reporters by denoting all sexual activity to be 'inherently inju-
rious.' 10 8 For these reasons, the court refused to accept Attorney Gen-
eral Kline's interpretation of the statute and declared that reporting was




The Tenth Circuit's decision had a minimal effect on the immediate
parties since the trial court quickly granted a permanent injunction. The
precedent set, however, is substantial. The court explicitly recognized a
minor's right to informational privacy for the first time and altered a sig-
nificant body of existing law regarding preliminary injunctions in the
Tenth Circuit. This section will address these two issues, arguing that
though the court was correct in extending privacy rights to minors, the
preliminary injunction standard should not have been altered.
1. Minors' Right to Informational Privacy
The competing interests involved in granting minors a right to in-
formational privacy both hold great importance, and neither can be easily
dismissed. On the one hand, minors should be protected as much as pos-
sible from the evils of sexual abuse. On the other, we want to respect
minors' right to keep personal information private, away from the scru-
tiny of the courts and government. Both interests have a long line of
legal support, and balancing the interests is a difficult task."0
The Kansas district court's opinion on remand gives many reasons
why denying minors a right to privacy under these circumstances would
be injurious to their health and well being. The court aptly noted that by
requiring disclosure to the government, minors will be dissuaded from
106. Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
107. See id. at 1103.
108. Id. at 1104.
109. Id. Since the reporting statute covers areas beyond sexual abuse, i.e. physical, mental or
emotional abuse, this opinion should have the effect of requiring reporting only when there is evi-
dence of injury, regardless of the injury's source. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522.
110. See Miriam E. C. Bailey, Note, The Alpha Subpoena Controversy: Kansas Fires First
Shot in Nationwide Battle over Child Rape, Abortion and Prosecutorial Access to Medical Records,
74 UMKC L. REV. 1021, 1032 (2006).
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obtaining medical attention, such as prenatal care, contraceptives, and
psychological services."'
The court further noted that the "evidence supports a finding that
mandatory reporting of all illegal underage sexual activity will harm
those minors who are actual victims of 'sexual abuse' as defined by the
SRS's working definition."" 2 That is, by "overwhelming state agencies"
with reports of every incident of sexual activity between minor age-
mates, the true victims of sexual abuse will be lost in the files., 3 Vital
resources will be wasted on gathering reports that will be screened out in
the end anyway.l 4
The most telling examples of the harms inherent in denying minors
some degree of privacy came from the various experts testifying at trial.
Oddly enough, experts on both sides of the lawsuit testified that minors
might be dissuaded from seeking medical attention and advice if their
private information were unprotected from government scrutiny. 1 5
The decision of the Kansas district court exemplified the benefits of
a minor's limited right to informational privacy, and adequately ac-
counted for the paramount nature of each competing interest. Limiting
mandatory disclosure to those situations in which injury is suspected
ensures that, where there is harm, a minor will be afforded the protection
111. Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 2dat 1107.
112. Id. at 1108.
113. Id. at 1109.
114. See id. One can imagine the immense number of calls the SRS would receive each day if
the Kline interpretation was followed. Beyond the prevalence of sexual activity between minors,
those opposed to the Kline interpretation might give him exactly what he wants, and take the slight-
est evidence of sexual activity as a chance to report, with a mind for overburdening the SRS to the
point that they simply cannot function and legislative action is required. As a matter of fact, Cali-
fornia faced this precise problem when the legislature amended the sexual abuse statute to include
any act of intercourse involving a woman under the age of eighteen. See Planned Parenthood Affili-
ates of Cal. v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Just like Kansas, the
reporting statute referred to the criminal sexual abuse statute for the definition. See id. The Califor-
nia state child protective services became so overwhelmed with reports that the legislature had to
amend the statute one year later, noting that they would not have amended the criminal definition of
sexual abuse had they realized it would require "reporting of promiscuous activity of females under
the age of 18 years ... [which would] divert the investigative attention away from real child abuse
cases." See Id. When the California Attorney General reinterpreted the reporting statute to mandate
reporting of such sexual activity, suit was brought, and the courts invalidated his interpretation for
essentially the same reasons as the Kansas courts did in Aid for Women. See id. Surprisingly
enough, counsel for the plaintiffs apparently did not find this case, and none of the courts involved
mentioned or cited it. The defendants did find this case, however, but cited to it only to support the
proposition that minors do not have informational privacy rights in their criminal conduct under the
United States Constitution, but only under the California Constitution which has much broader
privacy rights. Reply Brief of Appellants, Aid for Women v. Foulston, No. 04-3310, 2004 WL
3172399 (10th Cir. 2004).
115. Aid for Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-11. Defense experts Dr. Shadigan and Dr. Jo-
sephson both testified that minors might avoid visiting doctors for fear of reporting, and that the
legal system might do more harm than good to their minor patients. See id. Of course, the plaintiff's
experts gave similar testimony. See id. at 1109-10. For those who find humor in litigation debacles,
the remanded case provides a plethora of damning expert testimony. See id. at 1110-13. Some of
this expert testimony is discussed below.
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that only the state can provide, while simultaneously providing minors a
confidential environment to seek out needed medical help and advice. If
Kline's interpretation was followed, minors would be chilled from seek-
ing out medical care and the advice of their mentors' 16 for fear of inves-
tigation and public disclosure of sensitive, personal information. As the
Kansas district court aptly noted, such a result is not in the best interest
of children.17
2. A New Standard for Preliminary Injunctions
The Tenth Circuit altered a substantial body of law regarding the is-
suance of a preliminary injunction. By assuming that all governmental
action taken pursuant to a statutory scheme is in the public interest, the
court not only went against precedent, it also afforded the legislature and
the attorney general a protection never before seen in the Tenth Circuit.
In Aid for Women, the court "presum[ed] that all governmental ac-
tion pursuant to a statutory scheme is 'taken in the public interest."'
1 18
This was a drastic departure from previous cases dealing with the less
rigorous fair-ground-for-litigation standard, which explicitly analyzed
the statutory scheme to determine whether it was "taken in the public
interest."119
Beyond the departure from precedent, the court's interpretation of
this lowered standard fails to account for the plain language of the rule.
If the court were correct in assuming that all governmental action taken
pursuant to a statutory scheme is in the public interest, there would be no
need to include, "in the public interest." This added qualification only
reiterates what is already assumed. In fact, the determination of whether
Attorney General Kline's interpretation of the statute was in the public
interest was a key factor in the trial court's final decision. On remand,
the court went into great detail describing why the Kline interpretation
was actually adverse to the public interest, ultimately holding that it did
more harm than good.
120
In addition, canons of statutory construction provide that "[e]very
word in a statute must be given effect and meaning, and no part is to be
116. Teachers, psychiatrists, counselors, and many other non-medical professions are consid-
ered mandatory reporters. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (2006).
117. Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.
118. 441F.3d at 1115 n.15.
119. See, e.g., Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189 (discussing the public interest involved in adoption
of the statute); Sal Tinnerello & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Stonington, 141 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 1998) (It
is clear "that the Town of Stonington, by enacting an ordinance for the purpose of 'providing for safe
and efficient collection of solid waste,' was acting in the public interest."); N.Y. Urban League, Inc.
v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 n.7 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the public interest involved in the
statute); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding "the
'likelihood of success' prong need not always be followed merely because a movant seeks to enjoin
government action"); Plaza Health Labs. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1989) (the gov-
ernment action was clearly in the public interest).
120. Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1112-13.
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held meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the statute."
12 1
Of course, we are not dealing with a statute here. Nonetheless, the rules
of statutory construction can provide a meaningful analogy. By assum-
ing public interest in all governmental action, the court rendered "public
interest" meaningless, even though it very well could be reconciled with
the whole. Thus, the court's assumption violates the plain meaning of
the rule.
Perhaps most importantly, the court's assumption failed to address
the true issue at bar.' 22 The issue was whether Attorney General Kline's
interpretation of the statute violated the United States Constitution.,
23
There was no concern that the statute itself was unconstitutional. Thus,
there was no true "statutory scheme" at issue.' 24 In this way, the court
may have inadvertently given the judicial power of interpreting laws to
the executive branch via the attorney general's office. That is, since At-
torney General Kline's opinion was treated as a statutory scheme in this
case, future attorney generals may cite Aid for Women when defending
the constitutionality of their opinions. With such precedent in their arse-
nal, future attorney generals will be assured that preliminary injunctions
will only be issued where there is a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits. Adding this protection to their ability to interpret laws effec-
tively usurps the judicial branch of its sole power, interpretation of the
law.
In Aid for Women, this error proved harmless because the plaintiffs
received the relief they sought. However, this precedent may prove to
have negative consequences in the future. 25 The court shielded the leg-
islature from judicial oversight by assuming that everything it does pur-
suant to a statutory scheme is in the public interest. As such, any plain-
tiff seeking a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a statute
must meet the substantial likelihood of success standard, regardless of
how repugnant the statute is, or how heavily the balance of hardship tips
121. Plesha v. Edmonds, 717 N.E.2d 981, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
122. The Court may not be at fault here, as the plaintiffs apparently argued that the lessened
standard should be applied as, "the action of requiring automatic reporting is not in the 'public
interest."' Aid for Women, 441 F.3d at 1115 n.15. Thus, the plaintiffs failed to frame the issue
properly, and the court was bound to address their arguments and not create their own.
123. Id. at 1108.
The complaint sought 'declaratory and injunctive relief. . . against application of the re-
porting statute to incidents of consensual sexual activity between... a minor under 16
and a person of similar age [where Plaintiffs] conclude ... that the sexual activity has not
caused the minor injury.
Id.
124. Attorney General Kline's interpretation of the statute is not to be considered a statutory
scheme: "The Attorney General cannot amend the statute by an advisory opinion.., in accordance
with the general principles of the separation of powers, the executive department cannot generally
usurp or exercise judicial or legislative power." See Aid for Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1104 (citing
State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1181-82 (Kan. 1992)).
125. This assumption has already been applied in Graham v. Henry, No. 06-CV-381-
TCK(FHM), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65880, at *12 (D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2006).
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in the plaintiffs' favor. This is a dangerous precedent. Affording the
legislature such an added protection allows it to take action adverse to
the public interest without the checks and balances integral to our system
of governance, with full knowledge that the courts are substantially lim-
ited in their ability to review.
IV. THE UNDERLYING MOTIVATIONS-COMING TO AN
UNDERSTANDING OF AID FOR WOMEN AND THE KLINE OPINION
A. Academia's Interpretation
The limited literature there is analyzing Aid for Women links the
case and the Kline opinion to the ongoing abortion debate in Kansas and
across America. 126 While this connection is not immediately apparent, a
review of the political history of Kansas, Phill Kline, and some other key
players brings this connection into full view.
B. Recent Political Developments in Kansas
Although Kansas is traditionally a highly conservative state, both
.morally and politically, 127 "the state has largely withstood pressures to
curtail women's abortion rights. 128 Prior to 1991, Kansas had been a
paradigm of traditional Republicanism, concentrating mainly on low
taxes and keeping the government out of people's lives. 129 Kansas Re-
publicanism was of a "moderate" or "progressive" sort; Dwight Eisen-
hower, William Allen White and Alf Landon all came from Kansas, and
are decidedly "moderate" Republicans when viewed against today's Re-
publican Party. 130  More importantly, Kansas has historically been
"ahead of the crowd on women's rights."'1 31 Kansas was one of the early
states to accept women's suffrage and reform its abortion laws prior to
Roe v. Wade in 1973.132 Wichita was once known as the only place in
the plains region where a woman could get a late-term abortion, mostly
from the famous, or infamous, Dr. George Tiller.133
126. Recent Cases, District Court Grants Preliminary Injunction Against Enforcement of State
Law Requiring Reporting of All Sexual Activity by Minors. - Aid for Women v. Foulston, 327 F.
Supp. 2d 1273 (D. Kan. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 778, 782 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Cases]. See
generally Bailey, supra note 110.
127. See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATrER WITH KANSAS? How CONSERVATIVES WON
THE HEART OF AMERICA 34-35 (2004) ("Kansas today is a burned-over district of conservatism
where the backlash propaganda has woven itself into the fabric of everyday life.").
128. Recent Cases, supra note 126, at 782.
129. Andrew Corsello, This Man Will Do Anything to Stop Abortion, GQ, Nov. 2005, 254, at
258. Not a single Democrat has been sent to the U.S. Senate from Kansas since 1932. FRANK,
supra note 127, at 89.
130. See FRANK, supra note 127, at 89.
131. Id. at 89-90.
132. Id. at 90; see also Corsello, supra note 129, at 258.
133. See FRANK, supra note 127, at 90.
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In the eighties, Kansas' state legislature was dominated by moderate
Republicans. 134 In 1990, however, the voters elected a Democratic ma-
jority to the Kansas House for the second time since World War 1I.
135
This might have prompted what proved to be the end of moderate Repub-
licanism in Kansas.
1. "The Summer of Mercy"
In 1991, a popular uprising led by Operation Rescue, a pro-life
group known for its aggressive anti-abortion tactics, changed the political
climate of Kansas forever. 136 Operation Rescue aimed to take advantage
of the cultural contradiction evident in Wichita--George Tiller's abor-
tion clinic placed directly in the center of "a population that is world-
famous for its spiritual enthusiasm"--by committing acts of civil disobe-
dience and widespread protests all over Wichita. 137 This was not the first
protest Operation Rescue had organized. In 1988 they protested in At-
lanta, and then again in Los Angeles in 1990.138 This time, however,
something was different.
At the suggestion of the Wichita Police Department, George Tiller
and other abortion doctors in the area decided to close down for a week
and wait the protests out.' 3 9 This proved to be a disastrous move. All
over the country pro-life groups saw the shutdown of the abortion clinics
as a "miracle, a sign from God, and a blessing" on Operation Rescue's
campaign and flocked to Kansas to participate. 40 What was intended to
be a one-week campaign lasted for a month and a half.'4' At the climax
of the protests, over twenty-five thousand people showed up to a rally at
the Wichita State University football stadium. 142
134. Id. at91.
135. Id,
136. Id. at 92. Operation Rescue has been credited with incorporating "confrontational social
protests [into the] pro-life movement," and turning "what had been a small, ragtag group of easily
ignored protesters into a genuine movement, an aggressive national campaign that put the anti-
abortion cause back onto America's Page One" which "eventually became one of the biggest social
protest movements since the antiwar and civil rights campaigns of the 1960s." MARK ALLAN
STEINER, THE RHETORIC OF OPERATION RESCUE: PROJECTING THE CHRISTIAN PRO-LIFE MESSAGE
5 (2006) (quoting CHRISTOPHER LEVAN, LIVING IN THE MAYBE: A STEWARD CONFRONTS THE
SPIRIT OF FUNDAMENTALISM 25-26 (1998)). Operation Rescue essentially began the practice of
"rescue missions" where "a hundred ... or more people go to an abortion clinic and either walk
inside to the waiting room, offering an alternative to the mothers, or sit around the door of the abor-
tion clinic before it opens to prevent the slaughter of innocent lives." Id. at 7 (quoting Randall
Terry, founder of Operation Rescue, found in Os GUINNESS, THE AMERICAN HOUR: A TIME OF
RECKONING AND THE ONCE AND FUTURE ROLE OF FAITH 171 (1993)).
137. See FRANK, supra note 127, at 92.
138. Id. The Kansas protest "was the group's largest and arguably most pivotal" protest of its
kind. STEINER, supra note 136, at 9.
139. FRANK, supra note 127, at 92.
140. JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN ABORTION WAR
324(1998).
141. See id at 324, 333.
142. FRANK, supra note 127, at 92.
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The traditional moderate Republicans of Kansas were horrified.
143
The Kansas legislature acted quickly, preparing legislation to prevent
these protests in the future, mandating stiff penalties for blocking clinics
and ensuring that abortions would be legal in Kansas even if Roe v. Wade
was overturned." n The legislation cleared the Kansas House of Repre-
sentatives, but the Kansas Senate blocked it before it became law .
45
In the 1992 elections, 83% of the committee members elected in the
Republican primary were pro-life. 146  In Sedgwick County, "some 19
percent of the new precinct committee people responsible for throwing
out the old guard actually had arrest records from the Summer of
Mercy.' 47  The pro-life movement of Operation Rescue during the
Summer of Mercy effectively allowed conservative Kansas Republicans
to conquer the legislature. 1
48
Among those placed in the Kansas House of Representatives was
Phill Kline. 149 During his eight years in the House of Representatives, he
drafted and helped pass a total of five bills limiting abortion rights, in-
cluding the law forbidding abortions after the twenty-second week of
pregnancy. 50 Later, in his position as Attorney General for the state of
Kansas, he subpoenaed the medical records of George Tiller's abortion
office in Wichita for evidence of abortions performed in violation of this
law.' 5'
Even with the strongly anti-abortion legislature and the numerous
bills passed limiting a woman's ability to have an abortion, pro-life activ-
ists were still unhappy. 52 This brings us to the 2002 Kansas Attorney
General race that put Phill Kline in the Attorney General's office.
2. The Attorney General Race and the Kline Opinion
Anti-abortion activists in the state grew frustrated with the rising
abortion rate in Kansas 53 and the inability to succeed in either the courts
or legislature. 54 Thus, rather than use the legislative process to achieve
143. Id. at 92-93.
144. Id. at 94.
145. Id.
146. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 140, at 334.
147. FRANK, supra note 127, at 95-96.
148. Id. at 96.
149. Corsello, supra note 129, at 258.
150. Id.
151. Alpha Med. Clinic v. Anderson, 128 P.3d 364, 369 (Kan. 2006); Corsello, supra note 129,
at 258. This case is discussed in more detail below.
152. See Recent Cases, supra note 126, at 782.
153. The abortion rate in Kansas grew 15% between 1996 and 2000. See TRENDS IN
ABORTION IN KANSAS, 1973-2000, 2003 ALAN GUTTMACHER INST. 2, available at http://www.agi-
usa.org/pubs/stateab pt/kansas.pdf [hereinafter GUTrMACHER INST.]; see also Recent Cases, supra
note 126, at 782 n.38.
154. Recent Cases, supra note 126, at 782. Of course, they had some success in the legislature,
as previously discussed. However, the rise of abortion in recent years is evidence of the apparent
failure of the new laws in place. See GUTrMACHER INST., supra note 153.
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their goals, pro-life supporters sought an attorney general they could trust
to place pressure on abortion doctors through the re-interpretation of pre-
existing laws. 155 As it played out, the 2002 race for Attorney General
focused primarily on abortion, with both candidates arguing that he alone
could provide better enforcement of the existing laws regulating abor-
tion. 56 With the support of abortion activist groups, 57 Phill Kline won
the Attorney General position and immediately began his moral crusade
against abortion.
58
3. Alpha Medical Clinic v. Anderson'
59
In the same year that Attorney General Kline issued the Kline opin-
ion, he "subpoenaed the entire, unredacted files of 90 women and girls
who obtained abortions" at two Kansas abortion clinics in order to inves-
tigate "potential violations of two specific statutes ... K.S.A. 65-6703,
which deals with abortions performed at or after 22 weeks gestational
age, and KS.A. 2004 Supp. 38-1522, which governs mandatory reporting
of suspected child abuse."' 60 The petitioners filed a motion to quash the
subpoenas, but the state trial court judge, Judge Richard Anderson, de-
nied the motion and ordered the petitioners to produce the 90 unredacted
patient files. 161
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with the Kansas Su-
preme Court only two days before the files were to be released. The
Kansas Supreme Court held that the subpoenas were unenforceable as
issued.' 62  The court ordered Judge Anderson to permit the inquisition
"only if [he] is satisfied that the attorney general is on firm legal
155. See Recent Cases, supra note 126, at 782-83.
156. Jd. Tim Potter, Abortion Dominates Attorney General Race, WICHITA EAGLE, Oct. 5,
2002, at I; see also Jim Sullinger & Steve Kraske, Kline Names Abortion Protest Figure to Staff,
KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 28, 2003, at B1.
157. Potter, supra note 156, at I.
158. Attorney General Kline quickly appointed Bryan J. Broan to the consumer protection
division. Mr. Broan was arrested seven times during the Wichita Summer of Mercy Protests. See
Sullinger & Kraske supra note 156, at B 1.
159. 128 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2006).
160. See Alpha Med. Clinic, 128 P.3d at 369-70; 2003 Kan. AG LEXIS 22 (2003). During his
tenure in this legislature, Attorney General Kline also co-sponsored a law that prevents the release of
any identifying information relating to victims of sex-crimes. See Bailey, supra note 110, at 1029;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-221 (a)(10)(F) (2006). While Attorney General Kline claims that he specifi-
cally requested all patient-identifying information to be redacted from the files in order to comply
with this law, the Kansas Supreme Court noted that he changed his position midway through the
proceedings in Alpha Medical Clinic. Compare Alpha Med Clinic, 128 P.3d at 378, with Press
Release, Office of Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline, Statement by Attorney General Kline Con-
cerning Latest Action in Judicial Inquiry of Child Rape and Illegal Late-Term Abortion (Mar. 16,
2005), available at http://www.accesskansas.org/ksag/Press/2005/0316_statement_abortion.htm;
Bailey, supra note 110, at 1029.
161. Alpha Med Clinic, 128 P.3d at 370.
162. Id. at 924.
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ground."' 163 The court further required the redaction of all patient identi-
fying information from the files.164
Attorney General Kline claims that the subpoenas were issued to
"investigat[e] into alleged cases of child rape, failure to report child rape
and violations of the state's late-term abortion statute."' 65 This cause is
valid and noble, and it is the province of the Attorney General to investi-
gate violations of the law. However, it is not clear that the subpoenas
were truly aimed at "smoking out" child rapists and those who fail to
report. For if "they had been, Kline would be going after the medical
records of girls who had their babies as zealously as he went after those
who aborted., 166  Of course, the subpoenas might provide valuable in-
formation leading to the arrest of child rapists, but his selective applica-
tion of the laws on abortion clinics alone is, at the very least, suspect.
167
C. Coming to an Understanding of the Kline Opinion
One cannot blame a publicly elected official for appeasing his con-
stituents through lawful means, and Attorney General Kline is no excep-
tion.1 68 The political climate of Kansas, the attorney general race and his
deeply held religious beliefs169 all play a part in both why he got elected
and why he interpreted the reporting statute the way he did. Ultimately,
to understand Aidfor Women v. Foulston is to understand the Kline opin-
163. Id.
164. Id. at 924-25.
165. Press Release, Office of Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline, Attorney General Phill
Kline Takes Possession of Medical Records (Nov. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.ksag.org/Press/2006/1101_medicalrecords.htm.
166. Corsello, supra note 129, at 261.
167. The Alpha Medical Clinic decision also involved contempt proceedings brought against
Attorney General Kline for attaching redacted portions of the District Court hearing transcript and
later discussing the brief and its attachments at a press conference. Alpha Med. Clinic, 128 P.3d at
380. This was in direct violation of District Court Judge's order requiring all filing to be made under
seal and further restricting disclosure of the transcript. Id. The Supreme Court of Kansas found
Attorney General Kline's initial responses "troubling." Id. at 928. He admitted to knowingly violat-
ing Judge Anderson's order in attaching the sealed court records to the brief because "he believed it
to be necessary to further his arguments," and held a press conference "merely because he deter-
mined that petitioners had painted his previous actions in an unflattering light." Id. He then permit-
ted his staff to provide copies of the sealed transcript "to anyone who requested them." Id. The court
stated, "[i]n essence, Kline has told this court that he did what he did simply because he believed he
knew best how he should behave, regardless of what this court had ordered, and that his priorities
should trump whatever priorities this court had set." Id. at 928. Lucky for Attorney General Kline,
his lawyer, former Attorney General Stephan (the author of the initial attorney general opinion
interpreting the reporting statute) "wisely altered the tone of Kline's response." Id. at 929. "He
characterized whatever mistakes Kline may have made as honest ones and said that his client was
acting in good faith... [and] made a classic 'no harm, no foul' argument:" any harm that arose from
the disclosure of sealed material did not effect the soundness of the outcome of the case. Id. Ulti-
mately, the court concluded that "despite the attorney general's initial defiant tone, he should not be
held in contempt" as no prejudice resulted from his conduct. Id.
168. Attorney General Kline was not reelected in the 2006 midterm elections. See Press Re-
lease, Office of Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline, Statement by Attorney General Phill Kline
(Nov. 7, 2006), available at http://www.accesskansas.org/ksag/Press/2006/1107_Statement.htm.
169. Corsello, supra note 129, at 258-59 (noting that Kline keeps a bible on his desk, reads
scripture before work everyday, and wears his religion on his sleeve).
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ion, and to understand the Kline opinion is to understand where it came
from. Hopefully some light has been shed on this decidedly strange case.
D. The Cost of the Lawsuit
Complete figures are not available for the cost of this lawsuit.
However, experts in the first trial court decision alone cost
$230,609.98."70 The highest paid expert was Dr. Vincent M. Rue, who
received $152,701.25 but never testified. 17  In the remanded case, the
court noted that he did not testify and his participation in the matter was
largely a mystery, although some other experts indicated that he was
involved in organizing the team of experts.
72
As for the other experts, who received over $77,000 for their testi-
mony, none provided any support for Attorney General Kline's posi-
tion.173 Dr. Josephson was paid $15,225 to testify that mandatory report-
ing might deter some minors from seeking medical help, that he himself
does not report all consensual sexual activity between age-mates under
sixteen, and that if the plaintiffs' expert Dr. Kellogg were doing every
examination, he might feel more comfortable with discretionary report-
ing. 174 Of course, the court found his testimony "inconsistent and there-
fore unreliable. In fact, his own practice and opinion as to what should
be reported is not as broad as the reporting requirements of the Kline
Opinion.'
175
Dr. Shadigan was paid $18,900 dollars for equally damning testi-
mony. 76 She testified that mandatory reporting might do more harm to
the minor than the sexual activity itself and that she does not report all
such illegal activity herself.' 77 Several other experts were paid for their
services, but did not make it into the trial court's decision.17 1 Ultimately,
the experts for the defense were "unreliable" at best, but damning to the
case at worst.
Of course, these figures do not reflect the cost for the appeal, the
Attorney General Office's time and resources, the court's time, and the
cost to the defense.
170. Litigation Fees Paid -December 9, 2004 through December 31, 2005, http://www.ksag.
org/Press/2006/12-31-05contractpayments.htm [hereinafter Litigation Fees Paid].
171. Id. Dr. Rue is an anti-abortion researcher who co-directs the Florida Group Institute for
Pregnancy Loss. Bob Ellis, South Dakota Abortion Task Force Hears Testimony, DAKOTA VOICE,
Apr. 6,2006, http://www.dakotavoice.com/200511/20051122_3.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
172. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1110 n. 14.
173. Litigation Fees Paid, supra note 170; Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-13.
174. Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-11.
175. Id.
176. Litigation Fees Paid, supra note 170; Aid for Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-12.
177. Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 3d at 1110-12.
178. Dr. Shunn - $1,075; Dr. Yarbrough - $1,895; Dr. Swanson - $9,733.63; Dr, Meeker -
$7,605. Litigation Fees Paid, supra note 170.
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E. All for Nothing
Attorney General Kline took the outcome of this case as a victory:
In bringing this lawsuit . . .plaintiffs contended that the reporting
statute is unconstitutional. The judge found that the statute was clear
and did not violate equal protection, vagueness, or decisional privacy
rights. The constitutionality of the statute has been upheld.
We have defended the constitutionality of the law successfully. The
judge made his ruling in light of the earlier finding by the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals that the state has a substantial interest in pro-
tecting its children.
1 79
While this statement is not a lie, per se (except for the claim that the
plaintiffs' challenged, "that the statute is unconstitutional"'18) it borders
on absurdity. The court did not speak to equal protection and did not
speak to the constitutionality of the statute. 8 1 There was no claim of a
violation of equal protection rights at all. As a matter of fact, a recent
Harvard Law Review article criticized the plaintiffs for failing to assert
the equal protection claim.
82
Attorney General Kline's delusions aside, he did not win this case.
That much is clear. His interpretation of the statute was held unconstitu-
tional, and he was enjoined from enforcing it as interpreted. But, he did
not appeal the case to the Tenth Circuit. Perhaps he did not leave any
issues to be appealed, perhaps he realized the futility of the fight, perhaps
he was convinced by the court's decision. No one knows.
All this leads to important questions: Why did Phill Kline appeal the
preliminary injunction? What goals did he have in mind? He knew that
regardless of the outcome, the case would return to the same District
Court Judge in Kansas who would undoubtedly come to the same con-
clusions. He risked the possibility of precedent seriously adverse to his
179. Press Release, Office of Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline, Statement of Attorney
General Kline Concerning Federal District Court Ruling in Underage Reporting Case (Apr. 18,
2006), available at http://www.accesskansas.org/ksag/Press/206/0418-underage-reporting.htm. Of
course, the court did make their determination in light of the states substantial interest in protecting
its children - enforcing the Kline Opinion would be adverse to their best interests, and thus the
permanent injunction was granted. Aid for Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 (stating "[how is the
best interest of the child served by not seeking health care in either circumstance? Clearly, it is
not.").
180. Statement of Attorney General Kline Concerning Federal District Court Ruling in Under-
age Reporting Case (Apr. 18, 2006), http://www.accesskansas.org/ksag/Press/2006/0418_
underagereporting.htm; Aid for Women, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (asserting that "[pilaintiffs seek to
prevent enforcement of Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline's application of the state mandatory
reporting statute, through an Attorney General's opinion, to consensual underage sexual activity.").
Attorney General Kline missed the issues - perhaps that speaks to his ultimate defeat.
181. Aidfor Women, 427 F. Supp. 2dpassim.
182. Recent Cases, supra note 126, at 783 n.44 ("[A]n argument could be made that enforcing
Attorney General Kline's opinion would violate the equal protection rights of young women" as only
the female's name would be turned over to state agencies.).
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point of view (a minor's right to informational privacy being one) and
stood to win very little. At the very least, one would expect him to ap-
peal the case to the Tenth Circuit again, but he simply did not.
Perhaps he honestly believed that he won the case. The only press
release he issued after the District Court's final decision is quoted above,
and indicates he felt victorious.
Of course, to attribute such a ridiculous point of view to a man as
intelligent as Phill Kline would be unfair. In all likelihood, he probably
felt the chances of victory were slim, the cost would be high, and any
possible outcome would not be worth the expense. In light of the trial
court record, replete with expert testimony tending to show his interpre-
tation was actually injurious to the health of minors, he might have been
correct in assuming he would not win. Regardless of the Tenth Circuit's
apparent sympathy for his interpretation, the facts and record that would
be relied upon could hardly have supported a reversal. The damning
expert testimony, the existence of a minor's right to privacy, and the
strength of the plaintiffs' arguments would prove a significant hurdle to
victory. Ultimately, all we know is that he did not appeal the decision,
and his interpretation will never have the force of law.
CONCLUSION
No one can deny that Phill Kline thinks he is working his hardest to
protect the children of Kansas. That being so, he doesn't always choose
the best methods of protection. Forcing disclosure of teenage sex will
only serve to dissuade impressionable, fearful youth from seeking medi-
cal help and advice from their elders. Everyone wants to curb teenage
sex and the unwanted pregnancies that come with it, but in so doing hu-
man nature must be taken into account before policies are implemented
that may look noble on their face, but only lead to disastrous results in
the end.
Underneath the lawsuits, critiques, anger and rhetoric revolving
around this case is a problem that sits deep in the American public-the
abortion debate. Somewhere during the debate, people lost their sense,
lost their reason, and began relying on absolutes. One is either pro-
choice or pro-life, and it seems that whatever stance is taken, the argu-
ments grow more and more absolutist in nature as time goes on.
83
This case is a paradigm example of what happens when an attorney
general grabs hold of this absolutist mentality and runs for the finish line.
Teenage sex leads to pregnancy, pregnancy leads to abortion, abortion is
bad, and therefore all teenage sex is bad. We know this can't be true.
The last thing in one's mind when Romeo and Juliet made love for the
first time was the awful, inherently injurious nature of consensual teen
183. See Corsello, supra note 129, at 259.
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sex. Many parents met, made love, and had children, all before they
were 18. And some of them are still together, and happy. The legisla-
ture appreciated this fact, and took steps to acknowledge it. Thus, where
teenage sex causes injury to one of the parties, it should be reported for
further investigation-to protect the children when they need protection.
By getting sucked into the rhetoric of absolutes, the children who need
the most protection are actually being harmed. Fortunately, the courts
are here to curb this line of thinking and come to reasoned decisions ef-
fectuating the noblest of intentions.
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